Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Danny Kruger and Robert Neill

Committee of the whole House
Wednesday 17th January 2024 Commons Chamber

[Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and my right hon. and learned Friend the Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright). Although I will not be supporting the hon. and learned Lady’s amendments, I have great respect for the intellectual rigour that she brought on Scots law and its application in this case. I say the same about the points made by my right hon. and learned Friend in relation to his amendments 54 and 55. I hope the Minister will think seriously about how we deal with that issue—I am sure he will, because serious points have been raised. In a nutshell, I agree with the proposition that while Parliament can, of course, legislate to do whatever it likes in domestic law, the simple fact is that one cannot legislate away international law obligations or treaty obligations, and it would be misleading to pretend otherwise.

I now turn to the amendments tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Newark (Robert Jenrick). I am sorry that he is not in his place, because I have to say that, with every respect, I profoundly differ from his characterisation of pyjama injunctions by a foreign court. Respectfully, I would argue that that characterisation is both inaccurate and rather unworthy. As was observed by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West, it is perfectly normal for interim injunctions to be issued at difficult hours when the test for them is met, so we should not say that that is unusual. Arguments can be legitimately made about the way in which the rule 39 procedure in the Strasbourg Court works, but let us make them on the basis of an accurate construction of what the Court is about, rather than otherwise.

[Danny Kruger (Devizes) (Con)]

I have great respect for the argument that my hon. Friend is making, and I defer to his experience and knowledge on this issue. I am genuinely interested in his view: he has described a judge in the UK issuing an injunction late at night in the event of what, in normal circumstances, would be an individual situation. Does he really think it is comparable to describe in the same terms the act of a Court that is genuinely in another country and a judge who is anonymous and does not publish the rationale for their opinion, which calls a halt—with the support of the Government, it must be said—to the policy of the British Government, enacting a law passed in Parliament? Surely there is a difference, both of degree and of nature, between the two cases.

[Sir Robert Neill]

I think my hon. Friend needs to bear in mind that the application that was made to Strasbourg was also about the circumstances of an individual case, so that is no different.

There is a legitimate criticism—one that I have voiced in the past—about the procedure adopted in Strasbourg for these applications in two areas: first, the anonymity of the judge, and secondly, the failure to state reasons. From our point of view, that would not be acceptable, but the answer is not to throw out the whole of the judicial and treaty baby with the bathwater. Thanks to the Brighton declaration that was signed by my noble and learned Friend Lord Clarke of Nottingham, it is possible to make reforms following dialogue between member states, the Council of Ministers and the judiciary of the Court. I am pleased to say that after pressure from the United Kingdom—perfectly properly—the Court itself has indicated that it will to consult on reforms to its procedure, which can only be a good thing. That is what I think the balanced position is on that issue.