National Security Bill (First sitting)

Ben Everitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 7th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[The Chair]

I am going to have to move on to the next questioner. I would appreciate it if colleagues could be succinct with their questions. I will allow a couple if you are succinct—otherwise it is just one question.

[Ben Everitt (Milton Keynes North) (Con)]

Q I shall be succinct, then. Thank you for attending, Mr Hall. Are you comfortable with the change in language between the focus on non-state actors and state actors? I am thinking in particular from the perspective of your terrorism background.

Jonathan Hall: I think what you mean is, am I comfortable with the fact that legislation has now been passed that is dealing with state threats, when previously the focus had been on terrorism? If that is what you are saying, then I think I am comfortable, because I accept and recognise that we live in a contested and uncertain world. Focusing on state threats is now a very sound necessity.

[Ben Everitt]

Q This is the succinct follow-up: when it comes to the link between state actors and non-state actors—who are actually proxies for rogue states and other aggressive foreign powers—do you think we have got the balance right in being able to capture the intelligence we need to combat those threats?

Jonathan Hall: I think the two regimes—the terrorism regime and the state-threats regime—should be sufficient. There are obviously people operating in the grey zone at the moment who might be able to say, “We fall outside the remit of terrorism legislation,” for example, the Wagner Group. If they are acting on the battlefield in support of Russia, we would have difficulty seeing them as terrorists. I think this legislation probably fills some gaps.

--- Later in debate ---

[Stewart Hosie]

Q I just want to press further on clause 23. You said that the absence of a carve-out to protect officers could have a chilling effect. Given that we have substantial data sharing, particularly with our closest partners, that the internal safeguards are very robust, and that there is already the defence of acting reasonably—you made the point that this would be on an order to do so—I am not clear yet why the carve-out in clause 23 is as necessary as you suggest it is.

Sir Alex Younger: First of all, “carve-out” means different things to different people, but there is a wild idea that this is a granting of immunity that means we can behave willy-nilly. You will know from your Committee experience that this is not true. I want to make that really clear. The reality at the end of all this—we have had the theoretical versus practical conversation already—is that there exists a risk that individual UK IC officers will face criminal sanction for doing their job. I do not think that risk should exist. That is fundamentally where I am. You can decide as politicians that it is better than what is being proposed by the Government, but I am saying that I do not think it is compatible with a healthy sharing regime of the sort that produces the security benefits I have outlined.

[Ben Everitt]

Q Sticking with that point, Sir Alex, in an earlier answer you referred to Australia having a much broader, greater carve-out for their intelligence officers to keep them safe and do their job legally. Could you expand on that?

Sir Alex Younger: I cannot. I am sorry, but it happened just at the end of my time. I know from conversations with my Australian colleagues that they are very satisfied with the legislation that exists, in so far as that it deals with this issue. I would recommend looking into that yourself or speaking to the Australians. I do know that it is broader than what we are proposing here today. I am sorry I cannot be more helpful.

[Ben Everitt]

Q I am sure the Clerks are listening. Speaking generally then, with Australia in particular being a close ally—there is Five Eyes and other joint initiatives—would you recommend more co-ordination legislatively with close allies such as Australia, to protect our frontline officers?

Sir Alex Younger: Yes. It is not something I have thought hard about, but the fundamental principle of operating as a team is probably our most powerful riposte, alongside our values, to the threat of authoritarianism. It is something I am completely signed up for, but alliances are a thing we have that our opponents generally speaking do not. I was very proud to operate in one of those—Five Eyes—which is a particularly effective version. If we, as a matter of principle, aimed for interoperability through legal alignment, that is something I would absolutely support. It is never going to be complete. The United States particularly has a very different legal process to us. Certainly as regards counter-terrorism, the extent that we manage to align legally massively boosts operational co-operation. I am wholly confident that the same would be true when it comes to state threats.

[Ben Everitt]

I think everybody here would agree that a team has to play by the same rules.

[Holly Lynch]

Q The Bill creates a new offence of preparatory conduct in part 1. To what extent do you think that was an omission in previous legislation? I have heard from former members of the security services that they feel quite strongly that this is welcome, but the definition of preparatory conduct is drawn quite broadly. I wonder if you could comment a little on that.

Professor Sir David Omand: I was pleased to see the power in the Bill because, particularly in the digital age, you can take the offensive and you can prepare, but you may not have got to the stage of actually pressing the button. If you can demonstrate that a foreign state was engaged with help from inside the country in some serious espionage or sabotage activity, it seems to me that the very preparation is something that the prosecutors ought to be able to bring forward. In the terrorism example, the cases would be slightly different, but the offence of acts preparatory to terrorism has been extremely helpful to the prosecution authorities for good reason.

Sir Alex Younger: The bottom line is that we have to get in front of this stuff. Just speaking as a counter-terrorist practitioner, that is the additional discipline. It is not like solving the crime. We need to solve it before it has happened, and that raises a set of ethical and legal dilemmas where it is important to be striking the right balance, so I really welcome the proper treatment that we see of that in the Bill.

National Security Bill (Second sitting)

Ben Everitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 7th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Gary Sambrook (Birmingham, Northfield) (Con)]

Q The Government tabled an amendment to the Bill to make “foreign interference” a priority offence in the Online Safety Bill. Do you think that will go some way towards addressing the concerns you have raised today?

Sam Armstrong: Yes, I think so. Imposing a duty on the social media companies is one of the only immediate tools and levers we can pull. I take Carl’s point; I do not think it is going to be sufficient to deal with the hordes of people overseas who are, frankly, conducting quasi-military-type activities against the UK through cyber means here, because criminal law is not the tool for that. Should they exist and are they necessary? Yes. Are they sufficient? Probably not.

Carl Miller: It is just massively insufficient. The reason why is that the platforms, however rich, clever or large they are, cannot reach beyond the platforms themselves. That is the problem. The way we have tried to respond to this problem so far is to have Facebook take down accounts, but take-down is a very weak response. That is essentially being priced in to those kinds of activities. They have developed methodologies for setting up or acquiring new accounts as they go. In principle, I am not hostile to platform regulation across a range of online threats, but for those problems where we are dealing with a set number of actors who have specific capabilities and tap into a specific and constantly evolving tradecraft, I do not think it is going to be the tool to make much difference.

[Ben Everitt (Milton Keynes North) (Con)]

Q We have covered a lot of the ground that I wanted to talk about. Several times in your answers, Karl, you have alluded to the fact that whatever we do the pitch is so complex that we cannot deter. What is it in the Bill, which you said you have no problems with, that you like about detecting and prosecuting—if deterrence is not contained in the Bill?

Carl Miller: The main thing I would say that the state can step in to help with is around attribution. That is something that we cannot do without state powers. It is something that, at the moment, only the tech giants do, and that is only linked to take-down. If we were to have any prospect of either taking direct cyber-action, or actually bringing criminal prosecution, it would be something that we need. One big thing here is around data access—I am sure you have had other panellists talk to you about that before. To foreground that, I have come here as a researcher whose job it is to do that kind of research, and one of my main things is that we know so little. We know nothing about TikTok—it makes none of its data available. Facebook makes some of its data available, and that is why we have some picture of it. Twitter makes a lot of its data available, and that is why we have a bigger picture.

TikTok is enormous, likely very influential, anecdotally there is tonnes of Ukraine-invasion activity happening on it now, and it has absolutely no application programming interface available for researchers in any way, whatsoever. By the way, there are also rumours that Facebook is withdrawing some of the data access that it currently gives researchers. I am sorry; I know this is ranging far beyond the scope of the Bill. However, to put this on your radars, I think that legislators may have to step in sooner or later to compel platforms to maintain data availability. Otherwise, even the very small window we currently get is going to continually shrink.

[Ben Everitt]

Q The Online Safety Bill can cover those points as well. Sam, have you got any comments on that?

Sam Armstrong: Yes, I would say that we should actually open this up. One of the best things about the Ukrainian war—there is not much to take solace in—is that defence intelligence has been publishing daily information that has been countering many of those problems. That is a really good thing; we have seen it work and it is wonderful.

We saw a foreign intelligence asset, Christine Lee, regularly making use of this place and having worrying relations with Members of this House. That continued right up until MI5 published a foreign interference alert about her. She is not alone; a number of countries have foreign intelligence and influence assets operating in and around here. There are a number more from the country that sent Christine Lee.

It has been a few months now. If you want to deal with this problem, the fastest way is some sunlight and disinfectant. Let us see a routine publication of those individuals that lengthy, hugely expensive but necessary investigations launched by MI5 have established—beyond MI5’s doubt, at least—are engaged in foreign interference.

[The Chair]

Order. That brings us to the end of the allocated time. I thank our witnesses for coming in today.

Examination of Witness

Louise Edwards gave evidence.

National Security Bill (Third sitting)

Ben Everitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 12th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

[Stephen McPartland]

We are not talking about legislating in that way. If the hon. Lady will forgive me, we are saying that there are three layers of protection. The first layer is that people would be deemed to be obtaining or disclosing protected information for, or on behalf of, a foreign power. The next layers would involve the Attorney General and the Crown Prosecution Service. The hon. Lady, as a lawyer, will be very well aware that the CPS always determines whether it feels it is in the public interest to prosecute. People will not be caught up by accident, and I think we are getting into theoretics by going further and further down that line.

[Ben Everitt (Milton Keynes North) (Con)]

I am struck by the hypothetical example given by the hon. Member for Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and—

[Stuart C. McDonald]

Just go with Cumbernauld, if that helps.

[Ben Everitt]

Okay, we will just go with Cumbernauld. The hypothetical example referred to a Government of the day diversifying their energy sources so that, potentially, they were less reliant on fuel and power from a possibly hostile foreign state. The Minister has detailed the extra layers of defence that will act in the public interest. Does he agree that in the hypothetical example cited we would want some protection from foreign interference in Government policy—a democratically elected Government of the UK?

[Stephen McPartland]

My hon. Friend is correct. Three tests must be met for someone to be prosecuted: conducting harmful activity with regard to information that is protected effectively, knowingly prejudicing the safety or interests of the United Kingdom, and acting in a way that benefits a foreign power. Forgive me, but I do not believe that an NGO will accidentally fail all three of those tests.

National Security Bill (Sixth sitting)

Ben Everitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 14th July 2022 Public Bill Committees

If the Government and the security services can demonstrate that there is a genuine operational requirement for change, we will work through solutions, but the solutions must include entirely appropriate scrutiny and oversight, which clause 23 currently does not provide.

[Ben Everitt (Milton Keynes North) (Con)]

I understand that clause 23 seeks to address a specific operational challenge currently faced by the UK intelligence community and the armed forces. The clause removes criminal liability for the offences of encouraging or assisting crime, but only where that activity is

“necessary for—

(a) the proper exercise of any function of the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service or GCHQ, or…the armed forces”

and only in support of activity taking place overseas. That is because in a specific scenario legislation is affecting the ability to collaborate with key partners and achieve legitimate shared national security objectives.

Essentially, we are trying to avoid there being a disincentive to sharing information that makes us safe. Looking at it the other way, we are trying to remove the liability from a brave young officer who is doing their job and keeping us safe.

[Mr Jones]

On the hon. Member’s second point, frankly there is already no liability, because that has already been covered. Can he give an example of where the security services have not been able to carry out their functions because of the absence of the clause?

[Ben Everitt]

That is probably beyond what I can say here, and indeed beyond what I am aware of. It is one of those situations in which, were I a Minister, I would be happy to write to the hon. Gentleman—but I am not. Far from gold-plating, as referred to by the hon. Member for Halifax, clause 23 does not create a blanket criminal law immunity for our intelligence officers. It does not change the application of other criminal law offences that overlap with those underneath the Serious Crime Act 2007. It provides no change to the UK’s international law obligations.

I assume that the Minister agrees that the approach undertaken in the Bill is more limited and targeted than the approach other key allies have deemed necessary to protect those working on their behalf. Indeed, last week we heard from Alex Younger, the former chief of the Secret Intelligence Service. During his oral evidence he noted that there is an international precedent for such measures. He was referring to Australia; I understand that it was section 41 of the Australian Intelligence Services Act 2001, where there is a much broader immunity. That Act states:

“A staff member or agent of an agency is not subject to any civil or criminal liability for any act done outside Australia if the act is done in the proper performance of a function of the agency.”

Clause 23 is much more limited than that example. Rather than a proposal for wholesale immunity, it will just remove the legal risk for individuals’ actions that are done in good faith and following all authorised processes. That risk should not be underestimated given the chilling effect that we have discussed over the past couple of weeks. That effect can prevent or even delay the sharing of critical intelligence with international partners. Thus, the line of argument that the provision is too broad does not really hold when considered in the context of what our key allies are doing in relation to sharing information.

I express my support for clause 23, and the core principle that this is the right thing to do. We do not expect the current criminal liability of the Serious Crime Act offences to sit with trusted individuals who are conducting authorised, highly sensitive and vital national security work to keep our country safe.

[Stuart C. McDonald (Cumbernauld, Kilsyth and Kirkintilloch East) (SNP)]

I rise to support a lot of what the hon. Member for Halifax has said already. Nobody on the Committee doubts the importance of collaboration; we all recognise how crucial that is. I do not think that any of us doubt that the services have approached the Government having identified what they perceive to be a problem, and that the Government are genuinely engaged in trying to resolve that. One of the challenges that we face as parliamentarians is the degree of confidentiality and secrecy that surrounds their operations, which sometimes makes it difficult for us—particularly if we are not members of the Intelligence and Security Committee—to properly understand the nature of the problem and how it can be resolved.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jones]

I thank the Minister for reading his speech very well, but I take issue with the implication of what he said at the end, and I feel a bit annoyed about it.

The implication is that if someone ask questions about clause 23, somehow they are not supportive of our security services. I am the longest serving member on the Intelligence and Security Committee and a former Defence Minister, and I think most people who know me in the House know that if I am anything, I am a supporter of our security services and defence forces. It is therefore a bit churlish for people to argue that asking questions somehow means that I want to inhibit the work of our defence and security services; I certainly do not.

Having been on the ISC since 2017, I am aware of the bravery involved in the difficult jobs of our security services. I never cease to be amazed when I hear about some of the things they do. The general public would have no idea of the difficult judgment calls they sometimes have to make.

However, I am also a big supporter of proper oversight of our security services. We have the ISC, the Investigatory Powers Commissioner and the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, and that is the web we have in our democracy to ensure that the security services operate legally and that they are supported in what they do. In fact, the director general of MI5 often says in front of the ISC that those three organisations give it the legitimacy to operate. That is a good thing in a democracy, and I agree with him.

What worries me is the justification for why clause 23 is needed. We have heard it before, but we just heard the hon. Member for Milton Keynes North use the phrase “a chilling effect”. In their evidence, Sir Alex Younger and Sir David Omand also supported this provision. I have huge respect for those two gentlemen: they are good public servants whose service has done this country a huge amount of good. However, from reading the transcript—I was abroad when they were here last week; I apologise—I do not quite get the point that they were getting at. They used words, which have just been used again, such as principles and morals, and the idea that the onus somehow lies on the individual officer.

If that was the case, I would totally agree that the onus should not be on the individual officer because, having seen what they do, I know they have to make key judgment calls. In their evidence, I do not think that Alex Younger or David Omand gave us any examples of why this measure is needed.

[Ben Everitt]

I have been listening carefully to the right hon. Gentleman. He mentioned oversight as a key part of the functions of our security services. I waited for him to develop the point further into liability, which is what we are discussing here. Will he elaborate on what he means in relation to oversight when, I think, clause 23 specifically refers to liability?

[Mr Jones]

It is about both. I will come to liability, because I do not think that individual officers are liable due to existing legislation. As for what I mean by oversight, I am clear that the structures we have for the authorisation of things that are not pleasant should include oversight—whether from the ISC, the tribunal or the Investigatory Powers Commissioner. We do not live in a society—thank God—where Ministers and the Executive can just say to the security services, “Do x, y and z.” That would be wrong. That is why it is important to have oversight and checks and balances in the system, which were not always there. This morning, I referred to a very sad time in our history—I was a Minister at the time. It was not a good time for our security services, and we should have been ashamed of some of the things that were done.

I want to see an example of what Sir Alex Younger and Sir David Omand were talking about last week. If there is a specific problem, I would be sympathetic and say, “Right, we need to get that sorted.” It may be a broad notion. We are talking about principles and morals, and it is very difficult to legislate on morals—certainly the Conservative party gets into difficulty when we talk about morals—but I would like to know specific examples that would lead to a liability.

Let me turn to the existing protections. Schedule 4 to the Serious Crime Act 2007 includes the offence of encouraging, assisting or commissioning an offence abroad. Clause 23 amends schedule 4 of the Serious Crime Act to disapply that offence when the activity is deemed necessary for the proper exercise of a function of an intelligence agency or the armed forces. The Government are basically asking for a carve-out, which I find extremely rare.

National Security Bill (Thirteenth sitting)

Ben Everitt Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 18th October 2022 Public Bill Committees

The first part of the Bill is very sensible. Tier 1—the primary tier—is very simple. The only thing I would like to understand relates to the Australian and US systems. I hate to use a David Cameron phrase, but disinfectant is the best sunlight. Sorry, transparency’s best disinfectant is sunlight. Sorry, sunlight is the best disinfectant.

[Ben Everitt (Milton Keynes North) (Con)]

I think your version is better.

[Mr Jones]

I am sorry; it is an odd quote. That will be the test for tier 1: to make sure that it is publicly available and people know it and can see. That has worked in both those systems.

I have real problems with the secondary tier. I understand what the Government are trying to do, but they are making it very complicated. I worry that we are putting in provisions that will not be helpful in practice. It goes beyond political influence, for which I think there is a need. One example is acting as a foreign intelligence officer. Those arrangements need inquiry, but we are left not really knowing, because a lot of that will be looked at in secondary legislation, and it does not apply to all countries. That will create some problems. I have already mentioned the diplomatic problems when a country is added to that list.

When I met officials yesterday I used the analogy of being put on the naughty step: there is no real understanding of what criteria would be used to do that. I have no problem with the Minister’s robustness in using this measure, but because it is getting into economics and other areas, there will be huge problems with pressures from the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and others. I would like to understand what a country would have to do to get on the naughty step.

On named countries, I am sure the Minister will not mention the exact countries today, but once the Bill secures Royal Assent, are there any countries that will automatically be added? I am sure no one will be surprised to see North Korea on it. The more problematic country is China, on which I know the Minister has strong views. That will create some problems. I am struggling to understand which countries will end up on this tier.

How will the list work in practice? If the Minister were to put a country that is hostile to us on this list, that is one thing, but what happens if the relationship with that country changes? The example I gave to officials was Iraq. During the Iran-Iraq war, it was our ally. When it invaded Kuwait, it was certainly not our ally. What would be threshold to take someone off that tier? What is the practical way in which that will be done?

National Security Bill

Ben Everitt Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 16th November 2022 Commons Chamber

[Mr Carmichael]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Sir Jeremy Wright), who did the House a great service in bringing to us in four minutes what could have been the subject matter of a whole afternoon’s debate in itself, thus highlighting the total inadequacy of today’s proceedings for proper scrutiny of this Bill. I fear it will be filleted when it goes to the other place, and it deserves to be.

I added my name to new clause 8, but it is not available to debate and discuss. So much of what is in the Bill risks offering protection to people who do the wrong thing in the service of our country, while those who seek to expose that wrongdoing are to be left completely unprotected. Others have said it before, and I say it again now: this was the perfect opportunity to provide protection of that sort. If not now, when are going to see it?

It is a matter of significant regret that in an area of public policy where there is a substantial and natural consensus across the political parties, we have come to this stage in the proceedings of the Bill with so much division and disagreement, albeit a disagreement between those on the Treasury Bench and the Government Back Benches, not just between the parties. I do not think anybody in this House would not want to promote the security of our nation, and we all understand the complex and difficult situations in which pursuing that work often places people.

We also know, because it is human nature as much as anything else, that in these difficult and complex situations it is often possible to persuade oneself of just about anything. When that happens, it is necessary that somebody, somewhere, can be held accountable for it, because we are a country that believes, still, in the rule of law, and these things matter. That is why my colleagues on the Liberal Democrat Benches and I are so concerned about the content of clause 27 and clauses 79 to 83.

As I mentioned in my intervention on the right hon. Member for Haltemprice and Howden (Mr Davis), the cases about which we know and are rightly shocked, we know about only because these matters came into the public domain by mere happenstance. It is eminently possible that the circumstances of Belhaj and Boudchar would not be known to us today but for the fact somebody who happened to be walking around Gaddafi’s palace during the fall of his Government found the papers that revealed the extent to which rights had been deliberately traduced. It is surely wrong that there should be protection for people who behave far outside British standards, notwithstanding Government policy and indeed the law.

The same is true in relation to clauses 79 to 83, which remain the subject of massive controversy. I am certain that they will be revisited, hopefully with more detail and vigour than we have been able to give them today, because they do not belong in a Bill of this sort. I hope that, when the Bill eventually comes back to this House, it comes back without them.

[Ben Everitt (Milton Keynes North) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to follow the right hon. Member for Orkney and Shetland (Mr Carmichael) and to see so many members of the Bill Committee in the House on Report. It was a very constructive Committee, and I am pleased that we are all still vaguely getting on.

As the Minister said in his opening remarks, a number of clauses in the Bill update espionage legislation that goes back to world war one. Obviously we do not have time to go through all of them, but after putting the Bill into context, I will spend some time talking about clauses 13, 14, 20 and 21. The context is important. In my lifetime, and since the end of the cold war, we have lived through an era of what could be considered unprecedented global peace. In many ways, in the ‘90s, we took our eye off the ball. Once the Berlin wall came down, we took our eye off the ball on state-based threats. When things got hot in 2001, after 9/11, our national security legislation and our activity were focused much more on counter-terrorism, so now is the time to update our espionage legislation to counter state-based threats as well as counter-terrorist threats.

It is clear that state-based threats have not gone away. There are more Russian spies in London now than there ever were at the height of the cold war.

[Mr Kevan Jones]

How do you know that?

[Ben Everitt]

Because I have read it. [Interruption.] I will give sources to the House of Commons Library if I have to.

Those hostile threats are a real and present danger. Russia in particular is a danger. We know that the Skripal poisonings were the work of the GRU. We know that Russia continues to implement a range of hybrid techniques that undermine what it sees as its adversaries—to make it clear, that includes us. The use of disinformation, particularly through bot accounts on Twitter, has been used to foster division and political instability in countries.

The head of MI5 has declared that China, not Russia, is the biggest long-term threat to Britain’s national security. It is said that if Russia is a tropical storm, then China is climate change. This new threat requires new measures to protect us. We need to create new offences to tackle state-based sabotage. I refer to clause 13, in particular. I would argue to my right hon. Friend the Member for South Holland and The Deepings (Sir John Hayes), who is not in his place, that we do go far enough.

Part 2 of the Bill covers prevention and investigation measures, which update our legislation to mirror the counter-terrorism legislation that we learned so hard in the noughties. In many ways, that reflects the new foreign intelligence threat that we face, which is much more like the threat of terrorism from the past 20 years. Espionage has never been the gentleman’s game that is portrayed in books and films, but now, in particular, we face some pretty gruesome threats. Clause 21, on arrest and detention, is also incredibly necessary in this day and age.

In summary, I support the Bill. We must bring our espionage laws up to date and into the 21st century.