Baroness Sharp of Guildford
My Lords, I, too, rise briefly to support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill of Bengarve. My experience now is somewhat dated, but back in the early 1990s I was responsible for supervising a group of researchers putting together a substantial database on bibliometrics. The difficulties of cleaning up such a database are extreme and costly. The group of four young researchers I was supervising worked for two or three years in just cleaning up the database. One issue that we were looking at then was the advantage of concentrating research into large laboratories rather than having a lot of smaller researchers. You cannot do such research until you have cleaned up the database. Someone coming in and using your data is clearly something that we need to protect against. We also need to make sure that the costs involved in putting databases together are fully met.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Henley)
My Lords, I start by saying that I am very grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady O’Neill, for her opening remarks when she talked about discussions that have already taken place. I understand her concerns. I understand them now possibly in spades as I look at the serried ranks of academe facing me. I ought to make it clear that further discussions will have to take place between now and Report as there are real concerns in the academic and research community. The noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, reiterated concern about costs and her noble friend Lady Blackstone referred to burdens on academe. Concern was expressed about safety, particularly for those involved in research relating to animals. I can well understand that, having had some responsibility for that issue when I was a Minister in Defra.
I shall try to explain our intention behind Clause 100 and what we initially think of the amendments. I should make it clear that I am more than happy to have another meeting with the noble Baroness and any others who wish to come along, as we want to ensure that we get this right and can meet those concerns. I shall say a few words about the background to Clause 100, particularly as this is the first amendment in the group. I shall not go on at this stage to Amendment 151, to which the noble Baroness referred, as I had better do that when it is moved in its proper place.
Clause 100 gives effect to the Government’s commitment to provide greater transparency and create, in particular, a new right to data so that government-held data sets can be requested, used by the public and published regularly. We believe that that will help the public and organisations to hold the Government to account. It will redirect and shape public services to reduce the deficit and deliver better value for money in public service spending. It will realise significant economic benefits by enabling individuals, businesses and not-for-profit organisations to build innovative applications using that public data.
The Freedom of Information Act 2000 currently provides for the release or publication of the recorded information held by public authorities covered by the Act but makes no provision for reuse at the point of publication or release. It requires only the provision of access to the information and only upon request, which means that repeat requests have to be made over a period of time to gain sets of information or data. There is no obligation for public authorities to provide such data in an electronic format that promotes reuse—for example, machine-readable or open, standard format. I note the comments of my noble friend Lord Lucas about his trials and tribulations with the university sector, particularly with its use of PDF, which causes him problems.
These changes to the Freedom of Information Act, as set out in Clause 100, are intended to promote the proactive release of more data sets and to ensure that when data are released they are in a reusable format and, where possible, free for reuse. This will, in turn, promote the use and development of the raw data held by public authorities to provide useful products and services.
Additionally, the Government announced their intention to ask Parliament to undertake post-legislative scrutiny to see how well the Act is working in practice and whether there are any further changes to be made. In advance of this, the Government must act on their commitment to transparency and open data to release the benefits of open data to the public as soon as possible. There will be further post-legislative scrutiny to see how well that Act is working, and we will come to that in due course. When we have that, we can respond.
I turn now to the amendments in this group and will deal with them, but I repeat the commitment I made at the beginning that I am more than happy to discuss these in greater detail afterwards with whoever the noble Baroness wishes to bring along. Amendment 147A seeks to add the word “complete” to the definition of data sets allowed to be requested. However, I believe that the use of the word “complete” would not improve the definition of data set and could introduce a degree of uncertainty and confusion around the operation of this provision. For example, data sets may be continuously updated depending on the publication scheme set out by a public authority, and one could argue that a particular data set is never complete per se. The Government do not wish to be overprescriptive on this matter and defer judgment to the public authority to decide when its data are ready to be published in the interests of all parties.
I appreciate that the noble Baroness raised concerns at Second Reading in respect of these provisions, and we have exchanged correspondence and had meetings in response to her concerns about the potential impact on the higher education research community, which has argued that some of its data would be releasable in transient form until final publication. I reassure the Committee that Clause 100 as it stands does not alter the status quo in relation to the release of information in draft or of incomplete status, and such information is already adequately protected by existing exemptions under the Freedom of Information Act. Furthermore, the Information Commissioner’s office has produced specific guidance for higher education institutions by recommending those institutions to have a robust information management regime that will tackle issues about disclosure of data that is incomplete or in a draft form.
Similarly, Amendment 147B, which amends new Section 11(1A) of the Freedom of Information Act, is unnecessary as the provision already covers the circumstances that the amendment seeks to specify. The duty to provide a data set to the applicant in a reusable format, as currently drafted, adequately covers the effect of a public authority undertaking to provide the data set as requested in a reusable format. We consider that Clause 100 and the Freedom of Information Act as a whole already make adequate provisions for charging and that the noble Baroness’s Amendment 148A is not appropriate or necessary. Further, the Government will be providing guidance in the revised Section 45 code of practice on reusable formats and on when it will be considered reasonably practicable for a public authority to convert a data set into a reusable format for release, so that it will be clear what should be expected for both the data holder and the requester. The costs for releasing a data set in a reusable format falls to the public authority, as does releasing other information under the Freedom of Information Act, and the same freedom of information provisions apply here in terms of releasing that information.
With regards to the noble Baroness’s Amendments 148C and 148E, which seek to amend the definition of a data set, we consider that the current definition provided for in Clause 100 is fit for purpose. We do not believe that it would be sensible to introduce further limbs into the definition of a data set as, inevitably, the addition of any new terms, such as “data integrity and security”, could raise as many questions as to their meaning as the terms which they are intended to clarify. We believe that it is preferable to address such matters through the supplementary guidance for public authorities, which will be provided in the revised Section 45 code of practice.
As regards Amendment 148, in the name of my noble friend, I take a similar view. It seeks to define what is meant by the term “capable of reuse”. Again, we believe the appropriate place for any necessary clarification of the terminology used in the clause, and of the reusable formats to be adopted, is in the revised code of practice, which will be produced under Section 45 of the Freedom of Information Act.
We will be revising the statutory code of practice to provide greater clarity on certain aspects of these provisions. Among other things, the revised code will provide guidance on what constitutes a reusable format and sets out those factors that a public authority should take into account when deciding whether it is appropriate to include a data set in a publication scheme. We will also issue administrative guidance to central government on best practice.
On my noble friend’s Amendments 149 and 150, it is important that the changes we are making preserve existing regimes, specifically when it comes to charging for reuse of copyright material. Currently, public sector bodies under the Re-use of Public Sector Information Regulations may charge on a reasonable return of investment basis, and the policy is to maintain the status quo. Maintaining this right continues to allow public authorities the flexibility to charge should they wish and, where justified, in accordance with the Treasury’s guidance, Managing Public Money, which we all take enormously seriously.
We would expect, as now, most data sets to be provided free of charge for reuse but it is right that public authorities should, in appropriate cases, be able to charge. Any such charges would normally be set at the level necessary to recover costs, and no more, but fees can be set at a level to provide for a reasonable return on that investment. This would be appropriate in circumstances where the public sector has followed the Treasury’s guidance, Managing Public Money, and its accounting principles, and has taken into account the value of that data set and the costs incurred in resourcing the collection of the data.
With regards to my noble friend’s Amendments 148B and 148D, I would respectfully recall the reasoning behind the clause whereby the intention is to create a new right to data through the request for data sets for reuse and, where reasonably practicable, in a reusable format. The extension as proposed in my noble friend’s amendments goes beyond the realm of data sets and therefore is not appropriate in this instance but may be considered, again, as part of the post-legislative scrutiny that we are offering on the Freedom of Information Act which is currently under way.
Baroness Royall of Blaisdon
My Lords, I rise to support the amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses.
Amendment 151 provides both clarity and the appropriate safeguards for the UK’s research centres and its academics. Like other noble Lords, I wonder why the Minister has decided to go down a different route from that being trodden in Scotland, Ireland and the USA. It seems to me that by taking a different route we are putting our universities at a competitive disadvantage. That would obviously be a retrograde step.
It is clear from everything that has been said by noble Lords, who are far more well versed in these issues than I am, that the guidance provided by the Information Commissioner is completely inadequate in relation to competition and confidentiality. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott of Foscote, has commented that the amendment is probably defective. However, unless the Minister is prepared to accept the principle behind it, the contribution which our academic and research institutions make not just to the cultural and intellectual life of this country but to ensuring that we have a competitive advantage in many areas will be adversely affected. Therefore, I urge the Minister to accept the amendment in principle.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I start by saying that whatever arguments I put forward will not be based on those of the drafting point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott. However, I take his point that new section (1A)(a)(i) and (ii) are possibly unnecessary as they seem to include everyone. It would therefore be possible to delete the words from “by” onwards and just talk about what is published.
I make it clear to the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, and others that the Scottish, Irish and United States legislation have not been my bedside reading for some time. I am not completely and utterly familiar with them but I will no doubt make sure that I am made totally familiar with them and look at the consequences of what they do. An important point to remember in all the arguments put to me is the remark of the noble Baroness, Lady Warwick, that, if it does no harm, the amendment ought to be accepted. I am not sure that one should accept amendments merely because they do no harm. I want to make it clear that we are committed to transparency in this area. We will not introduce new exemptions from disclosure unless the necessity of doing so has been clearly demonstrated.
I recognise that a number of noble Lords have expressed considerable concern. We have devoted almost three-quarters of an hour to this matter. I commend my noble friend Lady Brinton for the admirable brevity with which she set out her case and expressed her concerns. I am aware that there are major concerns in the whole sector about the potential for the disclosure of information under the FOI Act which could undermine the United Kingdom’s academic research. We all accept that the UK is at the very forefront of international research and that it is vital that that position should be maintained. We wish to do that. I am more than happy to see noble Lords between now and Report if they want to make the case for needing to go further and to explain why they believe that the existing exemptions, properly applied, do not provide the appropriate protection.
I am aware that only in January of last year the Science and Technology Committee recommended in its report in relation to events at the University of East Anglia’s climate research unit that the application of the Freedom of Information Act to research material required clarification. There is in fact little evidence to demonstrate that existing provisions within the Freedom of Information Act do not provide adequate protection for research-related information. The circumstances provided for in this amendment are already provided for in existing exemptions. For example, exemptions exist which may be used, subject to a public interest test, to protect information the disclosure of which would at least be likely to prejudice commercial interests, health and safety, and the effective conduct of public affairs, as well as information intended for future publication. There is a clear public interest in protecting research information from disclosure in appropriate circumstances, and the Act passed by the previous Government—and I do not know why the Opposition now wish to amend it when there is no evidence that it needs amendment—is designed to ensure that public interest factors are given proper weight when exemptions are applied. Furthermore, the Act contains provisions protecting information provided in confidence and in relation to personal data.
Any new exemption within the Freedom of Information Act would also have no relevance to research on environmental matters. Requests for environmental information are considered not under the Freedom of Information Act but under the Environmental Information Regulations, and this amendment would not affect those. All information held by the higher education sector, including that relating to research programmes, has been subject to the Freedom of Information Act for seven years. The noble Baroness will remember, as she was probably a member of the Government at the time when it was passed in 2000 and came into effect in 2005. The Freedom of Information provisions within the Bill, in Clauses 100 to 102, build on a regime that is already firmly in place. I know that my noble friend Lady Brinton will be aware that the Information Commissioner has recently issued guidance for the higher education sector in response to the Science and Technology Committee’s recommendations. This is one reason why it is possible that it will not be necessary for me to study the provisions of the Scottish Act, as well as what they are doing in Ireland and America. The guidance will assist higher education establishments in dealing appropriately with requests for research-related information, and withholding it when it would not be in the public interest to disclose.
As a coalition Government, we are committed to greater transparency. I want to make it clear that we will not introduce exemptions into the Freedom of Information Act unless we can have that clearly demonstrated. I do not believe that it has been clearly demonstrated, but I am more than happy to see my noble friend and others if she feels that she can put a further case. I repeat to the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, and others, that I will study what is happening in Scotland—it is near to my heart. But what goes on in a devolved Administration does not necessarily have to be copied in this country. There are times when we can learn from them and times when we find that what they are doing is not necessarily appropriate. I am more than happy to look at it, but I do not think that a case has been made on this occasion. But my door is always open and I am always prepared to see my noble friend and others to discuss this matter, if they feel that I have not got the message appropriately.
Baroness Brinton
I thank the Minister for his comments and for his offer of a meeting, which I think myself and others will be very grateful to accept. I start by saying that in addition to the comments that I made, the comments from everybody else who spoke started to provide the evidence that the Minister was looking for in showing how there are problems with the current arrangements. In defence of the Information Commissioner, can I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, that I have no issue with his guidance, which is based on the FOI Act? One of the key points that I was trying to make was that the FOI Act did not envisage the complexities of university research, which is where the issues have arisen. I know that the UUK briefing, which the Minister mentioned that he had just received, will provide some evidence, and I am sure that UUK and RCUK would be delighted to provide more information on specific cases for the Minister to look at.
I want to pick up the point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, about paragraphs (a)(i) and (a)(ii) of the proposed subsection (1A) of the amendment. As I understand it—and I may be wrong—the key point about the Freedom of Information Act is that the only authorities affected by it are public authorities. That is why it is so specific. Thereafter it refers to individuals because there are individuals who work within those authorities. I would be delighted to be proved wrong but that is the basis on which I understand it. If others with more expertise in drafting want to correct that I would be delighted to concede that point.
We have taken some considerable time on this amendment and the only point I want to consider before we finish is to say that the evidence is clearly there. It is also evident from Scotland, the USA and Ireland that these arrangements are working and working well and I hope the Minister will be able to satisfy himself on those accounts. The key point I want to keep returning to is a very selfish one about the commercial viability of English and Welsh universities. They are now on the back foot compared with Scottish universities. I believe that that is inappropriate. We believe very strongly across the House that we want our universities to be able to succeed in the commercial market that is academic research today. Providing a clearer framework for academics through this clause would do that. It would not endanger transparency and access to freedom of information for people who genuinely need it. This is purely protecting a number of areas where there is a complete muddle at the moment that is beginning to affect how our universities can work effectively in the research market. On that basis, and thanking the Minister for his offer of a meeting, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I welcome the noble Baroness to this Bill. When I saw she was going to be moving this amendment I wondered whether I should have asked my noble friend Lord Howe to step in and deal with it, but I think he has quite enough on his plate at the moment. As the noble Baroness made quite clear, she does not want me to deal with this from the point of view of the Department of Health. She accepts it has every right to appeal the issue and that the Government can appeal it further through all the appropriate courts. Although this is a matter for the Department of Health, it obviously has implications for wider government. Therefore it is of concern and they have the right to appeal these matters.
As she asked me to do, I will confine my remarks—particularly when I get on to Amendment 151F, the second of her two amendments—to the broad principles, because that is what she wants me to address on this occasion. No doubt she has had and will find ways of debating these matters further, and at some length, when she continues the debates on the health Bill. I want to deal first, rather briefly, with Amendment 151E, which proposes that where a response to a freedom of information request is not issued within 20 working days the applicant must be given the option of requesting any updated or new information,
“unless there are grounds for significant new concerns as to the exempt nature”
of such material. I want then to deal with the broad principles relating to Amendment 151F, concerning,
“Appeals against information notices by public authorities”,
and why we do not accept that her amendment is an appropriate way of dealing with this.
First, with regard to Amendment 151E, I accept that we would certainly want to encourage all public authorities to provide the most up-to-date information in such circumstances where it is appropriate and reasonable to do so, but the proposal we have here is fraught with difficulties. It could make it very difficult to conclude a request taking more than 20 working days, even where the deadline has been extended for legitimate reasons, given that new information might continuously be produced and the existing information would be continuously updated. That could have real disadvantages for the requester of that information if previous versions of the information that they might be interested in seeing were not ultimately disclosed because the obligation to disclose those versions had been superseded by an updated request.
Further, the effect of the option to request updated information being exercised will be to create in effect a rolling request for information each time the 20-day limit is exceeded. That might delay the information originally requested from reaching the requester, and will mean that the public authority expends time answering one version of the question only to see that work disregarded if it is superseded by an updated request. Neither of those are sensible results. I also believe that the amendment could lead to the undesirable outcome where public authorities rush decisions to complete cases within 20 working days, even where there are legitimate grounds to take longer. Therefore they either withhold uncontentious information or release sensitive information inappropriately.
I turn now to the second of the amendments—
Baroness Thornton
I would be grateful if the Minister could address the issue. The register of risk is a very good example of this. Were my honourable friend and the Evening Standard to have succeeded ultimately and were the Government to have acceded to the Information Commissioner’s ruling to release the information, the register of risks of November 2010 would not have been the relevant document. It was mentioned that it would not be very much use to my honourable friend because it would be that of November 2010, not November 2011. There is a genuine issue here which I would be very grateful if the Minister could address.
Lord Henley
I do not really see how it applies in the particular case that the noble Baroness is referring to, when she is talking about a 20-day limit and, if that is exceeded, how it would affect the November 2010 or November 2011 health risk register.
I shall come on to what I think is the more important part—
Baroness Thornton
I am very sorry to press the Minister on this matter, but I think I have been completely clear about this. I explained that a register of risks is a living document. It is a traffic-light process of red, amber and green in terms of the risks in any given policy area. The Minister must be very familiar with it because all government departments use them. A register of risks published in November 2010 would not be relevant in November 2011 when we in the House of Lords were discussing the health Bill.
I am perfectly happy to accept that this may be an incompetently worded amendment, but the Minister has not answered the question. Are the Government saying that when, under freedom of information, people ask for information that is then outside the 20 days and it goes to appeal, and the Government lose that appeal and the information may therefore be a year old, the Government will ensure that the up-to-date information is made available, if that is relevant?
Lord Henley
Obviously we want to provide the most up-to-date information that is appropriate. If this goes to appeal and it is found that we should be providing this information, we would provide that November 2010 information, but it would then be open to the noble Baroness to put in a request for the later information. Having had that decision by the tribunal, the court or whatever, that information would then be provided in the appropriate manner, because we would have lost that case and it would have become clear that that sort of information was that which should be provided.
Baroness Thornton
For the record, if the Government lose this appeal and publish this register of risks on this Bill, it will be not the November 2010 register of risks but the November 2010 risks plus the up-to-date version. Is that what the Minister is saying to me?
Lord Henley
I am not going to give an absolute guarantee of that sort without proper notice at this stage. However, I would have thought that it is fairly obvious that if something has been through the courts or the tribunal, or at whatever stage the Government decide that they are not going to appeal any further, and the courts have decreed that that sort of information ought to be available, it would be proper to provide the later information because it would be the same information that was being requested, other than the fact that it was at a later time. It would still be the same request being made, and it would have been decreed that that was appropriate. We would be bound by that decision.
Perhaps I might move on to the noble Baroness’s second amendment, with which I have even greater problems. In Amendment 151F, she proposes that no Bill may be submitted for Royal Assent where information directly relevant to that Bill has been requested under the Freedom of Information Act and where an appeal against an information notice issued by the Information Commissioner in the course of an investigation into the handling of the request is under consideration.
Baroness Thornton
I am sorry to interrupt the Minister again but did I understand him to say that it was disproportionate to delay the passage of a Bill? But what if the information is relevant to the passage of the Bill? This is the problem we have now. I am sure the noble Lord intends to enlighten me on that point.
Lord Henley
Yes, I think it is disproportionate to use the FOI process to delay the passage of a Bill and I do not draw back from those remarks— particularly when the appeal is under way for entirely legitimate reasons, as my colleagues in the Department of Health have made clear.
Perhaps I may go on, if the noble Baroness will let me. It also brings a political dimension into the process. The commissioner, who again I stress is independent of government, would obviously have to be mindful of the likely impact on the passage of a Bill were he to issue an information or decision notice during the passage of related legislation that he might expect to be appealed. Given that a decision on whether and when to issue a notice might indirectly impact on the passage of legislation, there is a real risk that his actions could be viewed through a political prism. That is not what we want and would have an adverse effect on his ability to act in a way that is—and is seen to be—both proper and impartial.
Baroness Thornton
Is the noble Lord saying that the ruling of the Information Commissioner—and the words he used, which I quoted to the Committee earlier in my remarks—was political in some way?
Lord Henley
I have not said that at all. I have said that what the noble Baroness is saying in her amendment would bring in a political dimension because it could cause delay to the passage of that Bill.
Obviously that risk could be avoided by the commissioner simply refusing to issue a notice while any Bill that he thought was related to the request was passing through Parliament. However, that would then cause even greater delay in him deciding whether or not to issue the notice, with an obvious disadvantage to the parties involved, particularly to the person who has requested the information. In either case, this would be to the potential detriment of the effective operation of the Freedom of Information Act and to the perception of the commissioner’s independence.
Baroness Thornton
This is really very important. Is the Minister saying, suggesting or even inferring that the use of freedom of information by Members of Parliament—and I have put the odd one in myself, and been a victim of it, from time to time—is not appropriate during the passage of any legislation, because a Member of Parliament may want that information to assist them in their deliberations or their input into that scrutiny?
Lord Henley
I regret to say that the noble Baroness is now getting to the stage where she is deliberately trying to misunderstand me on every occasion. There is no desire to stop people putting in a request for freedom of information. All we are saying is that her amendment, which in effect delays the passage of the Bill while that process is going on, is not an appropriate way in which to deal with it, and brings in the political dimension to the Bill. The amendment also undermines the premise that the Freedom of Information Act is motive blind by introducing a requirement to consider whether information has been requested in connection with a particular Bill.
Lord Scott of Foscote
Can the Minister help me or the Committee in indicating whether law officers have given any advice on the implications of this amendment from a constitutional point of view? I have in mind the prospect of a Bill being introduced in one or other House—it does not matter which—being passed in that House and going to the other House and being passed in that House too, perhaps with a commencement date specified in the Bill. All that would be needed to become part of the law of the land would be Royal Assent. If the result of the proposed amendment becoming embodied in the statute is to bar the presentation of the Bill, passed through both Houses, prevent it from receiving Royal Assent and becoming law of the land according to its tenor and the will of Parliament, it would be a very strange constitutional state of affairs. It would mean that the previous Act would fetter the ability of the current Parliament to pass and bring into effect its own Bills. Does the Minister think that this is the sort of point on which a constitutional opinion from the law officers would be necessary?
Lord Henley
My Lords, as I am sure that the noble and learned Lord will be aware, we never comment on the advice that we might or might not have received from the law officers, and I am not prepared to comment on this occasion. However, I join the noble and learned Lord in speculating on the very odd constitutional effects that an amendment such as this could have on the passage of legislation. It cannot be right that by submitting an appeal an outside party can restrict the passage of legislation. That is the crucial point in relation to this amendment. I will give way to the noble Lord, Lord Wills, in a moment if he can just keep calm. It would restrict the passage of legislation in Parliament and in effect govern how this place or another place does its business.
Lord Wills
I am perfectly calm, but I am very interested in following this debate, which has been fascinating. I understand the point that the Minister is making. The noble and learned Lord has raised an important constitutional question. However, could the Minister seek to find a way to reassure those of us who are worried about the other side of the argument? I am not making any comment on this particular Bill but, in the event that the suspicion arises that information is being deliberately withheld by the Government in an attempt to prevent proper scrutiny of a controversial Bill, which then goes through without that information being available—particularly to this House, whose particular role is to scrutinise on the basis of expert opinion and all the rest of it—what reassurance can he provide that this Bill and the processes of the Freedom of Information Act will not be used by the Government of any party to subvert proper scrutiny?
Lord Henley
I can give the assurance that the coalition Government have given again and again of our desire for genuine transparency. That is why we were committed to making the Freedom of Information Act work as well as it can, which is why we have brought forward amendments to the Act in this Bill. I can go no further than that in trying to reassure the noble Lord. There is a genuine commitment by this Government, and I do not believe that any Ministers would wish to subvert our processes by deliberately withholding information as the noble Lord seems to suggest. He will just have to take my word for it.
The noble and learned Lord put it best. It would be a novel and dangerous proposition and one that I cannot believe is in the best interests of Parliament that some outside party could restrict the passage of legislation through Parliament and in effect govern how Parliament does its business by putting in requests of this sort and causing delays. Therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness at this stage will not press the amendment—well, she cannot do so because we are in the Moses Room. I hope that she is content to withdraw the amendment, but I also hope that she has further discussions with my noble friend Lord Howe. No doubt they will keep those discussions to the Health Bill as it proceeds through this House.
Baroness Thornton
I cannot guarantee the last bit from the Minister—that this issue is over for this Committee or for the progress of this Bill. This is a matter of constitutional importance to this House and an issue between the Government and Parliament. The Government had a choice. When the Information Commissioner ruled that this information on the register of risks was relevant to the passage of this Bill, he made a very important constitutional point. By denying the House that information, the Government are asking the House of Lords to consider a Bill without the information that it needs to do so. We are not saying that any third party should seek to stop the passage of any legislation—and I am perfectly happy to take advice and redraft the amendment. But the Minister has completely failed to address the constitutional point that it raised here, which is not about the Health and Social Care Bill but about what happens if an Information Commissioner says that some information is relevant to the passage of legislation through this House and any Government deny it to the House. That is a very serious matter indeed. Of course, I will withdraw the amendment, but I do not think that the matter ends here or that it is limited to the Health and Social Care Bill.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am sure that my noble friend is right when she says that it is better always to ask the question rather than, as she put it, to take the risk. As I understand it, the amendment proposes to extend the scope of Section 6 of the Freedom of Information Act beyond the extension already proposed in the Bill. However, the amendment seeks to do so in a way that I think is at odds with the approach taken in the Act.
At present, Section 6 of the FOI Act brings within the scope of the Act only companies that are wholly owned by the Crown or any single public authority listed, with limited exceptions, in Schedule 1 to the Act. Companies that are wholly owned by more than one public authority, or by the Crown and one or more of those Schedule 1 public authorities, are not currently subject to the Freedom of Information Act. Clause 101 therefore amends Section 6 of the FOI Act to widen the definition of a “publicly-owned company”, with the effect of extending the Act to companies wholly owned by the wider public sector. This simply means that any combination of public authorities subject to the Act, with limited exceptions, or by one or more of those bodies and the Crown, will be brought within its scope.
I mentioned that there are limited exceptions to this change. In one such instance, where a company is owned in part or wholly by a body that is itself subject to the Freedom of Information Act in respect of only some—and not all—of the information that it holds, the company will not be covered. It is this exception that my noble friend proposes to remove, so that such companies are subject to the Act.
I appreciate the intentions behind my noble friend’s proposal. Although relatively few public authorities are subject to the FOI Act only in respect of some information, and the number of companies excluded through the current proposal is likely to be small, the case for adding such bodies may well often be strong. However, I do not consider blanket coverage for these companies in the way proposed to be the most appropriate solution. As their parent body does not exercise wholly public functions—hence their partial coverage by the Act—it follows that some of these companies will also perform functions that should not automatically be subject to the Act.
That is not to say that it will never be appropriate for such bodies to be subject to the Act. Indeed, that may well be the case where any company of this sort exercises, for example, functions of a public nature. However, in such cases other means exist, and are already being used by the Government, to extend the scope of the Freedom of Information Act. These include secondary legislation under Section 5 of the Act to include bodies performing functions of a public nature. It would be more desirable to consider adding companies of the type relevant to the amendment on an individual basis where strong reasons for including them exist. We think that, as it were, a piecemeal approach, rather than the blanket approach proposed by my noble friend, is the better way for doing that.
I hope that that explanation is of some use, but if it is not I hope that my noble friend can at least read what I have said and consider whether that is satisfactory from her point of view.
Baroness Hamwee
I thank the Minister for that response. I follow everything he says, except, perhaps, his conclusion because I was not seeking blanket coverage. My draft would deal with the coverage of particular information only. I will read what he said, and I wonder whether I may be able to discuss this with him or his officials in order to understand whether the Government have in mind examples of the piecemeal extension to which he referred. Having said that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Lucas
This amendment would give people seeking information the right to see that information in its original context. I beg to move.
Lord Henley
I thank my noble friend for speaking to his amendment with such brevity that he caught me unaware. He has set out how he seeks to introduce a provision into the Freedom of Information Act to the effect that, so far as is practical, and where they request it, applicants must be supplied with a copy of the original record containing the information in which they are interested.
I accept that disclosing copies of documents is often the easiest way of responding to freedom of information requests and that that practice is widely followed. In some instances, it may be reasonably practical in terms of cost to supply copies of the existing record, but there may be legitimate reasons why it is not proportionate to do so when the benefit to be gained is balanced by the burdens imposed. For example, the most reasonable interpretation of the amendment would mean that the additional information need not be released if it has not been requested, but if it is, the public authority would be obliged to provide pages of blacked-out text in order to provide the full existing record. I do not think that that would be the most appropriate way forward. Leaving the position that public authorities can provide copies of the original where necessary but they are not obliged to do so is possibly the more appropriate way to deal with this matter, and I hope my noble friend will feel able to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Lucas
I am grateful for that reply. I shall think carefully about what the Minister said, and if I need to ask further questions I shall do so when I meet his officials. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Lord Henley
“Trafficking people for exploitationTrafficking people for sexual exploitation
(1) The Sexual Offences Act 2003 is amended as follows.
(2) For sections 57 to 59 (trafficking people for sexual exploitation) substitute—
“59A Trafficking people for sexual exploitation
(1) A person (“A”) commits an offence if A intentionally arranges or facilitates—
(a) the arrival in, or entry into, the United Kingdom or another country of another person (“B”),(b) the travel of B within the United Kingdom or another country, or(c) the departure of B from the United Kingdom or another country,with a view to the sexual exploitation of B.(2) For the purposes of subsection (1)(a) and (c) A’s arranging or facilitating is with a view to the sexual exploitation of B if, and only if—
(a) A intends to do anything to or in respect of B, after B’s arrival, entry or (as the case may be) departure but in any part of the world, which if done will involve the commission of a relevant offence, or(b) A believes that another person is likely to do something to or in respect of B, after B’s arrival, entry or (as the case may be) departure but in any part of the world, which if done will involve the commission of a relevant offence.(3) For the purposes of subsection (1)(b) A’s arranging or facilitating is with a view to the sexual exploitation of B if, and only if—
(a) A intends to do anything to or in respect of B, during or after the journey and in any part of the world, which if done will involve the commission of a relevant offence, or(b) A believes that another person is likely to do something to or in respect of B, during or after the journey and in any part of the world, which if done will involve the commission of a relevant offence.(4) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of—
(a) where the arranging or facilitating takes place, or(b) which country is the country of arrival, entry, travel or (as the case may be) departure. (5) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if—
(a) any part of the arranging or facilitating takes place in the United Kingdom, or(b) the United Kingdom is the country of arrival, entry, travel or (as the case may be) departure.(6) A person guilty of an offence under this section is liable—
(a) on summary conviction, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum or both;(b) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 14 years.(7) In relation to an offence committed before the commencement of section 154(1) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, the reference in subsection (6)(a) to 12 months is to be read as a reference to 6 months.”
(3) For subsection (1) of section 60 (sections 57 to 59: interpretation) substitute—
“(1) In section 59A—
“country” includes any territory or other part of the world;
“relevant offence” means—
(a) any offence under the law of England and Wales which is an offence under this Part or under section 1(1)(a) of the Protection of Children Act 1978, or(b) anything done outside England and Wales which is not an offence within paragraph (a) but would be if done in England and Wales;“UK national” means—
(a) a British citizen,(b) a person who is a British subject by virtue of Part 4 of the British Nationality Act 1981 and who has the right of abode in the United Kingdom, or(c) a person who is a British overseas territories citizen by virtue of a connection with Gibraltar.”(4) Omit section 60(2) (sections 57 to 59: jurisdiction).
(5) Accordingly, the title of section 60 becomes “Section 59A: interpretation”.”
Lord Henley
My Lords, in moving Amendment 152B, I will speak also to Amendments 152C, 163A, 169A, 169B, 170A, 171A, 172A and 178.
As the Committee will be aware, the United Kingdom opted into the EU directive on human trafficking in October last year in order to send a strong message that the UK is not a soft target for those looking to exploit others. The directive builds on and supports existing international instruments designed to combat human trafficking, in particular the Council of Europe Convention on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings, to which the UK is a signatory. The UK is already largely compliant with this directive but it requires important changes to our criminal law, which these government amendments address.
Before I move on to spell out the detail of these amendments, I wish to pay tribute to my noble friend Lord McColl, who has through his Private Member’s Bill been a strong advocate of tightening the law in this area.
There are two areas where our criminal law on human trafficking currently falls short of the requirements imposed on member states by the directive: namely, the requirement to establish extraterritorial jurisdiction where the trafficker is a UK national and commits a human trafficking offence anywhere in the world; and the requirement to criminalise labour trafficking within the United Kingdom. Amendments 152B and 152C insert two new clauses into the Bill that will broaden the current human trafficking offences by extending extra-territorial jurisdiction over UK nationals and criminalising labour trafficking that takes place entirely within the UK.
The first new clause relates to trafficking offences for the purpose of sexual exploitation. Under Sections 57 to 59 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003, it is already an offence to traffic a person into, within or out of the United Kingdom for the purposes of sexual exploitation. In the interests of clarity, Amendment 152B proceeds by consolidating these existing trafficking offences into new Section 59A and adding the necessary additional provisions to ensure extraterritorial application of the offences where a UK national commits a trafficking offence anywhere in the world.
The new clause introduced by Amendment 152C, which relates to trafficking offences for the purpose of labour or other exploitation, follows the same approach as Amendment 152B. In addition, Amendment 152C fulfils another requirement of the directive. At the moment, it is not an offence to traffic someone from Manchester to London, for example, for the purposes of forcing them into slavery, unless the victim has previously been trafficked into the UK. This amendment removes this requirement. This brings labour-trafficking offences into line with sex-trafficking offences, ensures our offences comply with the requirements of the directive and provides better protection against trafficking. The other amendments in this group make consequential amendments to other enactments as well as to the extent clauses and the Long Title.
These provisions will apply to England and Wales only. We have been advised by the Scottish Government that, following the enactment of provisions in the Criminal Justice and Licensing (Scotland) Act 2010, the criminal law in Scotland already satisfies the criminal law requirements of the directive. The Northern Ireland Administration intend to bring forward separate legislation in the Northern Ireland Assembly to achieve a similar effect.
The Government are committed to implementing the rest of the EU directive on human trafficking. These amendments deal with those points of the directive that require primary legislation. The rest we will implement through secondary legislation or by other appropriate means. I commend the amendments to the Committee.
Baroness Hamwee
The opt-in to the directive is of far more than technical importance: the message that the opt-in sent was of great significance. I do not want to repeat much of what has already been said but, on the issue of a national rapporteur, I echo the noble Baroness and what the noble Lord, Lord McColl, has said previously about the importance of its independence. The Government have recently published a trafficking strategy and—because it is human nature—to expect them not to defend their own strategy and to see the issues in a more objective way is to demand more than is reasonable.
I also echo the request for an analysis of the matters that can be dealt with by secondary legislation—it is quite clear that the previous speakers have a much better grasp of the detail than I do—so that we can be assured that every point has been picked up, rather than an assumption that secondary legislation will do the job.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I hope that I can respond relatively briefly but I will have to write a number of letters to noble Lords.
On the issue of what further work we have to do through secondary legislation and other means, I shall write in detail to my noble friend, both noble Baronesses who have spoken and place a copy in the Library setting out exactly what we intend to do. The advice I have is that, although we were very nearly compliant, there were certain things that we had to do through primary legislation—and we have found this vehicle through which to do them—and other things that we can do through secondary legislation. Obviously it would be right for me to spell that out in detail.
My noble friend also had some queries about the drafting of the new clauses. In particular, he was concerned that the new clauses referred to offences committed by “a person”. I can assure him that “a person”—as I am sure the noble and learned Lord, Lord Scott, would have confirmed if he was still in his place—includes legal persons. That will include companies and other bodies, other than an individual as he and I understand that. That is the nature of the law.
Lord Henley
“Trafficking people for labour and other exploitation
(1) The Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004 is amended as follows.
(2) For subsections (1) to (3) of section 4 (trafficking people for labour and other exploitation) substitute—
“(1A) A person (“A”) commits an offence if A intentionally arranges or facilitates—
(a) the arrival in, or entry into, the United Kingdom or another country of another person (“B”),(b) the travel of B within the United Kingdom or another country, or(c) the departure of B from the United Kingdom or another country,with a view to the exploitation of B.(1B) For the purposes of subsection (1A)(a) and (c) A’s arranging or facilitating is with a view to the exploitation of B if (and only if)—
(a) A intends to exploit B, after B’s arrival, entry or (as the case may be) departure but in any part of the world, or(b) A believes that another person is likely to exploit B, after B’s arrival, entry or (as the case may be) departure but in any part of the world.(1C) For the purposes of subsection (1A)(b) A’s arranging or facilitating is with a view to the exploitation of B if (and only if)—
(a) A intends to exploit B, during or after the journey and in any part of the world, or(b) A believes that another person is likely to exploit B, during or after the journey and in any part of the world.”(3) In section 4(4)—
(a) in paragraph (b)—(i) omit “under the Human Organ Transplants Act 1989 (c. 31) or”, and(ii) after “2004” insert “as it has effect in the law of England and Wales”,(b) in that paragraph, the words from “as a result” to the end of the paragraph become sub-paragraph (i), and(c) after that sub-paragraph insert “or(ii) which, were it done in England and Wales, would constitute an offence within sub-paragraph (i),”.(4) After section 4(4) insert—
“(4A) A person who is a UK national commits an offence under this section regardless of—
(a) where the arranging or facilitating takes place, or (b) which country is the country of arrival, entry, travel or (as the case may be) departure.(4B) A person who is not a UK national commits an offence under this section if—
(a) any part of the arranging or facilitating takes place in the United Kingdom, or(b) the United Kingdom is the country of arrival, entry, travel or (as the case may be) departure.”(5) Omit section 5(1) (section 4: jurisdiction).
(6) In section 5(3) (section 4: interpretation)—
(a) for “In section 4(4)(a)” substitute “In section 4—“country” includes any territory or other part of the world,”,
(b) the words from ““the Human Rights Convention” to the end of the subsection become the next definition in a list, and(c) after that definition insert—““UK national” means—
(a) a British citizen,(b) a person who is a British subject by virtue of Part 4 of the British Nationality Act 1981 and who has the right of abode in the United Kingdom, or(c) a person who is a British overseas territories citizen by virtue of a connection with Gibraltar.””
Lord Henley
Lord Henley
“(a) Chapters 1 to 3 of Part 5 (and Parts 6 to 8 of Schedule 9 and Parts 5 and 6 of Schedule 10), or(b) section (Trafficking people for labour and other exploitation) (and Part 9A of Schedule 9, and Part 8A of Schedule 10, so far as relating to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004),”
Lord Henley
Lord Henley
Baroness Hamwee
My speech moving Amendment 177 will be a little longer than the previous speech. This amendment takes us back to powers of entry to probe one particular point. I must make it clear that I support the restrictions on powers of entry. I know that the matter is likely to be pursued further on Report, and there are bound to be particular issues around particular powers. This power is one where I fear we may be in danger of throwing out a long-standing baby with the bath water.
My amendment would mean that the commencement of Schedule 2 would not be automatic but dependent on an order by the Secretary of State. It is merely a device to raise an issue which came to my attention only a few days ago, well after we had dealt with Schedule 2. Paragraph 12 of that schedule repeals Section 8(2) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, which gives a landlord power to enter premises to view their state and condition. I had minor experience of this in the first flat I lived in in London. The landlord with, I am sure, entirely benign intentions used to come in and potter around. I could tell from the grains of coffee left around that he had been there, and on one occasion, he repainted the kitchen, but did not move the towel hanging on the back of the kitchen door and painted around it. That is minor against the issue of a property being fit for human habitation, which is the subject of Section 8 of the 1985 Act.
The landlord has an obligation to keep the property fit for human habitation. Most modern tenancies have a power of entry written into them—a contractual power, if you like—so there is no need for a statutory power, but the British Property Federation, which has raised this point with me, estimates that of the 120,000 or so regulated tenancies, many of which are very old and rely on statutory terms and conditions, something between 18,000 and 24,000 rely on statutory powers of entry. In other words, there is a legal and, I would say, moral obligation on a landlord, but he will have no means to inspect the property and fulfil the obligation. Unlike modern assured shorthold tenancies, these tenancies often encompass some of the oldest parts of the housing stock, from before 1919. They tend not to have turned over frequently and there is a pretty high probability that if they are not kept up to a good standard, they may become unfit.
I know that this matter has been discussed between the Home Office, looking at it from the point of view of the powers of entry, and the Department for Communities and Local Government. I also know that an issue has been raised that because these tenancies are subject to very low rent limits, they would not in fact come within the scope. I want to anticipate that argument by saying—again, I understand this from the British Property Federation—that the rent limits are those that were in the original contract and cannot really be cited now because that is the historical event which brought them within the scope.
The British Property Federation is very clear that the provisions in the 1985 Act are not redundant. It seems that there is a real issue here, where we should not let our enthusiasm for the principle over powers of entry obscure the need to address it. I would be the first to say that this amendment does not address it. I am merely trying to bring the issue into play at this stage—a late stage, I know—and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on this. I suspect that it may be another matter where I am going to add to his diary commitments by suggesting that detailed discussion might benefit us all, but for the moment I beg to move.
Lord Henley
My Lords, as my noble friend has explained, the amendment relates to concerns that have recently come to light over the proposed repeal of Section 8(2) of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, as provided for in Schedule 2 to the Bill. This provision in the Landlord and Tenant Act grants landlords a power of entry to ensure that their properties are fit for habitation. The Act sets very low rent thresholds for London and elsewhere, which were agreed some considerable time ago. Because those rent levels were so low, it was originally our belief that there were no longer any existing tenancies to which the Section 8(2) power still applied. That being the case, we thought that the power could sensibly be repealed. It has since come to our attention from the same source that my noble friend mentioned, the British Property Federation, that there is a significant number of legacy properties to which this provision continues to apply. The BPF has indicated that there are in fact some 18,000 to 24,000 tenancies where this power of entry would continue to operate.
Landlords have a duty to ensure that the properties they rent are fit for habitation. In the overwhelming majority of cases, we would expect tenants freely to admit the landlord into their property to inspect it. In such cases, landlords have no need to use their statutory power of entry but in isolated cases the tenant may not be co-operative and there is therefore a continued need for this power. While we still intend to repeal this power of entry we propose to introduce a saving provision, using the order-making power in Clause 110, to ensure that the power remains available in respect of existing tenancies. In the case of any new tenancies, a power of entry can be provided for in the tenancy agreement as would normally be the case, as my noble friend will be fully aware as a solicitor. I thank her therefore for raising the matter. I hope that we do not need to have a meeting on this occasion, that she is satisfied by the explanation that I have given and that she will be happy to withdraw her amendment.
Lord Henley