Huawei and 5G

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Wednesday 4th March 2020 Westminster Hall

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

It is a great pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Paisley. I congratulate the right hon. Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith) on securing this incredibly important debate. We are on opposite sides of the House, but we share a deep commitment to British security and technological capability, which is clearly also shared by the many hon. Members present.

The UK has a proud technological history, from the earliest days of the industrial revolution to the invention of the first fibre-optic cable and, of course, the world wide web. Why, then, at the outset of the fourth industrial revolution, are we in a Huawei hole of our own making? As an enabling technology, 5G represents much more than faster mobile internet speeds. As the web enables applications that its inventor Sir Tim Berners-Lee could never have dreamed of, 5G provides the platform for the technologies that will define the 21st century.

As I may have mentioned before, I am a chartered electrical engineer and a tech evangelist. I want the United Kingdom to harness all the benefits that 5G networks can bring, but if the foundations are poorly laid, or not laid at all, the potential for national harm is significant. After I graduated from Imperial College London, my first job was for a world leader in the then-emerging telecommunications sector. I spent eight years with Nortel designing networking equipment all over the world and working with many of the other equipment vendors at the time, such as Alcatel, Siemens, Nokia, Ericsson and Motorola. If someone had said to me that, a couple of decades later, we would be incapable of building a European telecoms network without a Chinese supplier, I would have been dumbfounded.

As we have heard, Huawei is bound by China’s national intelligence law to support, co-operate and collaborate with national intelligence work. That raises many concerns for the security of our 5G network. I will not repeat those raised by many hon. Members, including the hon. Members for Isle of Wight (Bob Seely) and for Tonbridge and Malling (Tom Tugendhat). The fact that Huawei is designated by our National Cyber Security Centre as high risk says it all. It is high risk, so why are we taking a risk with our national security? My hon. Friend the Member for Leeds North West (Alex Sobel) and the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) highlighted the human rights and employment rights abuses with which Huawei is linked.

I have 10 questions for the Minister. How has the industry got itself into a position where our critical national infrastructure is so dependent on one high-risk vendor? The UK telecoms supply chain review, as summarised by the hon. Member for Rushcliffe (Ruth Edwards) and the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright), was seven months ago. The then Government committed to reduce our reliance on high-risk vendors over the next five to 10 years. Can the Minister say how that is happening? We have heard nothing since. The Government also said then that they would legislate at the earliest available opportunity. Again, we have heard nothing since.

With network design, cyber-security specialists will always advise people to assume breach, but the Government’s approach seems to have designed into it breach by a foreign power at a time of unprecedented geopolitical tension. I have many more questions as there is much that we do not know. What percentage of the UK’s currently deployed full fibre and mobile networks involves a designated high-risk vendor? From what proportion of our networks are they to be excluded under the terms of the NCSC advice?

If I understand the Government’s position, 5G and full fibre are critical national infrastructure, but only parts of them need to be secure. That is a difficult but, as the hon. Member for Rushcliffe suggested, tenable technological position, but we need to see the measures that will mitigate the risks and manage them out of our network.

On the international ramifications of the Government’s decision, as we have heard, the UK is the only member of the global intelligence-sharing network Five Eyes to have chosen to accept Huawei, with the exception of Canada, which is yet to make a decision but is being advised to block it. All the other members, the US, Australia and New Zealand, have blocked Huawei’s involvement, citing security concerns. Can the Minister tell us why our allies are taking such a different approach? Does he have a proper and detailed understanding of the impact on our international relationships, as the hon. Member for Glasgow South (Stewart Malcolm McDonald) highlighted?

Labour wants to work with the Government on this clear issue of national security. The Government say that the economic cost of barring Huawei would be too great and Mobile UK has estimated that a delay would cost £7 billion. If I compare that with the £8.3 billion committed by the Government to Brexit preparations, however, it strikes me as a clear case of political priorities—and what priorities they are, when we are at a profound national security crossroads.

I hold the National Cyber Security Centre in the highest regard—I thank its representatives for meeting me yesterday—but I ask the Minister to address a concern. The supply chain review report spoke of statutory guidance, but so far we have only had blogs. It is good to be responsive and we know that President Trump’s tweets have some force of law in America. Is the same true of these blogs? Will Ofcom be enforcing them?

The supply chain review report also promised telecoms security requirements, which would set a new bar for security and be enforced by Ofcom. The hon. Member for Rushcliffe seemed to imply that those requirements are available, but I have not seen them. Will the Minister tell me whether they are available, how they are to be enforced and with what resources, for both Ofcom and the Huawei cyber-security observance centre?

Finally, consolidation and competition from the Chinese subsidised sector means that many of the vendors and operators in the telecoms sector have finances that do not look exactly sustainable or stable. What is the Minister doing to assess the financial security of the sector?

As the Government shilly-shallies over national security, we will be tabling amendments to the Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill currently going through Parliament that will seek to reduce our dependence on high-risk vendors. I hope I will have the support of the Minister and other Members in this Chamber.

Labour also has proposals on the telecommunications industrial strategy, which has been highlighted by many Members, to ensure that we can take a leap forward in this critical technological area, including support for new standards and a new catapult, to bring together existing centres of excellence to ensure that we can once more be at the forefront of technological innovation. The good news is that, in technology, you are never so far behind that you cannot leapfrog existing technology. The bad news is that it takes investment in strategic vision—a quality that this Government sorely lack. Huawei is a test of both.

I return to my first question. Why are we in this position and what steps are the Government taking to ensure that it does not happen again, and to eliminate our dependence on high-risk vendors? The Government should start to proactively identify future technological needs and invest strategically to ensure that they can be met by a wider range of platform providers.

The Government claim to care about political sovereignty—about taking back control from foreign powers. It is high time that we started caring about technological sovereignty too.

[Ian Paisley (in the Chair)]

Before I call the Minister, I inform him that he has considerable time in which to make his contribution and he can take a number of short interventions, if he so chooses. Any time that he leaves at the end, I will give to Sir Iain Duncan Smith for a wind-up speech.