Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

David Davis Excerpts

Tuesday 16th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[Dr Lewis]

I disagree. When one is dealing with an intolerant ideology, one cannot simply say that one will, through some calm rationalisation, remove all the barbs, evil and poison. I am talking about what must be done to counter the pernicious ideology with which we are confronted.

[Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend give way?

[Dr Lewis]

I had not quite finished, but of course I will.

[Mr Davis]

Although I understand what my hon. Friend is saying, I rather agree with the hon. Member for Perth and North Perthshire (Pete Wishart) that we are sometimes very unwise in our choice of words. When we choose words such as “war on terror”, we give the other side the standing of soldiers when often we are dealing with criminal misfits. Should we not be more careful about our language?

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[Diana Johnson]

This group of amendments relates to the Government’s plans to create a privacy and civil liberties board. Clause 36 does not actually tell us very much—it is an enabling clause—so I have tabled amendments 24 and 25 to allow us to debate what the board will actually do.

As the clause is drafted, we have a name for the board, and there are three possible ways it could go. First, we have an idea of what a privacy and civil liberties board could look like from its name, which invokes the idea of a body with a wide remit of work on privacy and civil liberties issues in the United Kingdom, and which would safeguard human rights. Such a body would be very similar to the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which was created by a Labour Government.

Secondly, the Home Office has published terms of reference, which suggest a body that will support the independent reviewer of terrorism legislation in providing oversight of counter-terrorism legislation in the UK and investigating the operation of that legislation. We think that what is contained in the terms of reference is sensible and would provide both capacity and openness in the oversight of counter-terrorism policy. However, as I have said, clause 36 is quite an empty provision at the moment.

The third possible version of the board is as currently constituted in clause 36, which gives the Home Secretary powers to create—in future, if she wishes to do so—procedures, membership and the work plan for the board and provisions on publishing of reports. All those details are left to future secondary legislation.

If the body is created it is important that it has strong powers. Our amendments 23 to 26 would help achieve that. The post of independent reviewer of terrorism legislation has been around for over 40 years and its current formulation was created by a Labour Government. The post works well, and both holders of it since 2001 have served with real distinction. That does not mean that we are opposed to further strengthening of the oversight arrangements. Earlier this year, the current independent reviewer, David Anderson, QC, identified the limitations of his reviewer role, including the fact that it was restricted to certain statutes and the fact that significant powers, including those in the Counter-Terrorism Act 2008, were excluded and were therefore going unreviewed. He also pointed out that as a part-time reviewer without proper administrative support, he has extremely limited capacity.

[Mr David Davis]

I guess that the precursor of the proposal is the organ with exactly the same name in the United States, which was activated only after the Snowden events, when information was not just put in the public domain but became controversial and raised issues in Washington. The danger is that the body becomes toothless, does not have investigatory powers and cannot pre-empt a future Snowden. It seems to me that the most important aspect of that is the investigatory powers, not the rest.

[Diana Johnson]

I am sure that the right hon. Gentleman will contribute to the debate, and I certainly have things to say about the title of the body and what it will be doing.

It is important to note what David Anderson said about being a part-time reviewer without proper administrative support and limited capacity. If the proposals on clause 36 were meant to address those concerns, they do not achieve that. They do nothing to address the areas of counter-terrorism legislation excluded from the remit of the commissioners, such as those in the 2008 Act, the powers in this Bill or use of the royal prerogative. David Anderson notes:

“These omissions reduce confidence in counter-terrorism law and are hard to understand, particularly after the Home Secretary agreed, as recently as March 2013, that ‘the scope of the Independent Reviewer’s responsibilities should keep pace with changes to primary legislation’, and accepted in principle my recommendation that the 2001 and 2008 Acts ‘should be examined with a view to extending your statutory functions to include the review of relevant sections of those Acts’. Indeed, as initially proposed in July, the functions of the PCLB would have extended to both these Acts.”

The Bill does not address issues of capacity and resources for the independent reviewer, either, although the impact assessment suggests that the board will receive far greater resources than those given to the independent reviewer. The cost of members of the board seems to take up much of that, and the impact assessment anticipates that the rate will be £897 a day. Is that correct and will the Minister comment on it?

The work that members of the board will do is not clear, either. The current reviewer describes the relationship between the independent reviewer and the proposed new board as

“ill-defined and potentially problematic”

and goes on to say that

“the idea is…for the Board ‘to provide advice and assistance’ to the Independent Reviewer. Both advice and assistance are always welcome: but the former, including from the most eminent and knowledgeable quarters, is already frequently sought and freely given, whereas the latter is critically lacking. To require the Independent Reviewer to chair a Board…will make further claims on the Independent Reviewer’s time and could easily lead to competing priorities and inefficiencies. For there to be a net benefit, commensurate with the cost of resourcing the Board, its members will have to be doers rather than talkers, willing to accept direction in relation to often unglamorous researching and writing tasks.”

The Bill does not make provision for this, nor does the impact assessment’s description explain who will undertake the research and assistance roles that are so badly needed.

Finally, there is an issue about access to documents. Will the panel be security-cleared to the same standard as the independent reviewer? Will the staff? What will be the procedures for redacting documents either before they are passed on to the board or before they are published? These are the issues we are trying to address with our amendments.

Amendment 24 has been tabled to ensure a board with a statutory remit that includes the areas that the independent reviewer does not cover. It will also ensure that the board could respond to other areas of considerable and understandable public concern about the operations of counter-terror policy. We want the board to consider not just privacy but other human rights impacts, as well as the effectiveness of counter-terror policy. As David Anderson points out, counter-terrorism oversight in the past has taken strength from not being limited. If the office of the independent reviewer has influence with the authorities, it is in part because the reviewer can make recommendations to improve not just the fairness, but the effectiveness of counter-terrorism law.

Importantly, especially given the earlier discussions about the breadth of public bodies going to implement Prevent, we also want the board to be allowed to make recommendations to public bodies and public authorities. We tabled amendment 25 in particular to ensure that appointments to this body are made in line with the code of public appointments. We want the board to include real experts who will be able to access materials and provide real insight. We do not want a body compiled through patronage. We tabled amendment 26 to ensure that the statutory instrument creating this body addresses key questions about information gathering, reporting and access to documents.

We would rename the body to give it a title that reflects the nature of what it will actually do. As I said, the current name is misleading. As David Anderson has pointed out, the name not only offers little clue as to the function of the proposed body, but suggests a pure civil liberties watchdog, which this is not. It is not clear why privacy is singled out. Other important human rights are potentially infringed by counter-terrorism law, including the right to liberty, the right to a fair trial and freedom of expression. Mr Anderson takes issue with the word “board”, which he feels is better suited to the historical management of waterways than to the rigorous exercise of scrutiny under the direction of an independent reviewer. So Labour would call the board “a counter-terrorism oversight panel”, and we would give it the powers to back that up.

If the Government are genuinely committed to creating the body they outline in the terms of reference, they should accept these amendments without any hesitation. Of course, this is only part of the oversight package that we require. When the Justice and Security Bill was before the House, the Opposition suggested a number of ways of strengthening the Intelligence and Security Committee to give it a stronger, more independent and more open remit. We remain absolutely committed to the ISC and want it to continue to play a vital role in the oversight of the security agencies alongside a more prominent role for the intelligence commissioners, which is why we tabled new clause 7.

Let me turn briefly to the miscellaneous provisions, particularly clause 38, to which I have tabled amendment 19. Under clause 38, the Secretary of State can make changes that are

“consequential on any provision of this Act”

in any piece of legislation made by any UK legislative body, including the Scottish Parliament and the Welsh Assembly. This is important because under part 5, and particularly under clauses 21, 24 and 30, the Bill creates obligations on a range of bodies that are otherwise entirely devolved. As I mentioned in speaking to an earlier group of amendments, I do not think the Home Secretary should be able to amend devolved legislation without first consulting the relevant Government. That is why we tabled amendment 19, which I hope the Minister will feel able to accept.

[Mr David Davis]

I shall speak to new clause 3, tabled in my name. It is entitled “Intercept Evidence—use in legal proceedings”. It is a probing amendment and I do not propose to press it to the vote on this occasion. If I had wanted to press it, I would have included in the new clause the relevant legal machinery required, which is complex but not difficult to achieve if I wanted to do so. My aim is to provoke some sort of non-partisan debate on what is the cornerstone of counter-terrorism strategy—the legal treatment of intercept evidence. If need be, depending on what the Minister says and what the Government do in the meantime, I shall come back to the issue on Report.

The United Kingdom is unique among major western powers—common law powers and European Union countries—in not allowing the use of intercept evidence in court. I shall come on to the few exceptions in a moment. Why is that the case? It is difficult to know. GCHQ and its predecessor has always resisted putting any intercept evidence into the public domain. Frankly, this has probably been the case since the invention of the telephone. In the early days, I suspect it happened because gentlemen thought it ungentlemanly to listen in on other people’s conversations. Today, however, the argument advanced by the agencies concerns the protection of technique and capacity. Their attitude is very different from that of every other agency of its sort in the world. All our allies in the “five eyes” countries and beyond are equally concerned about protecting capability, but they also give high priority to the prosecution and conviction of terrorists and those who commit serious crimes. They manage to square that circle, but we do not appear to be able to do so at present.

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[Lady Hermon]

I have listened intently to the right hon. Gentleman’s contribution. Will he reflect on the fact that when we had Diplock courts in Northern Ireland they were supported by one section of the community and despised by another. We do not have Diplock courts in Northern Ireland any longer. If his proposal were to be legislated upon and we have a secret court that sits and hears all the evidence, including the intercept evidence, which I agree should be allowed into court, how does he think that would be received in Northern Ireland?

[Mr Davis]

I speak as probably one of the last people to give evidence at a Diplock court. It was against a terrorist who was convicted and then, under the Good Friday agreement, promptly released—it was a very frustrating process. Of course there is a problem of acceptability with any secret court. The hon. Lady will know that I fight vigorously against the idea of secret justice, but what we are talking about here is not secret justice; it is about a decision to let into the public domain more than is currently let into the public domain. Sometimes that information is exculpatory. One of the problems that has arisen with SIAC is that the agencies have not been good at their evidence discipline. At least one case has been struck down. A special advocate called Nichol, who is now a judge, discovered that MI5 was claiming that one person against whom it was bringing a case had used a passport to cross a border one week, and then the next week had brought a case against somebody else claiming that he used the same passport on the same day in a different place. So the agencies have their weaknesses. Nevertheless, the tool is significantly better than what we have at the moment. We may use intercept evidence in terrorism prevention and investigation measures and control orders. I happen to think that TPIMs and control orders are completely ludicrous, because they people who should be inside prison leave out on the streets. They should perhaps be called non-control orders, because all the dangerous ones disappear. Of course, it is not easy and there is an issue of presentation, but if there is fair representation from both sides to decide on what information should be put in the public domain, it is as close as we can get to public justice. That is the point.