Miscarriage of Justice Compensation

Ben Lake Excerpts

Wednesday 19th March 2025 Westminster Hall

[Ben Lake (Ceredigion Preseli) (PC)]

I beg to move,

That this House has considered miscarriage of justice compensation.

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Turner. I wager that the majority of citizens are unfamiliar with the workings of the criminal justice system, and still less familiar with miscarriages of justice. Perhaps, if they are aware of miscarriages of justice, they are aware of certain high-profile exonerees or miscarriages of justice, such as the Cardiff Three, the Guildford Four or the Birmingham Six. Most people will understandably and reasonably assume that victims of miscarriages of justice are compensated, particularly if they spent time in custody before being pardoned or having their convictions quashed. However, this is not the case. In England and Wales, compensation for the wrongly convicted is the exception rather than the rule. The current compensation scheme enables only some people in England and Wales who have had their convictions overturned, or been found not guilty at retrial, to receive compensation.

I make it very clear that my concern is not that miscarriages of justice happen. Sadly, no system in the world is perfect. Miscarriages of justice happen—we cannot get it correct 100% of the time—but when they occur, citizens expect the state to right that wrong. In a survey by Opinium in December 2024, 71% of those asked believed the Government should ensure fair and swift compensation for those who are wrongly convicted. Many will therefore be appalled to learn that this is not the case, that victims of miscarriages of justice seldom receive compensation for the wrong that has befallen them, that the wrongly convicted often have to fight for years, at great cost, to clear their name, and that the justice system unnecessarily forces the innocent to suffer continued injustice.

The issue in this debate is the failure of the state to right these wrongs. We should be clear that a miscarriage of justice inflicts considerable harm on the wrongly convicted. A 2018 report by the campaign group Justice, “Supporting Exonerees: Ensuring Accessible, Consistent and Continuing Support,” underscores the grave hardship and difficulty that the wrongly convicted have in adjusting to life after conviction, and the trauma that they have gone through, which they must deal with for years after the event. The report highlights how victims of miscarriages of justice struggle to adjust. Having spent time in prison, becoming institutionalised and grappling with the fact that they should not be there, they struggle to trust authorities.

The unfairness of the current system was brought into sharp relief for me when I met my constituent Mr Brian Buckle and his family and learned of their experiences. I am pleased that they have made the journey from Fishguard to join us in the Public Gallery.

In May 2017, Mr Buckle was convicted on 16 counts of historical sexual offences and sentenced to a total of 15 years’ imprisonment. He had always maintained his innocence, and in September 2022 the Court of Appeal overturned his conviction and ordered a retrial. He was immediately released on bail, having served five years and four months of his sentence. The retrial took place in May 2023. Mr Buckle and his defence team, led by Mr Stephen Vullo KC, who is also in the Public Gallery, prepared a detailed defence and presented new witnesses and forensic evidence. After three long weeks in court, the jury returned unanimous not guilty verdicts in just over an hour.

I cannot fathom the strain that Mr Buckle has endured as a result of years of legal proceedings and the travesty of being imprisoned for a crime that he did not commit. Let us remember what the wrongly convicted must go through and its impact. He missed important family milestones, such as his daughter’s 18th and 21st birthdays. His imprisonment cost him over £500,000 in lost income and devastated his plan to retire at 55 with a private pension, because he had been unable to make any contributions following his imprisonment. Furthermore, his state pension is now in jeopardy, given that he was unable to make any national insurance contributions for more than five years.

The impact on Mr Buckle is not limited to the period in which he was deprived of his liberty. Indeed, I am afraid to say that he has been diagnosed with post-traumatic stress disorder because of the impact of his wrongful conviction and imprisonment. His mental health is such that he has been unable to work since his release.

Prior to this awful state of affairs, Mr Buckle travelled every week from west Wales to London because he was in charge of an engineering firm. He performed this very important role, which had a lot of responsibility, for more than 15 years. He made the weekly journey on the great western main line or the M4 that the Minister and I also make.

This travesty of justice could befall any of us, through no fault of our own. Although it is difficult to comprehend the nightmare that has befallen Mr Buckle and his family, one can estimate the financial impact of his ordeal in terms of the income and pension that have been lost. Perhaps we can also put a figure on the costs incurred for appeals and legal defences, but how can we begin to calculate the impact on his health or the loss of precious time with his family?

I am sure we would all agree that that is a difficult dilemma, but it was not difficult, it would seem, for the Ministry of Justice, which issued a cruelly simple response to Mr Buckle after he applied for compensation under the statutory scheme. In the decision letter, which was issued almost a year after the application was submitted, the MOJ rejected his claim out of hand:

“Having carefully considered the particular circumstances of the reversing of your conviction, I do not consider your case demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that you did not commit the offences for which you were convicted.”

Mr Buckle spent five years and four months in prison, and he had his conviction overturned by the Court of Appeal. He produced a detailed defence, including new witnesses and fresh forensic evidence, at retrial, at which the jury unanimously returned not guilty verdicts to all 16 counts in just over an hour. Having been subjected to that ordeal and having jumped through all the hoops that one could expect him to jump through, the Ministry of Justice’s response was not only to deny him compensation but, worse, to state that it does not consider that his case

“demonstrates beyond a reasonable doubt that you did not commit the offences for which you were convicted”—

the same offences of which he was acquitted.

There was no reference to the harm he has suffered, to the impact on his family or to the Court of Appeal being concerned that the original trial was so flawed that the jury had failed to approach their task correctly that it ruled the conviction unsafe, such that the new witnesses and fresh forensic evidence were ultimately unnecessary. All that Mr Buckle received was a pretty meaningless reassurance that the matter had been “carefully considered.” If this is what comes from careful consideration, I dread to think what would result from reckless handling, but it surely could not be much worse for Mr Buckle. After years of legal battles following his wrongful conviction, he has been told that, although he is not guilty, the state will not compensate him for the years spent in prison because it does not believe that he has proven his innocence.

One does not need to be a King’s Counsel to see the unfairness of this situation. There can be no doubt that such a decision prolongs the miscarriage of justice in Mr Buckle’s case. That is a wrong that this new UK Government can and, indeed, must put right.

Before I discuss how the Government can do that, it is worth our reflecting briefly on how we have arrived at the current situation. Before 2006, the Government operated two compensation schemes for victims of miscarriages of justice in England and Wales: a discretionary scheme and a statutory scheme. The discretionary scheme was abolished in 2006, but the statutory scheme afforded the Justice Secretary the discretion to pay compensation to a wrongly convicted person when:

“his conviction has been reversed or he has been pardoned on the ground that a new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that there has been a miscarriage of justice”.

In 2011, the Supreme Court ruled that the meaning of “miscarriage of justice” for the purposes of the statutory scheme should not be restricted to applicants who are able to conclusively demonstrate their innocence, and should be extended to cases where a new or newly discovered fact

“so undermines the evidence against the defendant that no conviction could possibly be based upon it”.

However, in 2014, the then UK Government legislated to reverse the effect of this decision. The test for eligibility for compensation under the statutory scheme, as set out in section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, was amended by section 175 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 in such a way as to restrict compensation to those who can prove innocence “beyond reasonable doubt”. Therefore, for applications made to the statutory scheme on or after 13 March 2014, there will have been a miscarriage of justice

“if and only if the new or newly discovered fact shows beyond reasonable doubt that the person did not commit the offence”.

That modest rewording of a single section of an Act of Parliament has proved devastating. Indeed, it is legally illiterate to effectively reverse the burden of proof in this way, for it places a burden on the victim of a miscarriage of justice to prove their innocence. This is such a high bar that, in the words of the joint dissenting opinion of judges in the European Court of Human Rights case of Nealon and Hallam v. the United Kingdom, it:

“represents a hurdle which is virtually insurmountable”.

Such a claim is not solely a matter of opinion, but an observable fact. The data on applications to the miscarriage of justice application service shows that less than 7% of applications submitted between April 2016 and March 2024 were successful.

[Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)]

I have always believed—and the hon. Gentleman is probably the same—that someone is always innocent until proven guilty. It seems that the Ministry of Justice is saying: “You are actually guilty. Now prove yourself innocent.”

[Ben Lake]

The hon. Gentleman has got to the nub of the matter. That is precisely the effect of the change implemented in 2014. It has devastated the number of successful applications for compensation, because if we consider the data for the period between 1999 and 2024, we can see that, prior to the introduction of the new section 133 test, 45.6% of applicants received compensation for their wrongful convictions, but, following its introduction, just 6.6% of cases were successful—a drop of 39 percentage points. This new test has virtually put a stop to compensation payouts for these kinds of miscarriages of justice—an insurmountable hurdle indeed.

Members may wonder about the purpose of restricting eligibility in this way, and I am sure we will hear arguments that it was done to prevent those exonerated on a technicality from receiving compensation, but the cynic in me fears that the restriction was introduced to cut costs. Prior to 2014, the Ministry of Justice made average annual payouts of £5.9 million. Following the change, we have seen the average annual payouts under the scheme drop by 95%, to an average of £297,000. Even successful applicants have seen their individual compensation payments fall, with the average pre-2014 payment totalling just over £267,000, falling to an average of £61,000 after the change.

I am reminded of Cicero’s teachings, over two millennia ago:

“Justice looks for no prize and no price; it is sought for itself”.

He also said, of course:

“The worst kind of injustice is to look for profit from injustice.”

It is for others to consider whether anyone profits from this injustice, but the savings that the 2014 test realises for the Ministry of Justice perhaps offer an answer to that age-old question of, “What price do we put on justice?” Well, I can tell you, Mr Turner: it is around £5.6 million a year on average, compared with the pre-2014 payments.

The current system therefore places an almost impossible burden on the applicant—one whereby they are required to find a new fact that shows beyond reasonable doubt that they did not commit the offence for which they have been acquitted. The perverse situation into

The perverse situation into which the 2014 change forces the wrongly convicted can be summarised as follows: they are required to prove that they are innocent of a crime for which they have already been exonerated. I appreciate that this is an academic point, but it is worth considering whether some high-profile exonerees—the Cardiff Three, the Guildford Four and the Birmingham Six—would receive compensation if they applied under the scheme today.

To the layman, it is difficult to understand how such a situation is compatible with the principles underpinning our justice system, because it undermines the well-understood principle that we are all innocent until proven guilty. I know there might be a challenge to that assertion, but the fact remains that the current rules place the obligation on the defendant to prove that they did not commit a crime to the criminal standard of proof, which is beyond reasonable doubt.

In Mr Buckle’s rejection letter, the Ministry of Justice, as well as reassuring him that his case had been carefully considered, asserted that, despite rejection of his claim for compensation, he is still presumed to be, and remains, innocent of the charges brought against him. If you were ever looking for a definition of Orwellian doublespeak, Mr Turner, that response is a perfect example. It illustrates how the 2014 change, by reversing the burden of proof, undermines the presumption of innocence and forces the Ministry to perform quite impressive but legally illogical linguistic gymnastics.

For if Mr Buckle is in law presumed to be innocent, surely he must be treated as such by the state. A man presumed to be innocent who has spent more than five years in jail should be compensated. If the state wants to treat him as though he were a guilty man and deny him compensation, why should the burden not fall on to the state to prove his guilt? Claims by the Ministry of Justice—

[Karl Turner (in the Chair)]

Order. The sitting is suspended for approximately 65 minutes for multiple Divisions in the House. If we get back earlier than that and all Members are in their place, I will recommence the debate.

--- Later in debate ---

[Karl Turner (in the Chair)]

We will start where we left off. Injury time will be added to the debate, so I expect it to finish at 5.13 pm. I call Mr Ben Lake.

[Ben Lake]

I am grateful for the additional time to conclude the debate.

Prior to the Divisions, I was reiterating the perversity of the situation that the 2014 change has forced the wrongly convicted into. It can be summarised as follows: they are required to prove that they are innocent of a crime of which they have already been exonerated. To the layman, it is difficult to understand how such a situation is compatible with the principles that underpin our criminal justice system, for it undermines the well-understood principle that we are all innocent until proven guilty. I know that this can be challenged in practice, but the fact remains that the current compensation rules place the obligation on the defendant to prove that they did not commit a crime—a crime, of course, of which they have already been acquitted to the criminal standard of proof, which is beyond all reasonable doubt.

Let me return to the case of my constituent Mr Buckle. In its rejection letter, the Ministry of Justice, as well as reassuring him that his case had been carefully considered, asserted that, despite rejecting his claim for compensation, he is still presumed to be and remains innocent of the charges brought against him. If we were ever looking for a definition of Orwellian doublespeak, this response is a perfect example. It illustrates the way in which, by reversing the burden of proof, the 2014 change undermines the presumption of innocence and forces the Ministry to perform quite impressive, but illogical, linguistic gymnastics. For if Mr Buckle is presumed to be innocent in law, he must be treated as such by the state. A man presumed to be innocent, who has spent more than five years in jail, should be compensated; if the state wants to treat him as though he were a guilty man, and deny him that compensation, why should the burden of proving his guilt not fall on the state?

The Ministry’s claims that Mr Buckle is still presumed to be, and remains, innocent of the charges brought against him ring rather hollow when he is also denied a single penny in redress. It is clearly an affront to justice that the eligibility test prevents those who have been wrongly convicted from enjoying the full and unconditional benefits of being presumed innocent.

There is a growing acceptance of the need for action on this matter. Sadly, the list of miscarriages of justice that have perhaps not received as much media attention, but which are just as deserving of compensation, grows ever longer. I could mention cases such as that of Sam Hallam, who was imprisoned for seven years; Victor Nealon, who was imprisoned for 17 years; or Oliver Campbell, who spent 11 years in prison and a total of 34 years fighting to clear his name.

All have suffered unimaginable harm as a consequence of their wrongful convictions and, just like my constituent Mr Buckle, deserve justice. The new UK Government have an opportunity to provide it, and I urge them to address this injustice without delay. I know that the Minister will agree with the principle that the state should compensate those who have wrongly been deprived of their liberty by the state, and I would welcome confirmation from her that this is the Government’s position.

The Law Commission is consulting on reform to the law governing criminal appeals, because it, too, acknowledges that the current state of affairs is completely unfair. The Law Commission’s intervention is to be welcomed, in so far as it acknowledges the unfairness of the current position of the wrongly convicted. In its consultation, the commission suggests that, if the burden is to fall on an accused to prove innocence to obtain compensation, it should be to the civil standard, rather than the criminal standard, as is the position in every other situation in a criminal case where the evidential burden shifts to the defence. That would bring things into line with the normal state of affairs. Will the Minister offer the Government’s position on the Law Commission’s proposal? Would the Government accept such a recommendation? If they are minded to accept, will they ensure that the recommendation is applied retrospectively to those wrongfully convicted since 13 March 2014?

Although I cautiously welcome to the intervention of the Law Commission, and agree that it would make the current situation fairer, it still does not explain why someone presumed innocent has a further obligation or burden to prove it, nor would it address the failings made by the scheme in determining Mr Buckle’s application for compensation, or prevent other claims from being rejected after similar careful consideration.

If the Government maintain that it is necessary for a person presumed innocent to prove it to receive compensation, I do not believe the appropriate authority to make that decision is an official at the Ministry of Justice, someone who, through no fault of their own, will be unfamiliar with the facts of the case and will not have witnessed the evidence given under oath, but who instead must work solely from the papers. Such an individual is not best placed to decide on such applications.

Surely it is the trial jury that is best placed to decide whether the evidence proved Mr Buckle—in this case—to be both not guilty and innocent. I request that the Minister meets us to discuss the handling of Mr Buckle’s specific application and also the merits of amending the law to allow a judge to ask the trial jury, in circumstances where they have acquitted the defendant on all charges, to consider also whether they are satisfied on the balance of probabilities that the defendant is innocent of those same charges.

If it is the Government’s intention to ensure that true victims of miscarriages of justice are fairly compensated, asking the trial jury to make the decision must be the fairest way. It is difficult to see any rational argument against it. I ask the Minister to be kind enough to agree to a meeting to discuss how we can ensure that Mr Buckle is granted that opportunity, so that this miscarriage of justice and the ordeal that he and his family have endured is finally brought to an end. Urgency is key, because justice delayed is justice denied.

[Several hon. Members rose—]

--- Later in debate ---

[Ben Lake]

I begin by apologising, Mr Turner, for failing to acknowledge that this is your inaugural session in the Chamber. May I say how admirably and professionally you have chaired the debate, especially given that we had the unexpected interruption of Divisions? Thank you very much for doing so. I also thank my fellow Members from every part of the United Kingdom for their contributions. It is heartening to hear a great degree of consensus that there is a wrong to be righted and that the new Government have the opportunity to do that.

In summing up, I will make a few quick points. We have this opportunity to right a very clear wrong. There are far too many people who have had their convictions overturned, and who have been found not guilty at retrial after spending years in prison, but who are still awaiting compensation. We need to appreciate that any delay to this justice is effectively justice denied. While appreciating the need to proceed with caution and reasonably, we need to make sure that we do not waste any time, because too many individuals have already suffered ordeals for far too long.

We have an opportunity here, as Members of Parliament and with a new Government, to do something that I think is very honourable. It is something that a far more honourable Member than I, who sat just over here, once told me: we are sent to this place to right wrongs. I think today there is a great consensus in that endeavour.

Question put and agreed to.

Resolved,

That this House has considered miscarriage of justice compensation.

Devolution of Justice: Wales

Ben Lake Excerpts

Tuesday 29th November 2022 Westminster Hall

[Mike Freer]

My right hon. Friend asked a very pertinent question and did not get a clear answer from the hon. Member for Cardiff North (Anna McMorrin). My understanding is that the official Opposition do not support the devolution of justice—that is what I took from her speech.

Let me go back to what happened during the coronavirus pandemic. The pandemic served to demonstrate that in a number of areas the settlement is working well. In fact, the justice system performed better in Wales than it did in England in several respects, and I will say more on that later. Among the key arguments made by those who support devolving justice to Wales is what they see as the principle that a holistic approach is required to ensure that policy objectives can be delivered effectively. Of course, we agree that policies on substance misuse, education, mental health and social welfare need to be aligned with measures to reduce reoffending and protect the public, which is the responsibility of Westminster, but the notion that justice must be devolved to achieve that is misplaced. The Ministry of Justice works closely with the Welsh Government to ensure that justice policies are aligned and that we take account of distinct Welsh needs.

[Ben Lake]

On the specific point about the alignment between the UK Government, the Ministry of Justice and the Welsh Government, does the Minister accept that it is frustrating, as a Member representing a rural constituency, to have witnessed so many court closures in the past decade? The court closures were made without any clear consideration of the fact that there are no direct transport links, so people have quite literally lost access to justice. Does he understand my constituents’ frustration that, contrary to what some Members have said today, the system is not working in lockstep, is not co-ordinated and is not in alignment to ensure the right access to justice?

Probation Services

Ben Lake Excerpts

Thursday 11th June 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I know that the hon. Lady will be familiar with this: the structure will be regional, within the national framework of the national probation service. The accountability will then of course be through Her Majesty’s Prison and Probation Service and ultimately me. Locally, it is important to get that link with police and crime commissioners—the “and crime” bit of commissioners should come into play. That is why I want to focus on more localised commissioning. I want to get a sense of responsiveness and more than that, get ahead of trends in local areas such as Hull. The hon. Lady makes a good point, which we understand very well.

[Ben Lake (Ceredigion) (PC)]

Education, health and social policies are key to supporting the work of the probation system. What does the Secretary of State make of the findings of the Thomas Commission on Justice in Wales? In particular, does he agree that the devolution of responsibility for the probation service would allow for better integration with Welsh health and education policies, thereby improving rehabilitation outcomes?

[Robert Buckland]

The hon. Gentleman makes a thought-provoking point and links the Thomas commission to it. Of course, the Welsh Government must respond to that, but we are ahead of the hon. Gentleman. As he knows, in Wales, the probation service was unified from the end of last year and is already supporting the people of Wales. The unified service, headed by Amy Rees, an outstanding civil servant, is delivering that integrated service that the hon. Gentleman so badly wants. We do not need further devolution or a separate jurisdiction.

Legal Aid: Post-Implementation Review

Ben Lake Excerpts

Thursday 7th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Mr Gauke]

First, I pay tribute to the hon. Lady, who is among those who have worked tirelessly in this policy area and who, as ever, brings great expertise to this matter. In respect of evaluating the overall impacts, we do need more evidence, which is why we want to have pilots to bring in more evidence and test the system to see whether we can reduce costs on the system as a whole through, for example, greater and earlier intervention. I want to build up an evidence-based business case to see how we should move forward. In respect of evaluating the impact on particular groups, one has to consider the system on an area by area basis. It is important that we continue to engage and look at the evidence that emerges.

[Ben Lake (Ceredigion) (PC)]

Wales has seen the largest decline in legal aid providers over the past five years, with a decrease of some 29%. How will the Lord Chancellor ensure that citizens in Wales, particularly those in rural areas, are not put at a greater disadvantage and are able to access legal aid without having to travel prohibitive distances?

[Mr Gauke]

For rural areas as a whole, this review underlines the need to ensure that we are prepared to look at technology and innovation so that access to justice is greater and we have the ability to point people in the right direction. There is a real opportunity here, and it is important that we embrace it. The innovation fund of up to £5 million will encourage investment in this area so that we can find new and better ways of ensuring that, wherever a person is in the United Kingdom, they are able to access justice.

European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Ben Lake Excerpts

Committee: 1st sitting: House of Commons
Tuesday 14th November 2017 Commons Chamber

[Hywel Williams]

I take that advice. I say only that it has been suggested that some in Northern Ireland would surely see the Government’s taking this decision with no Assembly in place as being the diktat of a governor general, or at the very least unwise as a basis on which to proceed.

As I said, the elephant in the room is the question of who speaks for England. This is the last constitutional conundrum—the constitutional exceptionalism that successive Governments have failed to address in this place. Who speaks for England? Clearly on this matter, it appears that this Conservative Government do so. Are the Labour Opposition sanguine about that? I hope to press this amendment to a vote. I do not know how Labour will vote on it, but I remind them that their Labour colleagues in Cardiff are certainly not sanguine.

The Minister may point to the resurrected Joint Ministerial Committee as a cover for—

[Ben Lake (Ceredigion) (PC)]

Members will no doubt be aware that the Joint Ministerial Committee on EU Negotiations has met only twice in the past year. Does my hon. Friend agree that that Committee fails to afford the devolved Administrations a real voice in these negotiations and that in its current form it is wholly inadequate for the purpose of facilitating discussion and agreement?

[Hywel Williams]

I thank my hon. Friend for making that point. I was obviously about to come on to that matter.

The Government might wish to use the Joint Ministerial Committee as a cover for proceeding with this matter, but so far that Committee has not proved itself to be a substitute for proper agreement obtained directly with the Welsh Assembly and the Scottish Parliament. The JMC—as obscure to many Members in this place as it is to the press and the population at large—met in February and did not meet again until October, during which period the most important and momentous events were taking place and fundamental decisions being taken. Following the October meeting, the Government sought to gloss over the real concerns of the Scottish and Welsh Governments, but as I said earlier, these have now been made clear.

In the Brexit Committee on 25 October, I asked the Brexit Secretary what the formal relationship was between himself and the First Secretary of State, who is handling the JMC. I asked:

“What is the formal relationship between your Department and his on this specific issue?”

He replied,

“there is none at all. He is one of my oldest friends”,

to which I replied:

“He is a very fine man, I am sure.”

I have been in this place for long enough—though not in government—to know the ways of Whitehall working. There are two conditions: where there is a formal relationship between Departments and there is accountability, and where there is no formal relationship and there is no accountability. In the case of the JMC, there is no formal reporting back but perhaps a chat between old friends. I have a large number of old friends—fine people whom I respect—but I certainly would not base my decision about the future of my children and my grandchildren on an informal fireside chat.

Assaults on Emergency Workers (Offences) Bill

Ben Lake Excerpts

2nd reading: House of Commons
Friday 20th October 2017 Commons Chamber

[Chris Bryant]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. Two years ago I stood in utter amazement in Porth watching kids on the other side of the valley throwing bricks at fire officers who were trying to put a fire out on the mountain. Words fail me.

[Ben Lake (Ceredigion) (PC)]

rose—

[Chris Bryant]

The hon. Gentleman is also Welsh. It is just as well that this Bill applies to England and Wales.

[Ben Lake]

Does the hon. Gentleman agree that just as importantly, this Bill would help to ensure that people are aware of the abuse that many of our emergency services suffer and make it clear that as a society we will not stand for it?

[Chris Bryant]

The hon. Gentleman is absolutely right. I am glad that he is not at the Plaid Cymru conference either. I am sure he will get there later.