Civil Aviation (Consumer Protection and Regulatory Reform) Bill [HL]

Lord Grayling Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 16th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate (Con)]

My Lords, this is Committee and I do not wish to talk about amendments that will come later, but I want to support my noble friend Lord Davies as another pilot and the honorary vice-president of BALPA.

I raised general aviation with him at Second Reading and I am waiting for answers from the Minister. There will be a specific amendment a little later in today’s proceedings, and I hope my colleagues who have spoken so far on general aviation will be here later to join me when we get to it. In the meantime, I fully support Amendment 113 and look forward to the Minister’s response to my noble friend.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I support the amendments from my noble friends Lord Moylan and Lord Davies of Gower. This is not a failing market. This is a highly competitive environment, where both domestic and international competition are working aggressively to make it a challenge to run an airline or a freight airline in today’s world.

The need for extensive government regulation, therefore, is limited and questionable. We are not trying to solve a massive problem. There are, of course, specific issues. We will hear more, for example, about disability rights, where, yes, of course we should make sure that airport operators in particular deliver the right environment for disabled people. But first and foremost, we must ensure that the Government do not interfere in this marketplace in a way that damages the competitiveness of one of the UK’s most important economic sectors. That is why my noble friend Lord Moylan is absolutely right. As we go through this debate—not simply on these amendments but on the Bill as a whole—the Minister needs constantly to have in mind the need not to cramp the style of our sector by overregulation, and, where he is regulating, to explain why, otherwise he will not have the support of this Committee.

Finally, on general aviation, the comments made so far are absolutely right. There is a genuine issue around the future of general aviation—the loss of smaller airports, for example, to planning pressures and planning opportunities, and those who own them trying to make money out of them. General aviation needs to be looked after in this country because at a time when, as we hear, there is a growing shortage of young up- and-coming pilots, general aviation is an essential way of developing the skills that we need for the future. It is not simply a way for a few rich people to have a good time.

[Baroness Grender (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 1 and Amendments 23, 24 and 25 are in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. As we noted previously, the Bill sets out the framework but leaves a great deal of detail to be determined later, so we welcome these amendments. We have consistently argued that such an approach risks leaving both passengers and Parliament with too little certainty about how the regime will operate in practice. We see these amendments as useful in probing how that framework might be strengthened.

Amendment 1 raises an important issue around transparency and consumer protection: the case for clearer comparable information at the point of sale. In our view, it should be pursued and I look forward to discussing my noble friend Lord Russell’s amendment, which aims to strengthen the Bill in this area, in the next group.

Equally, how compensation is delivered remains a live and important concern. The current system too often places the burden on passengers to navigate complex processes to secure redress. I say to the noble Lord, Lord Harper—I am sure we will keep coming back to this issue of a low-margin industry—that a different way of viewing this is that if £1 million is not returned to a whole group of consumers by a low-budget airline over a long period, it is, in effect, using families who cannot afford it, or can ill afford it, almost as an overdraft facility with no interest. Getting the balance right on that will be important as we investigate some of the amendments and get into the detail.

On Amendments 23, 24 and 25, we find ourselves in close alignment with the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. As the Bill proposes to confer significant new functions on the Civil Aviation Authority, it is right to consider how those powers are to be exercised and scrutinised. A more centralised regulatory role must not come at the expense of transparency, or indeed parliamentary oversight. The noble Lord and I have discussed this issue, which is that unless there is a threat, with teeth, to move a fatal Motion on a piece of secondary legislation, there is a tendency for Governments to plough on regardless—also regardless of previous colours, I would just say. If we are concerned about secondary legislation—and we are concerned about this—there needs to be clarity about what we would do with it. I hope we can get into some of the detail on that.

On Amendment 24, later we propose two amendments that explore a high common denominator between UK 261 and EU 261, and we look at shadowing EU 261. I entirely hear what the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, says about there being no ownership of who has the best, so we want to pursue, on behalf of industry and customers in the UK, what is the best. That may be EU 261, as revised when it cuts, or it may not.

Overall, these amendments highlight two issues. We consider fundamental the need to embed meaningful consumer protections and the need to ensure proper accountability in the exercise of new regulatory powers as the Government move to address the post-EU powers gap. It is essential that this Committee is not asked to accept a blank cheque approach. I therefore look forward to hearing the Minister’s response as we all warm to this theme throughout the rest of today.

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However, that is not actually the case. In its latest report and accounts, its revenues were over £1 billion. The compensation for the largest failure in its history would have been £100 million—not disproportionate at all. As far as its ownership is concerned, it is different in that the Government hold a substantial minority stake, but why should that protect it from claims?

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

Will my noble friend allow me to help him a little? He may have heard of a company called Network Rail, which, if my memory serves me correctly, must pay compensation to train operators if it goes through the kinds of failing that he has identified. Were he to know anybody who used to chair Network Rail, he might have an interesting point to make.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My noble friend is a mind-reader; I was going to refer to Network Rail in about 40 seconds. As I said, as far as NERL’s ownership is concerned, it is different, but that should not preclude it having to pay up for claims.

The review then produced another pretext, which, again, does not stand up to scrutiny. This is what it said:

“Such a liability would probably lead to a substantial increase in the annual costs of the ATC”—


air traffic control—

“service, which could in turn lead to increased costs to airlines and passengers”.

What happens at the moment? The compensation liability rests with the airlines and, as such, it has already caused increased costs to passengers. If the airlines did not have the liability their costs would go down, but if NATS then passed back all the increased costs we would be back where we started. Crucially, that assumes that the regulator, the CAA, would allow the costs to be passed on by NATS to customers, instead of taking it out of profits. If, as happens with the water companies, costs were not passed on to consumers but funded out of profits then costs to the airlines and passengers would actually go down, not up—the opposite of what the review suggested.

I come to my noble friend’s intervention. The Minister will understand and, I hope, sympathise with the case I am making because of his previous responsibility for Network Rail. If, as my noble friend said, a passenger is delayed, the train operator pays the compensation. If Network Rail was responsible for the delay, it then reimburses the train operator. That is as it should be, and it is exactly what should happen in air transport. A failure in traffic control is paid for by the traffic controller. My amendment is supported by IATA, which actually wants to go further. It would like the amendment to be extended to airports and other parties that provide air services that can cause disruption yet are not liable for passenger compensation. Airlines currently pay all passenger compensation regardless of who is at fault—for example, the power failure at Heathrow last year.

To sum up and use management jargon, we need shared accountability across the value chain. I hope the Minister can respond positively to the case I have made and put right this manifest injustice.

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My amendment is very simple. It seeks to increase back to where it was before the Employment Rights Act the turnout threshold for ballots undertaken by trades unions that operate in the airline and airport sector. I would have thought that even this Government could accept that this is as valuable a consumer protection measure as any other that we have discussed today. I beg to move.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 17 and 22 in this group. Following on from what my noble friend Lord Moylan has said, my concern is that the nature of the Civil Aviation Authority is being changed by the content of this Bill. It seems to be going further than simply continuing the protections for consumers that existed under European law—which rightly should remain in UK law. The level of enforcement powers in the Bill cause me a great deal of concern and are not what the Civil Aviation Authority is there to do. It is primarily a safety body. Its big focus, as we left the European Union, was taking over the responsibilities for aviation safety in the UK from EASA. Since then, we have seen dramatic changes in technology, the emergence to a much greater degree of drone technology and different kinds of aviation beginning to appear on the horizon. We are looking at the realistic possibility of air taxis in the very near future. There is a very clear and necessary remit for the Civil Aviation Authority to maintain as the guardian of aviation safety in the United Kingdom.

Of course, there will be occasions when it needs enforcement powers, but as my noble friend rightly says, it is taking over enforcement powers that very much mirror those that already exist for consumers in this sector from the CMA. In doing so, it is creating a whole raft of additional responsibilities for a body that I want to remain a very focused organisation that has safety as its number one priority.

I simply cannot understand why it is necessary to give the CAA what are, in essence, enforcement powers that the police have—for example, the power to kick in a door or to interrogate someone in their place of work or their own home. This is not a simple civil enforcement provision. This is taking the role of the Civil Aviation Authority to another level. The first of the amendments that I have tabled is intended to challenge the need for those powers to exist. I am utterly unpersuaded that they need to exist. Unless the Minister can do a pretty good job of explaining why they are necessary, we will return to it on Report.

We will also need to limit somewhat the CAA’s ability to get into the weeds with these enforcement powers. In effect, we need to concentrate its ability to take such action in a situation where there is clearly a systemic failure. We should not be giving the Civil Aviation Authority draconian powers to deal with relatively minor matters. That simply should not be the case in law. The CMA already deals with minor and significant consumer matters. Amendment 22 simply says that the powers in the Bill should focus on substantial systemic failure only.

I await with interest the Minister’s defence of this element of the Bill. I have addressed two specific areas but, as my noble friend Lord Moylan just set out, there are more. I hope the Minister can persuade us because, unless he does, I am sure we will want to return to this on Report.

[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

My Lords, I support the thinking behind the comments made by my noble friends.

For clarification, if we are looking at consumer rights, it is the Civil Aviation Authority that has dealt with the public over a number of years when the public have not been satisfied with the compensation for delays or cancellations that they have received from an airline. The CAA is already doing that and playing that role. Do the Government see the CAA continuing with that particular role in such cases? That is one question.

Secondly, when we start to look at the Competition and Markets Authority, I do not see how you can have two authorities basically dealing with the same things. We know that the Civil Aviation Authority has the expertise in these fields, which is quite right, whatever we might object to in terms of powers. I am not sure who came up with the idea of the competition authority coming into decisions that should be made by the CAA as a regulator. I would be very interested to know from the Minister how this thought—that there could be two regulatory authorities dealing with civil aviation, its merits and everything that goes on around it—came about.

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, this group concerns the consumer rights powers in the Bill and the scrutiny of those powers. I am grateful to noble Lords for their amendments. The Government’s objective is a coherent, effective and proportionate consumer protection regime for aviation passengers.

Before I turn to the individual amendments, I will make three points that apply across this group. First, Clause 1 does not in itself create new powers of entry or financial penalties; it simply enables regulations to be made, with their scope, safeguards and detail being considered when they are brought forward. Secondly, the Government believe that detailed requirements should be developed through secondary legislation, with consultation, options appraisal and an impact assessment where appropriate. Thirdly, the Bill preserves flexibility so that the CAA, the CMA and the Government can respond effectively to consumer harms that may cut across aviation and wider markets. Where I refer to duplication, proportionality or flexibility, these are the common justifications that I have in mind.

Let me begin with Amendments 8 and 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, which are supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, and concern the role of the Competition and Markets Authority. Although most aviation-specific enforcement relating to information gathering and powers of entry will sit with the CAA in practice, the CMA has a broader, market-wide role—including in sectors that overlap with aviation, such as travel and holidays. The CAA and the CMA already have concurrent powers in relation to general consumer law. Removing the CMA from this framework could limit flexibility and make it harder to address problems that span aviation and wider consumer markets. Therefore, in the Government’s view, it is right to retain the ability to include the CMA where necessary. The precise role of each regulator will be considered when secondary legislation is drafted. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press his amendments.

I turn next to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, which seeks to remove the power of entry provision in Clause 1. I am afraid that I cannot support it. The Bill is designed to improve the CAA’s enforcement ability and to reduce reliance on slow, resource-intensive court processes. Clause 2 strengthens the CAA’s direct information-gathering powers. Clause 1 enables those powers to be strengthened further, if needed, including by enabling powers to enter premises or to require documents and information during the course of an investigation. Any such power would be considered carefully, consulted on and include appropriate safeguards when regulations are brought forward.

I also assure the noble Lord that these wide enforcement powers, including powers of entry, fell within Section 2 of the European Communities Act 1972. Much passenger rights law originated in EU law and has now been assimilated into UK law. Since our exit from the EU, primary legislation has generally been needed to amend it. Clause 1 restores the necessary degree of flexibility while preserving parliamentary scrutiny and future consultation. I ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

I have a simple question. What the Minister has not done is explain why it is necessary. What are the problems that this is designed to solve?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I understand the noble Lord’s question. I will come back to him on that.

Amendment 22, also from the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, concerns financial penalties and the circumstances in which the CAA may act. The CAA’s role is to enforce consumer rights where breaches cause collective consumer harm, rather than to resolve individual disputes. Clause 1 does not in itself create financial penalties; it enables regulations to grant such powers in future where that is justified and appropriately framed. Any regulations creating penalties would be subject to the affirmative procedure. Thus the amendment would be unduly restrictive, so I ask the noble Lord not to press it. Having listened to noble Lords on the need for better enforcement, I would not wish to constrain the CAA’s powers in this respect.

I will address Amendments 26 and 27 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, together. I agree that future regulations must receive appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. Clause 1 already provides a balanced approach: the affirmative procedure applies to the most significant matters, including criminal offences and financial penalties. Some amendments could be more minor or technical changes, such as updating an organisation’s name. Requiring the affirmative procedure in all cases would not be proportionate and would place unnecessary demands on parliamentary time. I ask the noble Lord not to press his amendments.

On Amendment 28, also from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, I absolutely agree on the importance of reviewing the impact of regulations. However, post-implementation review requirements are already considered when developing secondary legislation and included where appropriate. Not every regulation will warrant a review, particularly where changes are minor or technical. For the common reason of proportionality, I ask the noble Lord not to press this amendment.

Amendment 33, also from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, concerns the procedure for regulations on co-operation between enforcement authorities. I do not consider the affirmative procedure necessary. These regulations are administrative in nature. They may cover information sharing, notification arrangements and how direct enforcers determine which authority should act in a particular case. There are precedents for such regulations using the negative procedure, which provides proportionate scrutiny. I ask the noble Lord not to press this amendment.

Amendment 34 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, concerns the jurisdiction of the CAA and the CMA in aviation consumer protection. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 1 already enables regulations to set out how the two authorities co-ordinate, decide which is best placed to act and avoid duplication, including through joint working. The CAA will also have regard to the CMA’s rules, supporting consistent enforcement. A fixed approach in primary legislation would reduce flexibility and risk constraining effective enforcement. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press Amendment 34.

Civil Aviation (Consumer Protection and Regulatory Reform) Bill [HL]

Lord Grayling Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 18th June 2026 Grand Committee

[Earl Russell (LD)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to start the second day in Committee on this Bill. I open this group on airspace modernisation, consultation and charging and move Amendment 60 in the name of my noble friend Lady Grender, as she is unfortunately unable to be here today.

The amendment is straightforward and seeks simply to insert a new subsection requiring that, before the Secretary of State makes any directions under Clause 4, three things must happen: a consultation with persons and communities likely to be affected; an environmental impact assessment; and a noise impact assessment. On these Benches, we feel that these additions are a basic requirement of legitimate decision-making where the power may have serious local consequences. The Clause 4 directions on airspace redesign are not merely a technical tidying-up exercise and can be used to alter flight concentrations, runway throughput, and the intensity and timing of overflight experienced on the ground. A ministerial direction made under this clause is capable, in substance, of facilitating additional capacity without ever being labelled as such.

As was said at Second Reading, the Bill is a blueprint; it is not the final product. It provides a framework that leaves the substance to future regulation. In that sense, as we have described, it is paving legislation. The Committee is entitled to ask what safeguards are built into that paving before being asked to drive on it. The Minister has given us reassurances that the Bill will not be used as a vehicle for airport expansion; we note and welcome those, and we accept them in the good faith in which they have been given. However, personal reassurances, however well-meaning, are not a legal safeguard. Ministers change, Prime Ministers change, Governments change, and interpretations can also change. The whole point of us seeking to put this duty into the Bill is to ensure that Parliament and the public can distinguish between a necessary operational change and one that, in effect, delivers additional capacity through the back door of airspace decision-making. Without mandatory consultation and impact assessment, the distinction cannot be realistically made. Even if it could be made, it would happen only after the fact.

Airport change proposals are already assessed through environmental methodologies, noise matrices and statutory directions. This should therefore be aligned with that pre-existing reality. For our communities, these matters are really important. Many, as we know, are already impacted by the noise and environmental impacts of existing airports, and future communities could be impacted by proposals under this legislation. These are real impacts on our communities, from noise late at night to environmental pollution. They should not have to rely on good will, however well-meaningly it is given. If the Secretary of State is to have this power, the Bill should state clearly what the procedural safeguards must be before it is used. That is exactly the point of Amendment 60. We are simply seeking to put a safeguard and some handrails in place around these powers. This is a crucial issue for us in our scrutiny of this Bill.

I turn briefly—I am sorry for speaking to these before others have managed to—to the other amendments in this group. In general, they all seek to do fairly similar things to Amendment 60. Amendment 61, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, would require a minimum 28-day targeted consultation with local communities, local authorities and airport operators before any direction on airspace redesign is issued. We have considerable sympathy for this amendment, for exactly the same reasons that I outlined on our Amendment 60. The 28-day objective is not onerous; it is fundamentally achievable. We hope that the Minister sees fit to put our Amendment 60, this Amendment 61 or some combination of them into the Bill.

Amendment 62, from the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, would add the British Airline Pilots Association to the consultation list. We are broadly supportive of this amendment and recognise the central role that our pilots play, particularly in matters of safety. Their judgment and professionalism are essential in any plans to modernise our airspace and capacity. However, our concern is that the amendment, by its nature, names one organisation and does not, for example, name air traffic controllers. We would prefer it if the amendment was reworded to talk about consultation with representatives of the industry, as opposed to naming only one organisation.

Amendment 63, from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, would require the CAA to establish a blockchain-based audit trail for every airspace change program. We recognise that the underlying objective and purpose of this is to create a tamper-proof, long-term record of what has been decided, by whom and when. That is an entirely legitimate concern. In the past, too many of these decisions have been opaque; it has been extremely difficult for anybody to know what has been happening and what has been done by whom.

The requirements in this amendment, particularly those in proposed new subsection (3) for cryptographic security, 15-year retention and tamper-proof records, are all laudable aims, but we wonder whether naming one specific technology would make this a hostage to fortune in the future. We suggest alternative wording that asks for a secure, auditable and publicly accessible record, without prescribing the exact technology to be used. We feel that that would be a better way forward. It might be that the technology that the noble Lord suggests is the one that is chosen, but alternative wording would at least leave more scope for examination in the round.

Amendment 64, from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, probes with characteristic precision the rationale for allowing changes to be imposed under Clause 6 on persons who neither use nor benefit from the air traffic services in question. This is a serious point: the Bill should have open scrutiny of who bears the costs for these matters. I hope that the Minister can provide some clarity on those points.

The final amendment in this group is Amendment 65, from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope. It would require the Secretary of State and the CAA to have regard to the growth and sustainability of general aviation when setting charges and to ensure that charges on general aviation users are proportionate to the use that they make of air traffic services. General aviation is too often forgotten, and this seems a proportional requirement and a modest and reasonable ask. We look forward to the Minister’s response to it.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Earl, Lord Russell, for his comments on my Amendment 61. I will speak to it only briefly, because it is pretty self-explanatory.

The legislation rightly gives some power to the Government to intervene and, in effect, act as arbiter when it comes to airspace redesign. Airspace redesign has taken much too long. It started when I was Secretary of State and now, nearly eight years later, we are still not close to bringing it to fruition, yet it is fundamental to the future of the aviation sector in this country. It will unlock extra capacity and use next-generation technology to enable us to provide more respite to communities that are affected by aircraft noise, even though the level of aircraft noise, in the world in which we live, has dropped enormously over the past generation.

The Government rightly believe that they need some degree of arbiter powers in this, but I do not think that they should have those powers just to say, “Right, that’s the decision”. There is an obligation there—nothing at great length, because we know that government consultations can last for ever, take months to be responded to and all the rest, but with a simple process saying, “Look, that’s what we’re going to do. Is there anything we haven’t thought of? Is there something we’re not quite getting right here?” I say to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, that the wording of the amendment is what it is, but I would expect pilots’ organisations, air traffic organisations and all the rest to be able to input a view on this point.

I would see this as being not an isolated consultation but a standard government consultation—a short, snappy one—simply so that the organisations and communities that have a vested interest can come forward and say, “There’s something you haven’t thought of. This is going to have an adverse effect that you haven’t thought about. You really shouldn’t be taking this decision”. It would be improper for that process not to exist where the Government have what is, in effect, a pretty absolute power of direction under the legislation as it is at the moment. I very much hope that the Minister will take that on board and perhaps look to include something of this kind on Report.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 60 to 62; I express a specific concern in my Amendment 62. I thought that I knew about the technology in this debate until I decided to brush up on it yesterday; I have spent most of my working hours since then getting up to date, to some extent.

The essence of the technology, which would allow a much more holistic review of airspace use, is that it is dependent not on aids on the ground but on global positioning systems. That gives great benefits, in terms of what it does for aviation, but I put it to the Committee that it also gives great benefits to those who are concerned about the environmental impact. If your route does not fit with that bit of society and there is a route that can fit with that bit of society, then, with the overarching technology, it can be changed. Up to this point, changing where aeroplanes go close to the ground has been totally dominated by the ground-based aids that they use to land.

The essence of my amendment—as an ex-BALPA shop steward, I thought that I had better represent my old team—is to get pilots involved in this consultation. They are going to face dramatic differences. One of the first things that I would say relates to the point that the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, made the other day, which is that the planes can fly themselves. Normally, you have to drag the plane into the air then tell it to fly itself, and, when you get to the end, you actually have to make a few decisions. It is a very good theory; hopefully, when you press “flight nav” or something like that, that will happen.

The problem facing the modern pilot is that one of their most important tasks is to cope when there are system failures. There will be system failures. There are no big computer systems in the world that do not have system failures, as we all know to our cost. The problem is that the level of knowledge needed by the operative to cope with a system failure is very large but it is not often practised. It will, I am sure, follow the pilot’s standard of continuous checking. I have never flown an airplane with its engine on fire, but, when I was an airline pilot, I flew a plane with its engine on fire many times in a simulator. It was dramatic and great fun, but the whole essence here is that the systems delivering this will intrinsically and inevitably have failure modes early on. The crew are there to look after that, among all the other safety issues that they have to care about.

All the literature on the impact on pilots of a very different system says that it will require if not an almost completely new licence then certainly a substantial licence endorsement to equip pilots to look after these systems. How can their views and their wisdom be taken into account? They are the only people who can envisage the situation, together with a very dramatic change in standards.

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The powers of direction introduced by the Bill therefore come into play only after all these steps have been completed. I welcome the support from the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, for the aim to ensure that the benefits of a properly approved and strategically important airspace change cannot be held up by a single reluctant party. These amendments, while well intentioned, would duplicate existing requirements, introducing unnecessary delay and costs. They would undermine the delivery of approved airspace changes, which themselves deliver major benefits relating to delays, emission and noise. I note the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Empey, on this issue.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

May I just ask a specific question? If we countenance the situation where, for example, a plan coming from Heathrow to amend the routes into that airport clash with the routes into Farnborough and it has been through extensive process and, effectively, there is a logjam where one says one thing and the other says another, my understanding is that the Government, using their direction power, can say, “Right, we vote for Farnborough, not Heathrow”, or vice versa. In that situation, where the Government say they are voting for Farnborough, is there still a duty to consult on that decision before it is implemented?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I will take some advice and respond further. But I note in response to the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, that both proposals will have been consulted on and agreed, so it is not the case that consultation would not have applied to either of them. I will write to him with the precise answer to his very reasonable question and copy it to other noble Lords.

Amendment 63 is from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, and he is right that information about airspace changes should be secure and transparent. I take the noble Lord’s point about the choice of technology. The Civil Aviation Authority’s CAP1616 airspace change process is designed to ensure transparency throughout. There is already a legal requirement for directions related to airspace change to be published, as well as any steps the CAA takes to enforce them. In addition, both the sponsor of an airspace change and the CAA are required to publish relevant documentation throughout the process, which is held on the CAA’s airspace change portal—a secure platform which acts as a single source of truth. When an approved design is implemented, it is published in the UK Aeronautical Information Publication, as required by international law.

This is not an area where there is a lack of trust or accountability requiring a more complex or novel audit mechanism. The CAA operates within a well-established statutory framework with clear oversight and requirements for publication and traceability. Introducing a requirement to store this information in a prescriptive or novel format risks adding complexity without corresponding benefit, given that the core objectives of transparency, accessibility, and auditability are already being met. It would also apply irrespective of any identified gap, creating additional cost and rigidity on how information is managed, so I respectfully ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.

Amendment 64 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, relates to a technical change arising from the proposed expansion of who can pay charges for air traffic services, which will ensure that the “user pays” principle can continue to be fairly applied in future. Air traffic services are provided for all users within a block of airspace. Even when an airspace user does not use a service directly, they may still benefit from it. For example, if two aircraft avoid a collision because one is directed away from the other, both benefit even though one did not directly receive the service.

It is right that the charging framework reflects this. The Bill does not say that charges may be imposed on persons who cannot use or benefit from them. We reassure noble Lords that charges are not set without safeguards and that the Bill maintains them. The Civil Aviation Authority accounts for factors such as efficiency and proportionality and follows an established process, including extensive engagement, statutory consultation and rights of appeal.

A requirement to prove the precise level of use or benefit for every airspace user would be disproportionate and unworkable, particularly as an increasing number of emerging uses, especially drones and other unmanned aircraft systems, are integrated into shared airspace and require air traffic services in future. That issue is what the existing provision is designed to avoid and what the changes in the Bill seek to maintain. For that reason, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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Moved by

[Lord Grayling]

66: Clause 7, page 7, leave out lines 18 to 27 and insert—
“(a) allocating additional capacity created at an existing airport or a new airport where the affected air carriers have failed to reach a voluntary commercial agreement within a reasonable timeframe;(b) as to the circumstances in which, the terms on which and the procedure by which, slots may be transferred, exchanged or withdrawn where there is no agreement between the commercial parties about the slots;(c) determining the temporary reallocation or suspension of unused slots during a period of international crisis;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment strictly limits the Secretary of State’s power to intervene in airport slot allocation to distinct scenarios: managing unused slots during international crises, handling entirely new airports, or distributing newly created capacity where commercial airlines fail to reach an agreement, thereby preventing broader state intervention in functioning commercial slot markets.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, we now move on to the slots regime. My two amendments in this group, Amendments 66 and 68, are designed to press the Government to understand what they are trying to achieve and where the limits to that are.

I had always expected that, when we left the European Union, we would be able to have a less regulated slots regime, particularly once we and the European Union had taken the view that we would not stay part of the EASA. Fundamentally, we are talking about a private sector market, with privately owned airports or airports owned by third-party bodies—such as the local authorities in Manchester—and independent airlines. So the question is this: what do the Government actually need to do? What is the role of the Government in this space? Should the Government be determining how many airlines fly to an airport, how many slots are available to it and the circumstances in which slots can transfer between one organisation and another?

It seems to me that there are three things that the Government should be doing. I see the role of the Government in this as referee rather than regulator. I am concerned that the content of the clauses that relate to the slots regime give the Government extraordinarily sweeping powers. If I have a slight regret, it is that I did not provide for the removal of new subsection (4), which says:

“The regulations may make different provision for different purposes”.


What on earth does that mean? The Government are taking on to their own shoulders blanket powers to manage the whole of the slots regime between a commercially run airport, a commercially owned airport and a commercially owned airline. To me, that feels like many steps too far.

What I have sought to do with these two amendments is, first, on the principal amendment, focus on the things that the Government need. The first is all about acting as arbiter and referee, where there is genuinely a problem. We are talking about our key airports here. Where there is genuinely a problem—a dispute that cannot be resolved—I understand that the Government may, for strategic reasons for the benefit of the United Kingdom, need to have put in place some form of arbitration mechanism. Proposed new paragraphs (a) and (b) are designed to achieve that. It is topical because of the Iran war, as we have seen. We had the debate last week over the change to the slot regime resulting from that conflict and the need to take away from airlines the requirement to use a slot at a particular time. There may be circumstances in which, in a period of international crisis, the Government need to have a role in the slot regime.

I should also say that, on reflection—I look at the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Empey—I agree that there is an element, although we might not agree about the scale of it, of a need to make sure there is connectivity within the United Kingdom. In part, the market delivers that anyway. If you are a major international airline flying from Heathrow to another part of the world, you need the feeder flights to fill your planes. If you do not have flights from Belfast, Glasgow, Edinburgh and Manchester, you are losing a whole chunk of your market—probably losing a whole chunk of it to Schiphol. It is not, therefore, necessary for the Government to take an absolute view about this. But in much the same way that the Government provide and subsidise key strategic routes within the United Kingdom that may not be economically viable but are socially necessary, I understand that there may be a case, in some circumstances, for making sure that a particular route and slot is available to the airline. Therefore, I am not sure I agree with the full detail of the noble Lord’s amendment, but I have some sympathy with what he is trying to achieve.

What we do not need to do—this is my fear about elements of the Bill—is try to micromanage the market that is the independent aviation sector. This part of the Bill feels like it is treading into that territory. I am looking for the Minister to provide some clear justifications for the steps being taken here. Particularly, Clause 68 is designed to address, effectively, a criminal provision within the slots regime. I do not quite understand that. Why on earth does there need to be a criminal context to the management of the slots regime? I understand that there can, on occasions, be a need for regulatory enforcement or enforcement in the civil courts—but the criminal courts? My amendment would take out that provision. Frankly, I would take some persuading by the Minister before we come to Report that we need a criminal provision in the management of slots at our key airports. That feels like a bridge that goes much too far.

I need to hear from the Minister an explanation for why all this is necessary: why the slots regime needs to be as all-encompassing as it is, and why the Bill comes up with extraordinary provisions of interference. I refer again to proposed new subsection (4). The Bill does much more than is necessary to provide a sensible framework simply for protecting the strategic interests of the United Kingdom. It amounts to interference, not strategy, and should take a step back from where it is.

[Lord Empey (UUP)]

My Lords, I instinctively agree with a lot of what the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, has said but there are situations in extremis that could arise regarding access to hub airports, which is a critical—not only socially but economically—necessity. It has nothing to do with subsidy. There are some modest PSOs in operation. We had them when we were in the European Union. Cornwall was involved at one stage and had a subsidised air route. But that is not what I am getting at here. It is nothing to do with subsidy because all the main regional airports going to hub airports, primarily Heathrow, are perfectly economically viable. It is not a question of subsidy.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

My Lords, as we have heard, this group concerns the airport slots regime. I am grateful to noble Lords for their amendments. I will address each one in turn but first note two common points that apply across this group.

The UK slots regime depends on independent, fair, transparent and non-discriminatory allocation by the slot co-ordinator. It also operates within international frameworks, such as the Worldwide Airport Slot Guidelines, the global standard for managing airport capacity at congested level 3 and capacity-constrained level 2 airports. The regime already recognises commercial expectations that require clarity, consistency and timely decision-making. Where I refer to independence, proportionality, flexibility or international alignment, these are the common justifications I have in mind. I also say to the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, that the processes in this Bill do not in themselves allow airport expansion; they are about the efficient allocation of capacity created by expansion, which is a different issue.

I begin with Amendment 66, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Grayling. I understand the concern that the Government should not interfere in a liberalised and well-functioning sector, and our policy intent is not to interfere in this. These provisions, however, largely replicate provisions previously available through EU legislation. All the Government are doing is replicating the powers we think we appropriately need to continue. I refer the noble Lord to paragraphs 20 to 24 of the Explanatory Notes to the Bill.

Neither the Government nor airlines have a role in the day-to-day allocation of slots. As noble Lords have noted, that is undertaken by an independent slot co-ordinator who must allocate slots openly, fairly, transparently and without discrimination. The amendment would therefore not have the intended effect and would create uncertainty. The temporary reallocation or suspension of unused slots during an international crisis is already addressed by Clause 7. In our view, Amendment 66 is therefore unnecessary and duplicative.

I turn to Amendment 67, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, which would require sufficient slots at hub airports such as Heathrow to be allocated to flights from UK regional airports. The Government recognise the importance of strong regional connectivity and effective access to hub airports for people and businesses across the United Kingdom.

However, I cannot support the amendment because requiring hub airports to prioritise domestic regional services over international routes could conflict with non-discrimination and fair competition obligations in the UK’s bilateral air services agreements. It could also require the reallocation of slots from incumbent operators that have historic rights where usage requirements are met, raising legal and practical issues. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.

The next amendment, from the noble Lord, Lord Grayling, seeks to remove the ability to create regulations on enforcement of the slots regime through criminal and civil sanctions. Existing assimilated law already contains criminal and civil enforcement provisions, which the Government believe are necessary. Removing this power would freeze the current enforcement regime, meaning that even proportionate updates could be made only through further primary legislation. I do not believe that that is the noble Lord’s intention.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

Can the Minister illustrate to me the kind of circumstance in which a criminal sanction is required?

[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

I will respond to the noble Lord after today.

Clause 7 already reduces the severity of sanctions by removing the possibility of imprisonment for breaches of slots regulations. Any exercise of the power to amend enforcement provisions would be subject to the affirmative procedure, ensuring scrutiny and debate in both Houses. For those reasons, I ask the noble Lord not to press his amendment.

I turn to Amendment 70, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, which would place a statutory duty on the Secretary of State to consult airlines, airport operators and others before making any slots regulations under Clause 7. The Government recognise the importance of proper engagement and, where new policy is developed under this power, will carry out appropriate consultation, including with industry and, where relevant, communities. However, an inflexible statutory consultation duty would not be appropriate. The power may need to be used urgently in response to significant disruption, as was necessary during the pandemic. In those circumstances, government must be able to act swiftly and proportionately. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press Amendment 70.

I will take Amendments 71 and 72, also tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, together. They would require all regulations relating to slots to be subject to the affirmative procedure. I recognise the desire for parliamentary scrutiny, but the Bill already draws a proportionate distinction. The negative procedure is available only where there is a significant threat to public health, or another substantial reason, and only for temporary changes to slot-usage requirements. Requiring the affirmative procedure in every case could delay necessary action during disruption, where speed may be essential. I therefore ask the noble Lord not to press Amendments 71 and 72.

Amendment 73, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, would—

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

If I may, I shall respond to the noble Lord by saying that, if I have not understood his point clearly, I shall indeed go away and have a further discussion with him.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, we have had an interesting debate. Again, some important issues were raised. The noble Lord, Lord Empey, makes an important point. In fact, when reflecting on my own amendment at the start, I thought that what he was saying might be an element missing from mine. I have a lot of sympathy with what he has said.

I want to be frank with the Minister. He knows that I have the highest regard for him; he knows that I regard him as knowing more about much of the transport system than anyone I know, so I do not direct this comment at him, but at the Government. I am really quite unimpressed by the Government’s inability to explain what are relatively simple things, or should be relatively simple, if they had thought this through properly, in the measures that they are taking in this Bill and those in the debate that we had last week over the slot regime. If the Government want to take powers or continue powers to enforce criminal sanctions, they should at least be able to say what kind of issues those criminal sanctions are designed to address, because I do not think that this is simply a replication of existing EU law—and were it so, I would be asking what we can we do less of, rather than more of, outside the European Union.

However, if the Government’s intention is purely to replicate what is there already, they do not need new Section 34A(4), which says:

“The regulations may make different provision for different purposes”.


What does that mean? What it does is create a blank cheque for the Government to expand their remit in the slots regime beyond where it is at the moment. They are also seeking, as I say, to continue with criminal sanctions. That does not feel to me like a Government who are trying to maintain a light touch in what the Minister rightly says is a commercial marketplace with established processes that are part of international agreements that go beyond the European Union. So some of this should not be necessary, and it should not be necessary to continue some of it on from what we had before. Where it is continuing, there needs to be a good explanation for it. I am sorry, but I do not think that the Minister has been able to give that good explanation. The Government need to do a better job on what should be pretty basic questions about what they are proposing.

I will of course seek to withdraw this amendment today, but I give notice to the Minister that these questions need to be answered properly before we get to Report, because I can see no justification for having what are clear Henry VIII powers in the slots regime. There is not even a provision for the affirmative resolution so, frankly, in six or 12 months’ time, another Minister—I am sure that it would not be this Minister—could simply come back and take a much more interventionist approach to the slots regime, which would be absolutely out of kilter with anything that we have done either inside or outside the European Union. For now, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I will not leave this issue untouched when we come back on Report.

Amendment 66 withdrawn.

Civil Aviation (Consumer Protection and Regulatory Reform) Bill [HL]

Lord Grayling Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 13th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to a number of amendments in this group that are in my name. Nearly all of them are technical in character. None of them would make an enormous difference to the Bill, except perhaps the last one. There is not the slightest prospect of the Minister accepting any of them and I do not intend to divide the House on any of them. Therefore, it would be of assistance to noble Lords if I go through them briefly so that they are aware of the good things that the Government are casting aside and taking no notice of.

Amendments 7 and 12 relate to the Government having decided that the relevant aspects of the aviation sector, in particular consumer protection, will be regulated by two bodies—the Civil Aviation Authority and the Competition and Markets Authority. The Government have no way of ensuring that they work together effectively, or who takes the lead on one rather than the other. None of this is vouchsafed to us, but the Minister will have a sort of balancing power at the top to sort it all out ad hoc. We made the argument in Committee that it would be sensible to have one regulator and that dual enforcement is never a good idea, especially where potential criminal penalties arise. We have tabled these amendments to put an end to it, but the Government are not going to pursue that line.

Amendment 15 raises a cause of concern for the many noble Lords who are worried that the only ideas the Department for Transport has continue to come from the European Union. It would put restrictions and limitations on the ability of the Government to use these powers simply to adopt European legislation and continue to be compliant with European legislation as it changes, which indeed they are expected to do, because I understand that the European Union is reviewing some of these aviation regulation areas at the moment. I was moved to table this because I was shocked when I picked up the final version of the impact assessment that the department prepared to go with the Bill—a document that is at least two inches thick, I would think. One has to get only to page 3 to discover that the Government are saying how wonderful it is that this legislation will give us the powers to continue to align with any changes the European Union makes in the future, because those powers expire this month, so we would not be able to align with the European Union, but now we are going to be able to.

We have to have a Civil Service and a Government who actually realise that we are not part of the European Union, that there is no prospect of our being part of the European Union for a very long time—indeed, if ever; I do not think it will be ever—and that we have to come up with some policies of our own that are good for this country. That is the substance of Amendment 15.

Amendments 16, 17 and 29 address some of the many instances in the Bill where the negative procedure for statutory instruments is preferred over the affirmative procedure. There are also two massive Henry VIII powers in the Bill—I will come to these separately in their appropriate cases. I am not going to press these further at this stage, because to give the Minister the credit that is due to him, he has tabled amendments, which in some cases will move negative procedures over to affirmative procedures. Indeed, in one case, he has actually signed my own amendment having an effect on that. So he has come some way to meet the criticism that I tabled in Committee, so I will not press the fact that he has not come all the way, although I would be delighted if he announced, even at this last moment, that he would change his mind and perhaps accept these amendments.

Amendment 32, finally, perhaps has a little more hope of being adopted—I do not know. Under the current approach of the Bill, the only way that someone subject to a civil aviation decision can appeal against it is to the High Court. The courts are chock-a-block with demands on them at the moment. It seemed sensible to seek to create an intermediate mediation stage where someone aggrieved by a particular decision against them would have the opportunity to have an independent mediator appointed to seek to resolve the issue, and an amendment was tabled to that effect.

In Committee, the Minister was very dismissive of the whole idea and obviously believes that the High Court has nothing much to do and will be able to take these things on and that is the appropriate place. But a lot of money and testosterone can be wasted going to the High Court, when some of these matters can be sorted out better through more of a mediative approach, and that was the purpose of the amendment.

Those are my amendments in this group. As with many of the amendments I tabled in Committee, they are all intended to improve the operation of the Bill and the operation of administrative law. With that, I beg to move.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, Amendments 13 and 14 are in my name. I declare again my interest as an advisor to AtkinsRéalis in the UK and Ireland.

I have a lot of sympathy with my noble friend on the Front Bench and his comments about various aspects of the Bill; in particular, his comments about the European Union. We should not be looking simply to match the European Union going forward. Indeed, I am very much in favour of having high standards which are not tied to the European Union. Where we can do better—and we should do better—without doing damage to the commercial viability of the UK industry, we should seriously consider taking that kind of step.

While mentioning briefly the international side, in the light of the easyJet takeover proposals, I urge the Minister and his colleagues in the department to use the most muscular approach on this. It would not normally be possible for a UK airline to buy a US one. We need to make sure that the rules and ownership are properly and rigorously enforced. It is urgent to do that.

My two amendments are designed simply to try to put some limitation on the powers that would reside with the Civil Aviation Authority as a result of the Bill. I always envisaged changes upon leaving the European Union as likely to lead to a degree of deregulation and a relaxation of restrictions. The Minister knows that I raised a number of concerns with him in Committee about the extent of the powers to enforce—to enter premises and to impose penalties. These two amendments are designed to put some limitations around the freedoms of the regulator to take enforcement action, so that it does so only in what are genuinely serious situations. I know the Minister is not going to accept these amendments, but I would ask him to give some thought to how this is applied in regulations. Of course, we need a regulator to have the ability to take serious action in a serious situation, but what we do not want is to create a situation where we have undue levels of enforcement on small matters in a way that is overly onerous on the commercial independence and freedom of businesses. We want common sense; these two amendments are designed to apply common sense, and I hope the Minister will be able to take that principle forward.

Finally, I will just comment on my noble friend Lord Young’s amendment, which I am sure he will be speaking to in a moment. Given the impact on the airlines of the failures, when they do happen, in the air traffic control system, I think he makes an important point that is worthy of consideration by the Government.

[Lord Young of Cookham (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for that trailer. The reason behind Amendment 65 in my name is what happened on 28 August 2023, when the air traffic system run by NATS failed. There was an independent review which looked into the debacle, and I want to quote very briefly from the report, which said:

“From CAA estimates, over 700,000 passengers were affected by cancellations and delays ascribed to the incident, including approximately 300,000 impacted by flight cancellations, approximately 95,000 by long delays (over three hours) and at least a further 300,000 by shorter delays”.


The review went on to estimate the costs involved:

“Based on the information provided by the airlines most affected by the incident, the Panel has estimated that the costs to airlines were approximately £65m. In addition, substantial costs were incurred by passengers, airports, tour operators, insurers, and others. The Panel was unable to accurately quantify these costs. It is likely that the total cost was in the region of £75m to £100m”.


Noble Lords may be surprised to learn that the company responsible for those losses—NATS—with a turnover of over £1 billion, with profits of over £200 million in each of the last two years, has immunity from those losses. Those losses instead are borne by the airlines, which are tied into a monopoly provider. To my mind, this is a manifest, wholly indefensible position that flies in the face of natural justice, and that is what my amendment seeks to remedy.

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[Baroness Bray of Coln (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome this opportunity to stress the importance of establishing a meaningful consultation with those communities directly affected by the likely expansion of flight paths and airports as a result of the Bill. I hope the Minister will give us an assurance that this important issue is recognised by the Government and can outline what plans they are developing for a genuine process to achieve this.

The amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Grender, contains some important proposals, and I will add a brief comment specifically about the necessary quality and depth of the consultation process. It should not be a one-off procedure to take place after expansion plans have already largely been settled. Communities need to be engaged from the outset, when options are still genuinely open. To be clear, while the expansion of flight paths is perhaps the main concern, there is also the likelihood that more flight paths will lead to busier airports, attracting more traffic on surrounding roads and greater pressure on local transport and public services. This must also be part of the consultation process.

There will of course be occasions when, having weighed up all the competing considerations, the Government, or the relevant authority, decide that an expansion should proceed despite local objections. That is always a possibility. But those affected communities will still deserve a clear explanation of why their concerns were outweighed by other considerations. This is essential if public confidence in the process is to be maintained. I look forward to hearing what assurance the Minister can give us today.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly. I raised the issue of consultation in Committee. The Minister gave me a very helpful response, but he very clearly said that, in a case where the Government took a decision, that approach would already have been subject to detailed consultation. That was only one particular approach. In a situation where there could be three or four different options for an airport, what is his view on the Government’s job in explaining why they have chosen one of the different options available?

That is where we get down to the basic principle in the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Grender: the Government cannot simply take a decision out of the blue without detailed explanation and without some degree of clarification to, and discussion with, the communities affected about why they have taken it out of maybe two or three options. I accept the Minister’s very helpful response to my comments in Committee, but can he now set out for us how the Government will approach a choice between numerous options? What approach will they take to consultation in that situation?

[Lord Moylan (Con)]

My Lords, some very important points have been made about consultation. I just want to be clear that I understand what points are being made. I believe these amendments are not about airport expansion. On airport expansion, I would say that, especially as it is subject to a process under planning law—namely, the development consent order—there will not be a shortage of consultation as a result of that development consultation order. Certainly, in the case of Heathrow, if it expands, the consultation will take place.

I think that the amendment that the noble Baroness, Lady Grender, put forward is not about expansion but about airspace modernisation. Although I would not want to commit myself to the wording of her amendment in particular, she has a point which the Government need to be quite clear about and they need to reckon what the difficulties are; that is, the reorganisation of flight paths will have winners and losers. It is not simply that flight paths might be moved from one corner, one area or one approach to another; part of the purpose of airspace modernisation is to concentrate flights, so there could be quite a lot of winners but some very bad losers as a result of this. The Government need to take people with them as they do this. There is a strong case for doing it, and we support modernisation, but the Government cannot leave their successor in a position where people have not been given a chance to be brought along.

My Amendment 39A in this group is about charges for air traffic and air navigation services in Clause 6. I drew attention in Committee to the sheer incoherence of the drafting of this clause. The Government have come forward with an amendment which improves it somewhat, but it slightly misses the point—it still leaves it saying something quite incoherent. I offer this only because I like to see properly drafted legislation. There is no politics in this; the Government should be doing their job properly in the first place. Clause 6(3)(c) says:

“Persons may be specified … if the services concerned are available for their use”—


note that phrase—

“or benefit, and it is immaterial whether or not the services are actually used or could be used by … them”.

I understand the part about it being immaterial whether they are used: “It is available for your use, but you did not use it; we’re still going to charge you”. That may be right or wrong, but that is what the law says. That is the situation. How can the services be available for their use, but they could not be used by them? You could still be charged for them even if they could not be used by you. How is that consistent with them being “available”? I do not understand it. I just think it is very poor drafting.

Anyway, I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say. I am glad he has corrected the other part of it that was incoherent; we are getting somewhere slowly. Maybe he will come forward with some sensible amendments at Third Reading so that the Bill makes sense in some key areas.

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[Baroness Foster of Oxton (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friends Lord Kirkhope and Lord Goschen. This is an extremely important sector. Most people do not know that worldwide GA is actually a larger sector than commercial aviation.

There is a huge amount of hostility to private jets. Very often, when aircraft, aeroplanes and rock stars flying around the world are discussed, people say, “Oh, gosh, they’re doing terrible things to the environment”. Actually, aviation is responsible for 3% of CO₂ emissions worldwide and 4% in Europe. It is not dismissive about that. It is hugely important. Sometimes we, as politicians, should be thoughtful about that narrative when we are discussing this important issue because, as my noble friends said, GA is key to so many areas. I just wanted to add that point for information.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. One thing that the Government could do for general aviation is to take steps to designate smaller airports that are for general aviation and are important to be retained for general aviation. I am very aware of the pressure to redevelop smaller airfields. There may be a case to support that for a small number of them, but the loss of those which are used extensively by general aviation will do significant damage to the aviation sector as a whole.

[Baroness Grender (LD)]

My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Barber, is aware, I tabled an amendment in Committee similar to his Amendment 69. However, even as I was speaking then, I recognised and understood that there was far greater expertise on this area in the Room. I have not been disappointed on that this evening.

We support Amendment 69 in principle. We cannot ensure safety in a workforce vacuum. As the BALPA briefing identifies, the sector faces a looming retirement cliff due to the mandatory retirement age of 65—House of Lords, please note. This amendment requires an authoritative annual assessment of future workforce requirements, enabling the industry to address supply issues, particularly for commercial pilots, well ahead of time. By requiring these reports on demographic trends, we would ensure that the move towards agile regulation was supported by a transparent understanding of the human capital required. This mirrors best practice elsewhere, as I think I mentioned in Committee—for instance, the Nursing and Midwifery Council has a similar operation—and it provides transparency to the House.

On Amendment 41, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, we must recognise that general aviation is the front door to the industry. It underpins pilot training and contributes £4 billion to our economy, yet smaller users are too often quietly squeezed out by disproportionate charges. This amendment provides a vital tramline to that. We welcome it and look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

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Moved by

[Lord Grayling]

42: Clause 7, page 7, leave out lines 18 to 22 and insert—
“(a) for the allocation of slots at a new airport; (b) for the allocation of additional capacity created at an existing airport, or at a new airport, where the affected air carriers have failed to reach a voluntary commercial agreement within a reasonable period;(ba) securing the availability of such proportion of the additional capacity created at an existing airport, or at a new airport, as is reasonably necessary to maintain or improve regional air connectivity within the United Kingdom;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and two others in the name of Lord Grayling confine the Secretary of State's intervention in airport slot allocation to specified circumstances and permit intervention only where commercial agreement cannot be reached after reasonable efforts and preserves the commercial allocation of existing airport slots while allowing limited provision for regional connectivity from newly created capacity.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to a number of amendments in this group that address the future of the slots regime. I had hoped and expected that, in the wake of the decision to leave the European Union, and as the Government now move to change the legislation on the slots regime, we would be taking a light-touch approach to this. Instead, I regard what the Government are doing as unduly onerous and micromanaging. As evidence, I simply refer to Clause 7(4):

“The regulations may make different provision for different purposes”.


That is not the kind of line in legislation that a Government who do not intend to micromanage the slots regime would ever need to introduce.

What I have sought to do in these amendments is, first, to set out specifically what I think the Government should be doing and where the lines should be drawn. Amendments 42 and 43 in particular focus on the key responsibilities: the allocation of slots at a new airport and the allocation of additional capacity created at an existing airport or at a new airport but only where the affected carriers have failed to reach a commercial agreement themselves. Secondly, since these are private businesses dealing with each other, I hope this is not something where the Government should need to have any involvement. It should be for the airport and the airlines to come up with a plan. Where that is not possible, I absolutely accept that there is a need for refereeing, but the first port of call should be to allow commercial businesses to reach an agreement themselves.

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[Lord Hendy of Richmond Hill (Lab)]

The answer to that is that the Secretary of State does not have any power to intervene because, as I said, the core principle of the slot allocation regime is that slots are allocated by an independent co-ordinator. There are suggestions from noble Lords opposite that in fact the Government should have less power here, so I am not sure that I see that the Secretary of State can easily intervene in something that is already allocated fairly neutrally and without bias towards any airline, airport or Government.

[Lord Grayling (Con)]

My Lords, I will pick up that latter point. The Minister has perhaps misunderstood my points. I set out the four areas where I felt the Government did have a role, and I said that the legislation goes much further than that. I cited the example of proposed new subsection (4), which appears to give the Government the power to do absolutely anything they want in this field. The issue is a Government who want to be able to control everything, and we are saying that there are only a certain number of things they should be involved in.

I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Empey, that regional connectivity is one example. I mentioned the easyJet situation to the Minister. A lot of the commentary has been around the value of that business being much higher by breaking it up, stripping out new plane orders and the rest. As we know, slots at Heathrow have huge value, and you could well imagine a situation where slots that were important within the United Kingdom were auctioned off for another purpose. So, yes, I believe in a more constrained slot regime, or more constrained government involvement in the slot regime, but I am not arguing and I have not argued that the Government should have no involvement in that regime. Regional connectivity is one area where the noble Lord, Lord Empey, has made some good and important points.

However, I can see that the Government are not going to concede on this point tonight. I simply ask the Minister to reflect further ahead of Third Reading, particularly on the regional connectivity point. In the interests of progress this evening, I beg leave to withdraw my Amendment 42.

Amendment 42 withdrawn.