Financial Services Bill

Chris Leslie Excerpts

Monday 10th December 2012 Commons Chamber

[Greg Clark]

It is a pleasure to be muscling in at this late stage of our proceedings on the Bill, but I feel it is a bit of a cheek to do so given that many Members have laboured many hours over these clauses in Committee—

[Chris Leslie (Nottingham East) (Lab/Co-op)]

indicated assent.

[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman was one such Member.

We are in agreement with all their lordships’ amendments, and this first group demonstrates that the Government have listened to Parliament’s concerns and have amended the Bill accordingly.

The governance of the Bank of England was one area of concern, and it was debated at length in this place and the other place. The Government agreed that the Bank’s expanded responsibilities warranted taking another look at its governance arrangements. The Treasury Committee produced an excellent report on this subject just over a year ago—I note that the Committee Chairman, my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester (Mr Tyrie), is present—recommending that the Bank’s non-executive directors be given a greater role in scrutinising the Bank’s work, including the ability to commission and publish reviews of the Bank’s performance.

The current version of the Bank of England Act 1998 does not actually describe the non-executive directors as non-executive, but various amendments before us in this group will finally clarify the terminology in respect of the Bank’s court of directors by distinguishing explicitly between the non-executive and executive members.

On more substantive governance matters, amendments 3, 6 to 9, 148, 149, 151, 152, 154, 155, 169, 172 and 173 fulfil the substance of the Treasury Committee’s recommendations in this area via the creation of a powerful new oversight committee made up of the non-executive directors of the Bank’s court of directors. The oversight committee’s remit covers the entirety of the Bank’s objectives and strategy. This remit is already broad enough to allow the oversight committee to look at any aspect of the Bank’s work it believes appropriate to examine, including the effectiveness of its crisis management co-ordination with the Treasury, as suggested in an amendment proposed by the hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie). I am sure he will comment on that.

The oversight committee will have a statutory right to access the meetings and papers of the Financial Policy Committee and the Monetary Policy Committee, and it will have the power to commission reviews of the Bank’s performance from external experts or from the Bank’s own policy makers, and publish the reviews and monitor the Bank’s response to them. In line with the Treasury Committee report, these performance reviews will be undertaken retrospectively. The Committee recommended that they should take place at least a year after the period to be reviewed, in order to avoid second-guessing at the time of the policy decision. Just to be absolutely clear, the oversight committee’s remit to review the Bank’s performance is limited to the Bank’s objectives and strategy only; it does not extend to the Prudential Regulation Authority. The only role of the oversight committee in respect of the PRA is to determine the remuneration of the members of the PRA board. Because the PRA will be operationally independent in carrying out its statutory functions of regulation, it will be directly accountable to Parliament. The Government expect that the Treasury Committee will wish to summon the senior PRA executives and, where necessary, the non-executives to account for the PRA’s actions.

Amendment 167 will require the court of directors to publish a record of each of its meetings, fulfilling another of the Treasury Committee’s recommendations from its report. We have also listened to concerns in respect of the Financial Policy Committee, which focused on the role of economic growth in its decision making and the balance of its membership. Amendment 10 gives the FPC a secondary objective to support the Government’s economic policies, including growth, which will sit alongside existing requirements, such as the brake on the FPC taking action that would damage long-term sustainable growth. Amendments 4, 5, 150, 156 and 157 aim to rebalance the FPC by removing one of the Bank members, leaving a voting membership of 10 people—five Bank members and five non-Bank members.

Amendments 16, 17 and 19 to 21 go further to increase the transparency and accountability of the FPC. The FPC will be required to prepare an explanation of each of its actions, setting out publicly the reasons for its decision to take the action and its reasons for believing that the action is compatible with the FPC’s objectives, including to contribute to economic growth, and the various factors to which it must have regard, including proportionality. The FPC is also required to include an estimate of the costs and benefits of the action, where it is reasonably practicable to do so.

Amendment 17 requires the FPC to review the decisions that it has already taken in order to consider whether the actions are still necessary, or whether they should be revoked or removed. That will help to ensure that the FPC’s directions and recommendations do not remain in place for any longer than is necessary. The FPC must publish the explanations of its actions and a summary of its reviews in the next financial stability report.

The remainder of the amendments in this group represent further agreements made in the House of Lords in response to points raised in debate. Amendment 168 makes it absolutely clear that the Chancellor must always appoint a non-executive member of the court to be its chair. Amendments 174 to 176 continue the immunities from liability for damages that the existing regulators have and extends them to the new regulators. The Government have made amendments in the House of Lords to ensure that if the PRA or FCA commissions the other regulator, or the Bank of England, to carry out an investigation or produce a formal report on its behalf, the body that has been commissioned is also covered by the immunity.

This group of amendments represents a significant package of changes to the legislative framework for the Bank and the FPC, in response to points raised both in this House and in the House of Lords, and I commend it to this House.

[Chris Leslie]

It is a great pleasure to welcome the new Minister to these rather long-winded proceedings. I believe we started on this Bill back in February, but he should not worry, as this is shortly to be followed by the banking reform Bill and possibly even a banking standards Bill—to be determined—so we will probably have plenty more opportunities to chew over these issues then. It is a little preposterous to have a knife coming down at 7 o’clock, by which time we have to put the Question on 150 or so of these Lords amendments. That gives us about 25 seconds per amendment [Interruption.] I will get on with it; I lost about a dozen amendments just then.

That is why we have tabled several amendments to those Lords amendments—you will be impressed with that, Mr Deputy Speaker—and I wish briefly to explain why we have done so. The first Lords amendment that we are seeking to amend is Lords amendment 3, which, as all hon. Members here know, deals with the creation of an oversight committee within the Bank of England as a sort of subset of the court of directors, where it is to have a reviewing and, supposedly, a scrutinising role. There is a problem: the oversight committee has a series of responsibilities, not one of which is set out, in overseeing what the Bank of England does. The committee has a set of responsibilities to monitor, to review procedures and to conduct performance reviews, but all of that is retrospective—it looks backwards, not forwards. May I gently suggest to the Minister that it might be more appropriate if he were to call this a “hindsight committee” rather than an oversight committee, because as things stand I do not think there is a sense in which this is a proper check and balance within the governance of the Bank of England?

Why does that matter? It matters because the Government are giving phenomenal new powers to the Bank of England within our economy as an overarching financial regulator. The Minister says that the PRA is independent and will report to Parliament, but let us be honest: this is a creature of the Bank of England and the Bank will control very much what happens in the regulatory framework. Although we welcome the concession that was made to create an oversight committee, people have misgivings—we will probably hear about some of them, perhaps from members of the Treasury Committee, in a moment—that there is still a very hierarchical and centralised set of governance structures in the Bank of England.

We therefore need to make sure that this crucial verb “oversee” is included in the oversight committee’s remit. That would help to shift the balance of power between non-executives and executives in the Bank of England framework just that bit more. These are important lessons of governance, certainly from the private sector. While we are moving towards that executive and non-executive balance, it is important that we recognise that the Bank of England is being dragged into the 21st century. If we are taking the opportunity to do that in legislation, making that particular change would be very welcome.

The other amendment we wish to make to Lords amendment 3 relates to crisis management. As I said, the Bill gives massive new powers to the Bank of England, but in a crisis there will be very little time to figure out and design standing orders, or to work out arrangements for who will meet whom and for how decisions can involve the right people. You will recall, Mr Deputy Speaker, how during the global financial crisis crucial decisions affecting billions of pounds of taxpayers’ money and whether people could access the cash machines were made in the space of hours over weekends. In hindsight, it would have been nice to have had a carefully planned set of arrangements, and this Bill needs to learn the lessons from that. We are concerned that the crisis management arrangements are still thin and inadequate. We have suggested that if there is going to be an oversight committee in the Bank of England, the Bill needs to set out explicitly that it is to have a duty to ensure the adequacy and effectiveness of arrangements with the Treasury for crisis management.

There is no role for the new financial conduct authority in the drafting of the arrangements. Apparently it does have a veto, but it is not part of the drafting of that memorandum of understanding. The Government are still resisting proposals to ensure that deputy governors and the chief executive of the FCA can consult directly with the Treasury in circumstances where there might be differences of opinion. Given the import and the size of the FCA, the PRA and the FPC within the Bank, it is important that the deputy governors have an ability and a right to talk to the Treasury, so that everything is not hidden and suppressed within one view of the Governor of the Bank of the England.

There is a very bizarre set of provisions excluding the ability of the memorandum of understanding to make provision about the relationship between the Bank of England and the PRA, which goes to prove that the PRA is very much a creature of the Bank. It also suggests that the Governor will have powers to suppress the voice of the PRA in a crisis. Shockingly, there is no parliamentary approval process for that MOU; no statutory instrument arrangement has been made, as I understand it. The crucial paragraph of the MOU that deals with what happens in the white heat of an emergency simply says, “Oh well, there will be ad hoc or standing committees just to sort these things out.”

That is not good enough. The whole of best practice in preparedness and in emergency and contingency planning would suggest that now is the time for Her Majesty’s Treasury and the Bank of England to sit down and calmly and methodically work through what would happen in those circumstances. There should be some draft standing orders to pre-empt those scenarios.

[Mr Andrew Tyrie (Chichester) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman will recall, of course, that the poorly drafted MOU that lay behind the tripartite agreement certainly played a role in the lack of understanding of how to handle the crisis. Does that not point all the more towards a need to think things through very carefully now? That MOU was scrutinised in Parliament; I was in Committee at that time and most of the points made were largely ignored. Surely now, while we have the time, we should think through what is required in such an MOU and take the opportunity to consider that in Parliament.

[Chris Leslie]

I entirely agree with the Chairman of the Treasury Committee, who is very knowledgeable and has some strong views on these questions. It is a pity that when we flick through the luminous list of Lords amendments, we find a gaping hole on those crisis management arrangements, where none was accepted by the Government. Some clauses in the Bill deal with that set of scenarios, and it is noticeable that such provision is not included there. That is in part why we have sought to amend Lords amendment 3, as one of the few areas where we can make an amendment is in respect of the role and duties of the oversight committee. I accept that that is only half of the scenario, as we also want Her Majesty’s Treasury to have a process for reviewing the adequacy and effectiveness of its arrangements with the Bank of England, but we do not have the opportunity today to propose such an amendment.

If we are to have an oversight committee, it should be able to play a role in ensuring that the crisis management arrangements are up to scratch and that there is joined-up thinking between these variously important branches of governance to ensure that someone at the Bank of England is tasked with thinking these things through very carefully.

[Alison McGovern (Wirral South) (Lab)]

Does my hon. Friend agree that it is incredibly important that Parliament gives its view on such issues, given the weight of academic insight into the arrangements in place at the time of the crash? We are trying to learn some of the lessons from that, and one of the key lessons is the importance of rules and thinking them through ahead of the scenarios, since it is literally impossible to know what the next unforeseen shock might be and where it might come from.

[Chris Leslie]

My hon. Friend is correct that this is about learning the lessons of preparedness and of what level of forward thinking we can undertake at this point in time. It is still amazing—I know she agrees—that although the FSA conducted a comprehensive review of its role in the financial crisis and the Treasury and Government did the same, we have to this day still not had a comprehensive review by the Bank of England of its role in the financial crisis. That is amazing. It begrudgingly had three minor reviews dragged out of it—it was like getting blood out of a stone—considering small particular areas where it had some failings. Those reviews concluded that there were serious issues to be addressed, and one of the individuals conducting one of those three small arrangements talked about the fact that the governance arrangements in the Bank of England were still too centralised. I hope that the Government will think more carefully about crisis management provisions.

[Alison McGovern]

I thank my hon. Friend for being so generous in giving way again. This is a crucial point: Parliament rarely discusses the strategic role of the Bank of England and rarely legislates, in part because the independence of the Bank of England is still a valid economic principle on which we hope to rebuild our economy. We must therefore get the discussion right at this time.

[Chris Leslie]

It is worth noting that when we talk about the independence of the Bank of England we are talking about operational decisions of the Monetary Policy Committee. They have to be made, of course, without political interference. We can come on to the questions of quantitative easing and the Chancellor’s recent decisions on that, but we will put them to one side for now. The questions of governance of the Bank of England are a matter for Parliament to take very seriously indeed.

As the debate progresses, we will discuss the vast powers that the Bank will be taking, which are known rather opaquely as macro-prudential powers of regulation. Essentially, the Bank of England can intervene in any number of financial services, products and transactions and affect the financial well-being of businesses, consumers and households in the constituency of my hon. Friend the Member for Wirral South (Alison McGovern). We are talking about mortgages, lines of credit and supply and so on. That is why we need to get the arrangements right, and it is a shame that the Government did not do that.

I want to skip on, if I may, to Lords amendment 16, to which we have suggested another small amendment.

[Mr Gareth Thomas (Harrow West) (Lab/Co-op)]

While my hon. Friend has his arguments firmly in his mind, may I remind him that for some time many Members of this House have been concerned that the Bank of England has not done enough to encourage our high street banks to invest in deprived communities. Does he think that his amendment to Lords amendment 3 might help to encourage the Bank of England to pay a little more regard to those concerns?

[Chris Leslie]

Indeed, and I am grateful to my hon. Friend for taking the time to participate in this debate. A string of amendments that we will discuss later cover consumer credit and the interests of consumers, and we will talk about ease of access to financial services when we consider them. He is right, as the Bank of England is a key player in this regard.

That point neatly takes me on to our amendment (a) to Lords amendment 16. It tries to ensure that under the new arrangements the Bank of England—in particular, the new powerful committee that is being established, called the Financial Policy Committee—will, when it explains the decisions it is taking, also have to include an assessment of the impact of its decisions on economic growth. I know that the whole question of jobs and growth is somewhat of a blind spot for Treasury Ministers, but notwithstanding their rather peculiar inability to see the importance of these issues, we feel that it is important to put that requirement in the Bill.

We are delighted and overjoyed that the Government finally relented and granted a concession in the other place, after months of labour in Committee in this place, by agreeing to Lords amendment 10. It was a major victory for the Opposition when the Government were forced to change the Bill to ensure that the FPC would not only contribute to the financial stability objective but, subject to that, support the economic policies of Her Majesty’s Government, including their objectives for growth and employment. That concession was made because of the amendments we tabled and the evidence heard in Committee from a wide number of organisations, including the British Bankers Association, the CBI, the London stock exchange and others. They all said in submissions to Parliament that the new regulators should have regard to growth, so we are glad that the FPC has that general backstop requirement on its shoulders. However, we do not think it goes far enough.

As I said earlier, the powers the Bank of England will take—that rather opaquely described set of macro-prudential tools—will be very wide ranging. Each time it pulls one of those levers, each time it makes a particular decision, it should explain the impact of that change. The Bank of England will be able to affect a number of key areas. Perhaps the Minister will tell us when the draft order at the back of the Treasury’s consultation document is likely to find its way on to the Floor of the House for debate, because I know that a number of hon. Members will be interested in that.

The Bank will have powers called counter-cyclical capital buffers. I know that the Treasury Bench has a difficulty with the concept of counter-cyclicality, but it essentially means that banks will be required to build up capital when times are rather exuberant and things are going well in the economy, but to unwind those capital buffers in a downturn. The Bank will say that there should be sectoral capital requirements. In other words, the FPC can make the residential mortgage sector have a certain amount of capital or structure its business in a particular way. The commercial property sector will have to do the same. This is a Bank of England decision, not the result of parliamentary or legislative changes. Consumer credit decisions will be made. If my hon. Friends have constituents who pay off their credit card, perhaps currently a 2% or 5% minimum repayment on a monthly basis, at the flick of a switch the Bank of England will be able to say, “No, you have to pay off 10% each month,” or perhaps even more. That is the sort of power that the Bank of England will have.

[Mr George Mudie (Leeds East) (Lab)]

The situation with mortgages will be similar. I am certain that the FSA’s and the Bank’s insistence on a higher deposit will harm the construction industry. The average price of a two or three-bedroom house is £160,000, and 10% of that is £16,000 and 20% £32,000. We are getting more and more tales of young couples who simply cannot get on to the housing ladder because they are paying excessive rents and cannot save that deposit.

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[Chris Leslie]

My hon. Friend will not be surprised to learn that there was a little argy-bargy between the Treasury and the Bank of England. As I understand it, the Bank initially said, “Loan-to-value ratios on mortgages, and loan-to-income ratios, are an awfully big decision. There is a lot of politics in that. We are not that keen. Push that back to the Treasury.” I think the Treasury has been saying, “No, Bank of England, this is a decision for you to take.” These are inherently political issues and our constituents would rightly ask whom to hold to account for such big decisions that affect their daily lives: whether or not someone can get a mortgage, what is happening in the housing market, and so on. That is why we still have some reservations about the governance structures and the lack of accountability on policy making. That is why we are asking for an assessment of the impact on economic growth whenever these levers are pulled and whenever these decisions are taken. I accept that there are careful balances to be struck. The FPC of course has to have an eye to stability, but it also needs to recognise, as the Chancellor has said, that we do not want the risk-aversion of the graveyard so that there is no economic activity. That is why we have suggested this particular change.

I am conscious of the time and I know that a number of hon. Members want to speak. Those are the main points that I have to make about our particular arrangements and it would useful if we could hear the views of others.

[Mr Tyrie]

The Bill came out of the other place only last Wednesday night and it was heavily amended there. It is the most complicated, and one of the most important, pieces of financial legislation for decades.

Much of what we are considering today amends provisions in the Bill, which themselves amend the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 and the Bank of England Act. The Bill is incomprehensible without constant referral to FSMA. I would go further and say that it is incomprehensible in parts even after considerable referral to FSMA. We now have a piece of legislation that passeth all man’s understanding, like God’s will. FSMA itself was arguably the most complex piece of legislation ever passed by Parliament. I was on the Bill Committee and it was certainly pretty testing.

We are now legislating in a huge rush to get this on the statute book by the end of the year in order to meet an entirely arbitrary deadline. The deadline has been rendered all the more absurd by the fact that we will be back here next year anyway amending it as part of the banking Bill, which is required to give effect to the Vickers commission’s recommendations, parts of which have to be done by amending FSMA and cannot be done in any other way. I am not making some recondite point about parliamentary procedure; I am making a point about how to make the Bill effective. It is a point that is being made to me right now by senior regulators, who would very much prefer that we just take a little bit more time to get the legislation right.

This group of amendments deals largely with Bank of England governance. Everyone is agreed that Bank of England governance is in a huge mess. That is why last April the Treasury Committee took the highly unusual step of tabling a new clause in an effort to try to sort it out. I am particularly grateful to colleagues from four parties on the Committee who all co-operated to enable that amendment to go down with unanimous support. I am also particularly grateful to my deputy Chairman, who is sitting on the Opposition Benches, who assisted with the tabling of that clause. It was needed because the Bank has ramshackle governance arrangements that reflect their 17th century origins, as the name “court” demonstrates. As has already been pointed out, better governance would improve its accountability to Parliament. But much more important in some respects, it would also improve the Bank of England’s authority to act and to speak to the rest of the country as it takes tough decisions, such as those that have just been referred to. This is a point that is not lost on very senior people in the Bank of England right now, on the Monetary Policy Committee, the Financial Policy Committee, and also a number of deputy governors.

The Treasury Committee clause would not have solved all that, but it would have gone some way to bringing the Bank into line with good practice on corporate governance generally. It would have placed a duty on the court to conduct retrospective reviews of Bank performance and to publish the results, and it would have required the court to publish its minutes. I withdrew the amendment in the Commons only when the Government gave undertakings to make those changes in the Lords. I will come back to that.

In May, the Treasury Committee took another highly unusual step of reporting on the Financial Services Bill, after we had looked at it in the Commons, in order to assist the other place with its examination. Most of the conclusions that we came to in that report were raised as amendments in the Lords. The Government responded to some of them and that is what we are debating now. The Government’s Lords amendment 3 sets up, as we have heard, an oversight sub-committee of the court’s non-executives. That would give the court the power to commission retrospective reviews of the Bank’s performance —that is a step forward—to be carried out either externally or internally. The Government have also inserted an amendment to require the publication of court records of its meetings. While these amendments improve the Bill, they fall well short of what we were hoping for, and what in our view is still required, for several reasons.

First, the amendments place the power of review in the hands of a sub-committee of the court, rather than the court itself. This will further confuse the lines of accountability, not least to Parliament and to the Treasury Committee. These accountability lines are now very complex. I urge the Minister to try drawing them on the back of an envelope. I wager that he will have quite a task on his hands. Senior regulators agree that they will not do as they stand, and they have been telling us that publicly and privately. They want an improvement. They want the legitimacy for their decisions that comes with effective parliamentary scrutiny. Senior people in the Bank of England have seen how the Monetary Policy Committee has been strengthened and bolstered as a result of effective scrutiny by the Treasury Committee.

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[Greg Clark]

The hon. Gentleman has more experience of questioning the Governor than I have. The Joint Committee on the draft Financial Services Bill, of which he was a member, volunteered to agree with the Governor on that assessment, at least. We followed the Committee’s advice on that, as was recognised in the other place.

[Chris Leslie]

I understand the Minister’s argument. However, we are talking about a lot of power in the hands of a single individual—the single point of potential institutional disruption, as the Chairman of the Treasury Committee called it. Surely the sun king is capable of responding to some internal questioning, scrutiny and challenge, and that would be a healthy thing to have. Some kind of more proactive oversight might therefore not be such a bad idea after all.

[Greg Clark]

All those things are provided for in the Bill; the question is whether the word that the hon. Gentleman seeks to introduce is a matter of semantics or would bring in scrutiny of current decisions. That is a point of difference between us. In the House of Lords there are many people with experience of being very effective non-executive directors, as I know from my distinguished constituent, Baroness Noakes. Most people would recognise that she is meticulous and robustly independent in the scrutiny that she brings to matters, and she regarded the wording of the Bill as entirely compatible with that. It is not right to go against what the Treasury Committee recommended and to have the second-guessing of immediate decisions.

Let me say something about the existing powers. The report by the Treasury Committee recommended that ex-post reviews of the Bank’s performance should be carried out, and those are provided for. In fact, the current wording of subsection (2) of new section 3A of the 1998 Act requires the oversight committee to

“keep under review the Bank's performance”,

and that is consistent with the Committee’s recommendations. We think that this wording strikes the right balance between ensuring effective retrospective scrutiny of the Bank’s policy performance and avoiding a situation whereby the non-executive members of the court would be constantly second-guessing the decisions taken by the Bank’s expert policy committees and executives.

Amendment (b), tabled by the hon. Member for Nottingham East, would give the oversight committee an additional function to keep under review the adequacy and effectiveness of the Bank’s arrangements with the Treasury for crisis management. It is very important that that should be under review, for all the reasons he said. Subsection (2) of new section 3A gives the oversight committee a broad remit to keep under review the Bank’s performance in relation to all its objectives and strategy. It is absolutely clear—I would like to confirm this from the Dispatch Box—that the effectiveness of the Bank’s relationship and co-ordination with the Treasury in crisis management is fundamental to the Bank’s achievement of its objective to protect and enhance stability. As such, the oversight committee can already undertake or commission a review into the effectiveness of these arrangements if necessary. In fact, in January this year the Bank said in its response to the Treasury Committee that the oversight committee should, among other things, assess whether the Bank is fulfilling effectively its duty to notify the Treasury of risks to public funds at the appropriate time. There is no substantial difference between us that the amendment is seeking to expose.

[Chris Leslie]

The problem is the threadbare nature of the memorandum of understanding, particularly the infamous paragraph 20, which says:

“However, the Chancellor and the Governor may agree to establish ad hoc or standing committees.”

That is so thin that it is important for the oversight committee to make it a top priority to ensure that there is preparedness and that it is thinking through the circumstances in which a crisis may occur, and that needs to be placed explicitly in the Bill.

[Greg Clark]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s clarification. We should bear it in mind that the Bill requires the Treasury to lay the MOU before Parliament and to publish it. It will be subject to full transparency. For example, I would be very surprised if my hon. Friend the Member for Chichester did not call the Chancellor or the Governor to explain it. The oversight committee will be responsible for overseeing the Bank’s performance and, clearly, the MOU is a key part of its work in bringing to bear the Bank’s financial stability work. The committee will, therefore, consider from time to time whether it is working well and Parliament will itself have every opportunity to address the issue.

Amendment (a) to Lords amendment 16 would require the Financial Policy Committee to produce explanations of its decisions to exercise its recommendation and direction powers. Proposed new section 9QA(1) of the Bank of England Act makes it clear that the FPC’s explanations must set out how its decisions are compatible with its objectives, including the new objective to support the Government’s objectives for growth. It is clear that it has an explicit responsibility to do that. The FPC’s explanations will have to set out publicly how it has considered the impact on economic growth when deciding to take action and its reasons for believing that the action is compatible with its obligations in relation to economic growth.

Lords amendment 16—specifically subsection (3) of proposed new section 9QA of the 1998 Act—already requires the FPC to produce estimates of the costs and benefits of the decisions, including those areas to which the hon. Member for Leeds East (Mr Mudie) has referred. This will cover the impact on financial stability, both directly and indirectly, and the impact, both positive and negative, on economic growth.

I reassure the House that the FPC is giving considerable care and thought to the impact of these tools. The Bill requires the committee to produce and maintain policy statements for its direction tools. The statements will discuss the likely impact on both financial stability and economic growth. The Bank is preparing a draft of the statements, to be published early next year, so that they can be considered alongside the secondary legislation that will set out the FPC’s direction powers. We do not, therefore, think that amendment (a) to Lords amendment 16 is necessary.

[Greg Clark]

I am grateful for the hon. Gentleman’s point. I am not able to produce a novel parliamentary procedure, but I can certainly tell him and the Chairman of the Treasury Committee that when the time comes to publish the statutory instruments, if they or their Committee would like to consider and advise on the discharge of the commitments, I would be happy to engage with them in good faith and take on board any suggestions.

[Chris Leslie]

I am delighted to hear that concession from the Minister. We have suggested a super-affirmative procedure for some of the regulations. That would give the Treasury Committee and others more time to look at the issues and ask the other Select Committees about the effect on, for example, housing and communities and local government. If the Minister is willing to open that door, we would support him.

[Greg Clark]

I give the hon. Gentleman an inch and he takes a mile. I will not commit to a different procedure but, as I have said, I will certainly commit, in good faith, to considering personally any points that are made. [Interruption.]

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[Greg Clark]

The short answer to that is yes. The FCA’s powers will be broad, and defined by practice rather than activity. We have been clear that it might not be just the level of interest charged, but other practices associated with the lenders that come within the ambit of the regulator. It is clear that it will use those powers vigorously to promote the interests of all our constituents.

I will leave my introductory remarks on that point. I am sure that Members wish to contribute and I will seek to respond to any points raised when I make my winding-up speech.

[Chris Leslie]

There is a large number of amendments in this group, that focus on consumer credit and the best interests of consumers. I want to concentrate on two in particular—Lords amendments 25 and 78.

Lords amendment 25 was extracted from the Government and we are glad that they gave way on it. The amendment will henceforth make it clear that the new Financial Conduct Authority will have a requirement to ensure basic access to financial services particularly in deprived areas and neighbourhoods where some of our banks and financial institutions do not necessarily think that they can make millions and millions of pounds. That is the hope placed on the shoulders of the FCA. The key question is whether the regulator will roll up its sleeves and use the full extent of the powers that the Bill should provide. I, for one, will be seeking a very early meeting with the new chief executive of the FCA to extract commitments on how it intends to use the new powers.

It should not have taken months of persuading and cajoling Treasury Ministers for them to accede to the changes. Perhaps it was the fresh air provided by the new broom, the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, sweeping clean with perhaps more of an open mind than his predecessor on some of these issues. If that is the case, I commend him for it. We need to begin to look at the detail, so I have a series of questions for him, starting with Lords amendment 25.

There are already what some people call lending deserts. In some communities, bank branches are not as readily available as they are in other, more affluent areas. In some deprived areas of the country, it is hard for consumers to access affordable credit. The key word—affordability—is of course now well known. If people want to be completely ripped off, they can pay for high-cost credit, often on a very short-term basis, with immense interest rate charges that can accumulate and get them into severe jeopardy. That will lead to further financial exclusion if they cannot keep up with the repayments, and to them being trapped in a spiral of poverty.

It is important to hold the big five banks to account. As large institutions, they are not just private companies with no obligations beyond and above those that rest on the shoulders of any other private company. In this day and age, they are a social utility and have a duty to the community to ensure that all parts of the country have access to basic banking facilities. The work of the financial inclusion taskforce, under the previous Administration, sought to ensure that basic bank account facilities were available. With the onset of universal credit in April 2014, it will be even more important for everybody to understand and have access to those facilities. However, I am increasingly worried about the fragile deal put together under the previous Administration to support and extend those basic services. There are signs of a creeping onset of charges. As banks come out from the era where the taxpayer was essentially keeping them going, they are now starting to look to the consumer to extract more charges. I do not want a situation where banks get together and think about introducing basic charges on current accounts, especially for those who are taking care to ensure that they are in credit. There are worrying signs that that might be in the air. Even the regulators have started to say, “Well, let’s start charging a little bit for in-credit current accounts. It might be a way of ensuring we don’t have to charge such high costs for unauthorised overdrafts.”

[Sheila Gilmore (Edinburgh East) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend talks about regulating to ensure that these bank accounts remain available. Sometimes, if people find themselves being charged for an account, they simply give up, because it is too expensive, and sometimes they cannot open another account, because they have got into difficulty. That has been the experience in the past few years. I hope that the regulators will be alive to those issues.

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

Indeed, that is the case. Anxiety is spreading and rumours are circulating that people with credit impairments or county court judgments against them are finding it increasingly difficult to access basic bank account services. One of the most shocking changes has been the way some of the big banks have started gradually to pull out of the LINK cash machine network. That network depends on all the banks taking part, because, if some big banks withdraw, as has happened, more of the cost of maintaining the network falls on a minority of banks, which, as a result, are more likely to walk away. I have worries, therefore, not just about the basic bank account networks, but about the LINK cash machine system, and I would be grateful if the Minister set out to those banks in no uncertain terms that, given their social duties and responsibilities as a utility, we expect—as a de minimis requirement—that they maintain those basic, fundamental activities.

[Alison McGovern]

Will my hon. Friend slightly broaden his comments about the LINK system? In too many of our towns and cities, cash machines in the most deprived areas are the ones that charge. Unfortunately, the principle that those with the least pay the most is creeping back into financial services. If we do nothing else this evening, let us send the message to the financial services industry that such a principle is wholly unacceptable.

[Chris Leslie]

That is true. The Opposition take the view that the financial services sector needs to move away from the old model of essentially extracting profit on the basis either of the ignorance or lack of awareness of customers—basically taking advantage of the inertia in the system—or of the fact that the consumer has no other choice. We need to support a financial services sector that genuinely adds professional value and acumen to products fairly and transparently. That is the modern sort of financial services sector that this country deserves and can have. We need to get away from that old era, in which the banking system essentially raked in multiples of small penny packets of income and profit off the backs of people who were not necessarily aware they were being charged 25p or 50p for cash withdrawals. That is the sort of bad practice we need to move away from.

The Opposition have called for action to ensure that pockets of the country are not left isolated and on their own. In the United States, they have clear safeguards requiring banks to reinvest in communities and provide basic coverage. That counts not only for consumers, but for small businesses, which, as we know, also struggle to access affordable loans.

[Mr Thomas]

My hon. Friend is making an extremely important point. He will be aware that President Obama, in backing stimulus legislation in Congress, ensured that it required banks to disclose their lending to businesses across the USA, allowing us to see the lending deserts not only for individual financial consumers, but for individual business financial consumers. Surely that is something the FCA might usefully consider requiring of our banks.

[Chris Leslie]

In Labour’s view, amendment 25 ought to allow that. If we are talking about ease of access to affordable financial services, it should be a responsibility of the FCA to think of new ways to map what is happening across the country and to ensure that there are not these deserts or vacuums of poor availability or no availability. That is why there should be a requirement for a map to be drawn up of where and what lending is available, perhaps on a postcode-by-postcode basis. It would provide transparency and enable hon. Members to find out what is happening in their constituencies. Anecdote is not adequate; we need a more rigorous system of regulation and monitoring. That is how it is often done in other developed countries, such as the US, as my hon. Friend said.

In the past, Ministers have said that they are opposed to that level of transparency. I am not sure about this Minister—I know he will want to take a fresh perspective—but previous Ministers said: “It’s too burdensome to require transparency in respect of lending patterns, and there might be anti-competitive issues as well.” It would be entirely feasible to collect anonymised data in the way suggested, however, and I hope that Lords amendment 25 could be so interpreted.

[Mark Durkan]

Like my hon. Friend, I welcome amendment 25, which, I note, was something he laboured on valiantly when we spent our Lent in Committee. Does he recognise, however, that in one part of the UK —Northern Ireland—the five high street banks he referred to are not part of the banking profile? In Northern Ireland, we are facing a twilight zone of banking, with changes happening almost by default squared—as a result of changes here and in Dublin—and that will change further in the context of banking union. That is why we need to question how the FCA would use the powers being given to it under amendment 25.

[Chris Leslie]

Exactly. I imagine that what my hon. Friend describes is absolutely correct. Incidentally, I pay tribute to him for his endeavours in trying to improve the legislation, month after month after month, as we proceeded through Committee and on Report. The situation in Northern Ireland will be compounded by different factors, so how much more useful would it be if he and his neighbouring parliamentary colleagues had access to data about lending availability in a more rigorous form? That is how we want to interpret amendment 25 and how we will press the FCA to interpret it.

[Mr Thomas]

Is there not a danger that the Minister might see amendments 25 and 78 as a “Get out of Jail” card when it comes to taking real action to tackle the problem of payday lenders and the lack of access to financial services in many of our most deprived communities? Might he not say, “Well, 2014, when the FCA comes in, will be the time to act”? Does he not need to adopt the same initiative as my hon. Friend mentions by having a meeting with the chief executive of the FCA and saying, “We want action on these issues. We want you to set out clearly before you take office what you’re going to do about the problem of payday lenders and what steps you’re going to take to require better access to financial services in the most deprived communities”?

--- Later in debate ---

[Chris Leslie]

That is correct. The Minister ought to be meeting the FCA regularly, and clearly those are the questions the House expects Treasury Ministers to put to the new regulators.

Lords amendment 78 was another concession that had to be dragged from the Government at great effort. I do not expect too much sympathy from you, Madam Deputy Speaker, but it is quite difficult for the Opposition to win votes in this House. Occasionally we have the odd success, such as on the EU budget—I do not want to talk about these things too much, as I know the Minister is a bit raw on that point—but by and large we try our best, we make our suggestions and we do not get very far. However, on this issue the Government were faced not just with the weight of argument by many hon. Members—including, of course, my hon. Friend the Member for Walthamstow (Stella Creasy)—but with the spiritual hand of assistance from the new Archbishop of Canterbury-designate in the other place, the Cross-Bench Bishop of Durham, as is. The Government had no choice but to make that historic concession when faced with the overwhelming moral and political case and the breadth of cross-party agreement.

The Commercial Secretary to the Treasury admitted that amendment 78 would not be a silver bullet for the problem of high-cost credit—payday lending or however we characterise these things. Although we are slightly disappointed that the new expanded Lords amendment 78 does not refer to “consumer detriment”, we hope that some of the provisions will open the door to enabling the Financial Conduct Authority to take urgent action to clamp down on some of the high costs involved, as well as the duration and rolling over of some payday loans or high-cost credit arrangements again and again, getting people into a spiral of dependency with massive credit costs, which are severely damaging to very many people.

My questions for the Minister are these. If the legislation no longer contains the “consumer detriment” litmus test, what will trigger intervention by the regulator? What will be the test? We are keen on many of the ideas in the amendment. The power to recover funds for consumers, the power to strike down enforcement action by an unreasonable lender and the power to insist on compensation for customers are all good, but we need the Minister to explain in slightly more detail how the Financial Conduct Authority will trigger those powers. Will individual complainants ring up the FCA hotline? Will litigation or a set of class-action cases be needed to get the FCA to take note, or might it send mystery shoppers around the country to undertake proactive investigations and say, “This is not good enough; we will see action”?

We are glad that Lords amendment 78 also makes changes on unlawful communications. That is welcome. Hon. Members will be looking at the clock and thinking, “Well, usually about now”—some time between 7.30 pm and 8 o’clock—“we get text messages from companies trying to convince us that all our debts can be written off in a voluntary arrangement under new Government legislation.” We might get spam or a cold caller saying, “Did you realise you’ve got £2,500 overdue, if only you put in your PPI claim before Christmas?” It is around this time in the evening that people will be getting these sorts of automated calls. There are all sorts of advertising, text and cold-call arrangements proliferating across the country.

Many of our constituents are totally baffled about what is being done and what can be done by the relevant authorities to stop such exploitative behaviour. Apparently, some of the companies trying to exploit vulnerable individuals use mechanised arrangement to poll thousands and thousands of people, and even if only 1% pick up the phone and say, “Oh well, I’d like more information”, the volume of calls means that they can make significant profits. A lot of these automated telephone arrangements are routed through foreign jurisdictions—often not even in the European Union—as a way of skating around advertising regulations.

We want amendment 78 to get a grip on some of those questions. I know that financial services companies are not always the ones directly involved—it could be what are known as claims management companies. There are also organisations peddling debt management plans that have high fees associated with them. People are sold a product by a company that says, “Let’s consolidate all your expensive loans and we’ll take a single payment instead.” People think, “That sounds rather good,” and they start making payments. Perhaps months go by, during which they pay, thinking that they are defraying their debts, but when the company goes bust, they find that they have paid down absolutely none of their debts. All they have been doing is paying for the profits taken by a fee-charging DMP provider. Those are the sorts of services we want the Financial Conduct Authority to tackle.

We have had a lot of shilly-shallying on these issues. Quite frankly, it should not have taken nine months of hard effort to extract this concession from the Government since we first tabled an equivalent amendment in Committee back in March. We are glad for small mercies—this is a step in the right direction—but it is now for the Minister to explain how Lords amendments 25 and 78 will bite and how they will help people in their daily lives. I look forward to hearing his response.

[Helen Goodman]

I want to speak to Lords amendment 25. The Minister was not terribly clear in his opening remarks about whether it concerned consumers as individuals or whether it would be interpreted more widely, to address the branch networks that the main clearing banks operate. When he winds up, I urge him to say something about the significance of having a nationwide branch network to ensure that all communities can be financially included.

This issue came to my attention in July, when I received a letter from HSBC, which wanted to close its branch in Shildon in my constituency. Shildon is a town of slightly more than 10,000 people, many of whom have been banking with HSBC for a long time. Many local businesses—600 of them—bank at the Shildon branch. It is much cheaper for everybody to have a local branch than to get on the bus, go down to Bishop Auckland, put money into the bank or take it out, and then come back again. The round trip on the bus costs £4. It is absolutely ridiculous that people should face such barriers. We mounted a great campaign and a huge petition, but of course HSBC has paid no attention whatever to the needs of the people of Shildon. I happened to come across a man at the Labour party conference who revelled in the title of “Director for wealth management”, and who was apparently the person responsible for the branch network. It is true that there is not a lot of wealth to manage in Shildon; none the less, people in Shildon need a proper banking service, just like those in other parts of the country.

As well as thinking about that need, we need to think about the impact on the rest of us. Let us suppose that somebody who lives in a perfectly well-banked part of Durham wishes to make payments in Shildon, belong to an organisation there or make transactions with people there. It is far easier and better for everybody if they know that there is a proper national network of bank branches. I urge the Minister to comment on the branch network in his closing speech.

I remind the Minister that over the last four years taxpayers have given the major banks a considerable amount of support through subsidies and guarantees, yet although they are too big to fail, they are not too big to fail their customers, which is exactly what they are doing. HSBC claims in its slogan to be “the world’s local bank”, but it is not very local in my constituency.

--- Later in debate ---

[Greg Clark]

I come now to the Government’s implementation of the independent review of LIBOR conducted by Mr Martin Wheatley. I announced the Government’s response to the Wheatley review in mid-October and three sets of amendments to the Bill have been made to implement those recommendations that require legislation. The first is to enable activities in relation to benchmarks, such as LIBOR and potentially others, to be brought within the scope of regulation under FSMA. The second is to create criminal offences designed to tackle misconduct in the financial sector, including a new criminal offence for making false or misleading submissions in connection with the determination of a benchmark. The third is to provide the FCA with a rule-making power to require banks to submit to LIBOR and other benchmarks. Those amendments complement the market-led reforms to LIBOR as recommended by the Wheatley review. Martin Wheatley recommended that submission to, and the administration of, LIBOR become regulated activities, and amendments 59 to 62 create a framework to enable activities in relation to benchmarks to be specified as regulated activities under FSMA.

Amendment 60 defines “ benchmark” as an “index, rate or price”, defined from time to time by reference to the state of the market and used in relation to investments. A benchmark is capable of being regulated only if it meets that definition. The precise benchmarks that are subject to regulation will be specified by way of statutory instrument. The Government recently published a consultation paper on this legislation. Initially, the activities to become regulated will be LIBOR submission and administration, as recommended by the Wheatley review. However, further benchmarks can be added and the Government are considering and consulting on whether additional benchmarks should be brought within the regulatory perimeter. The types of benchmarks that could be eligible include equity or bond indices, derivatives and commodity or energy benchmarks. The definition of benchmark, as drafted, requires that it be used for one or more purposes that relate to section 22 of, and schedule 2 to, FSMA.

The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) has tabled an amendment that would extend that definition to include commodities. Let me say first that I totally understand the requirement that we should be able to address some of the alleged abuses that have taken place and have the powers in statute to include those benchmarks that are relevant to some of the concerns that have been expressed recently. We do not believe that there is any requirement to extend the legislation on that. In fact, the Bill was drafted to anticipate the Wheatley review and the work going on in other benchmarks. Benchmarks can represent many things, including commodities or energies, provided that they are traded financially in the way we often see. Under the definition, regulation by the FCA extends to benchmarks that involve financial matters consistent with FSMA and the objectives of the FCA as the financial services regulator.

The Wheatley review also recommended that banks should be encouraged to participate in LIBOR—participation is currently voluntary. In the absence of such submissions, LIBOR would cease to be a representative benchmark and, in an extreme scenario, would not be published at all. Therefore, Lords amendment 79 allows the FCA to require firms to participate in particular benchmarks, while making reference to a “code or other document”. That allows the detail of the requirement to be determined by the benchmark administrator, not by the FCA. It might not be necessary for the FCA to use that power immediately, if at all, and it has recently opened a discussion on how and when the use of that power could be considered.

The Wheatley review also recommended the creation of a new criminal offence in relation to the manipulation of benchmarks such as LIBOR and the re-examination of the criminal sanctions for market manipulation under FSMA. Although such conduct could already be a criminal offence under legislation, this is a helpful clarification of some of the powers. There will be three criminal offences: first, we are re-creating the offence of making a false or misleading statement; secondly, we are widening the offence in section 397(3) to include creating a false or misleading impression as to the market in, or the price or value of, an investment for the purposes of making a profit or avoiding a loss; and thirdly, we are creating a new criminal offence related to misleading statements and impressions in respect of specified benchmarks.

The amendments also replicate the penalties for existing offences: a person found guilty might face a prison sentence of up to seven years and an unlimited fine. The detail of the investments, agreements and benchmarks for which those criminal offences apply will be set out in secondary legislation. That is included in the public consultation currently under way.

Under the current arrangements, where enforcement action results in a firm paying a financial penalty, that is applied as a discount to fees paid by other firms the following year. Without reform, unprecedented fines, such as those relating to the attempted manipulation of LIBOR, would have represented a significant windfall to regulated firms. In future, regulatory fines revenue in excess of enforcement case costs will go to the Consolidated Fund. The hon. Member for Nottingham East and I had an exchange about that earlier. The regulators will be able to net off enforcement case costs before handing over the penalties to the public purse. The new arrangements will apply to FSA fines received from 1 April 2012, so the measure will include the penalty imposed on Barclays in relation to the attempted manipulation of LIBOR.

The Government have announced that £35 million of fines imposed from attempted LIBOR manipulation and other unacceptable behaviour received this year will be used to support Britain’s armed forces community. In addition, £5 million will go to the creation of new, groundbreaking first world war galleries at the Imperial War museum. I hope that the House will agree to these amendments but, of course, I stand ready to respond to any points Members make.

[Chris Leslie]

We have moved on to another series of amendments that have arisen largely as a result of the scandal that was discovered this summer, when it was found that some of the largest banks—obviously, we have heard about the concerns in relation to Barclays—had been manipulating LIBOR, the benchmark from which flows billions, if not trillions, in financial services products and investments worldwide.

The scandal had massive ramifications across the banking sector. It was as though having gone through three or four years of attempted reform following the global financial crisis, after which it was clear that the risks that many in the banking sector had been taking were not properly understood or accounted for, the sector was again knocked sideways. It turns out that it was not just about exuberant risk-taking; it was, in fact, about corrupt manipulation of what people had thought was a trustworthy index. What is worse, it hit the reputation of the City of London in particular. It was all in the name: the London interbank offered rate. This was taken by many other international financial centres to be a moment of weakness for the UK financial services sector, and we saw several examples of other jurisdictions taking action swiftly to capitalise on the disarray in which many in the financial services sector found themselves. It was therefore important that the Government took urgent action and commissioned a review of what happened in the LIBOR scandal.

At the time, we felt that the matter was of such significance that we called for an independent judicial inquiry into the whole question of banking standards and ethics. As I am sure you will recall, Mr Deputy Speaker, we had a very heated debate in which the Government said, “We’ll have a parliamentary banking commission,” while we said, “Go for an independent judicial variant.” Of course, the Government won the day, and hence the Chairman of the Treasury Committee is now demonstrating his stewardship of that commission, which is due to report shortly. I hope that it has an opportunity to look into the wider issue of ethics and standards in banking. The Government have been keen that it starts to focus, almost in pre-legislative mode ahead of the banking reform Bill, on the Vickers reforms, but these questions of standards, ethics and culture also matter tremendously.

The Government made several amendments to the Bill in the House of Lords. In amendment 79, it is envisaged that there will be new provisions for a benchmark administrator, but it is not certain that a private sector organisation, even if it has a certain amount of experience, will be totally immune from conflicts of interest. Did the Government give any consideration to establishing a more independent body or entity for that administrative process? It is vital that the process of finding a new benchmark administrator is open and transparent. Will the Minister give more details about the process that he is undertaking and how the tender process is happening?

On amendment 115, it is important to ensure that the new criminal offences have a strong effect in respect of misleading statements on benchmarking and in general. In terms of its jurisdiction, is the amendment limited to British banking and financial services activities, or does it cover activities undertaken by UK organisations or UK-approved persons in operations in countries beyond our shores? Clearly, in a globalised world, that is relevant to how we see the behaviour of those in the sector.

The Government’s proposals to regulate benchmarking currently apply only to investments. We want to ensure that the regulatory net is also cast around commodities, including oil trading, gas market trading, silver, gold, foodstuffs, and so on. I am sure, Mr Deputy Speaker, that you can think of a range of potential commodities. Therefore, in the marvellous parliamentary way in which we do these things, we are seeking to amend a Lords amendment to ensure that the definition is focused not only on investment but, for clarity’s sake, puts commodities into the Bill. The Government say that they are consulting on this arrangement and might have the power to include those things later down the line but do not believe that there is a requirement to do so at this stage. However, it is time that we got ahead of these issues early on.

In the Public Bill Committee in March, after several hours of debate—it had been a bit of a long day—I asked the Minister’s predecessor, in relation to LIBOR and the benchmarking of these arrangements, “Do the Government have a view about whether there is manipulation and whether changes need to be made to the regulatory arrangements?” He stood up and answered with the single word, no. Of course, he came to regret that stance and several months later—I think it was in June—we learned that a tremendous scandal had taken place. If we have these legislative vehicles, it is important that we take the opportunity to deal with any potential issues.

[Alison McGovern]

My hon. Friend mentioned ethics a moment ago. Although we need a financial services system that is internally ethical and that has the right culture, there is a broader problem. The LIBOR scandal bit in the way it did not because it was a usual Whitehall story, but because the Government rely on LIBOR, among other indices, to know what is going on in financial services. This might not be the part of the Bill that has been most hotly debated this evening, but we are all reliant on these indices. Is that why my hon. Friend is suggesting that we should cast the net a little wider and try to get ahead of the problem rather than constantly chase ourselves?

[Chris Leslie]

My hon. Friend makes an excellent intervention. She is right. In our debates about financial services we sometimes talk in rarefied or esoteric technical terms, but this issue is certainly of relevance to all our constituents, whose mortgage rates, the interest they pay on loans, and, in the case of oil markets, the price they pay for petrol at the petrol station and the price they pay to heat their homes, as well as prices in the gas and food markets—the price of a loaf of bread, for example—are all too often rooted in the costs of these commodities and investments, as determined by the global trading environment.

This is what it boils down to: it is a question of trust. Hitherto, people assumed that all the market benchmark arrangements were simply transparent exchanges of data and prices that showed the true value of an investment, product or commodity, and that people were buying and selling in an open and fair process. It turned out that those in the know, who were often highly paid traders in the bigger banks—incidentally, even more revelations will come out over the coming months about the banks that might have been involved in LIBOR—knew how to wangle the system and play the market in a way that helped not only the profits of their particular company, but that boosted their own personal bonus arrangements. It was a question of using other people’s money in order to shift massive volumes of trades. Even if the changes in price were fractional and seemed irrelevant, when they were multiplied by the billions of trades that were taking place they could have massive financial advantages to those traders involved.

It was alleged recently that banks rigged electricity markets in the United States and record fines have been issued. That involved British institutions, so British regulators should be explicitly equipped to tackle attempts to rig commodities trading, whether it be spot trading, forward contracts, futures contracts or hedging arrangements. Global commodities markets include a vast range of products, such as grains, fibre, other food, precious and industrial metals, energy, carbon offsets and so on.

As I have said, British households are affected by commodity market manipulation—perhaps even more than attempts to rig LIBOR. Commodity speculation has contributed to the record costs of staple foods in recent years. In fact, some people argue that the riots and social unrest in Egypt, Tunisia and other countries were influenced by pricing issues and distortions.

Last month, after the Energy Secretary made a statement to Parliament, the Financial Services Authority and Ofgem confirmed that they were conducting an inquiry into claims that British companies manipulated the wholesale gas market on 28 September. The Government have said that it would not be appropriate to use legislation to cover pure commodities, such as gas, but that if commodities are referenced by derivatives or other financial instruments, it is covered by the definition of investments. However, a derivative instrument may essentially be a traded instrument and there is no reason for it to fall within that definition. It could be regarded as an insurance product and so does not fall clearly within the definition of investments in Lords amendment 119.

Total, the French oil company, recently made open allegations against one of the PRAs. That is not the PRA as we know and love it—the Prudential Regulatory Authority—but another acronym. Price reporting agencies are companies or organisations that essentially gather information, almost as a journalist might do, and figure out broadly what is happening in the market. However, it is not necessarily a true reflection of what is happening. Total alleged that there were erratic processes involved and that it was not a true reflection of the state of the market. There were also questions over the methodologies of the price reporting agencies. Does the Minister think that price reporting agencies need to be within the regulatory ambit? Again, they are important component players in the financial services sector, but are not familiar to all our constituents—but by goodness, they would become familiar to all our constituents if they were not trusted or were seen to be failing in some way.

[Mike Freer (Finchley and Golders Green) (Con)]

Much commodity trading is still focused on trading on the floor, rather than on the screen. Does the shadow Minister not accept that as the trend moves towards trading on the screen, that should drive transparency? Should we not let the transparency of the market work first, before we rush to regulate?

[Chris Leslie]

I do want to see more transparency. Electronic data exchanges certainly have the potential to provide the regulators, including the Bank of England, with more real-time transactional information about what is actually happening. I do not necessarily want to see regulators wading through reams of information, but I want to ensure that, if need be, they have the scope to act. It is not clear that the Financial Services Bill, as it first entered Parliament in February, would have captured the LIBOR benchmarking situation within the regulatory perimeter. There were suggestions from the FSA that it was not something that it could deal with. That was not good enough and the Government have come forward with amendments. I want to ensure that those amendments allow the regulators to trigger inquiries and oversight for all benchmarking indices and arrangements, especially in the commodities market.

The hon. Member for Harlow (Robert Halfon), who has been campaigning on oil and petrol prices, has called for an OFT and FSA investigation into manipulation by oil firms in recent times. The United States Commodity Futures Trading Commission has raised questions about price fixing and manipulation in the silver market. That study was inconclusive, but questions linger over metals markets more broadly. The Minister’s good friend, the European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, Commissioner Barnier, has suggested that all commodity indices should be covered in this way. Rather than waiting for European regulators to ensure that this happens, why do we not take this opportunity to deal with the issue?

We should not just say that benchmarking means investments; it is vital that we put it beyond doubt that the question of commodities is included. It is a stitch in time to ensure that we cast the regulatory perimeter correctly. I commend amendments (a), (b) and (c) to Lords amendment 60 to the House.

[Alison McGovern]

I promise not to test your patience, Mr Deputy Speaker, or that of the House by speaking for too long. Some, I know, will be of the view that indices and benchmarks are dry, dull, technical subjects—[Hon. Members: “Never!”] Hon. Members may say that, but I suspect them of sarcasm.

I begin with an explanation of why I think this part of the legislation so important, and why the amendments tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) are crucial. In my view, they relate directly to the subject that currently fills our newspapers and television screens—the indignity and horror of food banks. The reason my constituents, and those of other hon. Members, cannot just pop to the shops and buy food is that food costs more than the amount of money in their pockets. In the long term, the answer to that problem is not charity—grateful though we are for those efforts—but a food system that provides sustenance for people to buy in shops at a price they can afford. Price is not a technical, dry issue that ought to be left to economists in the academy; it should be of importance to every family, as I know it is to every MP.

Food prices unite those who are finding life difficult at the moment both at home and far away. Although I applaud the efforts of those who try to help people out, in the end we must seek a better solution. Whether we like it or not, since the 18th century this country has taken part in global trade. We had a strategic role in that which I will not bore the House with, but part of it means that we, more than others, have a special responsibility to understand global trading systems, not least the one that ensures there is enough food for us to buy here at home, and that farmers in this country and far away get paid a fair price.

This morning I was with the UN Secretary-General’s special representative for food security. He described two current problems in the commodity market that I hope will help people to realise why we must understand that phenomenon. First, global food prices are currently extremely volatile. Secondly, although prices are moving sharply up and down, they are trending upwards. That means that those most vulnerable to the price change in that commodity face an ever-worsening scenario as they try to feed themselves and their families. How can benchmarks and a better understanding of the data help? Well, when we understand those movements we can try to find out what is behind volatility in global prices.

Briefly, let me take hon. Members back in time to about 2005 until the end of 2007. Economists around the world were busy writing papers on derivatives and what we now call shadow banking, and saying that sharing risk in that way was a good idea and helped to manage investment and the finance markets globally. We now know that facts and information were available that we could not see, and my question concerns what is going on now that we cannot see, specifically in relation to food prices. Is there an issue with derivatives based on commodities? My hon. Friend has already given some indications of why we might think that.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Speaker]

With the leave of the House, I propose to put Lords amendments 98 to 290 together.

[Chris Leslie]

Amendment 98 is in a separate group relating to clearing houses, and I would like to make some remarks.

[Mr Speaker]

The Minister will need to move amendment 98, and can do so.

Clause 27

Powers in relation to recognised investment exchanges and clearing Houses of Parliament

Motion made, and Question proposed,

That this House agrees with Lords amendment 98.—(Greg Clark)

[Mr Speaker]

With this it will be convenient to consider Lords amendments 99, 122 to 127, 224 and 225.

[Chris Leslie]

I would have thought the Minister wanted to speak, as Lords amendment 98 is the lead amendment of a group relating to the extension of resolution schemes from banks and building societies to investment firms and in particular UK clearing houses. There is a wider set of issues, therefore.

UK clearing houses stand between two parties in a trade, ensuring that a deal goes through in the event of one party defaulting. Once a deal is agreed, the transaction is honoured even if one party goes bust.

The Government’s decision to extend a set of resolution arrangements to clearing houses is incredibly important, as the debates in the other place set out. Clearing houses are highly significant entities nowadays. After the 2009 G20 summit, it was clear that several hundred trillion dollars of market transactions, especially in over-the-counter derivative arrangements, were part of the clearing house ambit. Therefore, a failure in a clearing house could clearly mean a big problem—a series of problems—for the financial services sector more broadly.

I have a series of questions for the Minister, as I would be grateful for his help in respect of the provisions of this amendment and others in this group. First, I want to ask him about today’s Financial Times, the front page of which talks interestingly about the extension of resolution plan arrangements from covering just companies within the UK to an agreement between the United States and the UK that the Bank of England seems to have struck which will mean, for the first time, that there is a template for larger, serious, significant international financial institutions to have resolution arrangements that span borders. Clearly that is relevant to these amendments on clearing houses. [Interruption.] I can tell that hon. Members are very familiar with these arrangements. Clearing houses have a great deal of cross-border interoperability, they cut across jurisdictions and there is a need to co-ordinate their work. Will the Minister assure the House that steps will be taken to ensure that international efforts are made to promulgate resolution arrangements that also cut across borders for clearing houses?

Central counterparty clearing arrangements these days contain a requirement also to hold Government bonds as collateral. As we know, Government bonds are not what they once were; there have been some questions about their safety. The Minister needs to explain: are we guarding against the deterioration of standards in central counterparty collateral arrangements? If we are increasingly reliant on gilt-edged securities of an international variety, are we actually ensuring that there is sufficient strength behind our central counterparty clearing arrangements?

Finally, may I ask the Minister a further question? Basel III arrangements will be ensuring that banks that are members of clearing houses need to capitalise their exposure to central counterparty contingent liabilities. Can he just give us a sense of the impact on the UK banking system, particularly on its capital adequacy, of processes that will see a rapid change on central counterparty arrangements from an over-the-counter arrangement to an exchange-based arrangement? If the regulators are insisting more and more on exchange-traded arrangements in those clearing houses, there will be an imperative for those clearing houses to become more and more price sensitive and they will be more desirable for the market more generally. That is why we are seeing so many mergers and acquisitions of clearing houses. Are these costs eventually going to be finding their way on to customers and our constituents? I would be grateful if the Minister replied.

[Greg Clark]

Let me give a bit of context to amendments 98 and 225. Taken together, they make provision with regard to the Bank of England’s role in insolvency proceedings relating to a UK clearing house. The amendments will ensure that the Bank of England is put on notice of any application for administration in respect of a UK clearing house, of any petition for a winding-up order in respect of a UK clearing house, of any resolution for the voluntary winding up of a UK clearing house and of the proposed appointment of an administrator of a UK clearing house. That will give the Bank the opportunity to consider whether to exercise a stabilisation power provided for in part 1 of the Banking Act 2009 in order to minimise the impact of the clearing house’s failure on financial stability. Amendment 225 gives the Bank of England the power to direct insolvency practitioners appointed in relation to a company that is or has been a UK clearing house. The direction would operate without prejudice to the existing statutory requirements relating to company insolvency.

The financial crisis of 2008-09 highlighted many deficiencies in the regulation of the global financial system. Most importantly, we found that the disorderly failure of systemically important banks could have catastrophic effects on the stability of the UK and international financial markets.

The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) mentioned the piece that featured in the Financial Times today, which was a joint paper, in effect, between the Bank of England and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation on plans for resolving global systemically important financial institutions. The Bank of England and FDIC paper is a perfectly proper collaboration between brother regulators across the world and is exactly the sort of approach we would expect regulators to take to make the financial system safer. It should be seen as part of the wider international and European work to deliver a credible resolution regime for the biggest banks and for—