Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between David Davis and Julian Smith

Monday 15th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

I had not intended to speak today, but I have been sitting here getting rather more uncomfortable about some aspects of the proposal. I do not propose to go into the complex practical issues, which were well laid out by the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Frank Dobson), who gave thoughtful input, as ever, and by my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Beaconsfield (Mr Grieve). They outlined the issues and complexities very well and I suspect that those complexities will best be addressed by negotiation between those on the two Front Benches, which is not something I often recommend.

What concerns me today is the issue of the Home Secretary herself exercising the power. I am concerned that it comes about without prior judicial approval or, indeed, without being a power of the court, which would be my preference. Over time, I have become progressively concerned about the accretion of fairly absolute power to the state in counter-terrorism policy. Absolute power is pretty important. My hon. Friend the Member for Skipton and Ripon (Julian Smith) suggested that these measures did not impinge on people’s liberties in the same way as TPIMs might, but I am afraid that the impingement is pretty sizeable. I do not necessarily disapprove of it at all, but it should be exercised with a degree of judicial care.

These accretions of power have come about since the late 1980s and the 1990s when we avowed the various security services that had up until then not been recognised in public policy, or that were at least not in the public domain. At the time, it seemed quite reasonable for the Crown prerogative to be used as a method of giving warrants and of enacting the state’s will to protect the public. I took the 1994 Bill on the Secret Intelligence Service through the House. We did not foresee the level of use—the number of warrants used and the level of power being exercised—that is now necessary to deal with the Islamist terrorist threat.

What is more, we did not give much thought to how such power might be abused—not that it is at the moment, but it might be in the future—or how many errors might occur, which does happen. We had at the back of our mind a model of accountability that, frankly, does not work. The Minister for Security and Immigration will be familiar with the number of times on which he and I have had exchanges that amount to my asking him a question and his writing back something like, “I never comment on security matters.” That is not a particularly good form of accountability for any mechanism.

My concern is that along with progressive secrecy, secret courts and all the other things we now have, the weak accountability—

[Julian Smith]

Will my right hon. Friend give way?

[Mr Davis]

If my hon. Friend will permit me, I am coming to the end of my speech.

The level of secrecy, the low level of accountability and the power accruing to the Government, which is enormous when we think about our historic liberties in this country—this is in no way a criticism of the Home Secretary, as I would say the same of any Home Secretary, any Foreign Secretary or any Secretary of State—are why I am attracted by new clause 11. I do not know whether it will be pressed to a vote tonight, or whether it will come back on Report, but I ask the Government closely to consider the TPIM model. It is very sensible and those on the Opposition Front Bench have made a good case for it.

Police Federation Reform (Normington Report)

Debate between David Davis and Julian Smith

Thursday 13th February 2014 Commons Chamber

[Mr Davis]

I accept one aspect of what my hon. Friend says. He has had cases relating to the misbehaviour of police officers in his constituency and has done a great deal to defend them, sometimes but not always with the help of the federation. [Interruption.] If the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) wants to speak from the Opposition Front Bench, I will happily take his intervention. The breadth of the appeal of the debate is an issue, but I do not want to make this party political. There are now two Members on the Opposition Back Benches and they have strong views—the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy) has tabled a motion jointly with me in the past, and the right hon. Member for Leicester East (Keith Vaz) is the Chairman of the Select Committee on Home Affairs. I would not make this a party political issue. Members on both sides of the House have something to gain from the police being truly apolitical and truly upholding our democracy rather than interfering in it in the wrong way.

[Julian Smith (Skipton and Ripon) (Con)]

Does my right hon. Friend agree that leadership comes from the top, and that the Association of Chief Police Officers has not led from the top? Many of the criticisms in the excellent report could also be made of ACPO.

[Mr Davis]

My hon. Friend has a point. I do not want to broaden the debate to include all police issues, but he is right. ACPO is badly constituted and should never have been set up in the way that it was. There are signs that ACPO should have done more to lead firmly. We saw that in the west midlands cases, where the various chief constables were perhaps not as strong in upholding justice as they should have been.

That brings me to the federation itself. I am talking primarily about the national federation, but also about some of the regions. I say that because some of the local federation organisations do a very good job on very thin resources to represent, as they properly should, the interests of their members.

Nevertheless, there are many criticisms to level at the federation, including that it is inefficient and wasteful. There is a duplication of tasks and structures. It is profligate, spending its members’ money on grace and favour flats and on huge bar bills. It is badly governed, with no apparent strong leadership to guarantee direction and stability. It behaves in a manner that sometimes brings police forces into disrepute by pursuing personal and political vendettas—the sort of things to which my hon. Friend the Member for Enfield, Southgate (Mr Burrowes) has referred—against prominent public persons and bodies, and legal actions against private citizens, sometimes even the victims of crime.

After the Police Federation’s attack on my right hon. Friend the Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), the view of the public, and damningly of the federation’s members, was that the federation had to change.

National Security (The Guardian)

Debate between David Davis and Julian Smith

Tuesday 22nd October 2013 Westminster Hall

[Julian Smith (Skipton and Ripon) (Con)]

In the wake of the stolen Snowden files on America’s National Security Agency, it is right and proper that Parliament—both the House in general, and Select Committees in particular—debate the balance between national security and freedom of the press, and limits to and oversight of the power of our intelligence services.

This debate, however, focuses on a narrower and darker issue: the responsibility of the editors of The Guardian for stepping beyond any reasonable definition of journalism into copying, trafficking and distributing files on British intelligence and GCHQ. That information not only endangers our national security but may identify personnel working in our intelligence services, risking their lives and those of their families.

In August 2013, the Brazilian citizen David Miranda was stopped at Heathrow airport under schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000. Initially, The Guardian claimed that he was targeted merely because he is the partner of Glenn Greenwald, the Guardian reporter writing about the leaks. Mr Miranda had been held for hours, The Guardian said, and denied a lawyer, but within hours that story had unravelled. When challenged, the paper first added to its story that it had paid for Mr Miranda’s flights, but did not note in its story that that correction had been made. Later that night, after all the print deadlines had passed, The Guardian admitted that Mr Miranda had been offered a lawyer and had refused one, and that The Guardian had known that all along yet had allowed its false account to stand.

Following the Heathrow stop, a judge ruled that police were entitled to copy and analyse the documents and files carried by Mr Miranda that were in the national security interest. There is to be a court case later this month on the detention and whether the Act was used appropriately. That issue, of course, will be for the court to determine.

Oliver Robbins, deputy National Security Adviser in the Cabinet Office and security adviser to the Prime Minister, has described in a witness statement to the court case on Miranda the direct threat to the life of Government employees posed by the documents held and communicated by The Guardian, together with the grave threat to UK national security should they be released. In his statement, he lays out the careful, proportionate steps that Her Majesty’s Government have taken to engage with the newspaper and to agree protocols for future reporting, be it direct communication or the defence advisory notice system.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

If my hon. Friend really is concerned about risks to British security, is he not concerned that UK Government secrets are accessible to hundreds of thousands of US Government employees? Perhaps that is why Mr Edward Snowden, a 29-year-old contract employee of three months’ standing, was able to access GCHQ files from Hawaii.

[Julian Smith]

I agree that the NSA placed itself in a very odd situation.

The next step was to secure the documents and data, as there was a real fear that terrorists would seek to access that information by targeting The Guardian, and the Government had no confidence in the paper being able to protect the information it held. Unfortunately, the Government were not the only people making that assessment. The WikiLeaks hacker Jacob Appelbaum, who has worked with Glenn Greenwald, has tweeted repeatedly about the non-existent security under which Guardian editors held those files. Last week, he pointed out that laser microphones are routinely used as listening devices through windows and that The Guardian’s so-called secure room has floor-to-ceiling windows ideal for such remote listening by any interested foreign power or terror cell.

On 3 October, Mr Appelbaum tweeted:

“I’ve seen the horrible operational security at the Guardian over the last three years—it makes the New York Times look solid.”

And he scoffed:

“They shipped Top Secret documents by FedEX.”

Hackers have heavily implied on social media that they can access The Guardian’s US files.