Draft Human Rights Act 1998 (Remedial) Order 2019

David Jones Excerpts

Wednesday 1st July 2020 General Committees

[Mr David Jones (Clwyd West) (Con)]

Thank you, Sir Charles, for giving me the opportunity of addressing the Committee, although I am not a member of it.

I have concerns about the draft order. My objection is not to the substance of the change that the order would make, but rather to the lawfulness and constitutional propriety of making such changes in this way.

As the hon. Member for Hove pointed out, in a paper published by Policy Exchange only last month, Professor Richard Ekins of Oxford University made a powerful case for the proposition that the Human Rights Act does not authorise its own amendment in the way that is proposed today. I suggest, therefore, that the order, if made, would be of doubtful legal validity. Section 10 of the Act is an extraordinary power that authorises Ministers to amend primary legislation by executive order. Traditionally, the courts have interpreted such powers narrowly. The order would be lawful only if section 10 of the Act applies to the Act itself.

As we have heard, the Human Rights Act gives effect to the European convention on human rights in UK law on terms prescribed by Parliament. If the Government’s reading of the Act is correct—that is, that it permits amendment of the Act itself—I suggest that that opens the door to allow any future Government to undo the terms of the Act. For example, the Act was intended to apply to events that took place only after it came into force, in October 2000. Applying the Government’s apparent reasoning, there would be nothing to prevent them from making the Act totally retrospective by application of the section 10 power.

Similarly, if Parliament were to legislate in future to limit the application of the Act, the order, if made, would set a precedent whereby a future Government could simply undo Parliament’s changes by another order. That cannot be right. If the scheme of the Act is to change, it should be only when Parliament has agreed to it after proper scrutiny. With respect, the process for approving statutory instruments does not provide adequate scrutiny or debate for that purpose. It seems clear to me that, as Professor Ekins argues in his Policy Exchange paper, the order is of doubtful validity and, at the very least, is a startling use of the section 10 power. There are serious issues for concern and the matter needs fuller debate.

My concerns are made all the greater by the fact that the order, as we have heard, concerns the scope of judicial immunity, which is relevant to the principle of judicial independence. Parliament should think carefully before permitting any Government to make changes to the Human Rights Act that possibly undermine judicial independence by an executive order. If the Government think that the Act should be amended—and, as I say, I have no issue with the mischief that the order seeks to address—they should introduce a short Bill that would allow for the sort of scrutiny that is not possible in the time available to the Committee today.

I shall be grateful for the Minister’s observations on those points.

Police Funding Formula

David Jones Excerpts

Monday 9th November 2015 Commons Chamber

[Mike Penning]

I congratulate Derbyshire on reducing crime by 21% since 2010. Derbyshire has not lost anything, because the proposals were indicative and no money was allocated. As usual, the hon. Gentleman gets it wrong.

[Mr David Jones (Clwyd West) (Con)]

According to the report in The Times, North Wales police, which was due to gain some £2 million under the formula, now stands to lose some £10 million. Does the Minister agree that although the force will appreciate the frank apology that he has given, it now requires some form of reassurance that the settlement will be arrived at with sensitivity to the morale of the officers of that force?

[Mike Penning]

I am always conscious of the morale of police officers. That is why I say again from this Dispatch Box that I am proud to be the Policing Minister with the best police force in the world. I can tell my right hon. Friend that no money has gone missing from north Wales, because the proposal was indicative and no money was likely to go until a decision was made. However, the existing formula will continue for an extra year while we finish the rest of the proposals.

Assisted Dying (No. 2) Bill

David Jones Excerpts

Friday 11th September 2015 Commons Chamber

[Rob Marris]

No. I will make some progress. The doctor countersigns the declaration that the patient is terminally ill and of sound mind, is acting voluntarily, and has been informed of palliative and other care available. A second independent specialist doctor with expertise in that area countersigns that declaration. If a medical person has a conscientious objection to any of that, she or he—quite properly—does not have to participate in any way. Having had the signature of two doctors, the declaration has to go to a High Court judge. If the High Court judge agrees and makes an order, there is a 14-day cooling off period.

[Mr David Jones (Clwyd West) (Con)]

On the High Court judge’s agreement, what independent inquiries does the Bill provide for that judge to make?

[Rob Marris]

Like many Bills it does not fetter the discretion of the High Court judge. It is up to the High Court judge what inquiries they feel it appropriate to make. After the 14-day cooling off period, if the patient still wishes to proceed a medical person takes the lethal medicine to the patient and waits. At that point the patient could decide not to proceed. The medical person stays there until that decision is made. If the patient decides to take the lethal medication, the medical person waits there. If the patient decides not to take the medication, the medical person takes the medication away. There is no question of it being left on the premises.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr David Jones (Clwyd West) (Con)]

I have the most profound concerns about the Bill, most of which have already been rehearsed by other hon. Members. In view of the shortness of time, I do not intend to repeat them. However, I also consider it to be a deeply flawed Bill. I will focus on three concerns that I believe are sufficient to persuade hon. Members not to support it.

First, although clause 1 provides that the person seeking the consent of the court must have

“a voluntary, clear, settled and informed wish to end his or her own life”,

the Bill is completely silent on what inquiries should be undertaken to establish how that wish has been arrived at. The right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) made the perfectly reasonable point that it is possible to come to a rational decision that one does not wish to be a burden on one’s family. Equally, it is possible to be coerced, cajoled and browbeaten into that position, and the Bill provides no safeguards in that respect.

[Andy McDonald (Middlesbrough) (Lab)]

rose—

[Mr Jones]

I will not give way, as we have very little time.

Secondly, the Bill provides that the person seeking the order should have a terminal illness and

“as a consequence of that terminal illness, is reasonably expected to die within six months.”

Medical experts have pointed out that it is very difficult to ascertain whether an individual will die within three months. One is reminded of the Scottish case of Abdelbaset al-Megrahi, who was convicted of the Lockerbie bombing and discharged from prison on compassionate grounds because he was not expected to survive a further three months, and that was on the evidence of highly respected oncologists. In fact, he survived a further two years and nine months. Irrespective of the merits of the release, that illustrates how difficult it is to assess how long a patient might live.

Thirdly, the Bill is totally silent about what inquiries should be made by the court on whether an order should be made. I intervened on the hon. Member for Wolverhampton South West (Rob Marris) on that point, and he replied that it was a matter for the court. I venture to suggest that when one is talking about whether or not a declaration permitting assisted dying is to be made, there should be strong guidance in the Bill on how the court is to make that decision. In other words, it looks very much like a rubber-stamping operation, which cannot be right.

Ethical questions are notoriously difficult, and most of us here in this House are not medical professionals. We therefore have to rely on medical ethicists and on medical practitioners and clinicians. We should all have regard to what the BMA and the royal colleges have to say. We should listen to hospices such as St David’s and St Kentigern, which serve my constituency. In this House, we should listen to people such as the hon. Member for Central Ayrshire (Dr Whitford) and my hon. Friend the Member for Totnes (Dr Wollaston), who clearly understand the issues. I urge all hon. Members to oppose the Bill.