Northern Ireland Troubles Bill

Colum Eastwood Excerpts

Committee of the whole House & 3rd reading
Tuesday 20th October 2026 Commons Chamber

[Alex Burghart]

I am sure that the Secretary of State will have heard what the hon. Gentleman said and will refer to it in his final remarks.

The cases that we are talking about here include that of Coagh and Michael Ryan—an IRA man who shot two Ulster Defence Regiment officers, both in the presence of children.

[Colum Eastwood (Foyle) (SDLP)]

I am very grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s kind words. I just want to make sure that I understood him; he said that inquests have not dealt with innocent civilians being killed. In fact, they have: the Ballymurphy inquest and the Springhill inquest brought truth to families almost 50 years after their loved ones were murdered in cold blood by British forces. If we are going to talk about this, let us talk about it in the round.

[Alex Burghart]

I am happy to clarify my remarks for the hon. Gentleman. I am certainly not saying that at all. I am explaining why the inquisitorial process has suffered such a loss of confidence. It is because of the way in which certain inquests have been conducted and the way they have behaved. I am not talking at cross-purposes with the hon. Gentleman.

In the case of Clonoe, we are dealing with the fact that a van-load of men shot up a police station with a fully automatic machine gun and were confronted by the security forces. In the case of Loughgall, an IRA unit attacked a Royal Ulster Constabulary base and were shot. Those security forces, who kept our country safe in those moments, were asked to do extremely difficult things. They no longer trust the inquisitorial process, because they can see where it leads. It leads to lawfare—to years of court processes in which, even when the judges say, “This is a farce,” or, “This is ludicrous,” they are powerless to prevent the legal aid cavalcade from going on and on.

Amendment 113, which appears in my name, and the amendment tabled by my right hon. Friend the Member for Goole and Pocklington would essentially do the same thing that the hon. and gallant Member for Birmingham Selly Oak was seeking yesterday: they say, “Enough of the multi-track approach; let us put all the inquests into the legacy commission.” Let us dispense with the twin-track approach, which the hon. and gallant Member argued against yesterday. Of course, the twin-track approach is really a three-track approach, because inquiries are still being granted. As we argued at the time, the Government should have asked ICRIR to deal with, for example, the Finucane inquiry rather than set up a new public inquiry. Then, because of civil cases, we will have a four-track approach. For all the reasons mentioned here, I very much hope that the Government will at the very least accept that, where we are dealing with military action against known terrorists, the inquests ought to be dealt with by the legacy commission.

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[Alex Burghart]

The right hon. Gentleman says no from a sedentary position, but that is not the case. We have received legal advice that “essential” is no bar at all. For the reasons I have already set out, it will be very easily stepped over, whereas “new and compelling”, as we know from the overseas operations Act, is a more significant legal test.

“New and compelling” provides certainty in three ways. First, it is a filter test: no engagement with veterans unless there is new and compelling evidence. Secondly, it is a term already applied by the courts, so we have one system and equality of treatment. Thirdly, it is not subjective like “essential”: the evidence must be new and must be a matter of fact, and it must be compelling, meaning that it will impact the outcome. The test of new evidence only would be meaningless as there is no threshold.

Finally, I turn to new clause 7 in my name. It would require annual reporting on recruitment and retention within the armed forces. We have all seen repeated reports that our special forces are under threat because of the demoralising effects of lawfare, both present and historical. In October, we were warned by the SAS Regimental Association that lawfare was

“eroding the will to fight”.

In November, we were warned by eight retired generals and one chief marshal that “recruitment, retention and morale” were all suffering. In December, seven former senior SAS officers spoke of the dangerous operational consequences of lawfare. This morning, Brigadier Ed Butler, former commanding officer of 22 SAS, said in stark terms that “continued lawfare” was affecting recruitment and retention. When leaders with such experience issue such warnings, I think we all have a duty to listen and to take them seriously.

[Colum Eastwood]

Can I clarify the point the hon. Member is making? Is he putting forward an argument that if special forces are not allowed to do whatever they want, in whatever theatre, outside legal boundaries, people will not join up?

[Alex Burghart]

I reassure the hon. Gentleman that that is absolutely not the point I am making or, indeed, a point I have ever made. The simple point I am making is that vexatious repeat-and-rinse investigations are hugely demoralising to people who once served and people who still serve. That is very different to what he has just alleged.

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In the firefight that followed, all eight members of the IRA active service unit were killed. These are the people otherwise described as victims in this exercise. I have already detailed the worst of them, Jim Lynagh; rather than detail the rest, I will simply say that on forensic analysis, it was found that the weapons recovered after the event were responsible for 40 to 50 killings—killings that took place in every single county in Northern Ireland. What was the effect of this operation? Well, the East Tyrone brigade had been responsible for more than 20% of the IRA’s activities and killings in Northern Ireland beforehand; afterwards, they were responsible for less than 10%. This operation saved lives.

[Colum Eastwood]

Can I ask the right hon. Member to put on the record that another man, Anthony Hughes, was killed on that day in that operation? He was a totally, completely and utterly innocent civilian who was not involved in any IRA activity, or in any other organisation.

[David Davis]

I was about to come to that point, and I will probably come back to it again. That is the real tragedy of that day—he was the real victim, as was his son, I think, who was wounded as well. I know that the hon. Gentleman will not agree with this, but one of the things about the British state is that we take our judicial responsibilities in these matters seriously, and we have prosecuted our own soldiers. The name Clegg jumps to mind, but there are others who were prosecuted and sent to prison even for acting irresponsibly, let alone malevolently. Of course that is the worst tragedy of that day—that is literally in my next paragraph. I will give the hon. Gentleman my notes after this debate, so that he can see for himself.

Incidentally, that is one of the reasons why I say that this case should go to the legacy commission. It is a really important thing to investigate, but it should be investigated in a cool, analytical manner, not in the theatre of the court. Why do the IRA want to have a coroner’s inquest rather than a legacy commission investigation? Because they were humiliated at Loughgall, and they want to rewrite history with themselves as the heroes and British soldiers as the villains. Let me give the Committee an early sign of the sort of thing they will try to claim.

We have been hearing recently that these IRA people were only aiming to destroy the building—they were not aiming to kill anybody. That would have been completely different from the first operation, where they murdered people in cold blood before blowing up the station. That also does not explain why the IRA fired 78 rounds at the building—bullets kill people, not buildings. It does not explain why they were there at the shift change, when the RUC men were about to come out of the building. It is plainly nonsense, but it is the sort of nonsense that they want to perpetuate in a court. That is another reason why I would rather see the dispassionate actions of the commission than the activities of IRA lawyers in the courts.

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[David Davis]

I am very close to the end, Madam Chairman. The hon. Lady is exactly right, and that is the entire thrust of amendment 51. If I had had my way, I would have said that amendment 49 was better, because it would have stopped all these inquests. The amendments would not get rid of the investigations, but would put them into a better process, which the Government have designed.

I will finish on coroners courts. I have listened to a number of soldiers who have appeared in these courts, and the Committee can guess who I am talking about, but they are tough, intelligent soldiers. However, the court is not their environment, when they are being harassed by a lawyer not to get to the truth, but to get a story out of them. I spoke this morning to one of them who has been through more of these court cases than most, both inquests and judicial reviews. He told me that IRA lawyers are, in his words, “more interested in drama than justice”.

[Colum Eastwood]

Will the right hon. Gentleman give way?

[David Davis]

No, not on this point. I am nearly at the end. I have already been rebuked by the Chairman for going on.

What that soldier said is, I am afraid, consistent with what I saw. I have never appeared in an inquest, but I have appeared in a Diplock court in Northern Ireland. [Interruption.] Sorry, am I being heckled? I saw the same: the lawyers were interested in rewriting history. The IRA would welcome the restarting of the Loughgall inquest. They would view that as a victory in its own right, because it would allow them yet another attempt to rewrite the history of the troubles.

I will make an aside, which in a way goes back to the point made by the hon. Member for Foyle (Colum Eastwood), although it is the converse of it. One of the soldiers at Loughgall got the military medal. In my view, many of them should have done, but he got it for putting himself at extra risk to save civilians and to prevent the death of civilians. That tells us what we are dealing with in relation to British soldiers in Northern Ireland.

My last point is that this operation was approved in detail by the general officer commanding, Northern Ireland. I believe that it was approved in detail by the Secretary of State. It was reviewed by the Director of Public Prosecutions, with all of the information to hand—forensics, witnesses, the lot. We should remember that RUC people would not have been involved directly, but would have given witness statements. Do we want to run that through a circumstance where the evidence is degraded, where people’s memories have gone and where some have died? One of the individuals involved has dementia. Is that what we want to do, or do we want to do it properly, by dispassionate method, using an instrument that is designed for the process and that those on both sides of the House agree will work?

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[Al Carns]

That is encouraging to know, but although these are deaths from the same conflict being considered decades later, we are deliberately providing two different routes for dealing with them. For more than 12 months I have recommended that we create a single centralised body to deal with the troubles-related issues. I know that there are some who would be uncomfortable with that, particularly those who represent families who have waited a very long time for an inquest, and I understand why that is. I am not suggesting for a moment that those families should lose the work that has already been done; the evidence gathered should go with the case. Nor am I seeking to prevent prosecutions. If the commission finds evidence that someone committed a criminal offence, whether that person wore a uniform or belonged to a terrorist organisation, that evidence should go to the prosecuting authorities. I am trying to get us to one process in which we can have some confidence.

There is a reason why I feel strongly about this. We need to be very careful about the history that we are creating through the legacy process, and also to think about why it is impossible to balance truth and reconciliation with justice. The state kept a great many records during the troubles; of course it did. Operations were recorded and reports were written, and the people involved can often be identified. There is an enormous amount of material about what the British state did and did not do. The IRA and other terrorist groups did not keep operational records. There is no equivalent archive sitting somewhere with records of who gave an order, who carried it out, and what happened afterwards.

[Colum Eastwood]

I am not sure that we know that the IRA did not keep records, but that is an aside. What we do know very well, given all that we have seen over the last number of years and the reports that have been done, is that the IRA and other terrorist organisations were riddled from top to bottom with informers reporting directly to the British state. Those files exist, and they could tell us a whole lot about what the IRA and other organisations were up to.

[Al Carns]

I thank the hon. Member for the intervention, but when the records exposed threaten either national security or individual security, we must take that into account.

Yesterday, I think we all agreed that families deserve justice and answers, and indeed that many want closure, but with the majority of the murders during the troubles and conducted by terrorist organisations remaining unsolved, there just is not the evidence to get to the truth or to justice. I would like to ask: how is the Bill going to change that? Let us think about that. How is this Bill going to change the amount of evidence, and where is the new evidence to come from? I think we need to be honest with the families: do we genuinely believe that ex-IRA or Unionist terrorists are going to come and give information to this process? If by coming forward to offer information to provide answers that would at the same time self-incriminate the witness or individual providing the information, how many will participate?

I hear people talk about Ireland and about new biometric and forensic evidence-gathering capabilities, but there just is not the evidence to get to the truth. The reality—I could be wrong, and if I am proven wrong, I will hold my hand up—is that very few terrorists, if any, will come forward. The quest for the truth will rely on slivers of new evidence—and I mean slivers, although that does not mean we should not investigate them—that are found or indeed that arise from Ireland opening and giving the UK access to its extensive archives. Do we believe Ireland will do that? It would be politically very difficult and legally painful, and indeed it would lead to questioning the reputation and moral compass of successive Irish Governments.

We need to be honest with families: this Bill will not magically produce new evidence, and that creates a very real problem when, 30 or 40 years later, we try to establish the truth through legal proceedings. Material available to investigators is inevitably much richer on one side than it is on the other. If we put the cases through different processes as well, we will make the problem even worse. I have described this before as creating a hierarchy of truth. I do not mean that as a slogan, but something quite specific. What can be investigated most easily becomes what gets investigated most thoroughly, and what gets investigated most thoroughly produces the most findings. After enough years have passed, those findings start to become the history of the conflict. I do not believe anybody in this Chamber intends that to happen—I genuinely do not think that is the case—but intention is not really the point. We need to look at where the system we are building eventually takes us.

The Bill is trying to prevent repeat investigations, and I welcome the work to do so. I will, however, give a small example. Soldier B from Coagh has not been charged, but has had eight years of legal process, and three court cases have ruled that his actions were justified and there was appropriate use of force, yet the family have received legal aid to take the case again to the Supreme Court. Soldier B is unlikely ever to be charged, but he has undergone eight years of legal uncertainty and will endure many more. This is not about prosecutions; this is about the process being wielded as the punishment.

I come at this as a Labour MP. The Good Friday agreement asked an enormous number of people to do very difficult things. There were decisions made as part of that settlement that many people found very hard to accept, and still do. Prisoners walked out of jail, and people who had been enemies were expected to sit in government together. Blair and Mo Mowlam understood that there was no settlement available that could somehow settle every account from the previous 30 years, but they were trying to stop another generation having to live the same argument.

I worry that we are in danger of doing the opposite with legacy. In 10 or 15 years’ time, the Northern Ireland people’s understanding of what happened will come in large part from what is being established now. If over those years one part of the conflict has been examined again and again, because that is where records and people are available, while much of the activity of terrorist organisations remains beyond reach, we should not be surprised if people begin to draw conclusions from that. That would be a poor legacy for a Labour Government to leave them.

None of this diminishes what families have been through. There are people—hundreds of people—who have spent decades trying to find out what happened to someone they loved. They are entitled to pursue the truth, and I would never vote for a system designed to deny it to them. However, I also know veterans who have lived for years with the possibility that somebody will reopen an event that has already been examined, sometimes more than once—in many cases more than once. Many of those people are now very old men, and we cannot keep pretending that endless process is the same thing as justice.

The Government have chosen to strengthen the legacy commission, and I think that is the right thing to do. If we believe the commission can do this work, let it do the work. We should give it these outstanding cases and the material already collected and let the families take part, and if it finds evidence that belongs before a court, that is where it should go. Even the Joint Committee on Human Rights has questioned the justification for having two approaches to these revived inquests. I think that is a fair question, and I have yet to hear a convincing answer, other than that it will stress-test the framework agreement with the Irish.