Reports into Investigatory Powers

Dominic Grieve Excerpts

Thursday 25th June 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mr Dominic Grieve (Beaconsfield) (Con)]

Thank you, Mr Speaker. I think we can indeed be led in it by me, for this reason: notwithstanding my wholehearted thanks to the Home Secretary for the speed with which she enabled this debate to take place, a consequence of that speed—I hope she will not take this as a criticism—is that the material in our possession is now of such infinite complexity and depth that to do justice to all of it in this debate would be impossible. Indeed, one of the clear advantages of starting the legislative process in the autumn is that those of us who would like to participate properly in it have time to do a lot of holiday homework before we come back to the House then. I have always felt that one of the problems with the subject is that most of us in Parliament labour under a state of extraordinary ignorance, and have great difficulty getting to grips with some of the issues.

I spent four years and two months in the Government as the Attorney General, and without betraying state secrets, it may come as little surprise to the House to hear that I had some involvement with issues surrounding the lawfulness of Government. Of course, lawfulness extends to the interception of communications, and communications data, just as much as it does to everything else. It is possible that in that time, I had the wool pulled over my eyes—by the agencies, for example. However, my impression of the agencies from my dealings with them, particularly on surveillance and interception—this point is properly made in the ISC report—was of an absolutely rigorous desire to maintain legality; a willingness to get legal advice on areas of difficulty, as was mentioned earlier; and a very high standard of ethics. That standard of ethics went beyond legality to an understanding that in trying to protect us and prevent crime, they had to do a difficult job that could intrude into the privacy of the citizen, and that at all times they had to act in a reasonable, necessary and proportionate way. That was the clearest impression that I took from them. I left office with considerable admiration for the work done in that field.

That is not to say that everything can simply be left as it is, and that we can adopt a Panglossian view of the current state of affairs. As I mentioned in a previous intervention on this matter since the election, I think that there is complete unanimity in the House on the view that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 is not fit for purpose. I hope I may be forgiven for saying this: it has been described as almost incomprehensible, except to initiates, but I think even the initiates sometimes found it incomprehensible. I have a little lurking suspicion that because there has always been an anxiety that the legal framework will betray the level of operational capability, certain aspects of the Act were made deliberately opaque, even when it was drafted. We can hardly be surprised if, 10 years down the track, it appears even more incomprehensible than I suspect it was to those parliamentarians whose unhappy lot it was to scrutinise it when it was first being enacted.

The Act clearly is not fit for purpose. It clearly needs replacing. How we craft that replacement will—David Anderson’s report says this will be key—determine whether we can build trust. I will not get too carried away on the subject of distrust. David Anderson’s report rather highlights that notwithstanding Snowden, trust in the work of the agencies in this country on matters of surveillance and interception are rather high, and I have no reason to think that the public are hoodwinked. They seem, on the whole, to regard the institutions as benign and there to protect us, and I think they are right.

The question is, therefore, how we go about that process. I want to make only one point about this. We have had—let us face it—the complexity and the problems to which the Snowden revelations led. I have little doubt that those revelations have done very considerable damage in many cases, as has been cited, to the operational capacities of the agencies involved and their ability to protect us. On the positive side, that provides an opportunity for a more informed discussion so that the issues surrounding predictability in relation to what we legislate on can be better established for the future, and we do not end up with, or we have less of a problem with, people arguing that the legislation does not mean what it says.

That will be one of the great challenges for my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary. I wish her well in it. Those of us who have some inkling of what this is about will endeavour to help her as much as we can so that we can succeed in bridging the two requirements—that the legislation is open, transparent and understandable, and at the same time that it preserves operational secrecy, which will be a particular difficulty. I look forward to doing that aspect of the work in this House when the legislation comes back.

I turn to a number of the broad recommendations in David Anderson’s report, which is an amazing piece of work. I was delighted when he was appointed as independent reviewer of terrorism legislation, and the rigour with which he has delivered the report has entirely vindicated my right hon. Friend in trusting him to do this work. For the purposes of today’s debate, I shall centre on two or three points.

The first, which I suspect will be one of the big issues, concerns judicial authorisation. I am conscious that it may be argued, and I have heard it argued, that because our system broadly seems, particularly to the Executive, to function quite well, we should stick to the ISC report and continue with the current warrantry system. Against that, the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper) was right to make the point that we are very unusual in having our current system of warrantry. In other “Five Eyes” countries with high levels of intelligence capability and responsibility, a judicial system has been operated successfully. It is clear to me that a judicial oversight system, with possible exceptions where complex issues of policy may be involved, would probably enhance trust, although I would not get totally carried away with that. One must always bear in mind the potential problem that if the judiciary is seen to be turned into a rubber stamp for the Administration, that slightly removes the judiciary from the key work that it normally does: the arbitration of disputes, which is a different issue.

Nevertheless, my broad approach is that—if I may put it this way to the Home Secretary—the burden of proof is a little bit reversed. It seems to me, in the light of David Anderson’s report, that if the Government wish to maintain the current system, they will have to make a case why it is markedly better than that which would replace it. Beyond that, I am open minded. One argument I have heard is an anxiety that flexibility would be lost, and that it would not be possible to get warrants authorised quickly. I am not persuaded by that. I have seen injunctions obtained from judges in the middle of the night—indeed, judges signing injunctions in the bath and handing them out through the bathroom door—so that is not necessarily an overwhelming obstacle to involving judicial commissioners. They would necessarily be judges, though ex-judges and others might be able to do this work, and it would produce a measure of independence. If the Home Secretary concludes against David Anderson’s recommendation, I am quite prepared to listen, but she will have to make the case as to what would be lost by shifting the system to that which he has suggested.

Linked to that is the question of whether we should have a single commission. The two probably go together. A single commission makes a lot of sense. I am not sure about cost—it might cost no more, but it would certainly enable people to perform slightly different roles within one organisation. Again, I shall be interested to hear the Home Secretary’s views on that.

Other matters that have cropped up could be looked at today. Some anxiety over legal professional privilege has been expressed by both the Law Society and the Bar in the light of David Anderson’s recommendations. I am not entirely persuaded by that. One problem is that we need to preserve legal professional privilege, but the great difficulty has always been how to decide whether legal professional privilege applies if both the lawyer and the client are in criminal collusion with each other and legal professional privilege does not apply to the material that must be examined to decide whether that is the case. That will be another thorny subject, and I hope we can come back to it and craft legislation that provides the reassurance that lawyers undoubtedly need, preserves the principle of legal professional privilege, and also ensures that the material can, if necessary, be accessed if there is good reason to believe that what is taking place is not covered by legal professional privilege at all.

To conclude, I have covered only a number of very broad topics. There is so much more in the report that we will have to look at. I hope we have time before and during legislation to do justice to an immensely complicated issue. Of one thing I am convinced: we have been very well served by our agencies in this area hitherto, both in maintaining the very standards that we should be proud of in a democratic society, and in carrying out a difficult job that sometimes involves a difficult balancing act between privacy and the necessity of serving the wider public, all done in a spirit of which this House and the public should be proud. That was absolutely the impression I was left with. I would like to see us succeed in putting in place a framework for the future that ensures that in 10, 20 or 30 years people can still say the same thing.

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[Mark Field (Cities of London and Westminster) (Con)]

It would be remiss of me not first to apologise to you, Mr Speaker, and to the Home Secretary for my absence for the earliest part of this debate; I had a long-standing constituency engagement—an occupational hazard of representing a central London seat. Actually, I am having to miss my daughter’s end-of-term ballet show, so I suspect that I will have rather fewer brownie points in my household than the shadow Home Secretary will have in the Balls-Cooper household.

This is anything but routine and uncontroversial business. As someone who served throughout the previous Parliament on the Intelligence and Security Committee, I am fully aware of the intensive work that went into at least one of the reports that we are discussing today. Naturally, it was the Edward Snowden revelations in The Guardian that first led to allegations in the US—we have a close intelligence relationship—that UK Government agencies were engaged in blanket surveillance on the internet. The inherent tension between the individual’s right to privacy and the collective entitlement to security referred to by the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr Clegg) set the context for all these inquiries.

We looked first at interception. The agencies conduct two types of interception depending on the information they have and what GCHQ, MI5 and MI6 are charged with trying to achieve. The first type can be used as an investigative tool only where there is specific knowledge of a threat, allowing agencies to intercept a specific individual’s communications. That is known as targeted interception. However, as my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve) said, the watchwords of necessity and proportionality lie very much at the heart of everything that our agencies wish to do. If the target is in the UK, the activity must be authorised by the Secretary of State under RIPA. Even the most ardent of privacy campaigners accept that principle of targeted interception.

The second sort of interception arises as a discovery or part of an intelligence-gathering tool. This allows the agencies to use targeted interception only after they have discovered that a threat exists. Such separate capabilities are required in order to uncover threats in the first place so that the agencies can determine patterns and associations that can generate the leads and obtain the information used to target individuals under suspicion. Bulk interception is primarily used as a discovery tool. This capability attracts the most controversy, as we have seen. It has helped to create an impression—misguided, in my view—that GCHQ is monitoring the communications of everyone in the UK. I should make it clear that, if that were the case, GCHQ’s actions would be illegal.

Our Committee rightly scrutinised in great detail the agencies’ capability to intercept internet communications, and we had a number of key findings. First and foremost, bulk interception involves three stages: filtering, targeting, and selection. The first of those involves choosing which communication links are to be accessed. It is worth pointing out that each and every minute the internet carries some 4.1 million Google searches, 6.9 million Facebook messages, 350,000 Twitter posts, and 204 million emails. Most of those communications are carried out through fibre-optic cables that carry bearers, of which there are only about 100,000. GCHQ can theoretically access only a tiny percentage of those bearers. It is therefore misleading to use the phrase “blanket surveillance” for what it does.

The second stage that GCHQ has in mind is to select which communications to collect from the very small number of bearers that it is accessing. A decision is then made on how it collects the communications to read. For communications collected under the first processing system, GCHQ undertakes a so-called triage process to determine which messages have the highest intelligence value. Even when GCHQ knows that communications relate to a known national security target, it does not have the capacity to read them all and must therefore, even within that context, prioritise. This all means that only a very small proportion of collected messages are ever read.

When we scrutinised those arrangements, we found that GCHQ will search for and select communications to examine only on the basis of a selector relating to an individual here in the UK, if—and only if—it first obtains a specific authorisation from a Secretary of State naming that individual. It is unlawful for our security services to search for and examine the communications of someone in the UK without a targeted additional authorisation. Our Committee found that the regulations and safeguards in place were, on the whole, pretty reassuring. That said, as Members will be aware, we made a number of recommendations in order to address concerns about transparency. This was very much mirrored in much of the Anderson report. Anderson was critical about some of the legal framework, of which I will say a little more later, but ultimately he gave the actions of GCHQ very much a clean bill of health.

We also examined the concerns that have been expressed over how the agencies use communications data—the “who, when and where” of a communication. This debate is increasingly complicated by widespread confusion about what information is classed as communications data and what is classed as content. There is a grey area involved. For example, looking at information that would not usually be classified as content, but has the potential to reveal a great deal about someone’s private life, should be placed in a special category where more scrutiny is placed on it than there ordinarily would be merely on the basis of its being communications data.

On the other rather intrusive capabilities potentially used by the agencies, the ISC report contains a number of detailed recommendations primarily in relation to specific statutory oversight and greater transparency, where that is possible without damaging national security; that must always be at the forefront of our minds in these matters. The most significant finding in our report, and in the Anderson report, relates, as other Members have rightly pointed out, to the legislative framework that governs the use of all these intrusive capabilities. At present, no single piece of legislation governs the powers and responsibilities of our intelligence and security agencies. The current framework is, as we have heard, complicated and unwieldy. Consolidation is now essential to maintain or sometimes—dare I say it?—to re-establish public confidence.

While we saw no direct evidence that the agencies were in any way seeking to circumvent the law—in truth, their constant watchwords are necessity and proportionality—I am afraid that the lack of clarity in the existing legislation has understandably fuelled suspicion that our security agencies are, on occasion, able to arbitrage the plethora of statutes to choose the easiest route in seeking authorisation. That cannot be a satisfactory situation. I therefore believe that the purposes, functions, capabilities and, importantly, obligations of our security agencies will need to be set out clearly in a single Act of Parliament. Like my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield, I have some sympathy for the plight that the Home Secretary will face in having to get such a Bill through Parliament. It will be essential, but it will be a complicated matter. It will have to include issues such as privacy constraints, transparency arrangements, targeting criteria, sharing arrangements, and other safeguards that apply to the use of the security agencies’ capabilities.

The single most profound impact of the Snowden revelations has been felt by the global communications service providers. Exposing the hitherto cosy—perhaps over-cosy—relationships that existed between many household-name internet giants and security services and Governments across the world has resulted in a furious insistence from the CSPs that such co-operation must in future be governed by a clear legal framework.

That has potentially very serious implications, especially if there is any demand by globally run CSPs that such protocols should also operate on a global basis. This is, not least, because we have in this country a different culture regarding the security services, with a different framework and understanding of the way in which they operate within our Government compared even with other members of the “Five Eyes”. There is a glaring difference between the average UK citizen’s acceptance of the work of the secret intelligence agencies and the cultural approach taken to such matters in the USA, where there is a great sense of the individual being up against an all-powerful state, and in much of continental Europe. That is understandable. One need only look to my mother’s homeland. For six years of her life, she was brought up in Nazi Germany under the rigours of the Gestapo, and then under the Stasi in East Germany between 1945 and 1954. That has had a very strong bearing on these cultural differences. There is a danger that we in this country, after Bletchley Park and the glamour of James Bond, could be a little complacent about the way in which we view how the security services operate. It is very different in other parts of the world. If there were to be a push towards such global protocols, it would be more difficult to make the case for our exceptionalism.

[Mr Grieve]

My right hon. Friend makes a powerful case. This is one of the factors that we will have to take into account when we consider whether there might be advantages to judicial warrant systems because they are likely to command more acceptance internationally even if they do not necessarily seem to be required in this country.

[Mark Field]

I do not entirely agree with that, but I will touch on it in my concluding comments, which I will move on to fairly shortly.

There are potentially serious implications for the operational capabilities of our security services in their counter-terrorism operations. I am struck, however, by the clear irony that the business models of most internet service providers hinge on the exploitation of knowledge from their own user customers, which can then be sold for profit to third party advertisers. The protection of privacy obviously has its limits.

Snowden’s impact has also revolutionised the demand for and the creation of ever-more effective encryption, which further and seriously depletes the capabilities of our security services. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of 2001 and, more recently, the attacks that took place on the streets of London almost exactly 10 years ago, the conventional wisdom was that public safety could be protected only by ever more sophisticated targeted internet surveillance. The events of recent times mean that it would be unwise to neglect the future importance of developing more traditional security tradecraft. Our security services will need to invest extensively and prudently in agent expertise on the ground, rather than simply relying on ever-more sophisticated electronic surveillance expertise.

May I make a final observation on the highly contentious issue of the authorisation of warrants? As has been pointed out, the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation contends that all warrants should be subject to judicial authorisation. I also accept that, in the interests of promoting public confidence, it is now probably necessary that the regime of judicial oversight applying after the event will need substantial bolstering.

We need to remember, however, that it is senior Foreign and Home Office Ministers who are answerable to this House and to Parliament in the event of a major terrorist incident, which invasive surveillance is, of course, designed to prevent. It will be elected politicians, not judges, who will ultimately be accountable to the court of public opinion. Ultimately, therefore, I stand by the ISC’s view that Ministers should authorise warrants. Nevertheless, it is important that senior judges will need to be given a more significant role in scrutinising the operation of the process.

Our intelligence agencies do a very important, and increasingly very challenging, job in what are very difficult times. I believe that the UK public have good cause to maintain confidence in what they do, but I also contend that only greater transparency and scrutiny of their work will improve public understanding and reinforce that sense of confidence.

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[Mr Grieve]

I appreciate the hon. and learned Lady’s concern—and I appreciate, too, that this is one of the issues we will have to look at during the passage of the Bill—but I wonder whether she is right in her belief that a sort of mass trawl of a speculative character is taking place. I do not think it is, and listening to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) was saying, which I think correctly reflected what has been taking place, I do not think the way in which she has described it is the correct way of identifying what has been going on. It may be, therefore, that she can get some reassurance on this as the Bill goes through.

[Joanna Cherry]

I clearly defer to the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s experience, as he has been a Law Officer in England and has direct knowledge of the issue. I cannot speak from direct knowledge, but I can say that there is significant public perception and concern that what is at stake is mass, speculative trawling. The House must take that concern very seriously, and it is perhaps backed up by recent revelations.

When the Anderson report was first introduced to the House on 11 June, the Home Secretary, in her statement, did not commit to the root-and-branch reform recommended by Anderson. I am not sure whether she committed to it in her contribution today, but clearly we will have to wait and see the draft Bill that is introduced in the autumn. The SNP wishes to see that Bill bringing about the comprehensive and comprehensible reform recommended by Anderson, as well as achieving the appropriate balance with civil liberties and the recognition of international human rights norms.

The last time we spoke about this matter, the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) invited the Home Secretary to look hard at the recommendation for judicial warrants, but I am afraid that I found her response on that—both two weeks ago and today—decidedly lukewarm. However, I note her assurance that no decision has been taken as yet. This is a matter of serious concern for the SNP, and I very much support what the shadow Home Secretary said in that respect.

Cross-party co-operation in this Parliament has already forced the Government to backtrack on their plans to repeal the Human Rights Act, at least for the time being. Everything about David Anderson’s report emphasises the need for human rights to be protected under internationally recognised norms. The SNP will seek to defeat any Government plans to curb civil liberties in the forthcoming Bill. In particular, we are concerned that the mass collection of data, without any suggestion of criminality or wrongdoing, impinges on civil liberties, and we are committed to opposing any snoopers charter that sanctions mass spying on the public at large. I mention that, because it is a matter of huge public concern. In opposing any snoopers charter, the SNP will do so secure in the knowledge that both the Anderson report and the Court of Justice of the European Union agree that such a charter would be unlawful.

We support the targeted and proportionate use of lawful intrusive powers, but the Snowden revelations of 2013 and subsequent litigation brought by Liberty and others show just how far we have moved from a model whereby those under suspicion are targeted and the innocent are left free from state intrusion. Even more worrying is the fact that prior to recent revelations, the public and many politicians were unaware of the nature and extent of blanket surveillance.

In order for trust to be restored, this Parliament must assert its democratic function and set clear limits on the use of intrusive powers and prohibit their use on a mass scale.

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[Dr Andrew Murrison (South West Wiltshire) (Con)]

I start by paying tribute to our security services, whose work I have seen at first hand over many years. They are superb professionals, who, unspoken and silently, keep us safe every day on the streets of Britain in a way that we want and is emulated across the world.

I pay tribute to David Anderson’s report. From its very wisely chosen title to annexe 18, 373 pages later, it is truly magisterial. If I had a criticism, it would be that there are too many acronyms, but stand fast in my view that it is a truly superb work. The Intelligence and Security Committee report, too, in its own way, is also worthy of very close attention and provides a backdrop for the consideration that this House will be engaged in as we run up to autumn and the much anticipated consideration of the draft legislation.

We heard today, from my right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field), about his daughter’s ballet. We have heard about the shadow Home Secretary’s child’s graduation. A feature of this point in the academic year is that we are concerned about our children and their achievements. At the weekend, I had the very great pleasure of being at my daughters’ sports day. What impressed me most, apart from the athletic prowess of my daughters, was the camera overhead, monitoring this business, with the full consent of the school, the children and—I think probably implicitly—the parents for posterity. At first glance, it looked a fairly benign exercise, but I do not think that I was the only one who felt slightly uneasy. In my recollection, it was the first time I had come across this particular piece of technology—a great cumbersome, burdensome thing, very obvious and very noisy. In 10 years’ time, it will be replaced—I have no doubt—by a thing the size of a small insect, and at that point, it will become far more sinister. If I had one plea, it would be this: as we consider the draft legislation towards the end of this year, we must make sure that we future-proof the Bill and the Act that eventually transpires. That measure must be good for many years to come, and at a time when we will be faced with technology that most of us can only imagine at the moment.

My interest in this matter stems from my experience as the Minister for international security strategy and a Minister in the Northern Ireland Office, and as a Member of Parliament who represents a large number of people who are engaged, in one way or another, in the security services. Of course, all of us in this place are intimately involved with the product of the security services, since all our constituents are affected by it in one way or another.

I am very impressed by the National Crime Agency’s statistics on what it has done as a direct result of material that has been intercepted: the 750 kg of heroin and 2,000 kg of cocaine that were intercepted in 2012-14; the 2,200 arrests; the 140 firearms that were intercepted; and the £20 million of illicit loot that was seized. I note Operation Notarise and the resulting 600 arrests for suspected child abuse. All that represents a great well of human misery. Such things will not be dealt with unless we invest in our security services the powers they need to intercept material in a fast-evolving electronic space.

Clearly, the balance needs to be struck between our need to keep people safe in a complex world and privacy; between the extremes of Big Brother and the anarchy and lawlessness of laissez-faire. My right hon. Friend the Home Secretary touched on that in her remarks. To be honest, I do not know where on that Likert scale between Big Brother and laissez-faire we need to pitch our legislation. That is a matter for debate in the months ahead.

I was alarmed that the Intelligence and Security Committee report from earlier this year reported that organisations such as Big Brother Watch, Justice, Liberty and Rights Watch UK felt that the security environment was having a “chilling effect” on society. I do not believe that that is the case. I think that my constituents would be “chilled”, however, if we were not able to interdict and intercept the sorts of villains who would do them down and create havoc on the streets of this country. My constituents would be “chilled” in the event that we accepted, as those organisations appear to do, atrocities on the streets of London like the murder of Fusilier Lee Rigby. That is the consequence of not giving our security services the powers that that they need. It is as straight- forward as that, notwithstanding my remarks about balance.

There are many matters to be considered in the autumn. I welcome the opportunity this House will have for pre-legislative scrutiny. In the short time available to me, I would like to touch on one or two of those matters. Right hon. and hon. Members have commented on the need for public awareness and education to avoid confusion. I do not agree with the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) in so far as she suggested that there was widespread concern about snooping. There is not much evidence to sustain that. However, it is our duty, as we approach this legislation, to do our best to educate the people in whose name we act to ensure that they have the sort of understanding that is needed in a civil society to have confidence that the powers invested in the security services are appropriate, necessary, proportionate and legal. It is the job of Members of this House and, if I may say so ever so gently, the re-formed Intelligence and Security Committee to inculcate that understanding among the public, as far as is possible.

Snooping is a complete misnomer and, as we have heard this afternoon, there is nothing to sustain that description. That does not mean to say that we should not put in place the mechanisms that are necessary to ensure that our security services do not, wittingly or unwittingly, abuse the position of trust in which they are invested.

We need to be conscious that technology is proceeding apace. Quantum computing, probably in the next 10 years, will provide a double-edged sword, because it will increase the ability to encrypt data and thus the ability of villains to do bad stuff, but it will also improve the ability of our security services to survey bulk data, which brings significant implications for the legislation that we will consider in the autumn. As well as the requirements that the collection of material be necessary, proportionate and legal, the fourth hurdle is the impossibility of surveying the great bulk of the data. It is simply not possible for the security services to snoop in the way that has been suggested, because there is so much data and the technology does not exist to spy or snoop on people or invade their personal liberty in the way that some people seem to think is routinely possible. That may change, however, and we must ensure that the legislation we consider in the autumn is up to the task of dealing with this stuff as it evolves, as it surely will, over the next decade.

There are various things that we can do to mitigate that risk. We can insist on a time limit for the retention of data. We can be wary of allowing internet service providers to hold bulk data that are capable of being mined—so-called “big data”. I am persuaded that there is a distinct possibility that, in the near future, agencies will be able to profile people and predict not what they have done, but what they might do in the future on the basis of the profile that they have built up. That is extremely sinister.

Although it would be illegal to do that as things stand, if we could no longer rely on the fourth hurdle that I mentioned, namely the physical inability to tap the data because of their extent, it may just be possible with quantum computing and the changes in technology over the coming years, providing a sort of electronic version of Dixon of Dock Green that eyes up wrong ‘uns who might get involved in criminality or worse in the future. We need to future-proof the legislation to avoid that.

I am aware that other Members want to speak, so let me say very quickly that we need to be careful about the status of communications data—the who, where and when. Given the increasing importance of the data, the sophistication of them and the profiling that is capable of being built up on the basis of them, we need to look at the status of the designated person. I am not convinced that it is proper to vest those powers in a middle-grade person. We need to look at whether that needs to be changed in order to preserve the liberties that we have discussed today.

I want to comment briefly on who signs warrants for intrusive activities, because that is an important part of the material that we are discussing. Sir David Omand and the Home Secretary are quite clear on that point and I agree with them because of my ministerial experience, although I was at a far lower level than my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). I am less persuaded—indeed, my right hon. and learned Friend was not persuaded—by the immediacy argument. That seems to me to be superficial and easily dealt with. I am persuaded about the need to consider the wider political context. That is an important point. I am also persuaded on the point about accountability. We in this place are elected to represent real people. Nobody ever put a cross by the name of a member of the judiciary.

[Mr Grieve]

The accountability argument is, without doubt, the most powerful argument for Ministers doing the warrantry process. Of course, there remains the problem that, due to the nature of the work, accountability to this House can sometimes be difficult to achieve in practice because, inevitably, it is not made public. That is a tension that the House will have to debate and resolve.

[Dr Murrison]

As one would expect, my right hon. and learned Friend puts his finger on it. The mechanism that my right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster described so well may be a remedy for that, but nevertheless my opinion is that the power has to remain with Ministers. We need to guard jealously the power vested in our politicians, who are accountable to the House and the people for the extraordinarily important things that they do.

At the heart of the matter lies an improvement in public understanding. In the months before December next year, we have to do everything we can to inculcate in the public a far better understanding of these sensitive issues. Each of us has a job to do in that respect, and I hope that the Intelligence and Security Committee will play its part in improving public understanding. Our civil society will be in a much better place as a result.