English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Taylor of Stevenage Excerpts

Thursday 26th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Harris of Haringey (Lab)]

My Lords, I remind the House of my interest as co-president of London Councils and, like the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, as a former borough leader. I think I was also the longest-serving leader in my particular borough at various times, and I am a former member of the London Assembly.

I rise particularly to address government Amendment 243, to welcome it and to say how grateful I am to my noble friend the Minister for the consultations that she had with me and also with London Councils about the content of it. The amendment that has come forward is a welcome compromise. Obviously, there is a desire from London Councils that perhaps written in somewhere should be a formal requirement to consult. But I am very pleased that the Minister and the department have been able to respond in this way, and I am pleased that it is now going to be in the Bill.

To underpin the comments made by other noble Lords in respect of the other amendments, I think that what is being forgotten is that the basis of the settlement in London was that people should work together. I do not know whether that is a criticism of the three mayors that have been, the various iterations of London Councils or the relationship with government, but I suspect that that could be improved. Whether it requires the sort of review that the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, has suggested, I do not know. But all I would say is that noble Lords should be careful what they wish for in such a review, because it might produce outcomes that they do not like.

I will sit down by concluding again with my thanks to my noble friend the Minister for bringing forward Amendment 243.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (Baroness Taylor of Stevenage) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott, Lady Pidgeon and Lady O’Neill, for their amendments on the functions and governance of the Greater London Authority and London boroughs.

I turn first to Amendments 81, 154 and 156. This Government are committed to delivering a permanent transfer of power from Whitehall to our regions. Strategic authorities, including the Greater London Authority, will not be able to deliver for their residents if they fear that a future Government will be able, on a whim, to easily remove functions that have been devolved. Parliament is, of course, sovereign. The Government will always be able to introduce primary legislation that changes which functions should sit with which level of authority. However, this Bill makes sure that the Government will have to make that argument through the various stages of a parliamentary Bill; it must not be easy to take devolved powers away from strategic authorities. That is why this Bill limits the ability of this Government and future Governments to remove functions from strategic authorities using secondary legislation so that they can be exercised again by central government. It would be wrong to single out the Greater London Authority and allow its functions, and only its functions, to be removed by secondary legislation.

On Amendment 82, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for meeting me to discuss this issue. Her insight into the governance of London was very valuable to me. First, I would note that the Mayor of London is already required to appear before the assembly 10 times a year for Mayor’s Question Time. This affords assembly members an opportunity to question the mayor on a regular basis. It is a tried and tested mechanism for questioning the mayor, and is backed up by a strong incentive for the mayor to attend, in that generally, if they fail to attend six consecutive meetings, they will be removed from office. This amendment would not remove the existing mayor’s Question Time mechanism; rather, it would represent an additional burden on the mayor of London potentially requiring them to appear before the assembly multiple times within a given month.

Secondly, this amendment would enable the assembly to summon witnesses who are not connected to the Greater London Authority or work on its behalf. In using a broad definition, it could allow the assembly to require attendance from virtually any entity linked to activity in, or related to, Greater London. The assembly’s power is backed up by powerful enforcement mechanisms. A person who fails to comply with the assembly’s request can be liable for a fine or even imprisonment for not more than three months. I am sure noble Lords can appreciate that the expansion of a power with such an enforcement mechanism needs to be considered very carefully. In London, the assembly has broadly either the same or similar powers to those being introduced for local scrutiny committees. As London’s devolution settlement continues to evolve, the Government will continue to work with relevant partners, including the noble Baroness.

I turn to Amendment 83, for which I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill. I recognise her very long and dedicated service to Bexley and to London. The Mayor of London is directly elected by the people of London every four years, alongside the London Assembly, which scrutinises the mayor’s work. This model is unique among strategic authorities, and it has successfully served the people of London for the last 25 years. The Government are regularly in contact with the GLA to understand how its governance, scrutiny, arrangements and partnership working arrangements are delivering for London and Londoners. As London’s devolution settlement evolves, we want to continue to see positive working between the GLA and its partners, including London borough councils, to deliver on shared priorities.

With this ongoing conversation already happening, it is not necessary to impose a formal review of London governance to be reported on at an arbitrary point. Indeed, it would be unusual to put such a requirement into primary legislation. The accountability arrangements for all mayoral strategic authorities, including the Greater London Authority, will also be strengthened by revised guidance, such as new iterations of the English Devolution Accountability Framework and scrutiny protocol.

I turn to Amendment 84 from the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon. Simple majority voting in London would make it harder for the mayor to exercise executive authority and deliver for Londoners in areas where other mayors are being empowered. As I have said, London’s devolution settlement has served Londoners well for 25 years, striking the balance between the executive authority of the mayor and the scrutiny of the assembly. Mayors in combined authorities and combined county authorities can have their budget amended only by a two-thirds majority, and there is no reason why London should be different.

Finally, my Amendment 243 would enable central government to pay grant funding directly to a London joint committee, such as that run by London Councils. This will address a long-standing anomaly in London’s governance. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Harris, among others, for bringing this issue to my attention, and I also thank him for his very long service to London government.

Where there are cross-borough initiatives which are outside the remit of the Greater London Authority, the committees established by London Councils are best placed to receive and direct related funding on behalf of boroughs. Among many other examples, this is evident in the Freedom Pass, which the London Councils transport and environment committee negotiates with Transport for London and pays for on behalf of boroughs. At the moment, when central government wishes to pay funding for initiatives co-ordinated by London Councils, it must use cumbersome workarounds, such as paying to a nominated lead borough or routing it through the GLA. This creates additional barriers in time and complexity to getting money where it needs to go. It also lacks transparency, making it hard for citizens to follow who is involved in the spending of their money.

This amendment is a simple yet significant change that will allow money to flow directly from central government to joint committees established by London Councils, speeding up and simplifying delivery for Londoners. It is important that any entity receiving public money has the appropriate governance and oversight in place. Therefore, this amendment enables payment to take place only once the Secretary of State has made regulations setting out eligibility requirements. Those regulations will be approved by resolution of this House and the other place.

I commend my own amendment to the House and ask the noble Baronesses, Lady Scott, Lady Pidgeon and Lady O’Neill, not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

Before the Minister sits down, could she clarify something? With the new mayors of strategic authorities, I understood that the committees voted using a simple majority. Are we now saying that it is a two-thirds majority, the same as for London, in the new mayoral authorities?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My advice, as I read out, is that it is a two-thirds majority.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I read the Bill yesterday and thought that it was a simple majority, but there we are.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for making the clear and compelling case for the need for change to specific London governance arrangements. These amendments are ultimately intended to help improve services for Londoners and to strengthen democratic scrutiny of the mayor, whoever he or she might be, by elected members.

I thank my noble friend Lady O’Neill of Bexley for making the case for a full London governance review. I restate our support from these Benches for her amendments. We feel strongly that this is necessary in London, as is happening across the whole country. The Government may wish to contemplate further the possibility of that review, and therefore consider more seriously at the moment our proposed amendments to Clause 15, which would allow for the removal of functions from, as well as the conferral of functions to, the GLA.

If the London governance arrangements are so unique, as the Minister made plain in Committee, we believe Parliament ought to have further oversight and that democratic scrutiny should be strengthened in London. I hope that the Government will not dismiss these proposals but give them serious consideration. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, would it be in order to make a correction in relation to what the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, has just said?

[Noble Lords]

Yes.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I have double-checked the voting arrangements. It is a two-thirds majority for combined authority and combined county authority budgets. It is a simple majority, including the mayor, for most other things in a combined authority, and a combined county authority. The Bill does not override existing voting arrangements set out in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act, or the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act. This has to be done by consequential SI. The existing voting arrangements are set out in Article 8 of the Combined Authorities (Finance) Order 2017, and will continue to stand. I hope that is helpful.

[The Deputy Speaker (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, does the noble Baroness wish to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 84?

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

88: Clause 21, page 25, line 28, leave out “one or more of the areas” and insert “any aspect of any area”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would make this wording consistent with the wording used in paragraph 4 of Schedule 25 (in the definition of “eligible function”).

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Bichard, Lord Wallace of Saltaire and Lord Ravensdale, for amendments on collaboration. I will start with the government amendments in this group, which are minor and technical in nature. Their purpose is to align relevant definitions across the Bill. Taken together, they update wording in Clauses 21, 22 and 51. In doing so, they make the wording consistent with that used in paragraph 4 of Schedule 25 in the definition of “eligible function”.

The effect is to clarify that mayors may convene local partners, collaborate with neighbouring mayors or request an additional function in relation to any aspect of any area of competence. This reflects the Government’s clear policy intention to provide mayors with the flexibility that they need to use these powers effectively in addressing local priorities. For example, the health, well-being and public service reform area of competence should be read as covering its individual component parts of health and well-being and public service reform, rather than as a single inseparable policy heading. These amendments therefore promote consistency across the Bill, avoiding ambiguity or an unnecessarily narrow interpretation of how these powers relate to the areas of competence.

I hope that, with this explanation, the House will support these amendments. I will listen to the noble Lords introducing their amendments before I respond to them.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to talk to Amendment 181, which is grouped with this. Britain has an unwritten constitution, which gives us flexibility but also lacks constraint on changing Prime Ministers or Governments beyond trust in their behaving like good chaps. As we have discovered in recent years, not all Prime Ministers do behave like good chaps or chapesses. The Minister herself earlier today referred to the question of whether a future Government might “on a whim” change the way they operate in crucial ways. The purpose of this amendment is to entrench the role of the mayoral council in the future governance of England and to make sure that a future Government cannot simply muck things up on a whim.

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[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, I rise to speak on this group of amendments on collaboration. I will not comment on the government amendments, other than to say that we consider them to be technical and will not stand in the way of the Government. I must declare my interest as an ex-chairman of the Local Government Association.

Amendment 181 from the noble Lord, Lord Wallace of Saltaire, raises a number of serious points that the Government need to respond to. However, we have some concerns that a mayoral council risks duplication of work that is already happening in other forums, such as with the Local Government Association, and therefore risks increased bureaucracy.

On Amendment 309 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, we share his ambition for joined-up public services that co-operate effectively. That will be important to deliver the high-quality services we would all like to see locally. The Government need to consider how best this can be achieved. However, we have some concerns about how this amendment would work in practice as regards the legal duty to attend meetings and the interpretation of “reasonable”. We are therefore not convinced that the amendment as set out is the right way forward, but I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Bichard, that the Government need to think about how this can be made to work in practice.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the debate on this group. I will start with Amendment 181. I absolutely agree with the noble Lord, Lord Wallace, about the overcentralisation of decision-making in England, and that is part of the whole rationale for bringing the Bill forward. I must be clear that I appreciate the spirit of the amendment, as I know how much good work the mayoral council has done since this Government established it.

I will say just a little bit about the mayoral council: the existing mayoral council, and the Leaders Council of local authority leaders, are non-decision-making bodies so do not need to be in statute. The current format of the mayoral council and the Leaders Council has received very positive feedback on their collaborative nature from members of all political parties. The mayoral council has run a shadow right to request process, ahead of that process being made statutory through the Bill, without needing to be a statutory decision-making body. As a statutory process, the right to request provides certainty that engagement will take place.

The mayoral council and the Leaders Council are still relatively new forums, and they have already adapted to respond to feedback from members and the Government. As more devolution is delivered across the country and we get more mayors with more powers, their needs and best use may change. Retaining flexibility by not having forums set in statute will allow us to once again respond quickly to feedback to make sure these continue to be useful forums.

The Bill is already establishing a process to extend devolution in a more streamlined way and to deepen that devolution through the mayoral right to request process, so it is not necessary for the mayoral council to create a framework for further devolution. Funding is discussed regularly at the mayoral council, but it is right and proper that local government funding is provided through the local government finance settlement process, where allocations of needs-based funding are done fairly across the country.

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[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

Before the noble Baroness sits down, can she clarify one point? We are heading towards a model of English governance in which there will be roughly 35 elected mayors. Do the Government envisage that the Council of the Nations and Regions will then have the Scottish Government, the Welsh Government, the Northern Irish Government and, on the same basis, 35 English mayors?

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

Those bodies are new bodies, and they will be evolving and changing as we evolve and change the model. They are not decision-making bodies. That is the main reason for saying we do not want to put them in statute, particularly in view of the fact that they will change fairly rapidly as we increase the mayoral model across the country.

Amendment 88 agreed.

Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

89: Clause 21, page 26, line 20, leave out “one or more of the areas” and insert “any aspect of any area”
Member's explanatory statement
This would make this wording consistent with the wording used in paragraph 4 of Schedule 25 (in the definition of “eligible function”).

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

91: Clause 22, page 27, line 17, leave out “one or more areas” and insert “any aspect of any area”
Member's explanatory statement
This would make this wording consistent with the wording used in paragraph 4 of Schedule 25 (in the definition of “eligible function”).

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[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I am also grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, for bringing forward Amendments 93, 119 and 183, which address regional collaboration and the vital issue of social mobility, as we have heard.

Amendment 93, in the name of the noble Lord and supported by my noble friend Lady Barran and the noble Earl, Lord Clancarty, is a very sensible amendment that will encourage and enable collaboration between strategic authorities. We believe that this can only be a good thing for regional economic development, to the benefit of local residents. I will not repeat all the points so ably set out in support of this amendment, but if the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, decides to press this amendment to a Division, he will have our full support.

Amendments 119 and 183 go to the heart of what devolution is ultimately for. It is not simply about shifting powers between tiers of government; it is about improving life chances, particularly, in these amendments, for young people who are not in education, employment or training. Amendment 119 was ably supported and explained by my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, and it highlights the importance of the partnership approach in tackling youth unemployment. This is an area where local knowledge and collaboration between authorities, employers, education providers and community organisations can make a real and lasting difference. Devolution should enable that kind of joined-up working, and it is right that the Bill reflects that ambition. Again, we will support this amendment if pressed to a Division.

Amendment 183 raises an equally important point about measurement and accountability. Taken together, these amendments remind us that economic growth alone is not enough. We must ensure that opportunity is shared and that devolution contributes to widening access to education, skills and employment. We are grateful to the noble Lord for bringing these issues before the House, and we look forward to the Minister’s response, particularly on how the Government intend to embed social mobility considerations into the delivery of devolved powers.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, for these amendments, and for taking a great deal of time and trouble to discuss them with me in recent weeks. The amendments relate to pan-regional collaboration, tackling youth unemployment and gathering social mobility data. I agree with the words of my noble friend Lady Blake: where you come from should not determine where you get to. I am a living example of that myself, and I know that there are many around your Lordships’ House. That should apply to anybody, wherever they start out—they should be able to get as far as their aspirations and their ability take them.

Amendment 93 is about pan-regional collaboration, which we have debated in Committee. I recognise the spirit of this amendment and its aim of empowering our strategic authorities to collaborate across administrative boundaries, to tackle shared challenges and to seize regional opportunities. As your Lordships will know, there is already significant pan-regional co-operation taking place between authorities, with mayors encouraged to collaborate across their regions, as set out in the English Devolution White Paper. To give one example, the Great North was established last year by northern mayors as a mayor-led partnership to unlock jobs, opportunity and prosperity across the north.

I appreciate the intentions of the amendment before us, but it largely mirrors what has already been provided for in Clause 21, which gives mayors the power to convene meetings with local partners, and Clause 22, which provides a formal process for mayors to collaborate. These clauses establish a more formal framework for local engagement and partnership working, while allowing strategic authorities to determine their own methods and priorities for collaboration.

We will be publishing statutory guidance on the operation of the duty on mayors to collaborate. This guidance, to which mayors of strategic authorities must have regard, will elaborate on the importance of cross-boundary working and the benefits it can deliver for those who live and work across functional economic areas.

In response to the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, I am grateful for her words, which really encapsulated some of what we are trying to do. However, on pan-regional partnerships, we had to take very tough decisions on funding because of the legacy we were left. As she indicated, we believe that these functions should now fall into the mayoral remit and it should be for mayors to build up those clear partnerships. I know that some of the pan-regional partnerships continue to exist because they had moved themselves to self-funding, and I am sure our mayors will want to work with them.

In response to my noble friend Lord Berkeley, regarding Cornwall and the Isles of Scilly, he and I have discussed this on many occasions, and I have been to the Isles of Scilly with him. The Isles of Scilly are a sui generis authority, so they are not covered by the Bill. Nevertheless, we expect all areas to co-operate across boundaries, and I know there are useful discussions taking place between our friends in Cornwall and in the Isles of Scilly.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

94: Clause 22, page 33, line 19, leave out “one or more areas” and insert “any aspect of any area”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would make this wording consistent with the wording used in paragraph 4 of Schedule 25 (in the definition of “eligible function”).

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

101: Schedule 7, page 154, line 29, leave out “(5)” and insert “(5A)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would be consequential on the other amendment of Schedule 7 in my name.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

106: Schedule 9, page 164, line 7, leave out “CCA” and insert “combined authority”
Member’s explanatory statement
This provision is about combined authorities, and so this amendment would correct the reference to “CCA” that appears here.

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[Baroness Thornhill (LD)]

I will say a few words in general support of the principle of this amendment. We supported it during the passage of the Planning and Infrastructure Act, so it would make sense to do so here.

It was good old John Prescott who first promoted “brownfield first” and, ever since then, councils have been encouraged to promote it, for all the reasons that the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, has just outlined. But brownfield alone cannot meet our housing needs, and that is the real issue I have with this. Brownfield development is more costly. Decontamination and development costs alone make it much more costly. There is a fear of lopsiding development, and I would be interested in further discussion—but clearly not here now—about how we square the very emotional debates we have had over the last day on Report with rural issues, the lack of housing in rural areas and how people need it, for all the reasons given. This amendment squarely says, “Leave the green areas alone”, so I have a little problem with it, although we on these Benches absolutely support the overriding principle.

Given the large area of combined authorities, there will clearly be a massive range of sites, covering all sorts of greenfield and brownfield sites, so I will leave the Minister with the thought that perhaps the Government need to give more incentives to develop brownfield first. There are lots of ideas that I am sure she is aware of that would encourage that more, but the key thing is that brownfield alone will not meet housing needs. Rural areas need more housing, but clearly we need strong protections for our green belt and our countryside.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, for Amendment 121 about brownfield land. I agree that we should always use brownfield land wherever possible. As succinctly articulated by the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, one reason for promoting the development of town centres and cities is that there is more brownfield land there. We are trying to promote that kind of development as part of the reorganisation process, but there will always be a need for some development in rural areas. We have a rural housing crisis that we must tackle, and there are other uses, such as data centres, for which it might also be appropriate.

Once the relevant provisions of the Planning and Infrastructure Act are commenced, combined authorities and combined county authorities, including those with mayors, will be required to prepare a spatial development strategy. These strategies will provide the framework for local plans and will identify broad locations for growth, key infrastructure requirements and housing targets for individual local authorities, but they will not allocate sites for development. In preparing a spatial development strategy, authorities will be required to have regard to the need for consistency with national policy.

The effective use or reuse of brownfield land is strongly encouraged in the current National Planning Policy Framework, which expects substantial weight to be given to the benefits of developing suitable brownfield land within existing settlements. The revised National Planning Policy Framework, mentioned earlier, goes further still. New proposed policies on development within and beyond settlement boundaries are designed to promote a more sustainable pattern of development by directing growth to appropriate locations, maximising the use of suitable urban land and taking a more selective approach to development outside of settlements.

Mayors will also have the ability to grant upfront planning permission for specified forms of development on identified sites through mayoral development orders. We want the legislation to be sufficiently flexible to allow mayors to use these powers across a range of uses and land types in line with their ambitions for growth. It is right that we continue to promote the effective use of previously developed land. However, we should be cautious about introducing overly rigid legal requirements that may not be appropriate in all circumstances and could risk constraining the growth that this country needs. While I understand the intention behind the amendment, it is for these reasons that I do not consider it to be necessary or proportionate. I would ask the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for her comments and the Minister for hers. Let us be clear: this is about doing what everyone has said that we need to do, which is developing on brownfield first. It is not about preventing development anywhere else. This is about creating more sites, it is about getting more building done, but it is also about regenerating cities and providing the homes that we need. I am afraid that I do not agree with the Minister. This is not about blocking; it is about enabling. I therefore wish to test the opinion of this House.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

128: Transpose Clause 41 to after Clause 50
Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment of clause 2 in my name would add culture as an “area of competence” in the Bill, and it would appear as the last in the list of areas. Clause 41 falls more readily in the new “culture” competence and so this amendment would mean that its position in the Bill reflects the order in which the areas of competence appear.

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[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Fuller, which all address an important and practical issue: the clear separation of duties between the mayor and the Local Government Pension Scheme. At its heart, this is about avoiding conflicts of interest, as we have heard.

Under the Bill, mayors will rightly have a central role in promoting investment opportunities in their regions, championing growth, attracting capital and supporting local economic development. That is an essential part of the devolution agenda. However, we must be equally clear about who is making investment decisions and on whose behalf. Pension funds exist to serve their members and local taxpayers. Their primary duty is fiduciary: to act in the best financial interests of those beneficiaries.

There is a distinction here that matters. The mayors may promote opportunities, but they should not be in a position to directly or indirectly influence the allocation of pension fund assets. In simple terms, one body promotes the opportunity and another independently decides whether to write the cheque. As has been noted, there are important differences between funding and financing and between providing the capital and structuring the deal. Both require clarity of responsibility and robust governance.

Co-operation between mayors and pension schemes is not only desirable, it is inevitable, but the co-operation must not drift into anything that could be perceived as pressure or direction. We must guard against any blurring of lines. What begins as collaboration must not become, even inadvertently, connivance. These amendments are therefore modest but necessary. They seek to put beyond doubt the separation of roles to protect the integrity of pension decision-making and to give reassurance to local taxpayers and scheme members alike. For those reasons, I support them.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, for Amendments 129 to 131 and for the time he took to discuss them with me. I recognise his intention to clarify the roles and responsibilities of strategic authorities and pension funds in making local investments. I agree that it is very important for roles and responsibilities to be completely clear. We want strategic authorities to play an active role in bringing forward investment and guidance. We will further explain the Government’s expectations.

I just point out that there is in the Pension Schemes Bill a reciprocal requirement for local government pension funds to co-operate with strategic authorities. The wording of “identify and develop” in this context is consistent with that requirement, which makes it a bit late to change that just now. The meaning of “development”, however, can be clarified in guidance. Pensions guidance will confirm that there is no requirement to invest in assets that are not deemed suitable as pension investments. This should provide the noble Lord reassurance.

Schedule 20 includes a requirement for local growth plans to set out key projects for achieving economic growth through private or public investment. The guidance on local growth plans already makes clear the expectations and support available to mayoral combined authorities and to mayoral combined county authorities for developing and taking forward that pipeline of investment opportunities. Further, government guidance for local government pension funds will explain the meaning of this requirement for them. This guidance will further clarify our expectations in this context. I am very happy to discuss this with the noble Lord outside the Chamber as we develop the guidance. Therefore, I respectfully ask the noble Lord, Lord Fuller, to withdraw his amendment.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Rees for Amendments 135, 138 and 174 and for being available to explain why he has brought this forward from other mayors. He has passed on their views for us.

I will speak first to Amendments 136 and 137 in my name. As I set out in Committee, these are essential amendments to Schedule 23. They would not create a new duty or expand powers, but they would ensure that existing provisions apply consistently when a mayoral combined authority is acting as a fire and rescue authority. Amendment 136 would bring the inspection regime for mayoral combined authorities and mayoral combined county authorities—I do hope we can call them the same thing at some point, because I am getting fed up with saying it twice every time—

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

Make an amendment.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

Yes—that would be my amendment.

Amendment 136 would bring the inspection regime into line with the existing exemptions for other fire and rescue authority governance models, maintaining consistency and fairness across England.

Amendment 137 would confirm that, where a mayoral combined authority or a mayoral combined county authority assumes fire and rescue responsibilities, it is treated in the same manner as established fire and rescue authorities. This amendment would extend the application of Part 5 of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989 to mayoral fire and rescue authorities relating to companies in which local authorities hold interests. It would similarly bring them within Section 155 of that Act for the purposes of emergency financial support.

Furthermore, Amendment 137 would clarify the process for handling Section 114 reports for mayoral fire and rescue authorities and the corresponding duties under Section 115 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988. When a chief finance officer issues such a report, it must be provided to the relevant scrutiny committee. The authority’s response must then be sent to the chief finance officer, the external auditor and the relevant scrutiny committee. In Committee, the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, raised concerns about accountability in relation to fire and rescue authority functions, and I trust that her concerns have now been addressed by the introduction of local scrutiny committees.

Turning now to Amendments 135, 138 and 174, I stress that Clause 47 is a key provision, ensuring that fire and rescue services in a mayoral combined authority area are subject to clear and direct accountability through elected mayors. These amendments would cut across that approach by creating a separate legal entity for chief fire officers. Doing so risks blurring the lines of accountability and making it less clear who is ultimately responsible for the delivery of fire and rescue services. The amendments could also introduce unnecessary complexity into fire governance arrangements and move away from the integrated model of local leadership that the Bill is designed to support. For those reasons, the Government cannot support the amendment. I do, however, recognise the strength of feeling on this issue and the interest in exploring alternative governance models. We will continue to consider this very carefully and work with partners across the sector to explore the model in due course.

With these reassurances, I hope my noble friend Lord Rees feels able to withdraw his amendments. I commend the minor and technical amendments in my name to the House.

[Lord Rees of Easton (Lab)]

I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

136: Schedule 23, page 261, line 7, at end insert—
“Matters outside the scope of inspections
4A In section 28 (inspectors), after subsection (A8) insert—“(A8A) When carrying out an inspection under subsection (A3) of a mayoral combined authority, or mayoral CCA, in its capacity as a fire and rescue authority by virtue of section 1(2)(f) or (g), an English inspector must not review or scrutinise decisions made, or other action taken, in connection with the discharge of an excluded mayoral FRA function.(A8B) For the purposes of subsection (A8A), the following are excluded mayoral FRA functions in relation to a mayoral combined authority, or mayoral CCA, in its capacity as a fire and rescue authority—(a) the issuing of a community risk management plan;(b) the variation of priorities and objectives set out in a community risk management plan;(c) the allocation of the draft or actual budget for fire and rescue functions in relation to any financial year;(d) the function of appointing, suspending or dismissing the chief fire officer;(e) the function of holding the chief fire officer to account for the exercise of—(i) the functions which are delegated to the chief fire officer; and(ii) the functions of persons under the direction and control of the chief fire officer;(f) the function of approving a pay policy statement prepared for the purposes of section 38 of the Localism Act 2011;(g) the function of approving arrangements to enter into a reinforcement scheme under section 13;(h) the function of approving arrangements with other employers of firefighters under section 15;(i) the function of approving arrangements under section 16;(j) the function of approving plans, modifications to plans and additions to plans for the purpose of ensuring that—(i) so far as is reasonably practicable, the mayoral combined authority, or mayoral CCA, is able to continue to perform its fire and rescue functions if an emergency occurs; and(ii) the mayoral combined authority, or mayoral CCA, is able to perform its functions so far as necessary or desirable for the purpose of preventing an emergency, or reducing, controlling or mitigating the effects of an emergency, or taking other action in connection with it;(k) the function of approving any arrangements for the co-operation of the mayoral combined authority, or mayoral CCA in relation to its fire and rescue functions with other general Category 1 responders and general Category 2 responders in respect of—(i) the performance of the mayoral combined authority’s, or mayoral CCA’s, duty as a fire and rescue authority under section 2 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004; and(ii) any duties under subordinate legislation made in exercise of powers under that Act.(A8C) In subsection (A8B)—“community risk management plan” has the same meaning as in Schedule ZA1;“emergency” has the meaning given in section 1 of the Civil Contingencies Act 2004 for Part 1 of that Act;“general Category 1 responder” means a person who falls within Part 1 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004;“general Category 2 responder” means a person who falls within Part 3 of Schedule 1 to the Civil Contingencies Act 2004;“priorities and objectives” has the same meaning as in Schedule ZA1.”” Member's explanatory statement
This would provide for matters which inspectors of fire and rescue authorities may not review or scrutinise when inspecting mayoral combined authorities or CCAs which are fire and rescue authorities.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

139: Clause 50, page 57, line 14, after “the” insert “GLA and the”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in my name inserting new provisions into the Licensing Act 2003 to confer powers on the GLA and the Mayor of London.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Lords from all sides of the House for the seriousness with which our new proposed strategic licensing measures were considered during Committee. The attention given to the detail of these clauses and to their practical implications has been valuable.

I begin by stating clearly that this Government recognise the important role of local licensing authorities, which are often best placed to make licensing decisions based on their local knowledge. This is reflected in the design of the new strategic licensing functions for the mayor and the Greater London Authority—for example, by requiring the Mayor of London to consult London licensing authorities before determining the London-wide strategic licensing policy. The Government intend to consider this and may seek to engage with key licensing stakeholders before setting out thresholds in regulations of what is meant by “potential strategic importance” to Greater London.

London licensing authorities remain the default licensing decision-makers in Greater London, and the mayor will be able to “call in” decisions made by a London licensing authority only on applications of potential strategic importance to Greater London and in a limited set of circumstances. Even then, the mayor may choose to uphold the decision of the London licensing authority.

The Greater London Authority has launched a consultation on the new London-wide strategic licensing policy. I am pleased to hear that many London licensing authorities have responded. This will help to inform the criteria by which the Secretary of State will be responsible for setting out in regulations what “potential strategic importance” to Greater London means. We intend to conduct further engagement with London borough councils and other licensing stakeholders before laying these regulations, as well as any other statutory instruments that are needed to determine the procedural elements of the call-in process.

Nevertheless, our amendments establish some important parameters that prevent the mayor encroaching on local licensing authorities’ decision-making unnecessarily. This includes preventing the mayor rejecting an application that would otherwise have been granted by a London licensing authority, reflecting our intention to establish a clearly defined role for the mayor in promoting London-wide strategic objectives to drive growth in London’s sporting, cultural, hospitality and nightlife sectors. The call-in power is intended to be used as a measure of last resort and only in specific circumstances—effective as much in its existence as in its use—to encourage a more enabling and joined-up approach to licensing across the capital.

I turn to some of the concerns raised by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bexley, in Committee. While my time in local government was spent some 30 miles outside of London, I am acutely aware that large urban areas cannot be treated as homogeneous—least of all our diverse capital. I therefore recognise that the licensing priorities of inner and outer London boroughs will vary significantly, as will their demographics and local policing capacities. There is no inherent contradiction between this reality and the establishment of new strategic licensing functions at the mayoral level. When determining strategic licensing policy, for example, the mayor will be under a duty to have regard to the requirements on local licensing authorities when carrying out their licensing functions—including, for example, the setting of local licensing policies—as well as locally published cumulative impact assessments. The mayor will be required to state his reasons for giving any direction to ensure an appropriate level of transparency. New rights of appeal against mayoral directions will also be established to mitigate against improper use of the call-in power. The Government will monitor the new strategic licensing measures, and the Secretary of State will be able to repeal the measures up to five years after they come into force.

I must conclude by emphasising that licensing decisions are, by their nature, nuanced judgments. They involve weighing competing factors and exercising discretion, rather than arriving at a binary outcome. Through the piloting of new strategic licensing measures in Greater London, our intention is to give greater weight to economic growth and the reputational importance of London’s hospitality and nightlife sectors, while recognising the importance of promoting the licensing objectives to help ensure that people’s local concerns are protected.

I commend to noble Lords the amendments in my name, and I will listen to other noble Lords before I comment on theirs.

[Baroness Pidgeon (LD)]

My Lords, our Amendments 140 and 148 seek to remove the London licensing provisions in the Bill. Talking to a number of London boroughs, I found that many of them were quite unaware of this proposed change, seeing it, in effect, as a power grab by the Mayor of London, potentially causing real issues locally in boroughs, where licensing can be a very sensitive issue.

Licensing decisions should be taken locally, with local context and knowledge. For example, in Kingston, I understand that for any licensed premises, their security staff are required to work closely with the police, street pastors, the VAWG team and VAWG charities. This is not just during operational hours but after closure and at local events. This is a detailed local arrangement that works for this borough. Having the Mayor of London call in a licence application and change conditions or impose longer hours on a community would simply not be right and would go against the spirit of this legislation, which is supposedly about devolving down local powers. Those are our concerns. Are the Government really confident that a future mayor, perhaps of a different political persuasion and approach, would not be far more interventionist, blocking the very growth opportunities it is claimed that these new powers are seeking to free up?

The Minister has talked just now about the important role of local licensing authorities. Licensing works best when it is grounded in detailed local knowledge, through local councillors and local communities working together. These proposed call-in or direction powers for the Mayor of London risk overriding this expertise, increasing tension and introducing uncertainty in the system for boroughs, businesses and residents. A key concern I have picked up is how potential conflicts between local priorities, which are reflected in a council’s licensing policy, and pan-London priorities, potentially driven by the mayor’s decisions, will be resolved. There is a genuine fear that this could lead to an additional burden on boroughs, including increased casework, appeals, additional workloads for borough staff and, no doubt, additional costs to the boroughs.

We talked earlier about this being strategic. What does that mean? Take sectoral activity zones, such as Wembley or Twickenham stadia, which sit in the middle of highly residential areas. Those boroughs work really closely with communities. They know what hours and noise levels are acceptable. I am concerned that centralising this in some way could cause a huge risk. We urge the Minister to think again on giving these additional powers to the Mayor of London at this time.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, and the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, for their comments. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, for Amendments 140 and 148. Our intention behind introducing the new strategic licensing measures in London is clear: to enable a more strategic approach to licensing to boost London’s nightlife and hospitality industries. These industries are essential to London’s economy, supporting over 1.4 million jobs and generating £46 billion in economic activity annually. They also play a vital role in shaping the capital’s global reputation as a vibrant, diverse and welcoming city.

However, there is evidence of unmet potential, particularly when it comes to London’s night-time economy. Night-time spending in the capital fell by 3% from 2022 to 2025. A YouGov survey found that 45% of Londoners stated that they might have ended a night out before midnight in 2023-24, despite wishing to stay out later. Of course, the reasons for this are multifaceted, and licensing is not by any means the sole factor at play. Nevertheless, the Government believe that licensing in London should operate as more of an enabling framework—one that allows responsible businesses to thrive, while continuing to protect residents and public safety. That is very important.

London operates across 32 boroughs and the City of London, with each rightly rooted in its local context and responsive to the needs of its communities. However, when licensing decisions are made in isolation within each of those authorities, the cumulative effect can be a fragmented and inconsistent approach to issues that may have consequences across the capital. For example, a venue of regional or international significance, such as the ones that noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, mentioned, a major cultural destination or a late-night operation tied closely to transport hubs and visitor economies, does not serve one borough alone. Yet, at present, the licensing system often means that proposals are assessed solely through a local lens, even where their impacts and benefits are distributed far more widely.

It is precisely to address this gap that a carefully constrained strategic role for the Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority is justified. Other major cities, such as Amsterdam and New York, have shown what is possible when licensing is approached not solely as a reactive regulatory tool but as part of a broader strategic framework for nurturing culture, hospitality and the night-time economy.

Our underlying aim is to enable London to be the best version of itself: vibrant, safe, inclusive and globally competitive. The measures before us are a necessary and proportionate step towards that end. I hope that my reassurance about the consultation we intend to carry out relating to the meaning of “potential strategic importance” to London will have helped reassure the noble Baroness. I ask her therefore not to press her amendments.

Amendment 139 agreed.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

141: Schedule 24, page 262, line 32, leave out “2 to 4” and insert “1A to 4P”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on the amendment in my name inserting new provisions into the Licensing Act 2003 to confer powers on the GLA and the Mayor of London.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

149: Clause 51, page 57, line 22, leave out “one or more areas” and insert “any aspect of any area”
Member’s explanatory statement
This would make this wording consistent with the wording used in paragraph 4 of Schedule 25 (in the definition of “eligible function”).

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

171: Schedule 25, page 274, line 28, at end insert—
“Exercise of functions may begin at different times etc
16A (1) This paragraph applies to a power under this Schedule to confer a function on, or provide for a function to be exercisable by, a class of strategic authorities or mayors (the “relevant class”).(2) The power includes—(a) the power to provide for the function to begin to be exercisable by different members of the relevant class at different times or in different circumstances;(b) the power to make further regulations which specify the times at which, or circumstances in which, the function is to begin to be exercisable by different members of the relevant class.(3) Regulations under sub-paragraph (2)(b) may be made in relation to different members of the relevant class at different times.(4) In this paragraph “different members” of the relevant class includes members of the relevant class that are of different descriptions specified in regulations made under the power.”Member's explanatory statement
This would make clear that regulations under Schedule 25 can provide for a function conferred on a class to become exercisable (a) by different members of the class at different times; and (b) by virtue of regulations.

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

Two more votes: that always makes you feel better. Thank you, Deputy Speaker.

Government Amendments 171 and 180 are technical amendments that provide greater clarity on how Schedule 25 will allow the functions of strategic authorities to be updated and modified over time. Amendment 180 clarifies that Schedule 25 to the Bill allows the Secretary of State to modify and confer functions on new mayoral strategic authorities during the period between their establishment and the inaugural mayor taking office. This amendment ensures that the functions of mayoral strategic authorities can be modified if needed ahead of the mayor being elected, ensuring that the authority is able to operate effectively during this period. A good example is the transfer of fire and rescue authority functions to devolution priority programme areas whose mayoral elections will take place in May 2028. Where local government reorganisation will see the abolition of current fire and rescue authorities in April 2028, the amendment will ensure that we have a mechanism to provide for the new mayoral strategic authorities to become the fire and rescue authorities, thereby ensuring the continuity of service provision critical for public safety.

Amendment 171 clarifies that Schedule 25 allows the Secretary of State to specify whether a function which has been conferred on a particular class of strategic authority is to be exercisable by different strategic authorities within that class at different times. This flexibility will, for example, be important in enabling the appropriate transfer of fire and rescue functions from existing fire and rescue authorities to strategic authorities at the right time for each area. In some areas, strategic authorities may be established in advance of local government reorganisation being completed, and it may not be appropriate to transfer those functions until the reorganisation is concluded. The amendment therefore ensures that such functions can be commenced at a point when an individual area is ready to exercise them.

I turn to Government Amendments 192 and 193. I am grateful to members of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and to the noble Lord, Lord Lansley, for their consideration of the Henry VIII power in Schedule 26, concerning the conversion of a combined county authority to a combined authority following local government reorganisation. The Government have carefully considered the committee’s recommendation to remove the Secretary of State’s power to amend primary legislation made in future Sessions as it relates to this power. We have concluded that any necessary transition of a combined county authority to a combined authority can be delivered without taking a delegated power. I am therefore able to confirm that the Government not only accept the committee’s recommendation in relation to this specific power but intend to go further, by removing the delegated power to alter any existing primary legislation when undertaking conversion, save for amendments to the 2007 Act that may be necessary. I beg to move.

I know that the House will sit tomorrow on the terminally ill adults Bill, but as I am not likely to participate in those debates, I wish all noble Lords a restful and relaxing recess, and we will continue our deliberations on this Bill on 13 April.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

I thank the Minister for these amendments. They help to clarify certain things and are tidying-up amendments. We fully support them. I also wish the House a very happy Recess.

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Moved by

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage]

180: Schedule 25, page 277, line 13, at end insert—
“Mayoral strategic authorities: period before first mayor takes office
26 (1) The fact that a mayoral strategic authority is in the preparatory phase—(a) does not prevent regulations under this Schedule from making provision which applies to—(i) the mayor for its area, or(ii) the mayoral strategic authority; and(b) where a provision of this Schedule requires consultation with the members of a class which includes the mayoral strategic authority or the mayor for its area, does not—(i) prevent that requirement from being complied with by a consultation that does not involve the mayor, or(ii) require further consultation with the mayor after the first mayor has taken office. (2) Any power under this Schedule to make provision in relation to mayoral strategic authorities or mayors (the “relevant class”) must be read as enabling regulations to make provision in relation to the relevant class which applies only to—(a) those of the mayoral strategic authorities in the relevant class which are in the preparatory phase, or(b) those of the mayors in the relevant class that are mayors for the areas of mayoral strategic authorities which are in the preparatory phase.(3) Regulations under this Schedule may make provision which applies only to—(a) mayoral strategic authorities which are in a preparatory phase that is of a duration specified in the regulations, or(b) mayors for the areas of mayoral strategic authorities which are in a preparatory phase that is of a duration specified in the regulations.(4) For the purposes of this paragraph a mayoral strategic authority is in the “preparatory phase”—(a) after the authority has been established, but(b) before the first mayor for the authority’s area has taken office.”Member’s explanatory statement
This would make clear that the powers under Schedule 25 are not affected by a mayoral strategic authority being in the “preparatory phase” (the phase before the first mayor has taken office).