Chris Leslie
Main Page: Chris Leslie (The Independent Group for Change - Nottingham East)Department Debates - View all Chris Leslie's debates with the HM Treasury
(13 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberMay I pay tribute to the hon. Member for Rochester and Strood (Mark Reckless) for securing this important debate? This is one of those occasions that make me think that there are not just two parties in the coalition.
We need to clarify some of the history to this issue because I get the impression that certain hon. Members are labouring under a false set of impressions about the European financial stabilisation mechanism. Of course there were the ECOFIN meetings of 9 and 10 May at which the EFSM was agreed to as part of the package of measures to maintain financial stability across Europe. It was against that backdrop that my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), the former Chancellor of the Exchequer, consulted both the current Chancellor and the Business Secretary, and cross-party consensus had been gained. Those are not my words but those of the Economic Secretary to the Treasury. The explanatory memorandum that she signed on 15 July 2010 in her own fair hand—Justine Greening, Economic Secretary—says those words:
“cross-party consensus had been gained.”
I know it is convenient for Ministers and some hon. Members to rewrite history and to give a partial account of what happened and about these important facts, but there it is in writing. [Interruption.] If hon. Members want to dispute the words of their honourable colleague on the Front Bench I am happy to give way to them.
In a moment. In a letter of 18 July 2010 to the Chairman of the European Scrutiny Committee, to whom I shall give way in a moment, the Economic Secretary also said, very helpfully, that
“this Government judges”
the EFSM
“to be an appropriate response to the crisis.”
So the official voice of the Government, according to what the Economic Secretary has written in her own fair hand, was that there was a consensus approach during the transitional period following the general election and that the current Government judged the EFSM to be an appropriate response to the crisis.
Does the shadow Minister accept that the date on which that particular statement was made, 15 July 2010, was four days after the expiry of the date on which a challenge to the European Court could have been made? Furthermore, does he accept that since then the Government have insisted that they oppose the proposal of the former Chancellor of the Exchequer?
That is an extremely illuminating fact and it would be perfectly legitimate for Members on the Government side, perhaps in private meetings elsewhere, to ask a few more searching questions about what exactly their Front Benchers have been doing in their name. Either the Minister who signed the memorandum was wrong—perhaps she was misled in her understanding or she and her officials were ignorant of the facts—or perhaps she was actually speaking the truth but was subsequently slapped down by the Chancellor.
I will not because I have only a few minutes left.
The situation has changed markedly since last May. The circumstances under which the EFSM was then agreed have altered, casting doubt on whether it is being used appropriately, as many hon. Members have said. Because of the various weaknesses shown by the current Administration in Europe, we have ended up increasingly paying more than our fair share in relation to the EFSM facility, especially as time and again the junior EFSM fund in the bail-out package has ended up shouldering up to a third of the bail-out costs, as some hon. Members have pointed out. We have found that the agreement in May regarding the EFSM sum of €60 billion would represent only 12% of the non-IMF contribution, with the remaining €440 billion being borne by the wider eurozone fund. The British liability for that was going to be only 12.5%, but the proportion contributed from the EU-wide EFSM to the Irish bail-out was greater than the eurozone proportion. The Portuguese bail-out was hardly an improvement, with one third coming from the EFSF, one third from the EFSM and another third from the IMF.
The Minister must explain to the House why the EFSM, which makes up only 12% of the non-IMF contribution, is being drawn upon to the same extent as or more than the EFSF. That forms a crucial part of the motion tabled by Back Benchers. The Minister is under an obligation at least to say why we are using the EFSM to such a high degree. That is incredibly important. It has been in the gift of Ministers to answer that question, but so far they have neglected to do so.
The EFSM was supposed to be a temporary mechanism all along. The failure of the Government to push forward with a permanent mechanism, despite opportunities to do so, is an abandonment of UK interests. The temporary emergency EFSM was only ever meant to be a short-lived interim arrangement. We should have been moving on as quickly as possible to a permanent eurozone-only mechanism. Why has the Chancellor failed to press his European colleagues to sort out a permanent eurozone-only fund more urgently?
The Chancellor attended an ECOFIN meeting on 18 May. The Financial Secretary attended ECOFIN on 8 June last year, the Chancellor on 13 July, the Chancellor again on 7 September and the Financial Secretary again on 30 September, yet the press releases from each of those ECOFIN meetings suggest that not once did Ministers raise the issue of pressing forward with that permanent arrangement. Can the Minister explain why not?
The shadow Minister is rightly attacking the Government for being weak and vacillating. Will he tell us what bold, straightforward and clear position he is urging us to take on the vote?
I am happy to do that. Unfortunately, the wording of the motion refers to the legality of the EFSM, and I do not think the former Chancellor, my right hon. Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling), would have acted illegally to sign up to it. I accept that that is a small point, but it is for that reason that we will abstain today.
We will have to revisit the issue time and again. It is hugely important that hon. Members understand the situation. We have not yet seen any occasion on which Ministers have raised the subject of moving to the permanent arrangement as swiftly as they can. They claim that they are responsible for having secured a commitment to move to a permanent arrangement in 2013. The temporary arrangements were always going to expire in 2013 anyway. So much for the famous victories claimed by the Prime Minister, the Minister and other hon. Members.
Too often we have an empty chair at the European table. Only a few weeks ago, on 6 May, Britain was excluded again from a meeting that took place in Luxembourg—the empty-chair approach was very evident when ECB officials met the Finance Ministers of Germany, France, Italy, Spain and Greece. Will the Minister say whether there was an active decision by the Treasury to continue to take an empty-seat policy, or were we simply not invited? We see in the Financial Times that Swedish officials are concerned that the Prime Minister is not pressing harder to prevent key decisions from being made only among eurozone members. Will the Minister say what we are doing to stop being sidelined at that European level?
We know very well that that temporary fund was needed. We recognise that it was part of a concerted pan-European action, standing together against the global forces that threatened the bond market with contagion. That is especially the case now in the eurozone. We have to acknowledge that we have trading partners in Europe and it is in our interest to support their continued economic stability, but Britain has already paid its fair share in the stabilisation process in the case of Ireland and Portugal. The time has come for a stronger voice with real influence in Europe to ensure that British interests are properly served, which must mean a swifter move to a permanent eurozone-only bail-out mechanism.
The fund was always due to expire in 2013. That was not Ministers’ doing; it was the original design. We know that Ministers were involved in the cross-party consensus during the transition from the previous Government to the present one. Ministers cannot wriggle out of their responsibility now in relation to the EFSM. The Government are on extremely shaky ground and even their natural allies are questioning the coalition’s leadership. The issue will no doubt return on another day.
If my right hon. Friend will be patient with me, I want to respond to some of the important points raised by a number of Members who have contributed to the debate. If I have time at the end, I will take interventions.
My hon. Friend the Member for Rochester and Strood said that taxpayers had contributed £12.5 billion to bail out euro area states, but that is simply not the case. Let me explain why. The European financial stability mechanism is funded by the European Commission borrowing from capital markets, and it is only in the event that a beneficiary member state defaults that the EU budget, and so the UK, will be called upon to contribute. The UK does not fund the EFSM, which is a contingent liability. Not a single pound of taxpayers’ money has gone into the EFSM. On Ireland, as my hon. Friend the Member for Devizes (Claire Perry) has said, we have made a loan, not a gift or a grant, and we expect to get our money back. Not a penny of the money that we have saved through spending cuts has been used to make that loan.
Let me go back to the events of a year ago. Europe faced a crisis, with concerns about the stability of Greece, and in the May ECOFIN meeting the EFSM and the EFSF were created. They were created at the height of the Greek crisis, in exceptionally turbulent conditions, before the Government took office. Markets were increasingly questioning the EU’s response to the situation. Indeed, there were fears about the stability of the entire euro area and the risk of contagion was real and dangerous. European Finance Ministers decided to create a broader package to restore confidence and stability. ECOFIN agreed to establish the EFSM and at the same time euro area Finance Ministers agreed to create the much bigger EFSF, which is backed entirely by euro area countries and does not create any liability for the UK.
It is worth reminding hon. Members that, although the Greek crisis triggered the creation of the new mechanism, the EFSM was not used by Greece. The Greek rescue package was financed by the IMF and a series of bilateral loans between individual euro area member states and the Greek Government.
The EFSM was agreed at ECOFIN by qualified majority voting and before this Government took office, and Cabinet Office protocol was followed throughout. At the time, in a conversation with his predecessor, the current Chancellor made his views on the EFSM clear and cautioned against committing the UK to proposals that would have a lasting effect on the UK’s public finances. Members need not take my words for it; the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West (Mr Darling) gave his recollection of the conversation to the House on 15 December 2010:
“I discussed with the Chancellor what we should do about the financial stability mechanism. He had his reservations and stated very clearly that he was against deploying it”.—[Official Report, 15 December 2010; Vol. 520, c. 954.]
That exactly matches the account given by my right hon. Friend the Chancellor.
No. As I said earlier, I want to make some progress on the matter.
My right hon. Friend was also clear that, in the days prior to the formation of the coalition, the right hon. Member for Edinburgh South West was still the Chancellor of the Exchequer, representing the UK in a dynamic negotiating environment, and it was for him to reach that decision.
The hon. Member for Nottingham East (Chris Leslie) quoted an extract from an explanatory memorandum, and yes there was consensus between the parties about the process, but not about the outcome—as the former Chancellor of the Exchequer made clear in his statement to the House in December. It was a matter for the previous Chancellor to decide, and he was the man occupying the office at the time.
Some of my hon. Friends have today articulated concerns about the use of article 122. The EFSM was created following agreement by a qualified majority of member states at the ECOFIN meeting on 9 May 2010, and the terms of the mechanism are set out in an EU Council regulation. It is based on article 122 and states:
“Where a Member State is in difficulties or is seriously threatened with severe difficulties caused by natural disasters or exceptional circumstances beyond its control, the Council, acting by a qualified majority on a proposal from the Commission, may grant, under certain conditions, Community financial assistance to the Member State concerned.”
The Council decided that in those circumstances those criteria applied.
Several hon. Members have raised the issue of article 125 of the treaty, the so-called “no bail-out” clause, but article 125 does not preclude member states from providing loans to one another, and, as evidence of that, the EU’s balance of payments facility has already provided medium-term financial assistance to a number of member states.
Over the past year, we have had to deal with the legacy that we inherited from the previous Government and the previous Chancellor of the Exchequer, but we have made sure that the permanent arrangements to sort out the euro area are the ultimate responsibility of euro area member states.
My right hon. Friend the Prime Minister made that his goal at last December’s European Council, where he secured two significant victories for the UK. First, he made sure that article 122 could not be used for euro area bail-outs in the future. Secondly, he ensured that the UK would not have to contribute to the European stabilisation mechanism, the permanent mechanism that will replace the EFSM and the EFSF. As the Prime Minister said, we have a good “belt and braces” approach—a no need, no use approach.