Joanna Cherry
Main Page: Joanna Cherry (Scottish National Party - Edinburgh South West)Department Debates - View all Joanna Cherry's debates with the Home Office
(9 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberI beg to move,
That this House has considered reports into investigatory powers.
When I made my statement on the publication of the Anderson report two weeks ago, several right hon. and hon. Members requested a full debate in this House. As I said then, and as I have said many times in the past, these are serious and sensitive matters. They require careful deliberation of the evidence, to ensure that the legal and privacy framework governing the use of investigatory powers is properly accountable and as robust as possible. These principles—accountability, transparency and a robust legal framework—are underscored by the report by David Anderson, QC. His report was preceded by the Intelligence and Security Committee’s “Privacy and Security” report, which was published in March and which examined the appropriate balance between the need for security and respect for privacy.
Today, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister has laid two further reports before the House: the annual report of the Chief Surveillance Commissioner and the annual report of the Intelligence Services Commissioner. Later this summer, a panel co-ordinated by the Royal United Services Institute and established by the former Deputy Prime Minister, the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr Clegg), will report on the legality, effectiveness and privacy implications of the UK’s surveillance programmes and assess how law enforcement and intelligence capability can be maintained in the face of technological change. Together, those reports represent substantial independent review of the frameworks and oversight governing the use of investigatory powers.
In addition, last year, my right hon. Friend the Prime Minister appointed Sir Nigel Sheinwald as his data envoy. Sir Nigel has submitted his report to my right hon. Friend and although, for obvious reasons of sensitivity, it cannot be published, a summary has been placed on the Cabinet Office website. Sir Nigel focused both on short-term and longer-term co-operation, and on the need to create an international framework between democratic countries. That would ensure that, where necessary and proportionate, data can be accessed even when they are held outside the requesting country’s jurisdiction.
As I have said before, and as the Anderson and other reports make clear, the use of investigatory powers by the police and the security and intelligence agencies is essential for national security and for the fight against crime. If the police are to investigate serious crimes such as murder and rape, if our law enforcement agencies are to track down criminals that operate online and if we are to protect the vulnerable and stop those who mean to do us harm, the police and the security and intelligence agencies need access to these powers when appropriate.
As this morning’s figures show, the threat from terrorism is serious and it is growing. In 2014, 289 people were arrested for terrorism-related offences, an increase of 30% compared with the previous year. We know that investigatory powers are important for tackling terrorism, and that communications data have played a significant role in every Security Service counter-terrorism operation over the last decade. Since 2010, the majority of MI5’s top-priority UK counter-terrorism investigations have used intercept capabilities in some form to identify, understand or disrupt plots seeking to harm the UK and its citizens.
Although the Anderson report and others recognise the necessity of investigatory powers, just as important is having the right regulatory framework, the right oversight and the right authorisation arrangements governing their use. As David Anderson has said, he regards it as imperative that the use of sensitive powers is overseen and fully declared under arrangements set by Parliament. It is therefore entirely right that Parliament should have the opportunity to debate those arrangements. Just as the Anderson review was undertaken with cross-party support, I am committed to ensuring that we take forward these arrangements on the same basis.
I want to turn first to David Anderson’s report. It is, as I have said before, a comprehensive report, covering the full range of sensitive intelligence capabilities, and there are 124 recommendations. I hope that right hon. and hon. Members have now had the opportunity to read it for themselves, and reflect on what David Anderson has said. David Anderson makes it clear that there is a need for investigatory powers—within an appropriate framework—in the fight against terrorism and serious crime. He notes the significance of communications data in prosecutions and that sensitive interception powers are not used routinely. He said:
“Interception is therefore used only in the most serious cases... But interception can still be of vital importance for intelligence, for disruption, and for the detection and investigation of crime.”
He also agrees with the Intelligence and Security Committee and others on the importance of bulk data, saying that
“its utility, particularly in fighting terrorism in the years since the London bombings of 2005, has been made clear to me.”
But David Anderson is also firmly of the view that the system needs updating, and he supports the need for a new legislative framework, noting that the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 was enacted 15 years ago. He makes a number of recommendations regarding transparency, oversight and authorisation.
On the legislative framework, David Anderson makes the point that legislation is currently spread over several different Acts, and recommends bringing it together in a single law. On oversight, he recommends the merging of the three oversight commissioners—the Interception of Communications Commissioner’s Office, the Office of Surveillance Commissioners and the Intelligence Services Commissioner— into a new single independent surveillance and intelligence commission. On authorisation, Anderson comes down on the side of judicial authorisation of warrantry, although the ISC takes a different view and has endorsed the existing system. Anderson points out the care with which Secretaries of State approach the task and makes it clear that European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence does not require a system of judicial authorisation, but he is of course mindful that requirements may change in the future.
Shortly after the right hon. Lady spoke in the House two weeks ago, The Guardian reported that Downing Street was indicating that the Prime Minister is unlikely to agree to David Anderson’s recommendation for a judicial authorisation of warrants. Does that mean that she is effectively ruling out judicial authorisation of warrants at this early stage?
Perhaps the hon. and learned Lady will let me read the very next sentence in my speech, which says that, on these recommendations, the Government have not yet reached a decision. These are important matters and we must consider them carefully. Today’s debate will inform our view.
The ISC’s review into privacy and security also supports the agencies’ need for investigatory powers, but recommends that the legal framework needs updating and calls for increased transparency, strengthened safeguards and improved oversight. The review involved a detailed investigation into the capabilities of the intelligence agencies and contained an unprecedented amount of information about how they are used and the legal framework that regulates their use.
The Committee found that all the surveillance activities of the intelligence agencies are lawful and proportionate. It concluded that the agencies do not seek to circumvent UK law—including the Human Rights Act 1998—and do not have the resources, capability, or the desire to conduct mass surveillance. It commended the agencies for the care and attention they give to complying with the law.
None the less, it concluded that the current legal framework is “unnecessarily complex” and should be replaced with a single Act of Parliament, governing everything the agencies do to increase transparency. Going further than David Anderson, the ISC’s recommendations include replacing the legislation that underpins the agencies as well as the legislation relating to interception and communications data. Its recommendations include allowing Secretaries of State to disclose the existence of warrants where that can be done without damage to national security; increased checks, scrutiny and use of the warrant process; and more resources—and more checking of the agencies’ activities—by the Intelligence Services Commissioner and the Interception of Communications Commissioner. As with David Anderson’s report, debate on these issues will inform the Government’s view.
The Scottish National party welcomes the publication of the Anderson report, which, as others have noted, is very thorough, and one can have only admiration for the job David Anderson QC has done. The SNP wants to work constructively with Members of Parliament across the Chamber to make sure that when the new Bill to which the Home Secretary has referred is introduced it takes adequate account of civil liberties and human rights issues.
The SNP recognises the need for law enforcement and security services to have access to the information they require in respect of the threat not just of terrorist offences, but of serious crime, such as the significant evil posed by child sexual exploitation. However, the SNP will always be vigilant to ensure that appropriate safeguards are put in place to balance the need to keep our communities safe with the need to protect civil liberties.
Although we have some concerns about the report’s recommendations, we welcome many of its aspects. We welcome in particular the call for a comprehensive and comprehensible new law to be drafted from scratch, to replace the multitude of current powers and to provide for clear limits and safeguards on any intrusive power that it may be necessary for public authorities to use.
We also very much welcome David Anderson’s recognition of the need for the new law to comply with international human rights standards and to be subject to the visible and demanding safeguards reflecting the central importance of both the European convention on human rights and the Human Rights Act.
We welcome the fact that the report urges much stronger oversight of the activities of the police and security services. We support the recommendation that interception warrants should be granted by judges rather than politicians. That properly reflects the separation of powers between Executive and judiciary, as applies in democratic countries across the world that pay more than lip service to the importance of the rule of law. In that respect, I wish to associate myself with the insightful comments of the shadow Home Secretary and the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve).
The SNP also welcomes David Anderson’s recommendation that the Investigatory Powers Tribunal should be able to make declarations of incompatibility under the Human Rights Act and that its rulings should be subject to appeals on points of law.
Finally and most importantly, we welcome David Anderson’s statement that no operational case has yet been made for the compulsory retention of third party data. He has also questioned the lawfulness, intrusiveness and cost of the proposals of the draft Communications Data Bill in 2012. His comments are a serious blow to previous Government attempts to introduce what was in effect a snoopers charter. David Anderson notes that no other European Union or Commonwealth country requires the blanket retention of weblogs and, as the right hon. Member for Sheffield, Hallam (Mr Clegg) has noted, Australia recently prohibited that in law—and for very good reason.
When the report was introduced to the House two weeks ago, the hon. Member for Brighton, Pavilion (Caroline Lucas) noted that both the European Court of Justice and David Anderson have now made it clear that blanket retention of data is unlawful. The SNP hopes that the UK Government will take serious cognisance of that.
The director of Liberty, Shami Chakrabarti, has noted:
“It’s striking that—despite a five-year campaign by the Home Secretary to convince us of its absolute necessity—David Anderson concludes that no operational case for the snooper’s charter has yet been made.”
The SNP hopes that David Anderson’s report will be the death knell for the snoopers charter.
My hon. and learned Friend, who has enjoyed a distinguished career as a lawyer, has rightly welcomed large parts of Mr Anderson’s report. Does she, like me, but perhaps unlike the right hon. and learned Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve), share the concerns of many lawyers across the UK that the rule of law and, indeed, the proper administration of justice may be undermined if the protection offered by legal professional privilege is not fully respected by investigatory powers legislation?
I share that concern and note the comments of the English Bar Council and the English Law Society, and I know that the Scottish Bar, of which I am a member, and the Law Society of Scotland also share concerns that legal professional privilege ought not to be interfered with. It is important to note that insisting on proper protection for legal professional privilege is not special pleading on behalf of lawyers; the privilege is that of the client, rather than the lawyer, and the underlying rationale is the public interest in ensuring the proper administration of justice. I share the concerns of legal bodies in that respect.
I will now to turn to the Scottish angle on these matters. When I spoke in this House on the occasion of the publication of the Anderson report, I asked the Home Secretary to commit fully to engaging with her Scottish Government counterparts in so far as there will be measures in the new Bill that impinge on the devolved competences. Her response was that national security is a reserved matter.
That is simply not good enough. The Bill will touch on issues beyond national security, including particularly serious crime. Crime is a devolved matter and the new Bill will clearly include measures directed against the investigation of serious crime. I and others have already mentioned child sexual exploitation as an important example of that. Much of what is to be covered in the new Bill may impinge on areas of Scots law that are clearly devolved and under the jurisdiction of the Scottish Government or Scotland’s law enforcement agencies, including the Crown Office and Procurator Fiscal Service.
I would like to give the Home Secretary at least two examples of proposals, which, if taken forward, would have implications for Scottish Ministers and Scottish legislation. The first is a return to judicial authorisation of interception warrants on serious crime grounds. At present, interception for the purpose of preventing or detecting serious crime in Scotland is authorised by Scottish Ministers. On the basis of David Anderson’s recommendations, that will, in future, be in the hands of members of the Scottish judiciary.
A second proposal that may have implications for Scotland is the recommendation that the three existing commissioners for interception, surveillance and intelligence services be replaced with a single independent surveillance and intelligence commission. A number of provisions in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers (Scotland) Act 2000 place duties on the Office of Surveillance Commissioners in respect of surveillance and the use of covert human intelligence sources. Any change in that area would almost certainly trigger the requirement for a legislative consent motion from the Scottish Parliament. Accordingly, I hope that the Home Secretary will stand respectfully corrected and now accept that there is a need for her to commit to engaging fully with the Scottish Government, insofar as any legislation introduced later this year and at the beginning of the next year will impinge on the devolved competences.
I mentioned that, although the Scottish National party welcomes the Anderson report, there are areas of concern about its contents. We are particularly disappointed at the suggestion that bulk collection of external communications should continue subject only to what are described as “additional safeguards” and at the recommendation that existing compulsory data retention capabilities under the Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 be maintained. The Anderson report offers six agency case studies in an attempt at justifying mass interception. However, as others, including Liberty, have noted, the information in these case studies is vague and limited, so it is impossible to assess whether the security outcomes could have been achieved just as easily by using the wealth of targeted and operation-led intrusive surveillance powers at the agencies’ disposal.
The Scottish National party does not dispute the use and value of targeted and proportional intrusive surveillance. We believe, however, that the mass speculative interception of communications and data retention is unlawful, unnecessary and disproportionate. We are pleased to see that Liberty is currently challenging the lawfulness of mass interception in the European Court of Human Rights and representing Members of this House in their legal challenge to DRIPA.
I appreciate the hon. and learned Lady’s concern—and I appreciate, too, that this is one of the issues we will have to look at during the passage of the Bill—but I wonder whether she is right in her belief that a sort of mass trawl of a speculative character is taking place. I do not think it is, and listening to what my right hon. Friend the Member for Cities of London and Westminster (Mark Field) was saying, which I think correctly reflected what has been taking place, I do not think the way in which she has described it is the correct way of identifying what has been going on. It may be, therefore, that she can get some reassurance on this as the Bill goes through.
I clearly defer to the right hon. and learned Gentleman’s experience, as he has been a Law Officer in England and has direct knowledge of the issue. I cannot speak from direct knowledge, but I can say that there is significant public perception and concern that what is at stake is mass, speculative trawling. The House must take that concern very seriously, and it is perhaps backed up by recent revelations.
When the Anderson report was first introduced to the House on 11 June, the Home Secretary, in her statement, did not commit to the root-and-branch reform recommended by Anderson. I am not sure whether she committed to it in her contribution today, but clearly we will have to wait and see the draft Bill that is introduced in the autumn. The SNP wishes to see that Bill bringing about the comprehensive and comprehensible reform recommended by Anderson, as well as achieving the appropriate balance with civil liberties and the recognition of international human rights norms.
The last time we spoke about this matter, the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis) invited the Home Secretary to look hard at the recommendation for judicial warrants, but I am afraid that I found her response on that—both two weeks ago and today—decidedly lukewarm. However, I note her assurance that no decision has been taken as yet. This is a matter of serious concern for the SNP, and I very much support what the shadow Home Secretary said in that respect.
Cross-party co-operation in this Parliament has already forced the Government to backtrack on their plans to repeal the Human Rights Act, at least for the time being. Everything about David Anderson’s report emphasises the need for human rights to be protected under internationally recognised norms. The SNP will seek to defeat any Government plans to curb civil liberties in the forthcoming Bill. In particular, we are concerned that the mass collection of data, without any suggestion of criminality or wrongdoing, impinges on civil liberties, and we are committed to opposing any snoopers charter that sanctions mass spying on the public at large. I mention that, because it is a matter of huge public concern. In opposing any snoopers charter, the SNP will do so secure in the knowledge that both the Anderson report and the Court of Justice of the European Union agree that such a charter would be unlawful.
We support the targeted and proportionate use of lawful intrusive powers, but the Snowden revelations of 2013 and subsequent litigation brought by Liberty and others show just how far we have moved from a model whereby those under suspicion are targeted and the innocent are left free from state intrusion. Even more worrying is the fact that prior to recent revelations, the public and many politicians were unaware of the nature and extent of blanket surveillance.
In order for trust to be restored, this Parliament must assert its democratic function and set clear limits on the use of intrusive powers and prohibit their use on a mass scale.