Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (First sitting)

Debate between Chris Murray and Will Forster

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Forster]

Q If I may, I will turn away from these historic strategic issues back to the wording in the Bill. I would welcome your thoughts on clauses 13, 14 and 16 about the new offences. How effective do you think they would be? Zoe, what do you think of the drafting? Dr Walsh, how commonly do you think they would be used given that so much of the preparation is done abroad?

Zoe Bantleman: The offences are drafted in quite broad terms and the defences are quite narrow. There is a real concern, particularly on behalf of the legal professions, as to what would constitute a defence. For example, one of the defences is where a person was

“acting on behalf of an organisation which—

(i) aims to assist asylum-seekers, and

(ii) does not charge for its services.”

Would a legal aid firm charging the legal aid fund for services come within the scope of this defence? That is a real question.

We could also imagine the much more practical question of someone who is, for example, in Calais with their family member, and their family member wants to get on to a small boat and they are saying, “No, don’t get on to the small boat. Look here—this is what the weather is going to be today” and they show them on their phone what the weather is going to be. That could be useful to that person in helping them to prepare for their journey to the UK, and it would be the collection, recording and viewing of that information. It is not clear that such a person would have a defence if they were to reach the UK by a safe route, if a safe route was available to them. Even though that was done in France rather than the UK, they could potentially be prosecuted once here because of the extraterritorial scope of the offences, subject of course to prosecutorial discretion.

There is a very large scope to the offences and the defences are potentially not sufficient and holistic enough to account for all situations in which persons should not be prosecuted and should not be criminalised for their behaviour.

[Chris Murray]

Q Dr Walsh, you said something fascinating that the Minister picked up on about the Dublin system and the driver of people getting on small boats. Could you say a little bit more about that? First, what is the evidence for that? Secondly, we know that people getting on to a small boat on the French side of the channel are part of a long stream of networks, illegal organisations and people fleeing. They are travelling through multiple countries. Could you give us a bit more detail on how those networks are functioning now, how they have evolved over the last couple of years in response to various conflicts and drivers, and the routes that people are taking?

Dr Peter Walsh: The Dublin system provided a mechanism for asylum seekers to be transferred between EU member states and prioritised the idea that people should have their claim processed in the first state in which they arrived. There are other things that the decision can be based on—one might be having family members in the country; that could also be the basis for a transfer.

There is emerging evidence from when researchers have spoken with migrants in and around Calais. They ask them, “Why have you taken this dangerous journey to the UK?” They talk about family, the English language and perceptions of the UK as being safer. Often they have experienced harsh treatment at the hands of the French police. Increasingly, they specifically mention Dublin.

What we can infer from that is that these people have an outstanding or rejected claim—or claims, potentially in a number of EU member states, even though there are rules and processes to prevent that. They have exhausted what they view as the opportunity to receive a successful asylum claim in the EU. That leaves the UK. They understand that because the UK is no longer a part of Dublin, we are effectively not able to return them to the continent. That is fairly recent evidence we have found.

On the smuggling networks and how they work, one of the big challenges is that they operate transnationally, so they are beyond the jurisdiction of any single authority. That, by its very nature, makes enforcement more difficult because it requires quite close international co-operation, so the UK would be co-operating with agencies that operate under different legal frameworks, professional standards and norms and maybe even speak a different language. That challenge applies with particular force to the senior figures, who are often operating not only beyond the UK’s and EU’s jurisdictions but in countries where there is very limited international law enforcement co-operation with both the UK and the EU. I am thinking of countries such as Afghanistan, Syria and Iran.

More generally, the smuggling gangs have become more professionalised. They are very well resourced and are highly adaptable. There is a sense that law enforcement is constantly having to play catch-up. The gangs are decentralised, and there are quite small groups of, say, eight to 12 individuals, spread out across the continent, who are responsible for logistics—for example, storing equipment like motors and engines in Germany that are imported to Turkey from China and then transported in trucks to France. Those networks stretch out across the continent. That is why it is so hard for law enforcement to fight them.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Forster]

Q What are the things that you would like to see the Bill go further on? We just heard from the legal director at the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association that they have some concerns at least about the Government’s rhetoric, if not some of their actions, against the international law, particularly on children. Could you comment on that as well?

Dame Rachel de Souza: Because I see so many of these children and work with them directly, I am often thinking practically about what their lives are like and how to ensure that they are okay, so I tend to come at your questions from that approach. One of the things that I am worried about is the potential for getting the scientific age assessment wrong.

There was a fantastic debate in the other House, where Lord Winston and others talked about the British Dental Association and the lack of clarity and slight vagueness around age assessment procedures. What I will say is that the social work team down at the Kent intake unit are fantastic and they have developed a strong approach to and knowledge about how to get those age assessment decisions right, with an understanding of school systems and other things about young people. I think we need to be really careful on the age assessment side.

You know that I am also going to be worried about safe and legal routes. Let me give you two examples two young ambassadors out of my large group. One is from Ukraine. She came under the Ukraine scheme, managed to complete her Ukrainian education and her UK education at the same time, and is going to King’s College. She has had nothing but support. The other is from South Sudan and, with no safe and legal route, came as an illegal immigrant. Female genital mutilation was an issue; there were some really serious issues. She found it hard to find somewhere to live and hard to get a job. She is now at Oxford University, because we have supported her and she is brilliant. Those are just two completely contrasting cases.

I stood and welcomed off the boat the first child who came from Afghanistan, who spent his nights weeping because he did not know whether his parents were alive. There is that safe and legal routes issue, particularly for children we know are coming from war-torn areas—we know that they are coming. We really need to think about that and think about support for them. That perhaps answers your tone question as well.

[Chris Murray]

Q We heard from the previous panels about how the Illegal Migration Act and the Rwanda Act caused wholesale dysfunction in the immigration system and especially in asylum. I want to ask you about the impact that that dysfunction had on children. As we were moving unaccompanied asylum-seeking children from Kent around the rest of the UK, how dysfunctional was that system? What was it like for local authorities that were trying to support them and the local communities? They have statutory obligations about child protection.

Dame Rachel de Souza: Down in Kent, because needs must, hotels were set up, so I visited the hotels that children were in. The situation was wholly inappropriate. Many children were languishing there for months, without English teaching. Kent county council was doing its best. Some of the best provision that I saw for children who were just arriving was put on by Kent, which had managed to get school going and get interpreters in, but it was overwhelmed.

What I will say, to pay tribute to local authorities around the country, is that whenever there was a very young child or a disabled child, they would step up and help. But it was hard to get the national transfer scheme going and the children were confused by it as well. The Hghland council offered a range of places to some of the children, and they were like, “Where is the highlands and what are we going to do there?” It felt discombobulated at best. It was really tricky.

Of course, let us not forget that a lot of those children were older teenagers, and a lot of the provision that they were going to was not care, but a room in a house with all sorts of other people—teenagers and older people. They were left to fend for themselves, which was incredibly disorientating. We have a problem with 16 and 17-year-olds in the care system. There was a massive stretch on social care. Every director of children’s social care who I spoke to said that it is a massive stretch on their budgets, and that they do not know what to do with those children.

I think we could be more innovative. Again, there is massive good will out there in the country. We should be looking at specialist foster care, and not sticking 17-year-olds in rooms in houses on their own. There are so many things we could be doing to try to make this better, such as settling children in communities with proper language teaching.

The No.1 thing that children tell me that they want, given that they are here, is to learn—to be educated—so that they can function well. For me, particularly with some of the children who I have seen, they do not in any way mirror the stuff that we read in the media about freeloading—coming here for whatever. Most of them are really serious cases, and given that they are here, they want to try to learn and be good productive members of our communities. There is much that we can do.

Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill (Second sitting)

Debate between Chris Murray and Will Forster

Committee stage
Thursday 27th February 2025 Public Bill Committees

[Mr Forster]

Q We have heard a lot today about supply and demand factors for migration, which you do understand. Data sharing is meant to be one of the examples of, “This is our way as a country of clamping down on immigration.” In your experience, does it have a de minimis impact?

Professor Brian Bell: Data sharing overall can be phenomenally valuable in thinking about immigration more broadly. The Migration Advisory Committee has been very clear that we need to improve the data. We have access to data from HMRC that we find very useful on the legal migration side. Fundamentally, the question is: what data does HMRC hold that will provide useful information to border security in terms of stopping organised immigration gangs? Presumably, the Government think that there are some useful points. My view is, “Why wouldn’t you try it and see if it helps?” If it does not, you are no worse off.

[Chris Murray]

Q Thank you for coming today. We heard some evidence this morning about the Illegal Migration and Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Acts. Witnesses have called them a disaster, a meltdown, and a fundamental system breakdown. What is your assessment of those Acts on the functioning of the Home Office systems and on the cost to the public purse? How effective have they been in reducing migrant numbers?

Professor Brian Bell: I will take those questions in reverse order. I do not think they were very effective. Again, I would caution that there is always this problem that you see a piece of legislation passing and then look at the numbers and try to guess whether it was the legislation that caused the change that you see. Other things are going on, so it is always difficult to do that.

More broadly, the evidence that we have from people seeking asylum is that the exact nature of the rules that exist in the country they are going to are not big drivers of their decision to go there. People have asked asylum seekers to list the reasons they want to come to the UK, and very rarely are they things like the legal system in operation for dealing with asylum claims. It is all about the fact that English is the most common language in the world and often the second language of these people. There is often a diaspora in the country, or labour market opportunities are potentially better than in some of the other countries. Those things are generally much more important than whether your asylum claim will be dealt with in Rwanda. I do not think that many people concern themselves with that.

The numbers are certainly not consistent with a story of a very significant deterrent effect from the Rwanda Act. Of course, asylum seekers might have been really clever and spotted that it was probably going to be declared illegal by the Supreme Court—perhaps they were prejudging the legality of the measures. The cost was staggering for a policy that was very unlikely to have a significant deterrent effect. The previous Government’s difficulty was that they could never actually tell you how many people they thought would be sent to Rwanda. It is not a deterrent if you are sending a few thousand people every year.