Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Tyler of Enfield Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 6th February 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to take part in day 4 of the Committee’s deliberations on the Bill. I declare my financial services interests as set out in the register.

I agree with all the amendments in this group. My noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendments are clear, and I ask my noble friend the Minister to answer him in the affirmative when she comes to respond and to say that legislating in this area would be helpful on whatever agenda it was measured against. He also reminded us of Sid, who was the poster child for British Gas. It seems only appropriate, in that I find myself sitting next to a former prima ballerina, for me to say that I seem to remember BT using the music from “Swan Lake” for its initial public offerings—all to the good. It must be right that people have an opportunity to take part, with all the correct safeguards and rails around it, in these activities. I very much support Amendments 55 and 241.

Similarly, I support the amendments around the “have regard” duty for the FCA. My noble friend the Minister will be familiar with these arguments; we talked about them very much in our debates on the 2021 Bill, now an Act. We have had Oral Questions and Written Questions on the subject, so she will be well rehearsed in her answer on a “have regard” duty.

For this reason, I tabled Amendment 67A. It is time for the FCA to have a financial inclusion objective. That is in no sense to fetter the regulator’s independence or existing objectives. The financial inclusion objective could only be additive and assistive to its existing objectives on consumer protection, market integrity and competition, and to any potential future objectives as set out in the Bill.

Following the intervening two years since we last discussed financial inclusion in detail on the 2021 Bill, are there now more or fewer bank branches and ATMs? Is there more or less cash acceptance and financial inclusion? Whatever government agenda we consider—growth, levelling up, or increased connectivity and creativity for our citizens, communities, cities and country—a financial inclusion objective for the FCA makes sense. Will my noble friend agree that it is now time to enable the FCA to play a spearheading role in financial inclusion, and to accept Amendment 67A?

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

My Lords, as this is my first intervention in Committee, I refer to my interests in the register as a member of the Financial Inclusion Commission and as president of the Money Advice Trust.

I will speak to Amendments 75 and 117 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, to which I attached my name, and Amendment 228 in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer, to which my name is also attached. I also support Amendment 67A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, who we have just heard from. Indeed, I would have been pleased to add my name to his amendment had I been able to do so.

In its 2017 report, the House of Lords Select Committee on Financial Exclusion, which I had the privilege to chair, recommended on a unanimous, cross-party basis that

“the Government should expand the remit of the FCA to include a statutory duty to promote financial inclusion as one of its key objectives.”

These key recommendations were reiterated in the 2021 follow-up Liaison Committee report, so this issue has been around for quite a long time. In my view, the Bill is an excellent opportunity finally to make some progress.

Amendment 75 would mean that the FCA must “have regard” to financial inclusion in the consumer protection objective. Amendment 117 would insert a statutory duty to report to Parliament annually on the state of financial inclusion, measures that the FCA has taken, and any recommendations to the Treasury that the FCA wants to give. I know some have argued that that would be onerous. I see it as adding a critical layer of parliamentary scrutiny and accountability to discussions on financial inclusion—something, frankly, that is sorely lacking at the moment. It has been a key theme of many of our deliberations on the Bill.

Whether through a primary duty, as in Amendment 67A from the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, or as a must “have regard” duty, as in the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, such a duty would directly remedy the fact that the FCA’s consumer duty, which we will look at in a later group, deals primarily with existing customers—a point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. The consumer duty does not address the needs of the customers whom the market views as more expensive and less profitable to serve and who are therefore excluded from the market.

This proposed new duty would also future-proof policy decisions made after the Bill passes. This would ensure that financial inclusion issues, such as free access to cash, which featured so heavily in our Second Reading debate, are dealt with as they emerge rather than dragging on for years, resulting in a race against time before the cash delivery infrastructure disappears completely.

Our previous debates on people’s need to have free access to their own cash are an excellent example of how the regulator is currently unable to act early on such financial inclusion issues, because they are viewed as outside its remit. The heart of my argument is that, by giving the FCA a cross-cutting “must have regard to” duty, with a requirement to publish findings, it will have the ability, and perhaps more importantly the incentive, to ensure that the needs of those currently denied access due to affordability issues are considered.

Why is this so important? Briefly, in a competitive market firms will naturally design a market around the people who are the most profitable. Certain consumers—we need to be honest about this—are seen as not desirable. These consumers tend to be those who are the most vulnerable and equipped with the least resources. That has consequences for those on the lowest incomes: they struggle to afford or have to pay extra for particular services or products and, if they cannot, they are often unable to access these products at all and are therefore excluded altogether.

Essentially, these amendments seek to remedy that harm. We have already heard a couple of examples of this: some people are paying more for insurance because of where they live, and some are excluded from credit or are paying more for credit due to their credit rating or, frankly, because they cannot benefit from direct debits or they need to use cash. We all know what has happened with the terrible scandal of forcible entry to install prepayment meters.

I will finish by talking briefly about the black hole between the FCA and the Treasury, and why what are seen as social policy issues too often fall through the cracks. That point was repeatedly made by witnesses giving evidence to the Select Committee. In essence, the problem is that industry is just not providing products to meet the needs of all consumers, and some customers it will never be profitable for the industry to serve. If consumer representatives take the issue to the Treasury and the FCA, the Treasury says that it requires more data to act. It sends consumer representatives to the FCA, which says that it is not its responsibility to investigate issues that touch on social policy, so it sends consumer representatives back to the Treasury. That is a totally Catch-22 situation.

It is not just people like me banging on about this. I was very pleased to speak last week to a senior representative of Phoenix, a FTSE-100 company focusing on savings and pensions, which is also calling on government to add a new regulatory principle so that the regulations must have regard to the need to tackle financial inclusion. I thought it was very telling that the company saw this as critical to the growth agenda.

I want to explain briefly why I have added my name to Amendment 228 in the name of my noble friend Lady Kramer. It very ingeniously adds a clear financial inclusion element to the authorisation or renewing of a bank’s licence, while requiring the FCA to have regard to a bank’s services to low-income communities. Major banks, frankly, have had little interest in people on low incomes and were, in my view, dragged pretty reluctantly into having basic banking accounts. That has got a bit better but not an awful lot. If we use bank licences, that gives banks another way to provide such services by supporting credit unions and community banks—institutions that are often better placed to provide banking that is properly tailored to low-income and excluded people.

There is a lot of scope for expansion here. The UK has a far smaller community bank and credit union sector than many other countries. I will not go through all the figures, but certainly the penetration rates in the USA, Canada and Australia are far bigger. Having this sort of arrangement in place is also very much linked to people's desires to have continuing access to face-to-face services, something that we have heard so much about, particularly from the excluded groups, older people and others. Although the banking industry has made some limited progress in addressing this issue, particularly through the launch of shared banking hubs, it has, frankly, been pretty glacial so far. As this amendment so cleverly says, however, there are other things that banks can do to ensure the provision of services, including face-to-face services in low-income communities, and that is why I support it.

[Baroness Bull (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 75, to which I have added my name, and in support of Amendment 117, which complements Amendment 75 by looking to provide greater clarity and transparency on how financial inclusion issues can be effectively tackled in future. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, have said all there is to be said, so I will be very brief. I also support Amendment 67A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, which makes many of the same points.

--- Later in debate ---

This whole section is very confusing. It should be redrafted as a whole rather than just having extra bits added. I urge the Government to look at that wording. I know it is hallowed by history, but it is far from clear about what it is really saying, in particular on people who have problems with their mental health.

[Baroness Tyler of Enfield (LD)]

I support Amendment 76 in the name of my noble friend Lord Sharkey, to which my name is attached. I will say briefly that I support Amendment 77, which we have just heard set out very persuasively by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton. The links between money problems and mental health are now very well established. They were covered in some detail by the 2017 Lords Select Committee on Financial Exclusion, which I have already referred to. We had a number of recommendations in this area. Five years on, the case is stronger than ever. I hope the Minister will be able to respond sympathetically to that point.

Turning to the duty of care to replace the consumer duty—indeed, having a duty of care was another of the Select Committee’s recommendations—I concur with the sentiments expressed by my noble friend Lord Sharkey. A consumer duty of the sort in the Bill and which was brought forward for consultation by the FCA is not a duty of care. The former has many exemptions and, critically, does not provide wronged consumers with the right to secure monetary redress through litigation. This point was made very compellingly by my noble friend. While the purpose of the consumer duty is to deliver improved outcomes for consumers, because the proposals are diluted from the duty of care—which was voted on in Parliament and enshrined in the Financial Services Act 2021—we have to ask why this has happened.

The external bodies calling for a duty of care, the financial services Consumer Panel, many consumer organisations and the House of Lords Liaison Committee were all clear that what they wanted was a duty of care, not a consumer duty. I would be grateful to the Minister if in summing up she can explain why this move from a duty of care to a consumer duty was made and why it was allowed to happen. In terms of accountability and parliamentary sovereignty it is of real concern that, after Parliament passed the Financial Services Act 2021, the regulator chose to consult and bring forward rules on something different. This amendment provides an opportunity to remedy a very unsatisfactory state of affairs.

In my view, the consumer duty provides little more consumer protection than is in the existing “treating customers fairly” principle. Nor do these proposals really help to rebalance the power and information imbalance between financial services providers and vulnerable customers, which is a real concern of mine. We need a convincing explanation of how the consumer duty enhances the “treating customers fairly” principle and how this new approach will provide the regulator with more of an ability to ensure better outcomes for consumers than at present. I must say that is not at all clear to me.

Finally, the problem is that, as currently drafted, the consumer duty places the responsibility on consumers to understand the benefits and risks of different products and services. There needs to be less emphasis on what consumers should be able to discern for themselves and more emphasis on what should be in place to stop firms exploiting that power and information imbalance between themselves and customers. This is something that a duty of care amendment would do.

[Lord Sikka (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 229 to 231. They overlap with the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey; I congratulate him on his excellent speech and the wonderful case that he made for a duty of care.

The key theme of these three amendments is the empowerment of consumers—that is, enabling consumers to secure redress from negligent authorised persons for failure to act with due care as well as enabling them to seek compensation from regulatory bodies for their failures. Empowering consumers generates pressure points for regulatory bodies and authorised persons to ensure that they act diligently, efficiently, honestly, fairly and with some care.

The key element in these amendments is a duty of care, about which the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, has already said a few things; I will add just a few more. The FCA has failed to carry out the mandate given to it by Section 29 of the Financial Services Act 2021. The consultation was fundamentally flawed; indeed, the wording of its questions indicated the bias against its mandate to create a duty of care.

I have time to go through only one example. Question 12 on the consultation paper was very badly designed. As an academic, I have carried out many questionnaires over the years, but I have never written a question like this with so many questions in one:

“Do you agree that what we have proposed amounts to a duty of care? If not, what further measures would be needed? Do you think it should be labelled as a duty of care, and might there be upsides or downsides in doing so?”


That is supposed to be one question. This question and the accompanying information provided in the consultation paper are severely misleading. The FCA asks, “Do you agree that what we have proposed amounts to a duty of care?” Does it not know what a duty of care is? Has nobody there ever studied any English case law from the 20th century to understand what it is? What a strange question to ask.

First, it was not for the respondents to inform the FCA whether or not it had proposed a duty of care; that was for the FCA itself to do. Secondly, if it is not a duty of care but the majority of respondents believe it to be one, does that make it so? Thirdly, if it is a duty of care but the majority of respondents believe it not to be, does that mean it is not one? It is very strange. Fourthly, if it is a duty of care then the FCA has proposed such a duty without asking the question, specifically mandated by Section 29 of the 2021 Act, as to whether there should be one. Fifthly, if it is not a duty of care then the FCA has proposed that there should not be one. If you look at it on logical grounds, none of it makes any sense. The questions and the accompanying statements do not make any sense, so the FCA has not really consulted on a duty of care.

The FCA’s consultation paper says that a duty of care “may have different meanings”—in other words, that is why it did not really want to go down that route. That is misleading. Just because the meaning of duty of care evolves does not mean that the FCA should not carry out its statutory duties. The principle of duty of care is well established in English law, especially since the 1932 case of Donoghue v Stevenson. It is found in fields as diverse as sale of goods and professional negligence, but it seems to have eluded the FCA.

The FCA has failed to create a duty of care as that phrase is commonly understood in law. What it has done is propose general rules about the level of care that must be provided to consumers by authorised persons. That is not a duty of care. Principle 2 of the FCA’s handbook does not create a duty of care because a breach of the FCA’s Principles for Businesses does not give rise to a right of private action by parties injured by a breach thereof. That has already been commented on; unless consumers can enforce something, it is not really a duty of care.

The FCA’s chair, Charles Randell, rejects the commonly accepted legal definition of the term “duty of care” and states that, for the FCA, it means nothing more than

“a positive obligation on a person to ensure that their conduct meets a set standard.”

That does not sound like a duty of care. Randell further commented in relation to the consultation paper that

“whether or not a private right of action for damages should attach to the duty … there would be alternative ways of enforcing such a duty. These include not only voluntary redress or a restitution order, but also our routine supervision and enforcement activities. And individuals have the ability to seek compensation by referring complaints to the Financial Ombudsman Service, which would have regard to the duty in its decisions.”

In a sense, I have no problem with regulatory remedies being in place in addition to the private right of action—I welcome them—but they cannot be a substitute for that right, which is what Amendment 229 calls for. There are two reasons for rejecting the FCA’s position. First, elsewhere—for example, in the sale of goods or professional negligence—a breach of a duty of care is by definition actionable, so why is that prevented in the world of finance? Why are the financial services and the FCA an exception to it? Secondly, the alternatives listed by Randell and the FCA have consistently been shown to be unsatisfactory. Individuals are therefore left in the lurch with nowhere to go.

A right of private action is desirable and creates a pressure point for financial services providers. While the consumer duty has many exclusions and qualifications I do not welcome, attaching a private right of action to it would materially strengthen consumers’ rights in relation to wrong scores and be of benefit to consumers. A right of private action would enable consumers to seek redress and compensation in the event that they are dealt with badly by a financial company. In the absence of that right, consumers, investors and pension savers remain dependent on the FCA. As we have already heard, the FCA is always dragging its feet to do anything. We need to set consumers free. In essence, I am supporting what the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said.