Crime and Policing Bill

Lord Hanson of Flint Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2026 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

334: After Clause 121, insert the following new Clause—
“Aggravated offences(1) The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 is amended as follows.(2) For section 28 substitute—“28 Meaning of “aggravated”(1) For the purposes of sections 29 to 32 an offence is aggravated if it is aggravated by—(a) racial hostility,(b) religious hostility,(c) hostility related to disability,(d) hostility related to sexual orientation, or(e) hostility related to transgender identity.(2) For the purposes of the following provisions an offence is aggravated if it is aggravated by hostility related to sex—(a) section 29,(b) section 30,(c) section 31(1)(a) and (c), and(d) section 32.(3) An offence is aggravated by hostility of one of the kinds mentioned in subsection (1) if—(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on—(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group,(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group,(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim,(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim, or (as the case may be) (v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by—(i) hostility towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that group,(ii) hostility towards members of a religious group based on their membership of that group,(iii) hostility towards persons who have a disability or a particular disability,(iv) hostility towards persons who are of a particular sexual orientation, or (as the case may be)(v) hostility towards persons who are transgender.(4) An offence is aggravated by hostility related to sex if—(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on the sex (or presumed sex) of the victim, or(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by hostility towards persons who are of a particular sex.(5) For the purposes of subsections (3) and (4), it is immaterial whether or not the offender’s hostility is also based, to any extent, on any other factor not mentioned in that subsection.(6) In this section—(a) references to a racial group are to a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins;(b) references to a religious group are to a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief;(c) “membership” in relation to a racial or religious group, includes association with members of that group;(d) “disability” means any physical or mental impairment;(e) references to being transgender include references to being transsexual, or undergoing, proposing to undergo or having undergone a process or part of a process of gender reassignment;(f) “presumed” means presumed by the offender.”(3) In the italic heading before section 28, for “Racially or religiously aggravated offences” substitute “Offences aggravated by racial or other hostility”.(4) In section 29 (aggravated assaults)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”.(5) In section 30 (aggravated criminal damage)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”;(c) in subsection (3) for “28(1)(a)” substitute “28(3)(a) and (4)(a)”.(6) In section 31 (aggravated public order offences)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”;(c) in subsection (7) for “28(1)(a)” substitute “28(3)(a) and (4)(a)”. (7) In section 32 (aggravated harassment)—(a) in the heading for “Racially or religiously aggravated” substitute “Aggravated”;(b) in subsection (1) for “racially or religiously aggravated for the purposes of this section” substitute “aggravated (see section 28(1) and (2))”.(8) In section 66 of the Sentencing Code (hostility as aggravating factor in sentencing)—(a) in subsection (1), after “subsection (3)” insert “and subsection (3A)”;(b) after subsection (3) insert—“(3A) So far as it relates to hostility related to disability, sexual orientation and transgender identity, this section does not apply in relation to an offence under sections 29 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 committed on or after the day on which section (Aggravated offences)(2) of the Crime and Policing Act 2026 comes into force.”(9) In the Armed Forces Act 2006, for sections 240 and 241 substitute—“240 Increase in sentence for offences aggravated by hostility(1) This section applies where a court or officer dealing with an offender for a service offence (other than an offence mentioned in subsection (7)) is considering the seriousness of the offence.(2) If the offence is aggravated by hostility of one of the kinds mentioned in subsection (3) the court or officer—(a) must treat that fact as an aggravating factor, and(b) must state in open court that the offence is so aggravated.(3) The kinds of hostility are—(a) racial hostility,(b) religious hostility,(c) hostility related to disability,(d) hostility related to sexual orientation, or(e) hostility related to transgender identity.(4) An offence is aggravated by hostility of one of the kinds mentioned in subsection (3) if—(a) at the time of committing the offence, or immediately before or after doing so, the offender demonstrates towards the victim of the offence hostility based on—(i) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a racial group,(ii) the victim’s membership (or presumed membership) of a religious group,(iii) a disability (or presumed disability) of the victim,(iv) the sexual orientation (or presumed sexual orientation) of the victim, or (as the case may be)(v) the victim being (or being presumed to be) transgender, or(b) the offence is motivated (wholly or partly) by—(i) hostility towards members of a racial group based on their membership of that group,(ii) hostility towards members of a religious group based on their membership of that group,(iii) hostility towards persons who have a disability or a particular disability,(iv) hostility towards persons who are of a particular sexual orientation, or (as the case may be)(v) hostility towards persons who are transgender.(5) It is immaterial whether or not the offender’s hostility is also based, to any extent, on any other factor not mentioned in subsection (4). (6) In this section—(a) references to a racial group are to a group of persons defined by reference to race, colour, nationality (including citizenship) or ethnic or national origins;(b) references to a religious group are to a group of persons defined by reference to religious belief or lack of religious belief;(c) “membership” in relation to a racial or religious group, includes association with members of that group;(d) “disability” means any physical or mental impairment;(e) references to being transgender include references to being transsexual, or undergoing, proposing to undergo or having undergone a process or part of a process of gender reassignment;(f) “presumed” means presumed by the offender.(7) This section does not apply in relation to an offence under section 42 as respects which the corresponding offence under the law of England and Wales is an offence under any of sections 29 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (offences aggravated by racial and other hostility).””Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause expands the grounds on which offences may be aggravated under sections 28 to 32 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 (racial and religious hostility) to include hostility related to disability, sexual orientation, transgender identity and (except for section 31(1)(b)) sex. It also makes consequential amendments.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am very proud to introduce Amendment 334, as it delivers on a Labour government manifesto commitment by extending the existing statutory framework for aggravated offences under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998.

As noble Lords will know, under the existing provision, specified offences are aggravated and subject to potentially greater maximum penalties where it is proved that the offender was motivated by hostility towards the protected characteristics of race and religion. The relevant offences for these purposes are criminal damage, harassment, stalking and certain public order offences, as well as several offences against the person, including actual and grievous bodily harm, strangulation, assault and malicious wounding.

Through Amendment 334, the Government are not creating new criminal offences; rather, we are extending a well-established legislative model to ensure that it properly captures the full range of hostility-based offending that we know is taking place in our communities. I just happen to believe that individuals who are trans or have a disability have a right and a promise to live life free from hostility in our society today. I pray in aid that, in the last year for which figures are available, March 2024 to March 2025, 4,120 hate crimes were registered by the police against transgender people and 10,649 hate crimes were registered against people with disabilities.

The amendment fulfils the Government’s commitment to level up the hate crime legislative framework by extending the regime of aggravated offences under the 1998 Act to cover criminal behaviours motivated by hostility towards sexual orientation, disability and transgender identity. We are also adding behaviours motivated by hostility based on sex or presumed sex.

As a corollary to Amendment 334, government Amendments 345, 347, 349 and 353 separately amend the new offences on abuse towards emergency workers to provide for aggravation where these offences are motivated by or demonstrate hostility to the same range of protected characteristics. This ensures, for the first time, parity of treatment across these protected characteristics and provides the police and prosecutors with a broader set of tools for recognising and responding to hate crime offences.

This measure has received a broad welcome from a range of charities and organisations involved with disability or with transgender issues. Stonewall has described the measure before the House tonight as

“a powerful message that LGBTQ+ people deserve equal access to justice”.

Galop, the LGBT and anti-abuse charity, has described the amendment as a “landmark moment” for equality. Real, the deaf and disabled people’s organisation, has said:

“It reflects long-standing calls for equal protection under the law for all victims of hate crime”.


The Spinal Injuries Association has said:

“It sends a clear message that violence and hostility directed at disabled people will no longer be overlooked and must be treated with the seriousness it deserves”.


I concur with all those comments, and I hope that the whole House will do too in due course.

Aggravated offences are well established in our criminal law. By extending the scope of the provisions in the Crime and Disorder Act, we will help to ensure that criminal justice agencies identify and record hostility against protected characteristics where they take place and that perpetrators are appropriately punished for their offending.

These are not abstract virtues. They translate into better case-building, clearer communication with victims and, ultimately, more robust outcomes in court. I hope that they will also prevent people being attacked, abused and harassed for issues to do with their identity as transgender people or people with disabilities. It is simply not acceptable in the 21st century for those types of offences to take place. That is why we consider that the aggravated offences framework remains the right tool for recognising and responding to hostility based offending.

Recognising hostility based on sex within the aggravated offences regime complements our mission to tackle violence against women and girls. It will enable the courts to recognise on the face of the offence the serious harm caused when a victim is targeted because of their sex or presumed sex. Making it clear in law that offences motivated by hostility towards a victim’s sex will be treated just as seriously as those motivated by hostility towards the range of other protected characteristics in the hate crime regime reinforces our determination as a Government to confront these harms.

To ensure coherence across the statute book, the aggravated version of the existing Section 4A offence under the Public Order Act 1986 will not extend to cases involving hostility based on sex or presumed sex. That is because the behaviour targeted by that offence—namely, causing intentional harassment, alarm or distress—is already more than adequately covered by the new aggravated offence introduced by the Protection from Sex based Harassment in Public Act 2023, which will come into force on 1 April. This approach prevents duplication while ensuring the law remains both targeted and effective.

I will listen to what noble Lords say in their amendments, but I put a clear message down that this is a matter of principle for this Labour Government and people across this House. I believe and know that it will have the support of many others in this House, for which I thank them in advance. It is not right that transgender people or people with disabilities are singled out for offences. They need the protection of the law and today is the day for this House, and for the House of Commons when it is considered there, to stand up and say what is right. I beg to move.

Amendment 334A (as an amendment to Amendment 334)

Moved by

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I have serious reservations about the Government’s amendments on aggravated offences. I appreciate that this puts me at odds with the Minister, but I knew that long before today, because in Committee he made a passionate speech, as he has today, telling us how proud he would be to move these amendments and claiming that they show a Government prepared to protect LGBT and disabled people.

If this is such an important change in the law for the Government, and a principled flagship for progressive Labour that appeared in its manifesto, we have to ask why the Government waited until Report in the Lords—so late in the Bill’s passage—to table the amendments. They must have thought that they were principled and important before, so why are we seeing them only now? I am afraid that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Cash, explained, this denies this House the constitutional right to properly scrutinise and mull over the complex details of the amendments—let alone the fact that that was denied to the elected Chamber.

In the limited space that we have here, I will start by raising some general concerns I have with aggravated offences. Some people might say that this is a Second Reading speech; if it is, it is because the Government did not bring the amendments forward until now, so I will say it anyway. In my view, the state’s job, via criminal justice, is to prosecute material, clearly defined offences. When the authorities attempt to either infer or impute motivation for a crime, seemingly to signal its particular gravity, that is a dangerous move towards punishing ideas, beliefs or attitudes. Some of those ideas, of course, might be bigoted or abhorrent, but they are none the less ideas and opinions. We need to be wary of inadvertently stepping towards thought-crime solutions just to signal our moral virtue, and I am worried about expanding that regime.

This has consequences. Offences such as these carry higher maximum penalties when offenders demonstrate hostility, and this can mean prison. But hostility can be interpreted broadly in the law as ill will, antagonism or prejudice. Let me be clear: violence, harassment, assault or whatever against a disabled person, a trans person, a woman or anyone should be punished appropriately—severely, if that is your take—and certainly uniformly, regardless of motive. But aggravated sentencing can lead to some perverse outcomes.

On hate crime aggravators, in Committee I used an example from the CPS report Our Recent Hate Crime Prosecutions. A man was put in jail for 20 weeks for

“assaulting his father, sister and a police officer, and using racist slurs against his sister’s partner”.

But the CPS notes that, without the racist slurs, he would have only received a community order. So for the assault he would have retained his freedom but, with the racist words, he got 20 weeks in jail. What is more problematic is that many of the offences we are talking about are not actually those kinds of aggressions but often speech that is promiscuously criminalised.

This sentencing anomaly really hits home when it comes to the much boasted-of addition of sex into the aggregation. “At last”, people will say; “misogyny taken seriously”. But, during the Sentencing Bill, the Government refused to accept a perfectly reasonable amendment exempting sexual assault offences and domestic violence offences from the early release scheme. Surely, a real, material commitment to women would be to have accepted that amendment, not increased sentences for offences deemed driven by hostility to women.

Instead, my view is that we should prosecute actual offences committed against any woman. When those offences involve, for example, sexual violence or domestic abuse, we should give appropriate sentences to perpetrators and then not let the offenders out early to free up prison places. That would help women far more than this amendment, the wording of which says that the aggravators must be announced in “open court” to declare an offence aggravated—if ever there were an indication of the performative nature of this, that is it.

One worry is that many of the offences to which “aggravated” will be attached will be the tangled plethora of hate speech crimes, already leading to the scandal of Britain’s declining free speech reputation internationally, with so many arrested for speech crimes, as we have heard about. So many of these offences are wholly subjective, because hostility can be defined by the victim. We have seen the recent weaponisation of speech against those who do not share the same views, the whole cancel culture and toxicity that has proliferated, and identity groups and those with protective characteristics pitched against each other in grievance complaints.

Although it was not in the criminal law, we saw a gross example of this when John Davidson, a man with Tourette’s and the subject of an award-winning sympathetic film, involuntarily ticked and shouted out the N-word. Subsequent commentary refused to accept that there was no intent to offend. Race and disability were put at odds, rather than empathetically understanding the issues, and that is one of the problems with playing the identity politics issue. Increasing aggravated offences will just add to this toxic mix, and that, combined with public order and communications arrests—if not prosecutions for speech crimes, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton—will make this issue really difficult.

The issue of hostility to transgender identity is likely to stir up further tensions. I want to ask: what is transgender identity? At best, it is a subjective category. It is a self-defined description. That is not a criticism; it is just an observation. Transgender identity does not require a gender recognition certificate or surgery. By the way, the wording in the amendment is confusing here: it gives credence to the fact that surgery might be a key, but then it says “proposing to undergo” gender reassignment, which is a very odd phrase. That is why the amendments of the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, are right to query and probe it, which is what we should be doing, even though it is so late in the day. How transgender people are defined will matter to how these amendments will be understood.

The clarification of the noble Lords from the Official Opposition, in Amendments 337, 350, 351 and 352, establishing what sex means in the Bill, is also helpful. Emphasising biological sex—sex at birth—is necessary to ensure that the cultural clash between gender identity and sex is not muddled up in this Bill or in these amendments. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, in his Amendment 334A, also hopes to ensure that the proposed changes do not criminalise misgendering.

I just note that I hate the word “misgendering”. If a male identifies as a female, even if he has a certificate or has had surgery, he is still a man. Saying that is not misgendering; it is factually accurate. Asking me to call him a woman is compelled speech, asking me to repeat misinformation. But would that statement, which I am very nervous about making, be seen as evidence of hostility to someone based on their gender identity? Guess what: too often, those accused of, and punished for, so-called misgendering offences are women. Police criminalised Sex Matters’ Helen Joyce for some tweets referring to Freda Wallace by his former name Fred and using he/him pronouns, and the police recorded that as “criminal harassment” with “transgender aggravators”.

What about the young lesbian who says that she is not attracted to a male—a man who thinks that, by wearing stilettos and a dress, he is a woman and should be allowed into a lesbian-only group at a workplace—

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I do not wish to disturb the noble Baroness’s train of thought, but how we frame this debate is important. It is an aggravated offence if the individual has committed an offence that I outlined earlier, such as grievous or actual bodily harm, public order offences, harassment, stalking or criminal damage. It is not about the issues the noble Baroness is speaking to.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

To clarify, in the first example I gave, of Helen Joyce, it was called criminal harassment for the tweets and the aggravated factors. The police actually dropped it in the end, but they—not me but the police—called it criminal harassment with transgender aggravators. In the example I was giving, the lesbian in her work group was then labelled a bigot. In other words, it is the L in LGBT, not the T, that will often take the hit. I mentioned that because she was threatened by the person, who said they would go to the police, and then she was visited by somebody who said that the police would be involved. I am making this point because I am worried about it spiralling out of control. I would say that that is misogyny: demonising a biological woman for expressing her sexuality as same-sex attracted. I want to be sure that the amendments in this group navigate such clashes and do not avoid them.