Chris Stephens
Main Page: Chris Stephens (Scottish National Party - Glasgow South West)Department Debates - View all Chris Stephens's debates with the Ministry of Defence
(7 years, 6 months ago)
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Again, the hon. Gentleman makes a very good point. This is an international market and these skills are very sought after. This comes back to my point that if we want this capability in the UK, we have to nurture and protect it and the only way to do that is by having a throughput of work.
The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife raised the issue of the Type 26. The delay is adding to that uncertainty. The wider piece really concerns me. To give the impression that we are going to have that drumbeat of work, we have had the Type 31 inserted into the programme. I have studied in detail to try to find out what the Type 31 actually is; no one has been able to tell me yet. It is a bit like the mythical unicorn—everybody thinks it exists, but no one has ever seen one. If the MOD can say that there is a budget line for it, it should please identify that—in the current procurement there is no budget line for it at all in the programme.
Was the hon. Gentleman concerned, as I was, to read in an article in The Daily Telegraph a suggestion from a Ministry of Defence source that there is no budget for Type 31s and that they might not even happen?
As people know, I am a bit of an anorak on this subject and I actually study the MOD accounts, but I still cannot find where this budget line is. Another point that has never been answered is what this ship will actually be used for. I am not sure where it fits into any naval strategy. Will it be able to meet, for example, Britain’s NATO capabilities? Will it have capability to fulfil those roles? If it has not got the air defence capability, it will not. The other thing that people have completely missed is that this is about not just building the ship, but running it afterwards. We all know that there is a crisis in recruitment and manpower in the Royal Navy. Again, where is the budget line for not only building but running this generation of ships?
The hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife makes a very important point. The Government say that the great thing about the ships is that they are exportable; I am sorry, but we are bit behind the game on this. He rightly identifies at least two other nations that have product out there.
There is another point about strategy. This is about not only skills but the defence of our country, because if we have the gap between the Type 23s going out and the Type 26s coming in, there will also be a gap in the nation’s capability. I understand that there is an ongoing extension programme for some Type 23s, but we need clarity, because if there is a gap, we will not be able to protect the carrier groups or some of our other capabilities.
That leads me to the wider piece about the Government’s strategy in this area. The Prime Minister argues that she is batting for Britain and that Britain is the key market, but we have a situation in which the Ministry of Defence, obviously leant on heavily by the Treasury, is happy to have multimillion-pound contracts with the United States—the Apache and P-8 contracts, to name just two—with no commitment whatever that proportionate workshare will come back to the UK economy. I asked the Minister a written question about the Apaches, and I think Boeing said that 5% of the programme’s value will come back into our supply chain. That point is important not just for the number of jobs, but to keep the capability that we need in this country. I cannot imagine for one minute the United States doing something similar, even before President Trump took office, and things will get even worse now. Exporting highly paid jobs and capability from this country is inexcusable. I do not want to see the same thing happening in shipbuilding, so that we will perhaps just buy ships off the shelf from the United States or anywhere else.
A few weeks ago I asked the Minister in a parliamentary question what she was doing to monitor whether Boeing, for example, would put enough jobs into the economy. She fudged the answer, saying, “We don’t monitor this area.” I am sorry, but that is inexcusable. What really irritates me is that if a British company sold a piece of defence kit to the United States of America, there is no way that we would not have to give guarantees about workshare and jobs in the United States. My fear is that without joined-up thinking on shipbuilding, if we are not careful, a time will come when the Treasury says, “Isn’t it cheaper just to buy these from abroad—from the United States or somewhere else?” We would then lose not only the sovereign capability that is so important to this country, but the skill base and jobs that come with that.
I come to my final point. It is about time that the Ministry of Defence fessed up that it has a huge problem, which is only partly of the MOD’s making, because this is actually a Treasury issue. The National Audit Office report is clear about the procurement budget. The Ministry of Defence is falling into an old habit—as a former Minister in the Ministry of Defence, I know this is easy to do—of just pushing the budget sideways, which is what has happened with the defence budget. However, there are other pressures on the day-to-day in-service budgets. Ships are being laid up, for example, because the cash is not available to run in-service services. In addition, there is a huge black hole—it was highlighted in the NAO report—that the MOD has to deal with. We are not talking about separate money; it will have to find £8 billion over the next 10 years for the defence estate. All that falls within the defence budget, so if does not come out of one place, it will come out of another.
The Government need to be honest about where they are with the equipment budget. The Opposition got lectures from the incoming coalition Government about how frugal they would be, in terms of ensuring that they did not over-commit on defence, but they are clearly doing that now. The shipbuilding strategy needs to be published soon. If we are going to answer yes to the question, “Do we want a sovereign capability for shipbuilding in this country?”, we will have to put the money behind it and ensure that the work is of a nature that allows the industry to develop its skills and retain that capability.
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) and to have listened to his technical expertise in this area. I very much appreciated his speech and particularly his support for the Clyde shipyards. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman) on securing the debate, and it is always a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Evans.
I shall start, as the hon. Member for North Durham did, with the extraordinary process regarding the strategy. He is not the only one who thought that Sir John Parker’s report would be the national shipbuilding strategy; I and other hon. Members of the House did too, as did trade unions and the defence industry.
The Minister said that a signed copy would be sent to my hon. Friend the Member for Argyll and Bute (Brendan O'Hara), but we are still waiting for it. Clearly that means that the actual statement has not been produced.
I remember that exchange, and there was clearly confusion about the report. I also find it extraordinary that although Sir John Parker’s report was sent to the Ministry of Defence on 3 November 2016, this is the first opportunity that hon. Members have had to discuss it in detail. In November or December, there should have been a debate, or a series of debates, on the report, so that hon. Members could give their views on it and feed into the process. I shall come to that later.
I was very concerned when it was pointed out to me that on 2 January in The Daily Telegraph—not necessarily a newspaper that I subscribe to—MOD sources were not only saying that there is no budget for the Type 31, but that it will not happen and the plan will not be realised. We need to go back to the former Prime Minister’s announcement on the Clyde in my constituency in 2014, when he promised that 13 Type 26 frigates would be built on the Clyde. We were then told that there would be eight Type 26 frigates and five general-purpose frigates. As the hon. Member for North Durham outlined, we do not know exactly what that capability is, but we were told, “It’s okay; relax, because eight plus five equals 13.” We are still awaiting the final sign-off, not only for the eight Type 26 frigates but for the five general-purpose frigates. I hope that the Minister will tell us, if there is indeed a budget for Type 31 frigates, what it is and what the procurement timetable is for Type 26 and Type 31 frigates.
If what my hon. Friend is saying is anywhere near the truth and the Type 31s will not exist, what does that say about the drumbeat for Govan and Scotstoun?
I would be very concerned about that, and I will come to the effects of that later. Sir John Parker’s report is an honest attempt to end the “feast and famine” procurement processes by the Ministry of Defence that have often plagued the shipbuilding industry. If any other public services carried out procurement processes in the way that the Ministry of Defence does, there would be uproar in the streets—imagine if it was equipment for the health service or education, and so on.
I am pleased that Sir John Parker’s report also recognises the capability and skills of shipyard workers on the Clyde—in my constituency, in the Govan shipyard, and in Scotstoun, in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Glasgow North West (Carol Monaghan)—working on digital technology adapted from the automotive sector and with new working practices that have increased productivity. It is an honour and a privilege to represent them in this Parliament. The shipyard workers are also supported by trade unions and are represented at shop-floor level by representatives who have campaigned tenaciously over the years to ensure that future work is secured. Any announcements that come from the Government are a victory for them more than anyone else. However, as someone who had family members in Yarrows who were made redundant under a Tory Government, I always view such commitments from this Government with suspicion when it comes to shipbuilding.
Sir John Parker’s report also recognises that the Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships should be assembled in the UK. It really is a nonsense that that work has been farmed out elsewhere. I would hope that Rosyth, to cite one example, would have that opportunity. Failure to ensure that Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships are built in the UK will make the report fall at the first hurdle. An award to a UK yard for Royal Fleet Auxiliary ships would demonstrate that the Government are serious about ensuring that an export model can be achieved and that investment in technology can be kept.
My hon. Friend is talking about Type 31s, but given the fact that the Secretary of State and also the leader of the Conservative party in the Scottish Parliament have said that there will be work on the 13 Type 26s, where is that guarantee from the Government?
I hope we will get that today. I hope the Minister will give us that commitment.
There is one fatal flaw, however, in Sir John Parker’s report, which needs to be tackled. His assumption that there is no precedent for building different first-class naval ships concurrently is wrong. In the 1990s, Yarrow shipyards were building and constructing Royal Navy ships as well as exporting ships to Malaysia. This precedent was envisaged by the Clyde shipyard taskforce in 2002, chaired by the then Scottish Executive Minister, Wendy Alexander, and the former Scottish Office Minister, Brian Wilson, which ensured that the Govan shipyard was responsible for the steelworks and that Scotstoun was to become the centre for excellence.
There is therefore reason to argue that Govan could construct the Type 26 frigates and Scotstoun could develop the new Type 31 frigate, using the specialist design capability to ensure that it could be exported to other countries. Such technical expertise to carry out the work is already there on the Clyde, but it will require investment. MOD pressure not to invest in the frigate factory—promises that led to the demolition of the covered berth and module hall at Scotstoun—has meant that we still have a constrained capacity and that the full potential for shipbuilding on the Clyde has not yet been realised. I want to hear from the Government about progressive plans with respect to shipyard reconstruction to unlock significant long-term advances and savings for the industry so that it can win more orders, not only here but from overseas.
Sacrifices have been made by shipyard workers on the Clyde. Let us not forget that to get to where we are now, workers on the Clyde took redundancy to ensure that the rest would be kept and that they would be match-fit to build the 13 Type 26 frigates. I hope that today the Minister will confirm procurement processes for the Type 26 and Type 31 frigates. The trade unions have said that failure to ensure that the Clyde leads on the general-purpose frigates would be a betrayal.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Evans. I congratulate the hon. Member for Dunfermline and West Fife (Douglas Chapman) on securing this debate; it is on a very important subject and, as has been said, it has given us a first opportunity to discuss Sir John Parker’s important report.
I welcome the contributions of Scottish National party colleagues, the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) and my hon. Friend the Member for North Durham (Mr Jones), who showed his expertise in this area. However, it is a great shame—a crying shame—that there are no Conservative Members of Parliament present, apart from the Minister and, rather belatedly, somebody else who I think has come in for another debate. It is a great shame that we have not had a full Chamber and that we have not all been able to debate collectively what is a fundamentally important issue for this country.
I will focus my comments on the situation regarding the strategy from the Ministry of Defence. My starting point, of course, is what the Government themselves declared in 2015 in their strategic defence and security review. They said that they were committed to maintaining a fleet of 19 frigates and destroyers, and that they intended to complement that force with a new class of lighter and flexible general purpose frigates. At that time, they correctly made the link between the need to develop our national security and the promotion of our domestic prosperity. The Government proudly announced then that a new national shipbuilding strategy
“will lay the foundations for a modern and efficient sector capable of meeting the country’s future defence and security needs.”
In the Budget of 2016, the Government proudly announced that they had appointed the eminent Sir John Parker to lead and write a national shipbuilding strategy, and it was promised that a report would be prepared and presented to this House in 2016.
However, there has been genuine confusion and I hope that the Minister will take this opportunity to clarify the situation. On 29 November 2016, we had a report from Sir John Parker, but it was not, as we had been promised, the Government’s national shipbuilding strategy. Many people thought that it was—some Ministers thought that it was—but it was not. Instead, we had an “independent report” on the UK’s national shipbuilding strategy from Sir John Parker.
My questions are quite simple. How did that metamorphosis take place; why did it take place; why is there confusion; what contact was there between the different Departments; and who is taking the lead on this issue? Those are very important questions about something as fundamental as the strategy for our future warships, which is not an issue that can be lightly dismissed. I echo what other Members have said: we would all like answers from the Minister about what on earth has happened and what on earth is going on.
Of course, Sir John’s report is very radical and extremely scathing about how things work, or rather do not work, within the Ministry of Defence regarding Royal Navy programmes. The report has a very interesting, informative and worrying chart about the length of time it takes for projects to develop to fruition. For example, Sir John points out that it was in 1967 that the conceptual start of the Type 21 frigates began and they were delivered nine years later. As for the Type 23 frigates, the conceptual start date was in 1978, but it took 17 years for that project to come to fruition. Goodness knows how long it will take for the Type 26 frigates.
Sir John asks why there have been such long delays. Why has this process taken such a long period of time? In some ways, the demands upon the frigates have changed. The world has changed and defence requirements have changed, but there is still that laborious project time before us. Why has that happened?
Does the hon. Gentleman agree that these delays not only impact on the Royal Navy but on the local economy in Scotland? He may be aware of the GMB report on Scottish shipbuilding and the value of shipbuilding to the Scottish economy.
Indeed, I fully support those points. The situation is very worrying for all concerned, not least the people who are employed in the shipbuilding industry and the local communities from which they are drawn.
Sir John gives a number of reasons why the long delays have occurred. He makes 11 points. I will not go through all of them, but will just pick out some of the reasons he suggests. He says that there has been
“A lack of assured Capital budget per RN ship series, subject to annual arbitrary change, with accumulative negative impact on time and cost with accompanying increased risk of obsolescence”.
That is very worrying. He also says that there have been
“Poor linkages across the ‘Total Enterprise’ including industrial capability and capacity”.
He goes on to say:
“Senior decision-makers have, previously, been engaged too late in the process and not always with high quality information and costing data”.
He adds:
“The MOD has lost expertise in both design and project contract management”.
He says that there has been
“Inadequate evaluation of risk contingency in each project”.
Those are some of the damning reasons why Sir John says there have been delays. I suggest that they are an indictment of the MOD, which really must sort things out once and for all regarding its procurement and governance strategy for warships.
Once the strategy has been written by the Government, when will it be published? I will not ask for the exact day or week, but will it be published in March, April, May, or whenever? We would like some sort of indication. Once it is published, we would like to know what sort of consultation there will be and how long it will last. I ask that because we want to have a full debate on every dot and comma of that important policy document.
I recognise that the Minister will not say very much about what might or might not be in that report. Nevertheless, I have a number of questions for her. First, will the Government sort out, once and for all, their procurement and governance systems for warship construction in this country? There really ought to be a masterplan that should be reviewed at each SDSR, and as part of that approach there should be a partnership with both the industry and the trade unions. As Sir John has suggested, a shipyard trade union representative ought to be appointed to attend regular meetings, to enhance the transparency and efficiency of the processes that are under way.
Secondly, will the Government commit to working with their industry partners and trade unions to enhance the training and educational capabilities and facilities, so that there is the correct mix of skills and competence, particularly with regard to the new digital systems that are coming on stream?
Thirdly, will the Government commit to having a small but highly specialised virtual innovation centre to force through, among other things, advances in design, new materials and productivity improvements? As Sir John has argued, such an innovation centre is necessary if we are to oversee the new “global competitiveness plans”, which I believe the Government want to see being created.
Finally, will the Government commit to placing a greater emphasis on the exporting of British-built ships, as well as British project management, design, equipment and sub-systems? Will they not only engage in general rhetoric, but commit to specifics, as part of a great national effort to ensure not just that British-built ships are used for British defence, but that the expertise in this country is sold for the benefit of navies throughout the world?
I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response to my questions.
It is about the distinction between the report and the Government’s publication of the national shipbuilding strategy. A range of people raised this issue, so I make it clear that we are considering Sir John’s recommendations, and we will provide a full response, which will be what we can all call the national shipbuilding strategy. It will be published in spring 2017. I am sure Members will appreciate that I cannot be more precise than that in terms of a specific date.
Will the Minister outline the process? A few Members have mentioned that, including the hon. Member for Caerphilly (Wayne David). Once the Government publish the national shipbuilding strategy and its response to Sir John Parker, what is the process? Who feeds into that response?