Multiannual Financial Framework

Chi Onwurah Excerpts

Wednesday 31st October 2012 Commons Chamber

[Mark Reckless]

Many hon. Members will be asking themselves the same question.

We heard from the Financial Secretary what these EU officials are paid. The Prime Minister went to Brussels a week or two ago and said that one in six EU officials earned more than €100,000. He might have understated his case, because we need to compare like with like. Not only do they earn more than €100,000 but they pay a special, incredibly low tax rate that applies only to people who work for the EU. They get an enormous expatriate allowance that shoves on another €15,000 to €20,000. They get a huge housing allowance. And, while a group of people in this country are about to lose child benefit of about £85 a month, EU officials get paid, tax free, another €300 per month per child. They contribute virtually nothing to their pension contributions. Under the arrangement we have in this country, any time a public official earns more than the Prime Minister—£142,500—that has to be signed off by the Chief Secretary to the Treasury. If we had to sign off every time an EU official was, in effect, getting the same take-home pay there as the Prime Minister’s salary here, that would apply to more than 5,000 European Union officials, or more than one in six. The Chief Secretary would be doing nothing but signing off those requests.

Today we have an opportunity to debate and vote on the multiannual financial framework—the long-term budget. This comes round once every seven years. It requires unanimity among member states and primary legislation in this House to implement it.

[Chi Onwurah (Newcastle upon Tyne Central) (Lab)]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that, despite the agitation among Government Members, the real issue is not the objective—there is a general consensus on the need for cuts to the budget—but the weakness of the Prime Minister in being unable to negotiate and having to threaten a veto?

[Mark Reckless]

No, and that is not a sensible point at all, because we have a one-off opportunity. It is this House that ultimately votes, so if any Government Members feel uncomfortable—not because of who I will be following through the Lobby, but because of who may be following me, in support of my Conservative amendment—I say to them: if we send the Prime Minister to Brussels telling him that it is acceptable to agree an inflationary increase, he may come back to this House having agreed that inflationary increase. We will then have to vote on primary legislation, in Committee and on Report, for that inflationary increase for the EU budget, all the way to 2020. If Members do not want that, they should vote today for my amendment.

The other strong argument for the amendment is this. Some people say, “We’re not going to get a real-terms cut,” but we will certainly not get one if we do not even try. If we use the veto, that is not a bad place to be; in many ways, it is better than where we would be with an agreed inflationary increase. There are two strong reasons for that. First, either we operate within a multiannual financial framework under the old, frozen ceilings carried forward, or we agree new ceilings going up by inflation, allowing higher budgets in future. Each of those budgets is always negotiated under qualified majority voting annually; the question is, where we have unanimity and where we need legislation, do we allow inflationary higher limits to 2020 or not?