Caroline Nokes
Main Page: Caroline Nokes (Conservative - Romsey and Southampton North)Department Debates - View all Caroline Nokes's debates with the Cabinet Office
Chinese Embassy
Caroline Nokes Excerpts(1 day, 8 hours ago)
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The Minister for Security (Dan Jarvis)
I would like to make a statement on the national security considerations of China’s proposal to build a new embassy at the Royal Mint Court in Tower Hamlets. I know that Members will by now be well aware that the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government has approved China’s planning application. Some right hon. Members have been briefed by my security officials, and some Members will have seen the statement from the Intelligence and Security Committee, as well as the letter from the director general of MI5 and the director of GCHQ.
The decision made by the Secretary of State for Housing was an independent, quasi-judicial planning one. It concludes a process that began in 2018 when the then Foreign Secretary, Boris Johnson, gave formal diplomatic consent for China to use the Royal Mint site for its new embassy, subject to planning permission, and welcomed it as China’s largest overseas investment. Given the potential for legal proceedings, it would not be appropriate to give a commentary on the grounds for the decision. In its decision, MHCLG notes that
“the package of security measures proposed would be proportionate to the proposed use of the site”
and that
“no bodies with responsibility for national security, including HO and FCDO, have raised concerns or objected to the proposal on the basis of the proximity of the cables or other underground infrastructure.”
I know that some Members have raised concerns regarding the security implications of the new embassy, and it is on that issue that I want to update the House. National security is the first duty of any Government, and that is why the intelligence and security agencies have been absolutely integral to this process. The ISC, which is the Committee entrusted and empowered by this House to scrutinise the Government’s most sensitive information, has today released its judgment on the security implications. I thank it for its work, and I am reassured by the depth of its scrutiny throughout this process. In its statement, the ISC concluded,
“On the basis of the evidence we have received, and having carefully reviewed the nuanced national security considerations, the Committee has concluded that, taken as a whole, the national security concerns that arise can be satisfactorily mitigated.”
I can confirm today that the Home Office has received a letter from the director of GCHQ and director general of MI5 that makes it clear that
“as with any foreign embassy on UK soil, it is not realistic to expect to be able wholly to eliminate each and every potential risk…However, the collective work across UK intelligence agencies and HMG departments to formulate a package of national security mitigations for the site has been, in our view, expert, professional and proportionate.”
They judge that
“the package of mitigations deals acceptably with a wide range of sensitive national security issues, including cabling.”
Indeed, they note that the consolidation has “clear security advantages”.
Our security services have over a century of experience of managing security matters relating to foreign embassies on UK soil. This Government, and the last, have been aware of the potential for a new embassy at this site since the Chinese Government completed the purchase in 2018. The issues that continue to be raised in media reports are not new to the Government or the intelligence community, and an extensive range of measures have been developed to protect national security. We have acted to increase the resilience of cables in the area through an extensive series of measures to protect sensitive data, and I can confirm that, contrary to reporting, the Government had seen the unredacted plans for the embassy and the Government have agreed with China that the publicly accessible forecourt on the embassy grounds will not have diplomatic immunity, managing the risk to the public.
Based on all that, and given our extensive work on this matter, I am content that any risks are being appropriately managed, but let me be clear: the build also brings clear national security advantages. Following extensive negotiations led by this Government, the Chinese Government have agreed to consolidate their seven current sites in London into one site. That is why, following deep scrutiny by security officials, the Government have been able to conclude that we can manage the security concerns related to the embassy.
Although there are those who have, and who will no doubt continue to have, concerns about the embassy, it is a fundamental and normal part of international relations that countries agree to establish embassies in each other’s capitals. While some would stick their heads in the sand and ignore the obvious need to engage, this Government are engaging with China confidently and pragmatically, recognising the complexity of the world as it is and challenging where we need to, because for our security, our economy and our climate, China matters. To be clear, this is not a question of balancing economic and security considerations; we do not trade off security for economic access.
Of course we recognise that China poses a series of threats to UK national security, from cyber-attacks, foreign interference and espionage targeting our democratic institutions to the transnational repression of Hongkongers and China’s support for Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine. That is why I announced a package in November to protect our national security, which set out the range of work the Government are taking forward to strengthen the security of our democracy against the threat from foreign interference and espionage. It is also why, for example, in December 2025 the UK sanctioned two China-based companies that have carried out cyber-attacks against the UK and its allies; why we have completed work to remove Chinese-made surveillance equipment from sensitive sites; why the UK has sanctioned 50 Chinese companies under the Russia sanctions regulations as part of our efforts to take action against entities operating in third countries over economic and military support for Russia; and why I will be hosting a closed event in February with vice-chancellors to discuss the risks posed by foreign interference from a range of states and to signpost our plans to further increase the sector’s resilience.
Taking a robust approach to our national security also includes engaging with China. Under the previous Government, engagement with China had ground to a halt. That made us no safer; indeed, it is only through engagement that we can directly challenge China on its malicious activity. By taking tough steps to keep us secure, we enable ourselves to co-operate in other areas, including in pursuit of safe economic opportunities in the UK’s interest, and in areas such as organised immigration crime, narcotics trafficking, and serious and organised crime. This is what our allies do and this is what we are doing: delivering for the public, putting more money in their pockets and keeping them safe through hard-headed, risk-based engagement with the world’s most consequential powers.
I am grateful to right hon. and hon. Members for the ongoing attention that they give to protecting the UK’s national security. China has posed, and will continue to pose, threats to our national security. However, following detailed consideration of all possible risks around the new embassy by expert officials across Government, I am assured that the UK’s national security is protected. Let me assure this House and the country: upholding national security is the first duty of Government and we will continue to take all measures necessary to defeat these threats. I commend this statement to the House.
Chris Philp (Croydon South) (Con)
Let us be in no doubt about the threat that China poses: MI5 has warned that Chinese intelligence is actively trying to disrupt our democracy; bounties have been placed on the heads of Hong Kong campaigners; Members of this House have been directly spied on by China; China actively supports Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine; and China is infiltrating universities and businesses to acquire sensitive technology, as well as stealing it directly. Yet this Government have failed again and again to take the action needed.
This Government failed to place China in the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme. This Government failed to properly support the case against two men accused of spying for China on MPs in this House. And now this Government have shamefully approved plans for a Chinese super-embassy. Despite everything China has done on our soil, China has been rewarded with exactly what it wants: a super-embassy that will be a base for espionage, not just in the UK but likely across Europe as well.
The Government have capitulated to Chinese demands. The Prime Minister himself said to President Xi at the G20 in November 2024,
“You raised the Chinese embassy building in London when we spoke on the telephone and we have since taken action by calling in that application.”
In other words, the Prime Minister did precisely what President Xi told him to do and then he faithfully reported back afterwards.
The decision has serious implications. Last week, The Telegraph published plans showing 208 secret rooms and a hidden chamber just 1 metre from critical data cables. Our economy depends on those cables, so what assurance can the Minister give that those cables will be secure from Chinese interference?
In paragraph 97 of his decision notice, the Secretary of State for Housing, Communities and Local Government, who made the decision, admits that he had not even seen unredacted plans before making his decision. How can he possibly have assessed the risk, as the decision maker, without having seen those plans? He also admits in paragraph 13 that he did not follow our suggestion to hold section 321 closed hearings to take evidence. Once again, how can the Secretary of State possibly have taken the decision in an informed way without having personally assessed the risk? It gets worse, because paragraph 8.63 onwards of the inspector’s report admits that China can legally refuse to allow UK authorities to inspect the building during or after construction—so we are going to have no idea what is being built in there in any event.
The Minister referred to the ISC. He said that someone in Government has seen unredacted plans, although we know that that was not the decision maker, the Secretary of State. Has the ISC seen those unredacted plans? It has been suggested to me that it has not. The ISC says that the risks can be mitigated, but mere mitigation is not enough. Mitigation entails only a partial exclusion of risk, and nothing is said about how to manage future developments in China’s capabilities—developments that we cannot anticipate today. The Minister for some reason forgot to quote this, but the ISC also says that the Government process was not robust enough. It says that it lacked clarity on national security, that the key reports lacked the necessary detail and that the Government do not have the “dexterity” required to handle China. Does the Minister accept those elements of the ISC report?
Others share those concerns. A US Government source was recently quoted as saying that the UK had “downplayed” the risks. Last week, the White House was reported to be “deeply concerned”, and the chair of the US House of Representatives China committee says that he opposes the plans on the grounds that Americans’ data may be “at risk”. Does the Minister agree with our American allies?
It is clear that this decision is timed to be shortly before a planned trip by the Prime Minister to China. He apparently intends to seek some kind of economic deal with China to fix the mess he and the Chancellor have created here, with jobs down and unemployment up since the election. From its timing and from President Xi’s clear demands, this planning consent appears to be linked to the Prime Minister’s imminent visit and to the economic deal. It seems clear to me that the Government are trading national security for economic links, and that this is a shameless capitulation to China’s demands.
China is spying on us. It is subverting our democracy, it is repressing people on our soil and it is stealing our technology. Is the truth not this? In those circumstances, giving them what they want is simply the wrong thing to do.
Madam Deputy Speaker
Order. Before I call the Minister, I gently remind shadow Ministers and spokesmen that there is a time limit, which the right hon. Gentleman exceeded somewhat.
Dan Jarvis
I listened carefully to what the shadow Home Secretary had to say. There was a glaring gap in his analysis: he did not seem to want to say anything about the level of challenge that we inherited from the previous Government in the laydown of the diplomatic estate. He did not want to accept that, as with other countries, there is a degree of risk that has to be managed. I explained that very carefully and made sure that he had the opportunity to come in this morning for a briefing. I was also at pains to stress in my opening remarks that although, of course, balanced views have to be taken about these things, there are national security advantages to the proposals that have been agreed. I know that he and other Conservative Members do not want to agree with that, but I think it is important that we debate—
Dan Jarvis
The right hon. Gentleman says it is nonsense. He is entitled to his opinion, as are this Government. I hope that he takes the opportunity to look carefully at what the director general of MI5 and the director of GCHQ have to say. I also say to him and to some, but not all, Conservative Members that this is a moment when I would have hoped we could discuss these things in a sensible and reasonable way. That is how we should approach matters relating to national security.
I do not think it would be such a bad thing to hear a bit of humility from some Conservative Members, not least because the attack that we heard from the shadow Home Secretary and which other hon. Members have already engaged in might have landed a bit fairer and a bit truer if they had not spent 14 years in government flitting between hot and cold, neither consistent nor credible on what is, after all, one of the most complex geopolitical challenges that we face. The Conservatives went from golden age to ice age, and from welcoming China with open arms to choosing to disengage almost entirely with the world’s largest nation, which, along with Hong Kong, is our second-largest trading partner. It is convenient for some Conservative Members to forget that it was Boris Johnson, as Conservative Foreign Secretary in 2018, who granted consent for the Royal Mint site to be used as diplomatic premises. He said he was proud to
“welcome the fact this is China’s largest overseas diplomatic investment.”
That was a Conservative Foreign Secretary. In recent times, we have seen Conservative MPs U-turn on the original position of their Government and take a different approach.
This Government will ensure that the approach we take is underpinned by consistent and pragmatic engagement with China, but we will do so a way that absolutely ensures our national security. The House will have heard the important contributions that have been made by the ISC, and the conclusion that it has drawn. The House and the country will have heard the comments from the directors general. These are important contributions. Nobody should underestimate how seriously the Government have taken this matter. We have engaged with it incredibly closely. The intelligence and security agencies have been involved in the process from the outset. I can give an assurance to those who have doubts that we will, of course, continue to monitor this process carefully, but we believe that this is the right judgment.
Madam Deputy Speaker
I respectfully say to the Minister that that was an incredibly long answer—indeed, longer even than the question. Perhaps questions and responses need to be briefer.
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend is an assiduous Member of the House and represents her constituents incredibly seriously. She will understand that, for obvious reasons, there are limits to what I can say about the specific measures and mitigations that will be put in place, but I am grateful to her for entirely understandably raising the concerns that some of her constituents have expressed. I assure her that we will want to work closely with her to minimise any disruption to local residents, and of course I would be happy to discuss these matters with her further.
Lisa Smart (Hazel Grove) (LD)
I am grateful to the Minister for advance sight of his statement and for the time his officials took to brief me earlier today.
The Government’s decision to approve plans for the Chinese mega-embassy represents far more than a planning matter. It shows that Ministers have learned very little from the evidence exposed in recent months of Chinese spying efforts to infiltrate British politics and this House. Throughout this stunted process, the Liberal Democrats have consistently called these plans out for what they are: a mistake. The Government know that the decision they have made today will further amplify China’s surveillance efforts here in the UK, endangering the security of our data. Planning conditions are meaningless without proper enforcement. Given the unprecedented security concerns surrounding this site, how will the Government ensure that planning conditions are rigorously monitored and enforced, particularly in regard to the underground cables that the current plans come dangerously close to?
No amount of planning conditions can address the fundamental problem. The embassy does not clean Chinese officials of their human rights abuses. It is shocking that China has placed bounties on the heads of democracy activists from Hong Kong who live in the UK. That type of interference and intimidation in our country is totally unacceptable, so in the light of this decision, will the Government include all Chinese officials, Hong Kong special administrative region officials and Chinese Communist party-linked organisations on the enhanced tier of the foreign influence registration scheme?
Beyond the security and diplomatic concerns, there are fundamental questions about our democratic freedoms. The previous Conservative Government attacked our fundamental right to protest, and this Labour Government have continued to erode those freedoms. As a democratic society, we must protect the right to protest peacefully, including near embassies and including for Hongkongers living in the UK. Will the Government continue to guarantee the right to protest, even as this embassy moves ahead?
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Member asks me what that means. I hope he will understand that it would be unwise of me to get into the technical detail of the mitigations that we are seeking to put in place. Surely he understands that the Security Minister is not able to get into the guts and the detail of precisely what we are going to do—[Interruption.] If he is just patient for—[Interruption.]
Madam Deputy Speaker
Order. I am simply not going to have this. There is too much chuntering, and indeed yelling, across the Chamber from a sedentary position. The Minister might like to focus on responding to the question that was asked by the Lib Dem spokesperson, not to heckling from the rest of the Chamber.
Dan Jarvis
I am grateful to you, Madam Deputy Speaker. Opposition Members have made points about transparency, and it is important that I take this opportunity to give as much detail as I can, but it is important for the hon. Member for Berwickshire, Roxburgh and Selkirk (John Lamont) to understand that, as Security Minister, I cannot get into the detail of precisely what we are going to do, for what I thought would have been fairly obvious reasons.
Let me say to the hon. Member for Hazel Grove (Lisa Smart) that the Government have been aware of the potential new embassy proposal since 2018. Our security services have been involved throughout that process, and an extensive range of measures have been developed and are being implemented to protect our national security. I can give her the assurance that she seeks that an extensive range of measures have been developed and are being implemented to protect our national security.
The hon. Lady also—quite unfairly, I have to say—criticised the Government’s belief in the right to protest. I do not think that that is a fair critique. The Government take very seriously the right of people to protest in our country. It is a cornerstone of our democracy and the Government will always ensure that people have the ability to protest in a peaceful way.
The hon. Lady asked, entirely reasonably, about the foreign influence registration scheme. I am waiting for Conservative Members to ask me about that as well. She will know that FIRS is still a new scheme. It came into force relatively recently, on 1 July, and more effectively on 1 October. She will understand that any decision with regard to FIRS will be brought to Parliament in the usual way.
Dan Jarvis
My hon. Friend is right to say that these are complex decisions, and right to make the point that there are significant restrictions on what can be said in this Chamber. I can give him the assurances that he seeks. Ultimately, of course, it is for the Intelligence and Security Committee to decide what lines of inquiry it wants to proceed with, but we have given it close assurances of the work being done, and it has had access to material, so that it can take its own view. I make a commitment to him and to the vice-chair of the Committee, the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), that we will continue to engage with the Committee in a constructive way, and that when we feel that it is necessary or appropriate to update the House further, we will of course do that.
Sir Jeremy Wright (Kenilworth and Southam) (Con)
As you, Madam Deputy Speaker, and the House would expect, the Intelligence and Security Committee has investigated the security implications of this proposal, and specifically whether the intelligence community had sufficient opportunity to feed in any security concerns, and whether Ministers had the necessary information on which to base a decision. I want to quote directly from our conclusions, which represent the Committee’s unanimous view:
“On the basis of the evidence we have received, and having carefully reviewed the nuanced national security considerations, the Committee has concluded that, taken as a whole, the national security concerns that arise can be satisfactorily mitigated.”
I will say, though, that we have been concerned solely with the national security perspective, not with the other arguments for or against a new embassy.
It has proved more difficult than it should have been to get straightforward answers to our basic questions. The process in Government does not seem to be effectively co-ordinated, or as robust as would have been expected. In particular, there was a lack of clarity about the role that national security considerations play in planning decisions. We will take those matters up further with the Government, as I know the Minister would expect.
Dan Jarvis
I do not accept the basis of the argument that my hon. Friend has made. He would be well advised to place more emphasis on the point about consolidation, because I am confident that that will deliver meaningful operational benefits; that has been agreed by the security experts. Let me find what I hope is an important point of consensus: I am absolutely clear about how unacceptable it is for China, or any other nation for that matter, to seek to persecute individuals who are resident in the United Kingdom. The Government take these matters incredibly seriously. That is why the defending democracy taskforce, which I chair, has completed an extensive piece of work looking at transnational repression.
A number of actions have come from that piece of work, which have been routed right across Government. We take this incredibly seriously; I have met a number of people who have been the victim of TNR. It is completely unacceptable for China or anyone else to persecute people in this country. However, I ask my hon. Friend to consider the fact that we are talking about a proposal that will deliver an embassy for China at some point in the future. The Government and I have to deal with the level of threat as it is. Given the point about consolidation, I am confident that this is a proposal that we will be able to make work in the national interests of our country and all the people who live here.
Sir Edward Leigh (Gainsborough) (Con)
While I associate myself with the wider security concerns, will the Minister forgive me if I raise a narrow point? He knows what I am going to ask, because I have asked this twice already and not had an answer. The correspondence between the Government and the Chinese reveals that the medieval monastery on the site—an important monastery called Eastminster, rather than Westminster, where we are now—will remain on inviolable Chinese territory. Any UK citizens visiting it will have to be frisked, and will effectively be in China. What reassurance can the Minister give to those who have bounties on their head—the hon. Member for Leeds South West and Morley (Mark Sewards) mentioned them—or to my right hon. Friend the Member for Chingford and Woodford Green (Sir Iain Duncan Smith), who has been sanctioned by the Chinese state? What further reassurances can the Minister give that UK citizens visiting their own heritage will not be in danger when going on to the site?
Luke Taylor (Sutton and Cheam) (LD)
Hongkongers and other Chinese dissidents in the UK will be rightly concerned about this news. I want to make it completely clear that the Liberal Democrats have serious concerns that this project will enhance China’s ability to conduct transnational repression against Britons and Hongkongers on British soil. What is the timeline for closing the seven existing Chinese consulate buildings, once Royal Mint Court is opened? Will the Government publish the 2018 note verbale confirming that the embassy was contingent on planning approval, ensuring that the Government did not prejudge the application? Finally, paragraph 62 of the Secretary of State’s permission letter states that
“lawful embassy use of the site”
would give no cause for worry about interference with the sensitive cabling that runs adjacent to the secret basement rooms. After China’s proven record of unlawful espionage against MPs and British institutions, does the Minister agree that this is a catastrophic misjudgment, and that we have no hope of our laws being observed by the Chinese Communist party?
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. When questions run to two pages and take a minute, perhaps Members might think about cutting them down slightly.
Dan Jarvis
The hon. Gentleman has expressed an opinion, and he is entirely within his rights to do that, but I hope he understands that I am also entirely within my rights to point out that his opinion is not backed up by the intelligence services or the security agencies, which have looked incredibly carefully at the detail of the proposal. He states baldly that the proposed embassy site will deliver additional capability to China, but I again make the point about consolidation, and about the security advantages that we think will accrue from this proposal. I hope the hon. Gentleman understands that I will not get into the timeline today, not least because I have to be incredibly careful about what I say, given the likelihood of further legal proceedings, but I am very happy to discuss these matters further with him and his Liberal Democrat colleagues.
Several hon. Members rose—
Madam Deputy Speaker (Caroline Nokes)
Order. I am hopeful that we can find consensus that questions and answers need to be shorter. I intend to keep the Minister here until all Members have been satisfied this afternoon, but we do need to speed up.
Mr Mark Francois (Rayleigh and Wickford) (Con)
There is a pattern of behaviour here: the failure to act meaningfully over Jimmy Lai, the mysterious collapse of the Chinese spy case and now this abject national humiliation. Let’s call this what it is: this is appeasement of communist China for economic gain. We tried that in the 1930s, and look where it got us. Why are this Labour Government kowtowing to China—a communist regime that imprisons 1 million Uyghur Muslims in concentration camps for having the temerity to believe in God?