Protection of Freedoms Bill

Baroness Royall of Blaisdon Excerpts

Thursday 12th January 2012 Grand Committee

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, I rise to support the amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses.

Amendment 151 provides both clarity and the appropriate safeguards for the UK’s research centres and its academics. Like other noble Lords, I wonder why the Minister has decided to go down a different route from that being trodden in Scotland, Ireland and the USA. It seems to me that by taking a different route we are putting our universities at a competitive disadvantage. That would obviously be a retrograde step.

It is clear from everything that has been said by noble Lords, who are far more well versed in these issues than I am, that the guidance provided by the Information Commissioner is completely inadequate in relation to competition and confidentiality. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, has commented that the amendment is probably defective. However, unless the Minister is prepared to accept the principle behind it, the contribution which our academic and research institutions make not just to the cultural and intellectual life of this country but to ensuring that we have a competitive advantage in many areas will be adversely affected. Therefore, I urge the Minister to accept the amendment in principle.

[Lord Henley]

My Lords, I start by saying that whatever arguments I put forward will not be based on those of the drafting point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott. However, I take his point that new section (1A)(a)(i) and (ii) are possibly unnecessary as they seem to include everyone. It would therefore be possible to delete the words from “by” onwards and just talk about what is published.

I make it clear to the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, and others that the Scottish, Irish and United States legislation have not been my bedside reading for some time. I am not completely and utterly familiar with them but I will no doubt make sure that I am made totally familiar with them and look at the consequences of what they do. An important point to remember in all the arguments put to me is the remark of the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, that, if it does no harm, the amendment ought to be accepted. I am not sure that one should accept amendments merely because they do no harm. I want to make it clear that we are committed to transparency in this area. We will not introduce new exemptions from disclosure unless the necessity of doing so has been clearly demonstrated.

I recognise that a number of noble Lords have expressed considerable concern. We have devoted almost three-quarters of an hour to this matter. I commend my noble friend Lady Brinton for the admirable brevity with which she set out her case and expressed her concerns. I am aware that there are major concerns in the whole sector about the potential for the disclosure of information under the FOI Act which could undermine the United Kingdom’s academic research. We all accept that the UK is at the very forefront of international research and that it is vital that that position should be maintained. We wish to do that. I am more than happy to see noble Lords between now and Report if they want to make the case for needing to go further and to explain why they believe that the existing exemptions, properly applied, do not provide the appropriate protection.

I am aware that only in January of last year the Science and Technology Committee recommended in its report in relation to events at the University of East Anglia’s climate research unit that the application of the Freedom of Information Act to research material required clarification. There is in fact little evidence to demonstrate that existing provisions within the Freedom of Information Act do not provide adequate protection for research-related information. The circumstances provided for in this amendment are already provided for in existing exemptions. For example, exemptions exist which may be used, subject to a public interest test, to protect information the disclosure of which would at least be likely to prejudice commercial interests, health and safety, and the effective conduct of public affairs, as well as information intended for future publication. There is a clear public interest in protecting research information from disclosure in appropriate circumstances, and the Act passed by the previous Government—and I do not know why the Opposition now wish to amend it when there is no evidence that it needs amendment—is designed to ensure that public interest factors are given proper weight when exemptions are applied. Furthermore, the Act contains provisions protecting information provided in confidence and in relation to personal data.

Any new exemption within the Freedom of Information Act would also have no relevance to research on environmental matters. Requests for environmental information are considered not under the Freedom of Information Act but under the Environmental Information Regulations, and this amendment would not affect those. All information held by the higher education sector, including that relating to research programmes, has been subject to the Freedom of Information Act for seven years. The noble Baroness will remember, as she was probably a member of the Government at the time when it was passed in 2000 and came into effect in 2005. The Freedom of Information provisions within the Bill, in Clauses 100 to 102, build on a regime that is already firmly in place. I know that my noble friend Lady Brinton will be aware that the Information Commissioner has recently issued guidance for the higher education sector in response to the Science and Technology Committee’s recommendations. This is one reason why it is possible that it will not be necessary for me to study the provisions of the Scottish Act, as well as what they are doing in Ireland and America. The guidance will assist higher education establishments in dealing appropriately with requests for research-related information, and withholding it when it would not be in the public interest to disclose.

As a coalition Government, we are committed to greater transparency. I want to make it clear that we will not introduce exemptions into the Freedom of Information Act unless we can have that clearly demonstrated. I do not believe that it has been clearly demonstrated, but I am more than happy to see my noble friend and others if she feels that she can put a further case. I repeat to the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, and others, that I will study what is happening in Scotland—it is near to my heart. But what goes on in a devolved Administration does not necessarily have to be copied in this country. There are times when we can learn from them and times when we find that what they are doing is not necessarily appropriate. I am more than happy to look at it, but I do not think that a case has been made on this occasion. But my door is always open and I am always prepared to see my noble friend and others to discuss this matter, if they feel that I have not got the message appropriately.

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[Lord Wills]

My Lords, when I tabled these amendments I thought they were typically uncontentious, modest little amendments that would not detain the House for very long. However, having heard the previous debate on Amendments 151E and 151F they seem to be perhaps slightly more significant than I first thought because, in trying to tackle problems of delay, they could help resolve the clearly difficult and contentious issue of the risk register. I hope the Government will look at these amendments sympathetically, not only for their own sake but also as a way of resolving the difficult issues raised in the previous debate. All three amendments seek to tackle the problem of undue delay in complying with freedom of information requests. I was the Freedom of Information Minister twice in my political life in the other place and this issue came up over and over again as a real problem. These delays are not necessarily malign but there is a problem with delays in the system. Therefore this is an attempt to go round it and put new controls in place.

Amendment 151L imposes a time limit for decisions involving the public interest test and limits the possible extension of the 20-working-day limit to a further 20 working days so that a response would have to be provided no later than 40 working days after the request. In general, authorities must respond to FOI requests promptly and in any event within 20 working days, but where an authority considers whether to disclose exempt information on public interest grounds it can extend that 20-day period by,

“such time as is reasonable in the circumstances”.

There is no maximum period to this permitted extension.

In some cases—not all—the delay is necessary and is there for very good reasons, but in other cases extensions have been repeatedly claimed, leading to delays of more than a year before freedom of information requests have been answered. This clearly is unacceptable. It is unacceptable if these delays are the result of the incompetence of officials—and, indeed, Ministers, where they are involved—not getting their act together in time and just putting things off. It is even less acceptable if the result of delay is to save the Government of the day some sort of political embarrassment. This is not unknown in government and it is not acceptable. The amendment is in line with the Information Commissioner’s guidance which states that normally an extension should not be needed at all, but where it is the extension should not exceed a further 20 working days.

Amendment 151M requires every public authority to produce as part of its publication scheme an annual report setting out the number of requests it has received and the number with which it has complied within the statutory time limits. This information would have to be provided for requests made under both the Freedom of Information Act and the Environmental Information Regulations. As I said earlier, the Ministry of Justice provides such information quarterly for central government bodies. There is no requirement for other bodies to publish these basic statistics and many do not choose to do so.

It is crucial that such transparency is in place. It is the Information Commissioner’s policy to subject authorities that consistently fail to comply with the Act’s time limits to a three-month period of monitoring, and if their performance does not improve during this period enforcement action may be taken. The decision on which authorities to monitor is partly based on the number of complaints of delay which the Information Commissioner’s Office receives. Any authority which fails to comply with at least 85 per cent of requests within the time limits is also selected for monitoring. However, as authorities are not required to publish their compliance figures, poor performers may not always be detected. This cannot be acceptable and this amendment would help to ensure that that situation is put right by getting the necessary figures published.

Finally, Amendment 151N would insert a time limit into the Act for complying with internal reviews. Under the Act the Information Commissioner is not required to investigate a complaint unless the authority has first carried out an internal review into the contested decision. However, the Act lays down no time limit for completing such an internal review. It merely says that the commissioner is not required to investigate until this review has been “exhausted”.

The amendment defines what “exhausted” means as one of three things: first, that a decision has been communicated to the applicant, which is the current position; secondly, that no decision has been communicated after 20 working days, which in effect gives the authority 20 working days to carry out the internal review in ordinary cases; and, thirdly, for exceptionally complex cases, no decision has been communicated after 40 working days. This is obviously consistent with the previous amendments in this group. This would give an authority, in effect, 40 working days for internal review in complex cases. Authorities would have to notify the applicant within the initial 20 days that they needed to take this extra time, and the extension would be available only if the issue was genuinely complex. This would implement the Information Commissioner’s current guidance, which is that internal reviews should normally be done within 20 working days but should never exceed 40 working days.

These seem to me practical and sensible measures which put right what were probably mistakes or errors of drafting in the original Bill. We obviously did not think it through fully enough. I hope that the Government will look at the amendment sympathetically. I beg to move.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, these amendments merely seek to ensure that the process operates as quickly and as efficiently as possible by providing a duty on public authorities to expedite requests through the relevant processes as quickly as possible and within a certain period of time. I believe that they are entirely reasonable and are a matter of enhanced transparency and good governance. My noble friend is right when he says that they could also help to resolve some of the deeper problems that we discussed earlier. Therefore, I very much hope that the Government will support these reasonable, clear and sensible amendments which would ensure that the system worked better in favour of public accountability—which is, after all, what the FOI Act was designed to serve.

[Baroness Stowell of Beeston]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wills, for explaining his amendments so clearly. I will not attempt to summarise them and take up the Committee’s time unnecessarily. I agree with the sentiment behind the noble Lord’s amendments in relation to the timeliness of public interest deliberations and internal reviews, which tally with the Information Commissioner’s best practice guidance.

The Government are firmly in favour of public authorities answering requests and internal reviews as quickly as possible. It is not acceptable that they should drag their heels in responding, and any extension to the time limit for responding to FOI requests should be claimed only where absolutely necessary.

The introduction of new statutory deadlines is certainly one potential way of strengthening the Freedom of Information Act, providing that it does not lead to hasty decisions that are not fully informed. Having an absolute limit of 40 days, even in the most complex cases, must raise some concerns about the potential for such an effect. Accordingly, careful consideration of the impact of such changes would be necessary before their introduction, and for that reason I cannot accept these amendments today. However, as I have said when we discussed other amendments, this might form part of the Justice Select Committee’s post-legislative review.

The noble Lord referred to his experiences as Freedom of Information Minister. I would never claim to have held any such senior position anywhere. However, I spent nine years working in the corporate end of the BBC and saw the internal conflicts that sometimes arose between the editorial part of the organisation using the FOI Act to obtain information and its corporate end having to be subject to the same Act. I am aware of the very careful deliberations that are necessary when an information request comes in and the complexities involved in that. It is sometimes necessary to take a bit of time to get to the point where the right decision can be made on releasing information. That said, in that public authority it was my experience that as the organisation got used to the FOI Act, it got quicker at dealing with the requests, the appeals, the internal reviews and so on.

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We need to clarify that kind of issue and I simply ask the Minister to give an indication of support for the need to develop a process within government, or within Parliament through the Select Committee process, to resolve this difficult issue. Far more people and communities get into difficulties on this than is acceptable. We need to address it. I beg to move.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

My Lords, I have little or nothing to add to what my noble friend has said. He is right to raise this complex and extensive issue. It is one that has clearly caused many problems for citizens and it would seem that my noble friend’s proposals might be a means of assisting people in their quest for information. This could lead to the roads on which they live being better maintained and safer. It may also assist in resolving difficult and lengthy disputes. I recognise this is an extraordinarily difficult area and I look forward to the Minister’s reply. I wish her well.

[Baroness Hamwee]

The advice “Don’t go to law” might be extended to “Be very careful about buying a house on an unadopted road”. The former private enterprise, which the noble Lord, Lord Soley, described, of clamping one’s neighbours’ vehicles is quite extreme.

Perhaps I may ask a few questions. I do not suggest that the problems the noble Lord has described are not important but, on the amendment, first, is he suggesting that this extends to any public authority beyond the Land Registry? I suppose that local authorities holding a local land charges register might be relevant, but this is all public authorities. Secondly, did the letter from the Land Registry refer to land having gone to the Crown in the situation of intestacy, and thirdly, is there a concern about more than the adoption of roads? The amendment is more extensive than that, as I understand the thrust of it.

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[Lord McColl of Dulwich]

My Lords, I welcome the fact that the Government are moving swiftly to give effect to certain requirements in the EU directive on human trafficking. The Minister was kind enough to write to me about this matter further to my own trafficking Bill, which, incidentally, goes a little further than the EU directive in a number of key respects and had its Second Reading in November last year.

As the Minister has stated, Britain is already largely compliant with the directive, although the areas of our non-compliance certainly make opting in very worth while, and I am glad that we have done so. However, having carefully examined the directive clause by clause and the current level of UK compliance, I have to say that I think there is a need for legal changes in other areas above and beyond those accommodated by the Minister’s amendments.

The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, regrets that she had to leave this session early but she will propose appropriate amendments next week during the passage of the LASPO Bill. Of course, I understand that the Government may well address all these other areas through secondary legislation and operational matters, as the Minister has said. However, having looked at the other areas of non-compliance, I am rather struggling to see how they can all be adequately addressed in this way. I will not try to list all the relevant areas now, but they include, for instance, implementing Article 2.3 on the definition of exploitation and Article 2.4 on the legal definition of consent for adults. Then there are provisions in Articles 12.4, 15.3 to 15.5 and others to ensure witness protection during criminal investigation and proceedings. Would the Minister be good enough to write to me outlining in some detail the areas where he intends to introduce secondary legislation and operational measures to achieve complete compliance, and would he place a copy of the letter in the Library?

As well as questions about what the amendments do not address, I also have a question about the drafting of the new clauses. Specifically, it is not clear to me whether the requirement under the EU directive for businesses as well as individuals falls within the scope of trafficking legislation and is upheld by the proposed changes. I would be grateful if the Minister could address that concern in his response.

Finally, while the Government are taking steps today to become compliant with the directive, I am concerned that they may be taking steps elsewhere that will make us non-compliant. The provision of legal representation for victims of trafficking, including for claiming compensation, is necessary if we are to be compliant with Articles 12.2 and 15.2 of the directive. However, civil legal aid for claiming compensation under the Criminal Injuries Compensation Scheme is specifically excluded under Schedule 1, part 2, paragraph 16 of the legal aid Bill that is currently being considered in Committee. As it stands, unless there is some other mechanism that the Government have in place for trafficking victims to claim compensation, I think that they may be in breach of the EU directive on this point. I would be grateful to the Minister if he could allay my concerns.

I conclude by welcoming again the fact that the Government are taking steps today to help Britain become compliant with the directive. For the reasons I have explained, however, their actions also prompt a good many questions, and I look forward to the Minister’s answer. I say in closing that I very much hope that my own trafficking Bill will soon be granted its Committee stage so that we can debate in greater detail its key provisions, which go beyond the directive.

[Baroness Royall of Blaisdon]

I am grateful to the Minister for introducing the amendments and for the letter that he wrote to noble Lords earlier this week. We welcome the government amendments as far as they go. Like the Minister, I commend the noble Lord, Lord McColl, for his tireless and extraordinary efforts on this important issue and the fact that he introduced his Private Member’s Bill, which I believe paved the way for the amendments before us today. As the noble Lord said, his Bill goes further than the EU directive and I, too, look forward to seeing it in Committee in the near future.

These amendments represent a clear admission by the Government that they were wrong in their initial decision to opt out of the EU directive on human trafficking. The claims made at the time by the Prime Minister about the EU directive were ill informed at best when he said,

“does not go any further than the law that we have already passed”.—[ Official Report, Commons, 15/9/10; col. 873.]

As the Minister explained, the government amendments serve to implement Article 9 of the directive, which requires member states to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction where the offender is one of their own nationals and grants member states discretion over the establishment of jurisdiction over non-nationals, where any part of the offence was committed in a member state’s territory or the victim is a national. We welcome the Government’s amendments to introduce extraterritorial jurisdiction over UK nationals who traffic or facilitate the trafficking of people. We also welcome the introduction of jurisdiction over non-UK nationals who commit or facilitate trafficking from within the UK. However, I ask the Minister to confirm three things about the jurisdiction extensions. First, will the extension of the UK’s jurisdiction also apply to those cases where the offence is committed for the benefit of a legal person established in the UK even if no trafficking activities took place in the UK? Secondly, will it extend to offences where the victim is a national or resident of the UK? Thirdly, will the amendments also extend the same extraterritorial jurisdictions over legal persons of the UK operating overseas or benefiting from trafficking perpetrated overseas as required by Article 5 of the directive?

The Government’s amendments to extend the UK’s jurisdiction to cases of trafficking connected with but not perpetrated in the UK is a welcome move and brings us closer to compliance with the EU directive. However, we are deeply concerned that the Government have sought to act in a way that presents us with an absolute bare minimum compliance and that without further primary legislation the UK could fall short of compliance. In particular, the government amendments do nothing to address the disappearance from the system of child victims of trafficking in this country. With 32 per cent of identified child victims of trafficking having gone missing from care between 2007 and February 2010, it would seem clear that the present system of care for child victims is not working. Charities such as CARE and Ecpat UK, which campaign to end child prostitution and pornography and trafficking of children for sexual purposes cite lack of continuity in care and children being passed from one professional to the next as a key reason for the disappearance of these children and have called for the introduction of a system of guardians to address the highly specific needs and risks that child victims of trafficking are exposed to. Articles 12 and 13 of the directive make it clear that signatories must provide, “assistance, support and protection” for child victims of trafficking and ensure that the,

“necessary assistance and support measures are provided for child victims of trafficking, taking account of their individual needs and concerns”.

I ask the Minister how the Government consider the UK currently complies with Articles 12 and 13 and, in particular, how present arrangements for the care of child victims of trafficking are uniquely tailored to the particular needs and vulnerabilities of these children, as required by Article 13. I also ask the Minister how many child victims of trafficking are known to have gone missing from care in the last year, and whether he thinks that the present and proposed arrangements go far enough to protect against disappearance.

There are other areas, too, where action is required in order to bring the UK into compliance with the directives that are not touched upon by these amendments. Article 16 of the directive requires that the UK establish a national rapporteur to independently monitor implementation of the directive. The Government have stated that they believe that the current Joint Ministerial Committee should be sufficient for this purpose. However, I would ask the Minister how the committee can operate independently of government and how regularly it publicly reports.

Finally, as the noble Lord, Lord McColl pointed out, the directive requires that adequate provision is made for access to legal counselling and representation for victims of trafficking under Article 10. I am specifically concerned about how cuts to the legal aid budget currently being considered in the LASPO Bill will affect such provision to some of the most vulnerable individuals. I should be grateful if the Minister could tell me what measures the Government are taking to ensure that the UK is compliant with this article.

In a debate in this House the Minister stated his view that:

“The remainder of the directive can be implemented in full through secondary legislation and through various operational measures and operational routes”.—[Official Report, 25/11/11; col. 1281.].

I am somewhat sceptical about whether secondary legislation can deliver many of the changes necessary to bring this country into compliance with the directive and, crucially, whether it can provide better protection for the hundreds of vulnerable trafficked children who have gone missing from the system. I note the request from the noble Lord, Lord McColl, for further information about the secondary legislation envisaged and I look forward to receiving that information from the Minister.

I welcome the amendments brought forward today and I look forward to hearing from the Minister what additional measures the Government will be introducing to fully implement this important directive.

[Baroness Hamwee]

The opt-in to the directive is of far more than technical importance: the message that the opt-in sent was of great significance. I do not want to repeat much of what has already been said but, on the issue of a national rapporteur, I echo the noble Baroness and what the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has said previously about the importance of its independence. The Government have recently published a trafficking strategy and—because it is human nature—to expect them not to defend their own strategy and to see the issues in a more objective way is to demand more than is reasonable.

I also echo the request for an analysis of the matters that can be dealt with by secondary legislation—it is quite clear that the previous speakers have a much better grasp of the detail than I do—so that we can be assured that every point has been picked up, rather than an assumption that secondary legislation will do the job.