English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Pinnock Excerpts

2nd reading
Monday 8th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, as a councillor on Kirklees Council in West Yorkshire, which is a large unitary authority with both a metro mayor and a combined authority, I have both an interest to declare and experience to share.

This has been a great debate to be part of and to listen to, because the passion for local governance and local democratic government has been apparent throughout the afternoon. Many issues have been raised that are important locally, such as cattle grids—who knew?—and taxi and private hire licensing, which is vital for safeguarding. We have heard about different parts of the country, from Cornwall and even Devon to Lincolnshire, Norfolk, the West Midlands and now Yorkshire.

This has been an important debate, but it has had rather a mixed response from various Members across the House. We on the Liberal Democrat Benches are completely in favour of the principle of devolution. It is fundamental to our values, as is community empowerment, which should naturally flow from devolution. Unfortunately, the Bill being debated neither encompasses real devolution nor, unfortunately, empowers communities. We on these Benches will strongly support proposals that enable either or both.

At the heart of the chasm that exists between the Liberal Democrat and the Government’s approach to devolution is an understanding of the essential purpose of local government. Successive Governments have viewed local government as simply a necessary local service delivery function. Perhaps that notion has its beginnings in the statement made by Sir Keith Joseph, when he was a Cabinet Minister in the early Thatcher Government, that local government should outsource all its service delivery, and the council would therefore only need to meet once a year to agree the contracts. Since then, there has been a persistent trend of central government viewing the purpose of local government through that lens.

Nearly 20 years ago, the Lyons report into local government expressed a more positive purpose for local government as being one of place shaping in order to use powers and influence to promote the well-being of a community. Lyons said that that approach was crucial to improving satisfaction through greater local choice and flexibility. It is that wider, more inclusive place-shaping role that we on these Benches support. It follows the long line of great local government reformers and indeed the Localism Act 2011, which introduced the concept of subsidiarity.

It is in that context that Liberal Democrats challenge the basis of the Bill. We support a strategic authority, but it should have greater democratic accountability and not be at the expense of local decisions made locally, where they belong. During this debate, there have been many contributions on Parts 1 and 2 of the Bill, which establish strategic authorities and the role of mayors. Strategic authorities have an important role to play in place shaping, as we have heard, and both Manchester and the West Midlands have been trailblazers in doing that, but what is not acceptable to those of us who cherish local democratic decision-making is the powers given to a single person over a large area with minimal accountability, minimal community engagement and little involvement of elected local councillors.

The Mayor of West Yorkshire, for example, serves 2.5 million people, and the combined authority consists of, in effect, the five council leaders. Under the Bill, the mayor will have very wide powers to determine a strategy for land use, for example, that will have a significant impact on local communities who will have been denied a genuine opportunity to have their voice heard. Where is the community empowerment in that? Where is the local accountability and local democratic decision-making?

My noble friend Lord Pack has rightly criticised the change to the mayoral electoral system. A supplementary vote fails the test of enabling the candidate with the widest support to be elected. Why has this system been chosen when others, which are more effective at ensuring the election of a candidate with the widest support, have been rejected?

A further undermining of transparency is the power the Bill provides for a mayor to appoint up to seven unelected commissioners. As it stands, this enables a mayor to appoint their mates to these roles—as has apparently already happened in some mayoral authorities, including one not far from where I live. At the very least, there need to be requirements in the Bill for an open process of appointment through a selection panel.

The extension of mayoral powers is far remote from the notion of community empowerment. For example, the potential for civil enforcement powers to be undertaken by the mayor removes them from local involvement. Further, the power of a mayor to take a planning decision away from the local planning authority is at complete odds with local democracy. I have read nothing in the Bill that explains how a strategic planning decision will be defined. Perhaps the Minister can explain that.

Part 3 is a further attack on local democracy and accountability as it provides powers to the Secretary of State to merge councils into unitary ones. What is not sufficiently discussed is that the key criteria for a unitary council is to be its population. The number of people will determine the geography of the new unitary councils, not whether places coexist and work well with each other, or whether it is the will of the people. Forced amalgamations fail. The council on which I served is a prime example. Even after 50 years, there are regular heartfelt calls for its abolition, because it forced together the great towns of Huddersfield, Dewsbury and Batley, when they do not have much in common. That is the danger of forcing councils together in this way.

Noble Lords will be pleased to hear that there are elements of the Bill that are welcome, such as the creation of the local audit office. That is a very important move. Since the Audit Commission was abolished, there has been a lack of oversight and guidance for local audit, so I welcome that clause. Clause 58 is important, because it gives a nod towards neighbourhood governance, although there is no clarity about what that might mean. In any case, Clause 58 provides a power for the Secretary of State, for crying out loud, to make the decision on what constitutes a neighbourhood unit.

If we really believe in devolution, neighbourhood governance should be decided by the local council area, not the Secretary of State. If there is one thing that I hope the Minister will help us to change, it is that. That is at the heart of what devolution should be: local people determining what neighbourhood governance should look like and what the area should be, not the Secretary of State, who surely has better things to decide on. That is just one example of a ministerial power to override local decisions, which are unfortunately peppered throughout the Bill.

This is not real devolution. There is no fiscal devolution in the Bill either, which, as many Members have said in their contributions, makes devolution a rather empty promise, given that mayors will probably have to compete for resources from the Treasury.

At its best, local government is greater than the sum of its parts. It is what matters most to the daily lives of people. The plea from these Benches is for the Government to start appreciating the power of vibrant, well-funded local government that enhances the lives of the people who live there and the place in which they live. During the next stages of the Bill, we on these Benches will challenge the Government to look through a local lens and provide real devolution and real community empowerment.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Pinnock Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 4th February 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Pinnock]

126: Clause 35, page 39, line 14, at end insert—
“(2) Notwithstanding any powers conferred under this section or Schedule 16, the Mayor of a Combined County Authority may exercise strategic planning powers only where the constituent local authorities have been consulted and, within limits prescribed by regulations, have the power to approve or veto such decisions.(3) Regulations under this section are subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that constituent local authorities have a consultative and limited veto role over strategic planning powers, with any regulations setting those limits made by statutory instrument subject to the affirmative procedure.

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[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, it is really good to be able to take part in the debate on the devolution Bill, particularly to speak to Amendments 126 and 127 in my name. These amendments seek to explore the depth of the devolution that we have been promised in the Bill, which is, after all, called the English devolution Bill. For us Liberal Democrats on these Benches, devolution involves enabling—

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes) (Con)]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness, but would she prefer to sit when speaking?

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

I will stand, as I am not speaking for long, and will sit if I need to, but I thank the noble Lord very much for his consideration.

For us on these Benches, devolution involves enabling governance at the lowest possible level to make the appropriate decisions. These two amendments in their different ways seek to explore whether that is in the Government’s thinking and whether they would accept the suggestions that these amendments make.

The purpose of Amendment 126 is to provide clarity concerning the powers of the mayor and the combined county authority. Clause 35 consists of just two lines and is a very brief statement of the powers of land acquisition and planning development. Further details are provided in Schedule 16. Clause 35 confers on the mayor and the CCA the power to acquire land and develop it. Presumably, though it is not entirely clear—and maybe this is where the Minister will be able help the Committee—this would be by providing an outline allocation of the site for housing development under the strategic planning powers in the Bill.

This may result in a major housing development being agreed in principle without the consent of the constituent local planning authority or, indeed, of the local council concerned. The consequences are then very significant if the development fails to include, for example, a condition for the provision of necessary additional facilities, such as school places, GP surgeries and transport and highway infrastructure. It may also mean that a significant housing development—as a general rule, given that it is coming through a strategic planning process, it will be a major site of 200-plus houses —is given permission in principle without consultation and the engagement of the local community affected by it. Imposing new developments on communities in this way will only build resentment and further discredit the notion of local democracy. Amendment 126 would provide safeguards to ensure that such engagement and consultation take place.

There is a provision within Amendment 126 for a veto, but it is a qualified veto. It is included but is constrained by regulation, which would ensure that a housing development is not simply rejected by those who do not want any development but rejected on acceptable planning grounds provided by the constituent authority.

The Minister may say that we have to build houses, and with that I agree. But we have to build them with the consent of the communities in which they are placed. In my own area, I have experience of where a mayor has the powers to impose without consultation and engagement. The local community is furious. It has done no good at all to either the mayor or the infrastructure that is being planned, because the mayor has not taken the community with them, which is what the amendment is about. I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say on that.

Amendment 127 is less of a challenge for anybody. It just refers to land acquisition powers. In Schedule 16 there is a list of authorities to be consulted when a mayor wants to acquire land, but the list fails to include parish and town councils. Parish and town councils are statutory consultees for planning applications, so they also ought to be statutory consultees for land acquisition by a mayor. In addition, given the nature of the Bill and the guidance that has been given about increasing neighbourhood governance in some form, making the case for parish and town councils is the right way to go, because I can see them becoming increasingly important as large unitary councils become the norm.

The new unitaries are expected to have a population of around 500,000 people, so wards are likely to be large. Each councillor will represent maybe 5,000 voters, which is the norm where I am. That is easily the largest ratio of elected representatives to voters of any western European nation. It therefore seems that more parish and town councils will be created, and that they will be an increasingly important part of our democratic representation. Given that, it is equally important that those councils can be formally consulted on sensitive issues in local areas, such as land acquisitions. The depth of our devolution is what I am exploring today. I beg to move.

[Lord Lansley (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 131. There is an interesting pot-pourri of subjects in this group. Amendment 131 would require the appointment of a statutory chief planner for local planning authorities and strategic authorities. Noble Lords who participated in the debates on the Planning and Infrastructure Bill will recall that we had positive debates on this subject during the passage of that legislation, and I do not apologise for returning to it.

The need for a statutory chief planner role is, if anything, increasing. The argument is very straightforward. We are increasingly, and I think the Government are deliberately, seeking to raise the status of the planning profession, increase the strategic responsibilities of planners and ensure that, through the planning reforms, we accelerate housing delivery and growth. The planning profession is instrumental to making this happen. Although on previous occasions the Government’s response was that this was something that local authorities can choose to do, and therefore we should not require them to do it by appointing a statutory officer, all the messages that are coming back to us from across the profession demonstrate that this would enable the planning profession to step up fully to the role that is envisaged for it through the legislation that we passed last year and this year.

Some of the examples will be known to noble Lords. The national scheme of delegation—I am looking forward to soon seeing the first statutory instrument implementing it—will enhance the role specifically of the chief planner, who will work with the chair of a planning committee in a local planning authority. Indeed, noble Lords will recall that the Government’s consultation document referred explicitly to the role of the chief planner, without there necessarily being a chief planner in all these planning authorities.

We are also adding to the number of chief planners needed overall, by reference to the strategic authorities and the increasing role of development corporations, each of which will have planning powers. Amendment 131 includes not only local planning authorities but strategic authorities. Why? Because spatial development strategies —which, if I remember correctly, are to be implemented under the Town and Country Planning Act but are a result of the Planning and Infrastructure Act—are a very significant strategic planning function in strategic authorities. There is a significant risk that, without a chief planner role, the spatial development strategy will be seen as an adjunct to a local growth plan and an economic development initiative, whereas, for it to be successful, it must be implemented by officers who understand and can use the National Planning Policy Framework and government guidance and mesh them together with the views of their elected members and the combined authority.

This was previously the subject of debate on the Planning and Infrastructure Bill. The Royal Town Planning Institute, whose support for the amendment I am grateful for—I am also grateful for the other signatures on Amendment 131—has added to that support by reference to a number of quotes. I will not keep the Committee for a long time but I want to read some out, if I may.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

As I am out of time, may I respond to the noble Lord in writing? I am happy to do that.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, this has been quite a long debate on a number of issues regarding strategic planning and its consequences.

Amendment 126 in particular referred to the new strategic powers that mayors—not just combined county authority mayors but existing metro mayors—will acquire and how those will knit with local plans. Perhaps I should have said at the beginning that I am a councillor currently serving on a large met authority in Yorkshire. It is clear to me that greater thought must be given to how strategic plans by the mayor and local plans by the local authority will work together and not come into conflict. Those who come from the London experience do not understand, perhaps, that the new mayoral authorities will not have the equivalent of a London Assembly where these things can be debated. They will consist of the leaders of the constituent authorities in West Yorkshire, which is five people. If that is deemed sufficient, it is not devolution.

I thank the Minister for her reply, which, as always, went into substantial detail on the probing questions that were asked; I am sure that some of them will be asked again when we get to Report. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 126 withdrawn.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Pinnock Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 9th February 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Pinnock]

170: Clause 45, page 49, line 37, at end insert—
“(c) arrange for the deputy mayor for fire and rescue to exercise one or more of the Mayor’s fire and rescue authority functions.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires a Mayor with Fire and Rescue Authority functions to delegate those functions to a Deputy Mayor for Fire and Rescue, ensuring governance arrangements parallel to those for policing.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment was tabled by my noble friend Lord Goddard of Stockport, who is unfortunately not able to be here today. It seeks to insert a vital safeguard into Clause 45, ensuring that the specialised governance of our fire and rescue services is not diluted as the powers of regional mayors are expanded. As the Bill currently stands, it enables the transfer of fire and rescue authority functions to elected mayors, yet it does not mandate the same dedicated oversight and accountability that is necessary for this important emergency service. Amendment 170 would rectify this by requiring a mayor with these functions to arrange for a deputy mayor for fire and rescue, specifically to exercise those responsibilities.

The prime strength of this amendment is that would ensure governance arrangements for fire and rescue services, which would then run parallel with those already established for the police service. As the Government have rightly sought to abolish police and crime commissioners, they have abjectly failed to ensure that governance and accountability to the public are paramount. A reflection as to how potentially fragile our governance arrangements are can perhaps be informed by events in the United States of America, where the governance arrangements of policing have apparently been overturned with ease.

Can the Minister explain how replacing an elected police and crime commissioner by an unelected appointment, accountable to no one but the mayor, is an improvement in terms of public accountability? By extension, how will governance work if, as proposed, the fire and rescue service loses its direct governance and becomes the responsibility of an unnamed mayoral appointee? Further, there is a real risk that, as this Bill establishes a new tier of “strategic authorities” with broad “areas of competence”, the elected mayors will become “Lord High Everything”, as was the arrogant Pooh Bah in the “Mikado”.

Amendment 170 would ensure that fire and rescue functions receive the dedicated attention they require rather than being treated as a secondary concern within a massive strategic portfolio. This role would provide a clear point of contact for local public service partners and ensure that the strategic direction of emergency services is managed by an individual with a specific, focused mandate—albeit not a specific and focused democratic mandate.

Proper accountability is also lacking within the Government’s plans. The idea that a scrutiny panel, as with the police service, can be effective when only able to consider decisions post hoc is for the birds. I hope the Minister can agree to think about the challenge that Amendment 170 provides in the interests of public accountability. What we need is structural consistency between policing and the fire and rescue services and the dedicated and democratic accountability necessary to protect both our fire services and the communities they serve. I beg to move.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

My Lords, I hope I am not causing any confusion by having moved to these Benches. It was simply because the other Benches are very congested; I continue to support the same party that I supported when I came into this House as a Conservative Peer.

I would like to use Amendment 170—I congratulate the noble Baroness for speaking so eloquently to it—to probe the Government on an issue that is causing great concern, not dissimilar to that expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock. I think from memory we were the only two Peers in this very Room who spoke against the orders for the combined authority of North Yorkshire.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

It was thee and me.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

It was thee and me, yes—that was the sum total who voted against. I think that we were right and history has proven that to be the case. I am still trying to get my head around where the fire and rescue service sits in the combined authority of North Yorkshire. I am concerned that now it is going to be even more complicated if, having elected a mayor for York and North Yorkshire, as the noble Baroness has highlighted, this will now pass to the mayor.

This is causing me concern because I raised the point elsewhere about the number of BESS projects—basically clean energy projects, particularly battery storage projects and solar farms—across North Yorkshire and the lack of consulting with fire and rescue authorities, because they are not statutory consultees. I believe that that has highlighted a gap in the structure at the moment. I use this opportunity to ask the Minister—I see that we have switched places; sliding doors and switching places is a theme for today—how that will impact on a county such as North Yorkshire, or York and North Yorkshire, if there is going to be no democratic oversight and no accountability, if that is the current understanding in the Bill.

The noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, is on to something here and I would like to listen carefully to how the Government plan to monitor this. I do not believe that rural counties have really been considered in the mix of things. Clearly, it is an oversight if fire and rescue authorities are not being consulted as statutory consultees to such major projects. For all the reasons that she gave, I think that another lacuna has been identified by Amendment 170 in the great scheme of things and I look very much to hearing the Minister’s reply.

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[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, I thank everybody who has contributed to this debate on the future of the governance of fire and rescue services. It has exposed a fundamental flaw in the pattern of governance that the Government are pursuing with some haste: enabling a single elected person to become the sole democratically accountable authority for strategic planning, skills, strategic highways, policing, fire services and possibly health. This reflects what the Minister has said: a person, as a directly elected mayor, will hold all the accountability for those important public services.

That will not happen; no one person can hold all that accountability successfully. It will be dispersed, as it is now. In West Yorkshire, we have a directly elected mayor who has appointed a deputy mayor—it could be a commissioner, but in West Yorkshire the position is deputy mayor—who is a political appointee, not directly accountable to the residents of West Yorkshire, for policing.

We know from earlier parts of the Bill that the directly elected mayor can appoint up to seven commissioners, as we are now calling them, who will take responsibility for some of these functions but who are not directly accountable to the public whom they serve and for whom they are making decisions. That format of governance will crumble away when the first big incident of significance occurs, because who is responsible and who calls the shots? That fundamental problem is at the heart of this.

Apart from that, the second fundamental problem is the method of accountability through scrutiny. In earlier amendments, we on these Benches called for a scrutiny panel for each political appointee as a commissioner, which would go some way to alleviating the discrepancy in democratic accountability. But at the moment those scrutiny panels will scrutinise decisions post hoc, which is unacceptable. If they are to be effective, they need to look at pre-decision scrutiny as well.

I am sorry that the Minister has recited the mantra that all will be well and that creating a “Lord High Everything” will be fine. I fear that it will not, and I shall continue to point out the fault-lines in this model. I beg leave to withdraw.

Amendment 170 withdrawn.

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[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, government Amendments 172 and 173 make essential amendments to Schedule 23, ensuring that the law operates as intended with evolving governance arrangements. Amendment 172 aligns the inspection framework for mayoral combined authorities and mayoral county combined authorities with existing exclusions for other fire and rescue authority governance models, ensuring fairness and consistency across England.

Amendment 173 makes technical alignments with existing legislation. It ensures that, where a mayoral combined authority or a mayoral combined county authority takes on fire and rescue functions, it is treated in the same way as existing fire and rescue authorities. The amendment will also bring mayoral fire and rescue authorities within Part V of the Local Government and Housing Act 1989, covering companies in which local authorities have interests. It will also bring it within Section 155 of the same Act for the purpose of emergency financial assistance.

It also clarifies the handling of Section 114 reports in the case of mayoral fire and rescue authorities, and the fire and rescue authority’s response under Section 115 of the Local Government Finance Act 1988. When a chief finance officer issues a report, the report must be sent to the relevant scrutiny committee, and the authority’s response must be sent to the chief finance officer, the external auditor and the relevant scrutiny committee. I commend these government amendments to the Committee.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, these two amendments are enabling amendments in response to the previous issue that was raised with Amendment 170 about absorbing fire and rescue services into a mayoral authority.

It has long been the objective of previous Governments to combine police services and fire and rescue services into one model by arguing that they were both emergency services and, therefore, would be better combined. That has always been resisted, with support from these Benches, because police and fire and rescue services have very different objectives. This Bill is seeking to absorb policing and fire and rescue into the ambit of the directly elected mayor, without having this discussion about whether it is appropriate.

I accept that four mayoral authorities have already combined policing and fire and rescue. Whether or not that has been a success is yet to be tested. The argument against these two amendments—I will reprise a bit of what I said on Amendment 170—is that it is an erosion of transparency and public accountability for what is, after all, a critical emergency service.

It is always interesting to me when we have government amendments—it points to pressure somewhere that new powers are needed to make this work. Amendment 172 removes the inspection of the fire service from the inspection regime and puts it into a mayoral regime. This means that, for instance—these are within the amendment—an inspector cannot challenge the budget of fire and rescue, challenge the appointment or dismissal of the chief fire officer, hold the chief fire officer to account or approve an emergency performance and reinforcement scheme.

All those are critical to ensure public accountability of the fire and rescue service, but suddenly they will not be available for its inspection regime. That will not do. The fire and rescue service plays a vital role as first responders to serious road traffic accidents. They are always the first there, not the police, and they are often at terrorist incidents. We need to have accountability for the public and the existing inspection regime, to ensure that it works well.

My argument with this amendment, as with Amendment 170, is that this is happening by stealth, by absorbing fire and rescue into the police service. Combining them ensures that the mayor has responsibility for those functions. The inspection regime does not apply to the mayor, therefore public accountability for the fire and rescue service lies in holding the mayor to account. As I have said, the mayor is now the sole Lord High Everything of a huge number of strategic functions, so holding them to account on any one of them will be a challenge. I hope that the Minister will think again on this proposal to change the way that fire and rescue services are democratically accountable and inspected, because I fear that failing to do so could have serious consequences.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, as I understand it from the Minister, the inspectors in question inspect only operational matters and not governance matters. Therefore, to not inspect the governance of mayoral combined authorities and combined county authorities is in keeping with the approach that the inspectors already take to existing fire services. Will the Minister please confirm that I have that right? If I do not, will she please explain why the Government’s arrangements for these new authorities will be subject to less scrutiny than already exists in the fire services? If my understanding is correct, I still have concerns about the need for effective scrutiny of new authorities taking new powers, in this instance over fire and rescue, so will the Minister please tell the Committee how the governance of fire and rescue services will be inspected and scrutinised, if not by this inspectorate? We have to ensure that there is an appropriate approach to scrutiny for all new mayoral combined authorities, which is exactly what the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, said. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

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[Baroness O'Neill of Bexley (Con)]

My Lords, I have a real concern about this group of amendments, which appears to look to tinker around the edges to bring the Mayor of London and the Greater London Authority into line with other strategic authorities. We already established in an earlier session that governance in London was the first established; it has never been repeated and, indeed, this Bill does not seek to repeat it either. Surely the sensible route is the one that we suggested in Amendment 75: to have a full review, consider the future governance of London and deal with issues such as this at that time.

I do not want to revisit the earlier argument, but I remind noble Lords that in London there is not the same relationship between the mayor and the boroughs as is suggested there might be in the new governance relationships, or indeed that exists elsewhere. In practice, that means that the mayor might not appreciate local circumstances—as I have said before, not all of London is the same. The mayor might not appreciate the local policing capacity, or lack of it, and the implications of that on licensing decisions. He might not understand the local economy and what licensing could mean for that. He might not appreciate the impact of the local demographics when decisions are being made to overturn local licensing decisions.

What is more, as we have heard before, the current scrutiny of the mayor is not considered to be effective. Devolution should mean respect for decision-making at its lowest common denominator—in this case, the borough level. If a more strategic decision is needed for a wider area, the decision should include the local decision-making processes or partners. For those reasons, I urge the Minister to consider the proposals put forward previously for a thorough review, at which time the implications of these amendments could be considered.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, I heard what the Minister said in her introduction to this group of amendments about it following a proposed change to the Bill in the Commons. Like the previous speaker, I understand the need, in a global city such as London, to reverse—for justifiable reasons—the direction of devolution and enable a power grab from the local boroughs in some circumstances. However, the circumstances are not defined, apart from saying that they have to be of “strategic importance” across Greater London. Yet the definition of “strategic importance” is left to regulations.

It is not at all clear how the mayor will make such decisions when they have been defined as being of strategic importance. Will they be based on the licensing priorities, which is a requirement for local borough licensing committees? How will local concerns be heard and considered? This appears to be a profound and unnecessary centralisation of power that threatens to strip local democratically elected committees of their voice in matters that affect their communities’ daily lives.

Under this proposal, which is set out in Amendment 179A—it contains a proposed new section headed “Licence applications of potential strategic importance”—local London licensing authorities, such as borough councils, would legally be required to notify the GLA of applications for the sale of alcohol, regulated entertainment or late-night refreshment. A further proposal grants the Mayor of London the power, in effect, to veto or override the decisions of these local authorities. So if a borough council decides to grant or reject a licence, that decision is suspended and has no effect until the mayor decides whether to intervene. This is allegedly the devolution Bill, but I am yet to be convinced that it has any relationship to devolution; this is the imposition of top-down command structure over local democracy.

The additional problem is that, if there is a veto and it is called in by the mayor, how quickly will the mayor decide? What is the democratic way in which that will be decided? Is it just the mayor in his or her office making a decision, or will it go to a scrutiny committee for discussion first? Will there be an open and transparent hearing where the local borough council—or several local borough councils, if it is something that affects several of them—can come and explain its decision? Will the mayor have to explain why it has been called in? A lot here is unsatisfactory, to say the least. I ask myself: who is best placed to make a judgment about licence applications, which can have significant effects on people’s daily lives? Is it those who live there and their elected representatives, or is it the mayor of 7 million or 8 million people who says, “Actually, I know best. This is important for business, so hard luck if it affects your daily life”? That is the risk in this.

In the end, this group of amendments is unsatisfactory until we know the definition of “strategic importance” and the methods that will be used for decision-making. For those reasons, I hope the Minister will think again and reconsider. I understand why, if it is a significant application that will affect large parts of London, you would want a mayoral authority to take that decision. But I would want to know how that is defined and how that decision will be taken in a public setting, with the ability for people to have their voices heard and an appeal process.

[Baroness Dacres of Lewisham (Lab)]

My Lords, I am a directly elected mayor of a London borough with a licensing authority and responsibility. I want to speak in favour of and welcome this amendment. The key word is “strategic”. It is important that we recognise that London’s nightlife and hospitality industries are essential to Britain’s economy. We need to support them; they bring more than 1.4 million jobs to the capital and generate £46 billion in economic activity.

Giving the mayor new powers over strategic licences, including the power to call in and decide strategically on those applications, could be important for the future. Different authorities will vary in how they approach their licensing. Of course, there needs to be that relationship between the local authorities and the Mayor of London—whoever that may be, now or in the future—to be able to listen and recognise, and to have that overarching strategic view of what the licensing is being applied for. We do not live within administrative boundaries, so if something is across different authorities and one side believes that a licence should be granted and another does not, there needs to be some sort of arbitrator to see the overall benefit of bringing that position forward and to say either, “Yes, it is strategically important for London” or, “No, it is not”.

English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Pinnock Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th March 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Lucas (Con)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Banner, unsurprisingly, makes an eloquent case for his Amendment 222C. I very much hope that the Minister will hold to what she said when this issue was addressed previously and reassert the Government’s commitment to a wider review of the existing protections to bring coherence to the legal framework, making protections more transparent and accessible so that communities can protect their most valued spaces, to paraphrase what she said.

At the heart of the amendment lies the travails of the All England Lawn Tennis Club. I declare an interest as a resident of Eastbourne and, therefore, as someone who holds a very low opinion of that organisation, which seems to be entirely concerned with itself and its money and very unconcerned with the communities that it interacts with. That is a widely shared opinion, as noble Lords will know—although they may not agree with it.

The troubles that the ALTC is facing have roots in the predecessors of assets of community value. We have long considered that communities have rights when it comes to the places and spaces that they enjoy. These have grown complicated and difficult to understand and enforce, which is why the Minister’s review is needed. But these places and spaces are needed and should be respected.

In this particular case, the ALTC has behaved abysmally, and it should not be advantaged by shortcutting what should be a careful review. I would like to see it soon and done with speed, but it should be an open public review, involving national bodies and others that are interested in the protection of public trusts and recreation rights to arrive at a coherent, well-agreed solution to this problem. To do it by way of an amendment in a Bill is far too limited; there are far too few opportunities to really get into the competing rights and interests that are involved here. I urge the Minister to stick to her previous resolution.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Banner, has returned to this issue, which was the subject of debate during the then Planning and Infrastructure Bill. Then, the amendment in his name concerned only the Wimbledon Park Community Trust. That amendment did not reach the statute book, so here we are again with round two.

In this case, the amendment encompasses all statutory trusts. The noble Lord, Lord Banner, is very persuasive, but there is an alternative argument. The argument proposed by the noble Lord is to clarify the legal technicalities, whereas the opposing argument, which I hope to be able to put, is one of principle: the principle of protecting green spaces that are kept in public trust.

In summary, Amendment 222C is a four-page amendment that proposes to grant the Secretary of State unprecedented power to permanently discharge statutory trusts from land once held for the public’s enjoyment. It is being framed as a measure to resolve legal technicalities—we have heard that argument from the noble Lords, Lord Banner and Lord Grabiner. In truth, it seems to me that the amendment would be an assault on some of our nation’s parks, sports grounds and green open spaces, which were created for the benefit of the local community.

Under the proposal in this amendment, land held in trust for the public under the Public Health Act 1875 or the Open Spaces Act 1906 could be stripped of its protected status by a simple order from the Secretary of State. This would essentially erase the general right of public enjoyment on that land for ever. The question is: in what circumstances is that justified? Who will benefit from the protection of land held in trust where the protections are removed? Will the community that has enjoyed the rights conferred by the trust have a significant right over any attempt to change the status of the land held in trust? Those critical questions are yet to be answered by either of those who have spoken in favour of the amendment. I hope that, when we get to the end of this debate, the noble Lord, Lord Banner, will be able to answer them.

What is most troubling is the basis on which these trusts would be destroyed. The amendment targets cases where a council failed to follow the “previous advertisement procedure” when it originally moved or sold the land. Essentially, we are being asked to reward past administrative incompetence. If a council ignored the law decades ago by failing to notify the public of a land disposal, this amendment would allow that very failure to serve as the qualifying condition for stripping the public of their rights today.

In addition, in my view the amendment would create a dangerous presumption of non-compliance. If an application is made, the Secretary of State must notify the relevant council, which then has a mere 28 days to respond. If that council, which may be struggling with records from 50 years ago, say—and which may have been reorganised by this or a previous Government—cannot confirm that the advertisement took place, the Secretary of State “must presume”, as the amendment says, that the law was broken, thereby clearing the path to discharge the trust.

This is a remarkably low bar for the permanent alienation of public assets. In my view it is outrageous—28 days is a completely inadequate period for doing paper archive searches. Then, the power of presumed guilt is totally contrary to the basis on which our legal system stands. The balance is being deliberately stacked in favour of those who wish to dissolve trusts that hold land for the common good.

That leads me on to the idea of public interest, as defined in the amendment, in the condition proposed in new paragraph (f). It is broad enough to include any “development proposals” or “economic … benefits” that the order might facilitate. If we allow development proposals to be weighed against the sanctity of a public trust, we know which will win in the era of intense commercial pressure and economic benefit or, indeed, financial benefit. The amendment proposes a 56-day window for representations. By the way, the amendment refers to publicity in a “local newspaper”. That is novel. I do not know how many local newspapers still exist. Whether that is a satisfactory way in which to advertise for local representation is one of the questions that needs to be asked and answered.

We are ultimately placing the fate of local green spaces in the hands of the Secretary of State rather than the local communities who use them. There is the idea that the noble Lord, Lord Grabiner, proposed, whereby the public will have a view and can be consulted. I have many experiences of public consultation, certainly in the reorganisation of local councils currently, where the vast majority oppose but, nevertheless, the changes are made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, I now have to remember where I left off.

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

I think it was near the end.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

I was making a point about public consultation. Since the land is held by a trust for public benefit and for the public good, it seems to me that some consideration should be given to giving the people who benefit from that trust—the community; I am sure it could be defined—some sort of veto over any change in the status of the land held in public trust. Obviously, it could not be just half a dozen folk thinking that it should not happen, but if there were a huge swell of public opinion in favour of keeping the land in a public trust, as was done many years before, maybe that ought to be an option for local people.

There are various places across different parts of the country where the council’s own land in public trust would be affected if this amendment were accepted by the Government. The ones I have been able to find—apart from Wimbledon, of course—include Winchester, Swansea, Finchley, Hornsey and many others. Once a statutory trust discharge order takes effect, the land would be freed from the trust “generally”. Its status would be altered for all time, regardless of who holds the title. We should not enable a statutory loophole in this amendment that would allow the procedural errors of the past to become the justification for stealing the green lungs of our communities in the future. As noble Lords might have realised, the Liberal Democrats strongly oppose this amendment and stand on the side of communities that strive to protect the integrity of our public open spaces held in trust.

I finish with a common little rhyme that emerged from the 18th century when the enclosures were taking place at great pace—when common land was taken by landowners. It goes:

“The fault is great in man or woman,


Who steals a goose from off a common;

But who can plead that man’s excuse,

Who steals the common from the goose?”

[Lord Grabiner (CB)]

Before the Division Bells, the noble Baroness was very dismissive of the consultation process, which is spelled out in the amendment. She referred to what sounded like her own unpleasant experience of such processes in the past. I wonder whether, on reflection—we have had a bit of time to reflect during the break—she thinks that a fair criticism of the amendment.

[Baroness Pinnock (LD)]

My Lords, the difficulty the public have with the word “consultation” is that they often dismiss it as being a mere sop by those who want to change the order of things, whatever that might be. Consultation is frequently used; it is a basic part of the planning process. Often, members of the public make representations based on planning law, the NPPF and local plans, but nevertheless the developers overcome those objections. It is the same with changes to the structure of local authorities. Consultation has become, “You can have your say, but in the end you’re going to be overruled”.

With something as serious as this, where land has been donated for public use for many years and held in trust—a word we need to reflect on—for public use, it should not be easy to remove that public trust, in effect removing the public from the trust. In my view, using a device called consultation is totally inadequate in those circumstances. There ought to be a different way of determining whether land should be taken out of that protection.

[Lord Jamieson (Con)]

My Lords, this is an issue that we remember well from debating the Planning and Infrastructure Bill, now an Act. I am pleased that the Government and my noble friend Lord Banner have been able to work together on this and have, I believe, come to an agreed position. I am also grateful that my noble friend has been able to lend his significant expertise to the drafting of Amendment 222C to help find a solution. However, as we are only in Committee, we will need a little more time to go through it thoroughly before we consider giving it our support.

In the meantime, can the Minister please update us on the wider review of existing protections, so that communities, local authorities and developers can have clarity about when and how land is protected, which she committed to during the passage of the Planning and Infrastructure Bill? Has this review been conducted? If so, what was the outcome and has it been published? If not, when will it be conducted?

We are also aware of the impact of the Supreme Court judgment in the Day case. That needs looking at in detail. Will the Government look into the case of Wimbledon specifically, given the enormous importance of Wimbledon to our national sporting life and the contentious issues at stake? Would a targeted inquiry into that case be appropriate? I would be grateful if the Minister could give her view on these points.