Defence Supplementary Estimate 2021-22

Debate between Bob Stewart and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

Wednesday 9th March 2022 Commons Chamber

[Bob Stewart]

I thank my right hon. Friend—who is a good friend and is gallant, because he was a midshipman once—for allowing me to intervene. One thing that the Russians are showing is that to take territory, people have to put boots on it. But, guess what? We are chucking our boots out. That is appalling and we must reverse that decision.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

Order. Before the right hon. Member for New Forest East (Dr Lewis) comes back, I think it is important to let hon. Members know that I will have to impose a time limit when he has finished, otherwise we will simply not get everybody in. The time limit will probably be around six minutes, depending on how long he takes.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Debate between Bob Stewart and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons & Carry-over motion & Carry-over motion: House of Commons & Money resolution & Money resolution: House of Commons & Programme motion & Programme motion: House of Commons & Ways and Means resolution & Ways and Means resolution: House of Commons
Monday 30th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

This Bill makes sense. I agree with the right hon. Member for North Durham (Mr Jones) that it is primarily about security. It is a top priority for us to ensure the security of all telecommunications networks, particularly those that might carry classified information and that is what this Bill is all about. I particularly endorse those clauses in the Bill that give the Government robust powers to manage high-risk vendors based, of course, on National Cyber Security Centre advice. That may well also include direct guidance from other intelligence agencies as well. It is also absolutely right that the Government have placed a ban on purchasing new equipment from high-risk vendors from September 2021 and ordered the removal of high-risk vendor equipment from our networks by 2027, but, as I will go on to say, it will have implications. I wish we could achieve that earlier, but, obviously, industry needs time to manage the transition required.

The NCSC is at the forefront in developing telecommunications security requirements. It has done this in collaboration with industry and these requirements are detailed and effectively designed to establish a layered defence against cyber-attacks and infiltration. Codes of practice will devolve from these requirements and they will form a method of operation as well as being a way of calculating risks for operators Ofcom, DCMS, and NCSC. I endorse the view that these requirements and codes of practice will definitely increase the difficulty, the cost and the risks faced by a hostile player attempting to infiltrate or to compromise a UK telecommunications network, but, as the right hon. Gentleman has said, that does not mean that we are invulnerable—oh, no, it does not. There are still risks.

Next year, I gather that we will need to pass secondary legislation to endorse codes of practice that will, thereafter, be used to instruct operators on how to meet their security obligations. Such codes of practice will be policed by Ofcom—we have talked about that a little. Most certainly, it will require training on how to do this. Here there needs to be a serious interchange with the NCSC where a working relationship between the two bodies is crucial—and at cost. Of course there are penalties for this decision. Not only will this change delay the roll-out of the 5G network, but significant consequent costs will be incurred by industry. I know that industry may need the Government to support it in consequence of this decision. On the other hand, a recent report has also suggested that upgrading the UK’s 5G infrastructure could be worth about £158 billion to the economy over a 10-year period.

We have already mentioned that there are three significant vendors who provide large-scale telecommunications equipment in the UK. These are Ericsson, Nokia and Huawei. With the significant removal of Huawei as a result of this Bill, choice of vendors is of course reduced by a third, which is most certainly not ideal. It would be far better if we had more choice and competition, but we do not—that is the fact of it. However, Ericsson and Nokia are very good, trusted and long-standing companies whose security credentials are tried and trusted. I am very pleased by the idea of the open radio access network—open RAN—being developed. It is crucial to develop the UK as a world leader in 5G. Essentially, open RAN allows interconnectivity between different telecommunications mobile networks, and avoids the necessity of all components coming from just one supplier. For instance, Ericsson equipment can be interfaced with that of Nokia, or perhaps another new supplier—let’s hope so. That aids the drive towards competition andthus has cost benefits.

 

I have been an extremely good boy, Madam Deputy Speaker. I hope I am going to get a thumbs up for finishing in six minutes. I commend this Bill to the House.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

indicated assent.

[Bob Stewart]

I got a thumbs up from Madam Deputy Speaker; I sit down with a big glow on my face.

National Security and Investment Bill

Debate between Bob Stewart and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Tuesday 17th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I want to concentrate on what is essentially the core of this Bill—our national security. Today our country continues to face a broad-ranging hostile attack from foreign intelligence agencies. A few of our critical industries and technologies may already have been purchased, at least in part, by foreign investors, some of whom may not have a particularly benign approach to British national security.

This Bill comes not before time, considering that the Intelligence and Security Committee ruled on the matter and suggested changes in 2013. Unless the UK curbs the right of foreign firms and investors to obtain technologies through the means of mergers and acquisitions, and similar, our advanced technologies could easily find their way into the weapons systems of foreign and potentially hostile states. This would definitely harm the UK either directly or indirectly. The Bill gives the Secretary of State the power to screen investments that might just pose a national security risk, and that is what we are talking about today.

Obviously the Bill very much reflects the views of the ISC, of which most Members, apart from the Chairman, are present. [Interruption.] I didn’t use the word “you”, did I, Madam Deputy Speaker? [Interruption.] Oh good—you were looking at me with horror.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I only pointed out that I was once a member of the ISC as well.

[Bob Stewart]

I am always a culprit on the word “you”. I have now lost my place, thanks to your intervention, Madam Deputy Speaker!

The report produced by the ISC in 2013 contained a requirement for legislation, and we are now getting that legislation seven years later, which is rather a long delay. I am delighted that the Bill protects British industry and puts safeguards on it, but it puts particular safeguards on our national security. In future, investors will have no choice but to notify the Government if the ownership of certain businesses is to change hands—thank goodness for that. However, I note that the Secretary of State will also have the power to call in other businesses if he or she has concerns about national security. That is why I am slightly against a narrow definition of national security; I would prefer it to be a bit more fluid.

The decision to call in an investment will be based on three factors: the nature of the target of acquisition; the type and level of control being acquired and how that could be used in practice; and the extent to which the acquirer raises national security concerns. The list of sectors to be covered is under consultation. I will not use a mnemonic, which until today I thought was some sort of drill, but that list includes advanced robotics, artificial intelligence, cryptographic authentication, whatever that is, quantum technologies—I do know what that is—and satellite and space technologies, in which we are world leaders. It is very important that those sectors are guarded against being infiltrated, because that is what it is—infiltration to take away intellectual property.

At the moment, the UK is almost unique among major western economies in not having stand-alone foreign investment legislation, and this Bill will sort that out. It will give Ministers the power to look at transactions overall and to review them. The Government’s impact assessment estimates that it will result in well over 1,000 transactions a year—possibly up to 1,800, as some Members have suggested. That is a lot, and it means a lot of work for a specific department of BEIS. There will only be 100 people to do that work, which is slightly worrying.

I will finish, because I was told to be short—and I have been, in six minutes—and because I had your naughty finger pointed at me, Madam Deputy Speaker.

Participation in Debates

Debate between Bob Stewart and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

Monday 16th November 2020 Commons Chamber

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call Bob Stewart.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Thank you, Madam Deputy Speaker. The point I was going to make has been repeatedly made by hon. and right hon. Members, so I will withdraw my question.

Passchendaele

Debate between Bob Stewart and Baroness Winterton of Doncaster

Thursday 13th July 2017 Commons Chamber

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

I want to talk about the situation 100 years ago. At that time, one quarter of the vessels crossing the Atlantic were being sunk by U-boats coming from the Belgian coast. The Navy had warned the Government that unless something was done about it, we might collapse in 1918. The United States had entered the war on 6 April 1917, which was great from our point of view, but in May and June the French army was massively defeated by the Germans, resulting in a huge mutiny in its ranks. At the same time, the British generals wanted to break out of the Ypres Salient, so the Germans had very good reason to believe that they could win the war at that time. They felt that the Americans would not get into the war before they had won it. That is fairly true, because the American army was very small, a bit obsolete and did not have many weapons.

Field Marshal Haig, Commander-in-Chief of the British Expeditionary Force, desperately wanted to break out of the Ypres Salient where it had been stuck for several years. He wanted to get to the coast, because the strategic aim was to get to those U-boat pens and stop us being throttled by torpedo attacks.

The plan was simple. There was a preliminary operation, which other hon. Members have mentioned, to secure the southern flank of the British position. The first phase was to take out the railway junction at Roulers and to then swing around and advance towards the coast. That was the plan, but it went very badly wrong.

I want to talk about the soldiers. By mid-1917, machine guns had become what Correlli Barnett called the queens of the battlefield. They were devastating. The rifle by comparison was absolutely useless. The 1st Battalion Cheshire Regiment, which I was to command 74 years later, had been equipped the previous year with 16 Lewis machine guns, which were pretty heavy: they were 28 lb, not including ammunition. Our soldiers had to carry them. Nobody really wanted to take a machine gun as they crossed the frontline, for two reasons: first, it made them an easy target and, secondly, its weight. They scurried across no man’s land, going as fast as they could, but it was difficult to go fast in those conditions.

At the same time, by the start of the third battle of Ypres, Passchendaele, our soldiers had been issued with those awful helmets. They called them tin hats. I wore one when I first joined the Army—I am that old—and they were acutely uncomfortable and very heavy. Again, that made it difficult for our soldiers when they scrambled out of their frontline positions.

They had had one hell of a winter: 1916-17 had been incredibly cold. The soldiers received only one hot meal a day and it was usually supplied by the quartermaster in boxes lined with straw. They brewed tea themselves. They would usually fill old jam tins with grease and insert a wick to make a flame on which they would put a pot to heat up the water. Every day, the quartermaster tried to bring clean socks to the frontline positions, because trench foot was appalling. The conditions were so wet and the men needed to try to keep their feet dry, which was almost impossible.

It was good that some of the soldiers in my battalion were allowed leave. They went home and came back, but they knew damn well what they were coming back to. That is why they are heroes—because they came back. They came back from home, where they saw normality. War is not normality. War is disgusting and horrid, and it is something to be avoided. Heroism is going back to that because, as my right hon. Friend the Member for Broadland (Mr Simpson) has said, they did not want to let their friends down.

Even then, in the middle of the war, when reinforcements were coming, those that were supposed to come to my battalion, the 1st Battalion Cheshires, were diverted. The battalion was on the frontline near Cambrai and one would think that, before the battle, it would be fully manned, but it was not. It did not even have enough troops to go along the front. It had to have little posts on the frontline, in the hope that they could cover the area in front of the battalion position.

They knew damn well what would happen when the signal for advance was given—they had been there long enough. On 31 July, very early in the morning, at 3.50, just as dawn was breaking, the battalion’s officers blew the whistles. Can you imagine how absolutely terrified our soldiers were? They must have had a hell of a night up to that time. They were laden with ammunition, kit and Lewis machine guns. As H-hour—that is, the start time—was declared, some soldiers were being delivered by train right to the frontline. They disembarked and went straight across the start line and into battle.

When they went into no man’s land, it was not a run. It was not even a walk. It was more like a crawl, I would think. No man’s land was full of wire obstacles, which sometimes got worse under artillery fire. And then, within hours, the rain came—the worst rainfall for 30 years. The men could not even get into the shell holes, because they were full of water. They were sitting ducks. They were covered in filth, absolutely exhausted, trying to go forward. And that is what they did. Some of them sank right down to their waists in the mud, and it took six soldiers to pull each of them out. Stretcher bearers could not move—there was no chance at all of them moving in that mud.

Our soldiers were not brave—of course they were brave, but what they really experienced was terror—and they thought that within minutes, within seconds, they would be dead. Perhaps they prayed that it would be a head shot. The soldier’s prayer is a head shot, to die straight out, not a wound to the stomach or the abdomen, when no one can get to the wounded and they lie there in agony for hours or days, sometimes just slipping under the mud and drowning while they are at it.

I think I have some idea of what they felt, because I have advanced when someone beside me has been shot. I knew I had to go, because I had to go and get some civilians—I am talking about Bosnia—but I was not a hero; I was not brave, but bloody terrified. I was so terrified that I wet myself. That is not bravery, but what mattered was that we went forward and did our duty. Our soldiers did that. They did not want to die—it was the last thing they wanted to do. They wanted to survive.

Passchendaele was a stalemate for four months, while our men were sitting ducks. It was a disgusting, exhausting and traumatic experience for anyone who was there. It cost both sides dearly. I do not think we know the exact figures, but the British were about 310,000 dead and the Germans 260,000. That was the dead, but three times as many casualties survived. The ratio then was one dead to three wounded.

Haig later justified what happened by saying, “It was necessary. We could take more casualties than the Germans, because we had more resources. That made it worthwhile.” Can anyone imagine a general today trying to give such a justification for the mass slaughter that occurred at Passchendaele? “I thought it was okay, because we could take more casualties than they could, so in the end we would win.” We remember them all, British, German and Commonwealth, today.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)]

I call Mohammad Yasin to make his maiden speech.