Ukraine

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 25th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

When will this House see the force structure of the British component of Multinational Force Ukraine so that we can properly scrutinise it?

[John Healey]

The detail of the structure and the deployment will become clear and depend on the context and detail of the peace agreement. In the context of a decision to deploy, the Prime Minister has said that the House will have the chance to debate and vote on that deployment, and I suspect that we will be able to set out the detail at that point. The hon. Member and other experts in the House will then have the chance to examine and debate it and, I trust, give it their approval so that any British forces will be deployed into Ukraine in the context of a peace deal with all-party support.

There is no more serious a decision for any Defence Secretary or any Government than committing our armed forces on operations, but I want to be the Defence Secretary who deploys British troops to Ukraine, because that will mean that we will have a negotiated peace and that the war will finally be over. Britain has been united for Ukraine from day one. The House, as the Father of the House said, has been united for Ukraine from day one.

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[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

As he marked the fourth anniversary of the conflict in Ukraine, following Russia’s illegal invasion, President Zelensky said that Putin “has already started” world war three. He went on:

“The question is how much territory he will be able to seize and how to stop him…Russia wants to impose on the world a different way of life and change the lives people have chosen for themselves.”

It is humbling to address the House as we enter the fifth year of this conflict—seemingly a conflict without end; peace talks are faltering and at an impasse. The last four years of conflict in Ukraine have been savage, unrelenting and at a level of total war that we have been fortunate enough to become unacquainted with in this country during of our lifetime. The toll that has taken on the civilian population has been horrific: there have been over 15,000 Ukrainian civilian deaths, thousands more displaced, and an entire population whose lives have been put on hold, forever changed. We have seen lives lost, families devastated and future hopes and dreams shattered, yet Ukraine has held firm against the Russian onslaught. It did in 2022 as it does today.

The Government have remained steadfast in their support for Ukraine, and that same support was extended when they were in opposition. When we were in government, we stood four-square behind Ukraine from the very start, and we were the first nation to openly back the Ukrainian forces with weapons. This House has been united in its support, and that support has been vital. Not only is it there to protect Ukrainian sovereignty in the face of such flagrant disregard for international law, but it represents the FLOT—the forward line of own troops—for the defence of Europe.

We have all seen the changes that this war has brought: a new cold war—maybe even a phoney war—and a generational leap in the nature of warfare in just four years that has catapulted drones from a nerdy hobby to a horrific “Black Mirror” reimagining of modern warfare.

[Melanie Ward (Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy) (Lab)]

The hon. Gentleman talks about drones. A couple of weeks ago, I was at the Munich security conference, where I had the privilege of hearing President Zelensky speak. He said that in January, Ukraine was attacked by more than 6,000 Shahed drones, which are made in Iran, or in Russia based on Iranian design. Does he agree that the sheer scale of bombardment that Ukraine faces from those drones, and from countries that also wish our country ill, is just one reason why the United Kingdom is right to stand with Ukraine for as long as it takes?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I wholeheartedly concur. The Iranians, in particular, are global leaders in exporting terror, backing, as they do, the Houthis, Hezbollah and Hamas. Their provision of the Shahed drone to Russia and the bombardment that the Ukrainians face lead to a terrible toll and are a terrible result.

Anyone who has seen any of the innumerable videos of first-person-view drone footage of soldiers being stalked and killed by drones cannot fail to appreciate the new reality of modern warfare. On the point made by the hon. Member for Cowdenbeath and Kirkcaldy (Melanie Ward), the last year alone has seen Russia increase its use of drones by 200%. Such a capability sea change cannot be overstated.

Four years into Putin’s three-day special military operation, Russia has sustained a staggering 1.2 million casualties, 325,000 of them fatalities. That is fast approaching the number of soldiers that we lost in the entirety of the second world war. The majority of casualties—reportedly 70% to 80%—are now caused by drones. It is reported that Russia can no longer recruit new soldiers at the rate that they are being lost, and in the past fortnight, Ukraine has liberated 300 square kilometres in its southern counter-offensive.

We are four years into this conflict, and the remarkable bravery of the Ukrainian armed forces remains undiminished. Yes, we have supported them with matériel, intelligence, rapid procurement and funding, but the human sacrifice required to win, or crucially not lose, a war of sovereignty and survival is something that we perhaps do not address enough. Fifty-five thousand Ukrainian soldiers have been killed since 2022—the equivalent of more than two thirds of our regular Army. From the contributions this afternoon, it is clear that Members on both sides of this House want an end to this conflict, and an end on Ukraine’s terms—one that does not see them acquiesce to the Russian threat that it has given so much to keep at bay.

In the broader context of European security, what comes next? There are significant lessons to be learned from the conflict in Ukraine. No war has been as visually documented at such close quarters as this. The Lessons Exploitation Centre at the Land Warfare Centre will have been busy shaping our future tactics. An example of that is the recently released outcome of NATO’s Exercise Hedgehog 2025 in Estonia, in which a team of just 10, training against experienced Ukrainian drone operators, were able to render two battalions combat-ineffective in just half a day. We are through the looking glass.

Last Saturday, the Defence Secretary wrote a piece for The Telegraph in which he explicitly stated:

“I want to be the Defence Secretary who deploys British troops to Ukraine–because this will mean that the war is finally over.”

But to quote Winston Churchill, that will simply be

“the end of the beginning.”

The Minister does not need me to tell him that the ceasefire will simply facilitate a reconstitution of Russian forces. To use an old adage, Russia will trade space for time. When it returns to its barracks in the Leningrad military district, it will be based only a few minutes from the Estonian border. Pskov, home of the 76th Guards Air Assault Division and the 2nd Spetsnaz Brigade, is just 35 km away.

The NATO Forward Land Forces already man the line in Estonia via Operation Cabrit—one of our ongoing commitments. The battlegroup deployed there serves as a deterrent to further Russian expansionism and belligerence. No longer just a strategic tripwire, it is now a force equipped with a capability in Project Asgard that presents a lethal recce-strike system—a force whose very presence provides Estonia with the security of the NATO umbrella; a force so vital that its ongoing presence is apparently written into Estonia’s defence strategy.

[Mike Martin (Tunbridge Wells) (LD)]

The hon. Member is making an excellent speech. While we want the war in Ukraine to end and, of course, for Britain to play a leading role in that, including, if appropriate, the provision of troops, does he not share my fear, when we zoom out and look at the geopolitical context, that putting the troops in Estonia in Ukraine stops us from guarding other areas on the eastern flank, and—to use military terminology—fixes most of our forces there when they might be needed elsewhere?

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

I thank the hon. Member for his contribution. I hope he has not stolen a look at my speech, as I am about to come on to just that point, but I agree with him. There is potentially a trade-off to be made between putting troops on the ground in Ukraine and in the High North. There is a possibility that doing both those things to the sufficient level that we require may prove too much of a challenge.

We are committed in Estonia, just as we are to be committed in Ukraine. It has been reported that our commitment to a post-ceasefire force would be around 7,500 troops. That is smaller than our peak commitment in Afghanistan, but that reflects the difference in posture. While 7,500 does not sound like a lot—only circa 10% of the current Army—it does not reflect the fact that three times that number is needed to sustain the deployment. By the time of a second six-month rotation through Ukraine, we would have 7,500 who have just returned from the first tour, the second 7,500 currently doing the job and the next 7,500 training to go. That is 22,000-odd from a field army of, say, 40,000, meaning that over half the Army will be committed to manning the eastern flank deterrence line.

It was reported in The Telegraph yesterday that multiple members of the coalition of the willing have privately conceded that their contributions to the post-ceasefire peacekeeping mission depend on permission from Vladimir Putin. Could the Minister in his summing-up confirm whether every country in the coalition of the willing has committed to deploying troops to the peacekeeping mission in Ukraine alongside us?

If we include the aforementioned battlegroup in Estonia, that is another 3,000 troops operating on the same cycle. If we factor in ongoing commitments, such as NATO’s Allied Reaction Force special operations component, which we lead for the next year, the Falkland Islands Roulement Infantry Company and the Resident Infantry Battalion in Dhekelia, as well as the process of retraining and rearming for the plethora of planned new capabilities, the number of personnel quickly adds up under the stacked readiness of multiple commitments. With the Prime Minister announcing our commitment to Operation Firecrest this year with the carrier strike group, as well as the expanded Royal Marines commitment in Norway, suddenly our armed forces are on the cusp of looking overstretched, and doubly so in the event that anything else comes into scope or goes hot.

I highlight these challenges to draw out the complexity of the broader strategic issue. The only way this level of operational commitment will be feasible is if, like our European allies, we properly fund defence. That is why we have called on the Government to go faster and spend 3% of GDP on defence by the end of this Parliament to ensure that they can deliver the 62 recommendations in the strategic defence review that they have already pledged to deliver. But the defence investment plan itself is six months late, strongly suggesting that the plan as it stands is unaffordable. Can the Minister confirm that the plan will finally be published before the Easter recess? It is imperative that the plan addresses the growing capability gaps as the warfare spiral develops in eastern Europe.

In conclusion,

“I believe we are on a collision course with a Russia that is on a war footing, that is replenishing its lost equipment and that is re-arming fast… Putin will only take us seriously when he sees our factories producing at wartime rates. And that’s why I believe so strongly in the need to rebuild our own national arsenal and reconnect society with its Armed Forces… The urgency could not be clearer. Just ask yourself: If you knew now that our soldiers would be involved in large-scale combat operations in 2027, what would you be doing differently—and why are you not doing it?”

Those are not my words, but the words of the Chief of the General Staff, General Sir Roly Walker. He said them yesterday. As we mark the fourth anniversary of Vladimir Putin’s needless and tragic war, I am sure everyone in this House would agree with me when I say that I hope we are not here to mark a fifth. Slava Ukraini.

Diego Garcia and British Indian Ocean Territory

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 25th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Falconer]

Madam Deputy Speaker, I apologise. I am failing again. The hon. Member will appreciate the scepticism on the Government Benches given that the Conservative Government started this process, two American Administrations recognised that there was a real issue to be addressed, and this American Administration supported the steps we had taken in May.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I will push back slightly on what the Minister is saying. As we know, the discussion between the UK and the Government of Mauritius around the sovereignty of the Chagos islands started in January 2009 under the previous Labour Government. That was confirmed to me by the Minister for the Overseas Territories, so he might want to bear that in mind.

The question I want to ask is about Jonathan Powell, the National Security Adviser who, prior to being National Security Adviser was the Prime Minister’s special envoy to the British Indian Ocean Territories—and still is today. Prior to being appointed on 6 September, he conducted meetings with the FCDO. He confirmed that he had already seen the deal prior to being in post and was then given a hard copy of the deal when he reached Port Louis. When did he attend Port Louis? Was it prior to his appointment as the PM’s special envoy? What security clearance did he have when he saw the Chagos deal for the first time?

[Mr Falconer]

On the first question, as I understand it the talks first started under the Conservative Government, but I am very happy to check the Foreign Office records and come back on that question. Whether they were started in 2009 or in 2010, that was quite a long period afterwards during which the Conservative Government were in charge and this strength of feeling was not demonstrated. Indeed, other hon. Members did not raise these issues in their time in office—[Interruption.] The suggestion, if I may say so, from the Conservatives that they were vociferously against this decision—they just took 11 occasions to work that out—does not feel very plausible to me. The hon. Member asked specific questions about Jonathan Powell’s work—[Interruption.] I thought I answered the first set of questions.

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[Madam Deputy Speaker]

The hon. Member for South Suffolk (James Cartlidge) might not be satisfied with the response, but that was a response none the less. We will not continue the debate.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

On a point of order, Madam Deputy Speaker. On 9 February I asked a named day question about the role of Jonathan Powell in the Chagos islands deal, which was due for answer on 12 February. As of now, 25 February, it has still not been responded to by the Government. How can I best encourage the Government to produce timely and accurate answers to named day written questions on this subject?

[Madam Deputy Speaker]

I am sure that those on the Treasury Bench, including Ministers, heard that. It is not good enough when Members put in for bits of information and table written questions and the responses do not come back in a timely fashion. I see those on the Treasury Bench and the Ministers nodding. One can assume that a response will be forthcoming very quickly. The hon. Member has got his point on the record. We do not want to continue the debate.

Jimmy Lai: Prison Sentence

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 9th February 2026 Commons Chamber

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The Minister appears to have come to the Chamber today with absolutely nothing to say. The recent visit to China was an absolute disaster, with people taking burner phones and a burner plane—we even appear to have taken a burner Prime Minister. The Minister referred earlier to progress being made in these discussions, so can she outline exactly what progress has been made, and what was the response from the Chinese Government when the Prime Minister raised the case of Jimmy Lai with them directly?

[Seema Malhotra]

The Prime Minister’s recent visit allowed us to open up discussion and dialogue directly with the Chinese Government at the highest level. The Conservatives seem to have forgotten that it is actually quite important to engage in such discussions and dialogue with other Governments, including on incredibly difficult issues. There is absolutely no point in trying to call for something when you are shouting into a void, and the Conservatives should know better. It is much better to have a relationship that allows us to make our case directly to the Chinese President, rather than talking to ourselves. As the Prime Minister has said, the purpose of engaging is to seize the opportunities that open up as a result of engagement, but also to provide an opportunity for those discussions. If you sit outside the room, if you refuse to engage, you cannot even have the conversation. I come back to the point that I have made a number of times in the Chamber today: we continue those discussions, publicly and privately, to secure the release of Jimmy Lai, which is this Government’s priority.

British Indian Ocean Territory

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 28th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Tim Roca]

I cannot clear up that point for the right hon. Member, but I have great confidence that ministerial colleagues would be able to. We have been told at all points that this treaty would ensure the continued effectiveness of the base in the way that it is run now. There was an Ohio class submarine there in 2022, and I hope those arrangements continue under this treaty. From what I have heard from Ministers, there is no reason that they would not.

Let us turn to the costs of the deal. It will cost a fraction of the defence budget for an irreplaceable asset—

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Could the hon. Member clarify precisely how much of the cost of the Chagos islands deal will come from the Ministry of Defence budget?

[Tim Roca]

I am sure that has been set out already in several debates. The point that has not been set out adequately and cannot be set out in huge detail is that, in exchange for providing the United States with facilities on Diego Garcia, the in-kind support in terms of intelligence and other matters that we receive from the United States must run into the billions every single year. Although we cannot put a figure on that, it is a really important element in this debate.

There is no prosperity without security, and there is no security without certainty. In an interconnected world, those are not abstract principles; they are strategic necessities. That is why, in my view, this is a sensible, hard-headed deal, and a confident assertion of the United Kingdom’s national interest.

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[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

So wrote the President of the United States only a week ago:

“The UK giving away extremely important land is an act of GREAT STUPIDITY.”

For once, he is not wrong. I have lost track of the number of times I have spoken about the Chagos deal in this House, but each time brings a new stick with which to beat the Government. It is genuinely difficult to see how the Government have got to this point, but their kamikaze negotiating tactics have led them to a situation where they can no longer even muster the collective energy of their Back Benchers to defend it. The dogged determination of the Government to capitulate to a 2019 advisory ruling by the International Court of Justice would be commendable, were it not so timid. The UN General Assembly adopted resolutions urging the UK to comply with the ICJ’s advisory opinion, but crucially, the US voted in support of the UK, clearly not fearing the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, of which it is not a member.

As I am sure everybody here already knows, the United States’s support is significant because of the presence of the naval support facility, Diego Garcia. It is a strategically important location that is effectively a persistent aircraft carrier in the Indian ocean, critical for force projection in the southern hemisphere and across INDOPACOM—the United States Indo-Pacific Command. On Monday, the Minister of State responsible for the overseas territories, the hon. Member for Cardiff South and Penarth responsible (Stephen Doughty) was quick to imply that discussions regarding the deal with the United States were an almost daily occurrence. With that in mind, perhaps the Minister in his summing up could outline to the House what discussions the Government have had with their US counterparts regarding the limitations placed on operations by compliance with the Pelindaba treaty.

This was the answer I received to a recent written question:

“Both the UK and Mauritius are satisfied that our existing international obligations are fully compatible with the Agreement”,

but what precisely does that exclude going forward? The African nuclear weapon-free zone treaty was signed by Mauritius in 1996 and prohibits myriad functions relating to nuclear weapons, including possession or control of nuclear weapons. There are obviously no intercontinental ballistic missiles based at Diego Garcia, but the US nuclear triad is designed to provide a second-strike capability that includes air-launched warheads.

Naval support facility Diego Garcia is a strategic waypoint for the US air force bomber fleet, the B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers. Following 9/11, the US used Diego Garcia for operations in Afghanistan, and subsequently during the start of the Iraq war. As recently as last May, the US air force had B-2 bombers stationed on the island. This is critical because the B-2 Spirit is the delivery method for the Mod 11 B61-12 thermonuclear gravity bomb, the primary weapon for the ground-penetrating mission. This capability matters, and while it will likely never be used, we cannot afford to let enemies in the region know that that will never be on the table.

We should bear in mind that the Prime Minister is in China this week. Strategic posture across the Pacific, particularly in Taiwan and the second island chain, will surely come up in conversation. Ceding the Chagos islands to a country within China’s orbit is yet another strategic mis-step in the Prime Minister’s inability to deal with China robustly.

On the ongoing issue of sovereignty, in note No. 25 between the ambassador of the United States of America and the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, written on 30 December 1966, point (1) states very clearly:

“The Territory shall remain under United Kingdom sovereignty.”

This time last year, I asked the Government whether the 1966 exchange of notes would require amendment as a result of the change in sovereignty, and they answered:

“The 1966 Exchange of Notes between the UK and US regarding the joint UK-US base on Diego Garcia has been subject to routine amendments and supplementation since signature. Any amendments resulting from the proposed agreement with Mauritius will be factored into this existing process.”

Can the Minister outline what progress the Government have made? I asked that question on 5 February last year, and here we are, a year letter, with the treaty on the brink and no update from the Government, other than through a slightly churlish appearance from the Minister at the Dispatch Box in Monday’s urgent question. Crucially, the legislation was pulled from the other place that afternoon.

Throughout the passage of the Bill, the Government have deflected, obfuscated, been dragged to the Chamber, given us the run-around on detail, gaslit us, and generally tried to force this deal through. The lack of speakers on the Government Benches is testament to the fact that Labour MPs simply do not want to put their name to this legislation. All it achieves is a weakening of our military options in the southern hemisphere, and the exemption of 80% of Mauritian workers from income tax. Kudos to Mauritian Prime Minister Navin Ramgoolam, clearly a savvier negotiator than our dear Prime Minister.

“There is no doubt that China and Russia have noticed this act of total weakness”,

said President Trump. Perhaps the Prime Minister could ask Xi Jinping about it before he offers him a state visit.

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[Luke Pollard]

The right hon. Gentleman nearly got to why the Conservatives started the negotiations. It did not quite hit my bar for an intervention, but I appreciate him giving it a good go.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

rose—

[Luke Pollard]

Let me see if the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Ben Obese-Jecty) can do any better.

[Ben Obese-Jecty]

Could the Minister explain why the previous Labour Government entered into negotiations in 2009, when the first talks took place with the Mauritian Government, which were ultimately ruled out after being criticised for being a unilateral decision around the marine protected area?

[Luke Pollard]

Again, the hon. Gentleman did not quite hit my bar, but I am sure I will get a parliamentary question from him about it.

The Conservatives started the negotiations, I am afraid, and they want everyone to forget it. They want the public to forget it; they want their own MPs to forget it. If they cannot do deals, they are in the wrong place.

Some interesting questions were asked today, and I want to try to deal with some of them.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 26th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

Again, I am slightly baffled by the question, because I answered it right at the beginning when the shadow Foreign Secretary asked me. I will read out my answer again. I said that we had been consistently clear that before the UK can ratify the treaty, we will need to do the following: pass primary and secondary legislation; update the UK-US agreement—the exchange of notes; and put in place arrangements on the environment, maritime security and migration. Indeed, that was very much the tenor of the answer that was given to Lord Callanan in the other place.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Last week we had a discussion about the cost of this deal, and I asked the Minister whether he would confirm the figure of £34.7 billion from the Government Actuary’s Department. He did not give me a direct answer, but later in the debate he confirmed that it was a nominal amount, not adjusted for inflation or the social time preference rate. With that in mind, will the Minister give the House the most accurate assessment he can of the true figure for the total cost of the deal, adjusted for inflation and the social time preference rate?

[Stephen Doughty]

The hon. Member asks an important question. The Government were clear about the forecast costs when they signed the deal, which were that the average cost per year was £101 million and the net present value was £3.4 billion. As I made clear the other day, forecast costs are, of course, forecasts; we expect any number to change over time, in particular to reflect things such as the Office for Budget Responsibility forecast inflation rate, which was updated in November 2025. I mentioned that the Treasury was updating the methodology for the social time preference rate. We are not going to keep recalculating every day, but at the time when the treaty was published we were very clear and gave a lot of information; we have given answers on this issue on many occasions and will continue to keep the House updated in the usual way.

Diego Garcia Military Base and British Indian Ocean Territory Bill

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Consideration of Lords amendments
Tuesday 20th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

With the greatest of respect to the right hon. Lady, I do not think she has been present in many of the other debates on this issue—she popped up here today to make these points. I have been clear and answered the question already, so I will not do so again.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I thank the Minister for giving way and for his detailed explanation of how the calculations have been made. The Government Actuary’s Department clearly stated that this deal would cost £34.7 billion. That figure was then confirmed by his colleague, the Minister for the Middle East, who said that all the figures had been ratified by the Government Actuary’s Department, but his colleague sitting next to him, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry, told me that that figure was inaccurate. Will the Minister therefore clarify how much this deal costs?

[Stephen Doughty]

We set out the costs clearly at the time, as I have done for the hon. Gentleman in the Chamber a number of times. What I will confirm is that they have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department. The House of Commons Library has been through them and reached the same conclusion. The Office for Statistics Regulation has welcomed the Government’s approach and said that it is in line with intelligent transparency, and the Office for Budget Responsibility also confirmed separately to it that the discount rates were correct. I have given the hon. Gentleman four good reasons and the costs. However much Opposition Members bandy about the costs, it is simply unhelpful.

I will move on to the other amendments. Lords amendment 6 would introduce an ongoing estimates and supply scrutiny process for expenditure under the treaty, including parliamentary approval for future payments and supplementary estimates. The agreement has undergone intense scrutiny, and the treaty provides robust mechanisms for dispute resolution under article 14. It is normal practice for payments under treaties to be made under the prerogative power and charged on the Consolidated Fund under the authority of the Supply Acts. Furthermore, the amendment would infringe on the financial privilege of the Commons and affect the Commons’ arrangements for authorising expenditure. These are long-standing practices that members of the former Government will know. The same applied under them, and it applies under this Government, too.

Finally, subsection (4) would infringe on the prerogative power to make and unmake treaties. It is not wise to impose any immovable requirements about a hypothetical set of circumstances that might arise in the future. This provision risks requiring the Government to breach the UK’s obligations under a treaty. It is clearly preferable for all options to be open to a future Government, so that they can deal with whatever the future may bring and act in the UK’s best interests, taking into account all the circumstances.

I am conscious of your exhortations about time, Madam Deputy Speaker, and I know that a number of right hon. and hon. Members wish to speak. The previous Government recognised that there was a problem. They engaged in 11 rounds of negotiations, but failed to reach a deal that was in our interests and those of the United States. We secured this deal. It protects the base, and the interests of the United States and our Five Eyes partners.

Iran: Protests

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 19th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Mr Falconer]

I will. The BBC World Service and BBC Persian are a lifeline, as are so many of the other World Service channels. I pay tribute to the vital work that they do in reporting, even in the most difficult circumstances.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

If I may, I will return to the topic of Craig and Lindsay Foreman. The Minister will be aware that they have been imprisoned for more than a year and are in Evin prison, regarded as the harshest in Iran. Can the Minister update the House on their medical condition since the outbreak of violence in Iran in recent weeks? Can he say when he was last informed of their medical condition, and whether they are still safe?

[Mr Falconer]

I am sure that the hon. Gentleman will appreciate that I do not want to provide too much personal information to the House, but I can confirm that we have had consular access relatively recently. I have spoken to the families twice, I think, since the protests began. Those people are very much at the forefront of my mind.

Ukraine

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Wednesday 14th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Stephen Doughty]

My hon. Friend is right to point out the contribution of the many organisations across the country that have reached out to support Ukrainian communities. I have certainly seen that in Cardiff, where some fantastic groups have done that; I know that is reflected in my hon. Friend’s constituency. There is a strong heritage in this country of individuals who fled conflict working to support others who have done the same. I have seen that repeatedly in many different groups. I pay tribute to all of them, and to all the people up and down Britain who have brought Ukrainians into their homes and supported these efforts in many other ways.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

While we are on the subject of Russian war crimes, James Scott Rhys Anderson is one of the only Britons to have been captured by the Russians. He was tried—the Foreign Office believes on false charges—and charged with being part of a terrorist group and illegally entering Russia. He was sentenced to five years in a Russian prison, and will then be transferred to a Russian penal colony, rather than being treated in accordance with the Geneva convention. What progress has been made on securing his release?

[Stephen Doughty]

I can assure the hon. Gentleman that we are well aware of the number of cases. Russia has obligations under the Geneva convention, and we expect them to be upheld. We regularly raise these cases at the appropriate levels. I am happy to talk to him separately about that specific case, but he can be assured that I am well aware of that and a number of other cases. We are clear that international law must be upheld, including the basic principles of treatment of prisoners of war and situations involving children. That goes to the heart of the nature of what the Russian regime has been doing and the lengths it is willing to go to. We urge the upholding of the commitments to basic decency and the treatment of individuals, to which we are all signed up.

We are standing with Ukrainian people on the ground in their hour of need. We have provided more than £577 million in humanitarian support for vulnerable citizens since the invasion began, including those forced to flee their homes. This year we will spend up to £100 million on support, including to help families through this harsh winter. We have upped our support in energy, particularly in response to regular attacks on energy infrastructure. A lot of our work is to help to mitigate that, but the scale of those attacks is severe and they have a daily impact, as Members can see in media reporting and from what we know on the ground.

There is no firmer friend for Ukraine than the UK. Indeed, our commitment runs deep. I have mentioned the crucial 100-year partnership that the Prime Minister signed with President Zelensky in Kyiv. That agreement has enhanced co-operation across defence and security, science, trade and culture.

Venezuela

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Monday 5th January 2026 Commons Chamber

[Yvette Cooper]

I can assure my hon. Friend that we continue to support and uphold the 2016 peace accord. We are the penholder, as he says, so we work closely with the Colombian Government on that, and on how to deal with a range of threats to their stability. I recognise that the Maduro regime contributed to instability in Colombia as a result of migration and criminal operations. We will continue to work with the Colombian Government.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

In November, I asked the Government what our position would be if the US took military action in Venezuela, in the light of the new US national security strategy, which clearly outlines the US Administration’s position on the western hemisphere and denial of influence to non-hemispheric competitors. The answer was not clear. Following her discussion with Secretary Rubio, what assessment has the Foreign Secretary made of the risk that Venezuela may be the first domino in a chain across central America, ending with Mexico? If we do not now recognise Delcy Rodríguez as the legitimate President of Venezuela, is it because she is one of the individuals we have already sanctioned?

[Yvette Cooper]

We want to see regional stability and calm across the region, and partnership working between nations—that is crucial. Delcy Rodríguez has clearly been part of the Maduro regime for a long time. We believe that there needs to be a transition to democracy that engages all the different Opposition parties and players in Venezuela. That is what we will work to do, and it is what I have discussed with Secretary Rubio.

Chagossians: Trust Fund and Resettlement

Ben Obese-Jecty Excerpts

Tuesday 16th December 2025 Commons Chamber

[Mr Falconer]

As I set out in my response to the shadow Foreign Secretary, the trust fund will have a majority of Chagossians on it and a chair appointed by the Chagossians. The conduct of the trust fund will also be observed by our own high commission.

[Ben Obese-Jecty (Huntingdon) (Con)]

Last month, after a three-month wait for an answer, the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry informed me in a written answer that the Government Actuary’s Department’s figure for the cost of the Chagos deal of £34.7 billion is inaccurate. I struggle to believe that the Government Actuary’s Department would have published the figure in error in August. It was widely reported at the time, and the Department has never publicly corrected the figure. Will the Minister confirm that the Government Actuary’s Department figure of £34.7 billion over the length of the deal is correct and that the Minister for Defence Readiness and Industry is misinformed?

[Mr Falconer]

I will have to consult the Ministry of Defence to be sure where the error is. My understanding is that all costs have been verified by the Government Actuary’s Department, and I cannot provide any further clarification.