Procurement Bill [HL]

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 6th July 2022 Grand Committee

[Lord True (Con)]

In answer to an interesting question in the Chamber yesterday, I implied that my noble friend Lady Wheatcroft had not been present in Committee. I had not noticed that she was here and I personally apologised to her afterwards. But, as my remark lies in Hansard, I thought it appropriate to correct the record. My noble friend Lady Wheatcroft graciously said that she did not expect me to do this, but I think that it is the proper thing to do.

In moving Amendment 10, I will speak to this group of government amendments. Monday was difficult and, on behalf of the Government, I candidly acknowledged the contrition and sympathy that we felt about the number of amendments that were put down. I think that we have arrived at a better place. As noble Lords know, we arranged a briefing for noble Lords on today’s amendments and I am grateful to the officials who gave this at short notice. I hope that noble Lords who were not able to be there have had the chance to consider the supplementary information on the government amendments that was circulated. Officials will be available again tomorrow to provide a technical briefing for your Lordships on the remaining government amendments.

The government amendments in this group refer only to Schedule 2, which lists what is an “exempted contract”. The exemptions are not mutually exclusive and a contract can be an exempted contract if it falls under multiple paragraphs of this schedule. If a contract is exempted, its award and management will not be subject to any of the legislation, unless it is an international organisation procurement, where some obligations apply.

Amendment 10 to Schedule 2 would ensure consistency with similar drafting elsewhere in the Bill. For any of the exemptions in this schedule to apply, the subject of a contract must represent the main purpose and cannot reasonably be supplied under a separate contract. The amendment would add “reasonably” to this description and is consistent with drafting elsewhere in the Bill—for example, on mixed procurements, the duty to consider lots and estimating the value of a contract.

Amendment 11 clarifies the exemptions for vertical arrangements, which arise where a contracting authority enters into an arrangement with an organisation that is connected vertically with it—in other words, with an entity under its control, or what is called a “controlled person” in the legislation. A typical example might be a trading company set up by a local authority to fulfil a specific task, such as carrying out waste treatment and collection for the authority. We briefly discussed this on our first day, when I said that the Government would bring forward further facilitating amendments; I know that the Liberal Democrat Front Bench expressed an interest in that.

Amendment 12 deals with a consequential update to clause formatting following Amendment 11. These amendments to the definition of vertical arrangements have been tabled following some helpful feedback from stakeholders, including the Local Government Association, of which I believe I still may be a vice-president, in which case I should declare an interest. The feedback showed that the drafting did not properly provide for the fact that such arrangements may involve control by more than just one contracting authority. The government amendments therefore ensure that this exemption will continue to apply where there is joint control of the controlled person, as it does now.

Amendment 13 has two parts. The first part—the inclusion of new sub-paragraph (5)—is a result of the amendment to provide for joint control. It ensures that joint control may still be achieved where one person is representing multiple contracting authorities on the board—or similar body—of the controlled body. This continues the existing position in Regulation 12(6) of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015. The second part—the inclusion of new sub-paragraph (6)—stems from the updated definition of “contracting authority”, which means that the vertical arrangements exemption would unintentionally have allowed a wider category of organisations to access the exemptions than intended. This amendment ensures that the vertical and horizontal arrangements are available only to the intended public sector contracting authorities and not to public undertakings and private utilities, which have arrangements that reflect their more commercial nature.

Amendment 14 is a mirror of Amendment 13, for the same reasons. In this case, the purpose is to limit the availability of the horizontal arrangement exemptions to the intended public sector contracting authority recipients.

Amendments 15 and 16 remove the term “legal activity”, which is currently defined by reference to the Legal Services Act 2007, and replaces it with the term “legal services”. This is necessary because the definition in the 2007 Act is not appropriately applicable in a Scots law context. Leaving the term undefined allows the exemption flexibility to adapt to different legal systems within the confines of the remainder of the exemption.

I turn now to the final government amendment in this group. Amendment 17 adds a reference to legislation that explains the meanings of “contract of employment” and “worker’s contract” in Northern Ireland. This is a result of the talks with the Northern Ireland authorities. Adding the Northern Ireland reference again allows the exemption flexibility to adapt to different legal systems, provided that the remainder of the exemption is met. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 11A, which is an amendment to government Amendment 11. Amendment 11A is really only a place- holder to discuss some broader concepts about this Bill and about paragraph 2 of Schedule 2 in particular.

I confess that I paid little attention to the government amendments ahead of our first day in Committee. Like other noble Lords, I was completely overwhelmed by the huge groupings and the lack of explanation that arrived before they were tabled—hence, I tabled Amendment 11A only yesterday. I am certainly grateful for the explainer that was circulated yesterday. I have not yet read all 60 pages, but a reasonable summary is something like this: “We are trying to keep the new UK procurement code as close as possible to EU rules.”

This is at the heart of one of my main problems with this Bill: we have not created a UK code at all. The Bill may well have simplified or reduced the number of different sets of rules, but that has not achieved a significant simplification of the rules to any meaningful degree. Furthermore, it uses terms and concepts that are comprehensible only to procurement practitioners and in a way that is often alien to the way in which we do things in other areas. It has few principles and a whole load of pernickety rules, of which this schedule is one. In short, this is the EU way of doing things and not the UK way of doing things. I believe that we have missed an opportunity to create something that would have worked better for UK businesses and, indeed, for the UK public authorities that have to comply with it.

I turn to the specifics of Amendment 11A. The amendment would delete new sub-paragraph (2A) in Schedule 2, which is contained in my noble friend’s Amendment 11. Sub-paragraph (2A) is not new, as it rewrites sub-paragraph (2)(c) of the existing Bill. The effect of sub-paragraph (2A) denies the vertical arrangements exemption that my noble friend has just described if the body concerned has even one share held by other than a public authority. I think that this is nonsense. Holding one share or any other kind of minority holding does not change the nature of control, which is what paragraph 2 purports to base the vertical exemption on. It would restrict the exemption to bodies that are wholly owned by the public sector, in effect, and I can see no economic rationale for that.

I also want to challenge two other aspects of paragraph 2, arising out of new sub-paragraph (2B), which is a rewrite of the existing sub-paragraph (2)(b). There is one material change from the existing sub-paragraph (2)(b). It is similar to the issue that I raised in the context of Amendment 4, which we debated on our first day in Committee. The existing sub-paragraph (2)(b) refers to a person who

“exerts, or can exert, a decisive influence”.

The new version merely talks about a person who “exerts a decisive influence”. I explained on Monday that the conventional UK approach when looking at things such as control is to use a test based on the capacity to control rather than actual control. Curiously, paragraph 2 uses that concept of capacity to control because it uses the basic definition of control via the parent undertaking definition in Section 1162 of the Companies Act 2006. Under that section, control exists if a parent undertaking holds a majority of voting rights or has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the board. That is, control exists for the basic purpose of this clause if there is the ability to control, whether or not the right is used. Can my noble friend explain why the Government are using one approach to control but another for decisive influence, deliberately caused by the amendment that he has just moved?

I now turn to the concept of decisive influence itself. If someone other than a controlling authority exercises decisive influence, the vertical arrangement exemption does not apply, so it is important to find out what it means. I expected to find a definition of the term “decisive influence” in the Bill, because it is not a term that is found in general use related to companies or the control of organisations, but I cannot find a definition.

Interestingly—I say “interestingly” as I find it interesting, but I am a bit of an anorak on these things—Section 1162 of the Companies Act contains the concept of dominant influence, which is an alternative way of establishing whether a parent undertaking exists. A dominant interest is defined in Schedule 7 to that Act and requires a right to give directions to a board of directors that the board of directors has to comply with. The Companies Act does not use “decisive influence”; it uses “dominant interest”.

How then do we establish whether decisive influence exits? Do we assume that because the Bill does not use the Section 1162 definition it means something different? That might imply that it is something below the level of control, but precisely what it is getting at seems unclear. As far as I can tell, decisive influence is not a term used in English law, which comes back to my point that we are still rooting ourselves in EU law. It is found in EU competition law and, in that context, it is used as part of a rebuttable presumption of control, so that if a majority of shares are held the parent undertaking is assumed to exercise decisive influence on the subsidiary undertaking.

If it means a variant of control, we end up saying that vertical arrangements will not be exempt even if a contracting authority can control a body. If another body in fact controls that body, it does not matter if the other body can control it but does not do so; it just looks at whether it exercises control. However, the exemption is denied if a tiny fraction of the shareholding of the undertaking is held outside the public sector. There is another leg, which is if less than 80% of the activity is carried out for the contracting authority. There is a confusing set of thresholds for denying the exemption. It is even more complicated if joint control is involved, but I will not go into that. I submit that logic and common sense have somehow gone missing in paragraph 2 and that it needs a rethink.

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Moved by

[Baroness Noakes]

22: Schedule 3, page 83, line 38, leave out from “contracts” to end of line 39
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment probes what “good reasons” are acceptable for the purposes of not aggregating contracts.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 22 is in a group of rather different amendments, most of which have more meat in them than my amendment. It is a probing amendment to paragraph 4 of Schedule 3, which contains a provision to ensure that contracts are not fragmented in order to escape the value limits that govern some of the procurement rules. The basic rule in paragraph 4 is that the contracting authority has to add up the value of all the contracts if they could reasonably have been supplied under one contract.

However, paragraph 4(2) allows the contracting authority not to do this if it has “good reasons”. Amendment 22 proposes to remove this in order to find out exactly what the Government intend to allow contracting authorities to do and to probe why they have not been more specific in the Bill. At first sight, paragraph 4(2) is a massive let-out clause, enabling authorities to avoid aggregating contracts. I look forward to my noble friend the Minister’s explanation. I beg to move.

[Lord Wallace of Saltaire (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 81, which we on these Benches regard as particularly important. It would put in the Bill one of the most important decisions to take before embarking on the procurement of public goods and services: make or buy? That is the subject of an entire chapter in the Government’s own Sourcing Playbook. This key decision process is missing from the Bill. We seek to put it in as an essential part of the pre-procurement process. The choice of delivery models should be based on careful and impartial consideration of the different forms of delivery available for each type of work, supply or service.

Conservatives in Government have sometimes acted as though outsourcing to for-profit companies—often large outsourcing companies that have been labelled “strategic suppliers”—is the only model worth considering. Unless the Minister wishes to argue that The Sourcing Playbook and other recent publications on procurement guidelines are no longer operable, it seems entirely appropriate to put in the Bill that the choice between in-house and outsource should first be considered. Later, we will move other amendments on the delivery model choices between for-profit and not-for-profit provision.

We have carefully followed the Government’s own language in these publications in drafting the amendment. The Minister may argue that we should leave the Bill a skeleton as far as possible to allow Ministers as much flexibility as possible; we have heard him press the case for flexibility already. We argue the case for clarity, accountability and future-proofing. The principles of the procurement process must be in the Bill, not left for later in the policy statements issued by changing Ministers as they pass through the relevant office.

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[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I could not possibly be tempted, particularly at 8.04 pm when the Committee needs to finish shortly and I already have a very long response to a large number of amendments. The Bill does have pipeline notices, which I have discussed: I will engage with the noble Lord on that before Report and I welcome that.

Amendment 141 is about a hugely important issue to which so many noble Lords spoke. The noble Baroness seeks to amend Clause 24 to require contracting authorities to take account of accessibility and design for all principles when drawing up their terms of procurement, except in duly justified circumstances. This is an issue of fundamental importance. It is of concern for disabled people, and I know that your Lordships hold concerns about accessibility very close to their hearts; it comes up in every piece of legislation.

As part of our broader goal of a simpler regulatory framework and increased flexibility to design efficient, commercial and market-focused competitions, the Bill does not dictate how terms of procurement including technical specifications are to be drawn up, which is the issue around Clause 24. It simply contains what is prohibited by international agreements and applies to all “terms of a procurement” as defined in Clause 24(5). We believe that this approach is better than the existing approach, as buyers are forced to truly analyse and develop the content of their specifications to address the needs of all those the public contract should support.

The UK has legal obligations, which we readily own and which will dictate how terms of procurement are drawn up, with accessibility covered by Section 149 of the Equality Act 2010, as mentioned by the noble Lord opposite. We consider that helps deliver the intended outcomes of both the current duties in this area contained in Regulation 42 of the Public Contracts Regulations 2015 and of this amendment.

I have heard the very strong speeches made by noble Lords on all sides, and I have seen the submissions from the RNIB and others. It is very important that we should have constructive discussion to test whether the Bill delivers the accessibility that your Lordships hope for. The Government remain absolutely committed to ensuring that public procurement drives better outcomes for disabled people. In our contention, there is no dilution of the commitment to accessibility under the Bill. The Government are clear that accessibility criteria should always be taken into account in every procurement, and the existing legislation ensures that that is the case.

However, we will engage further on this and on the other themes and points put forward by so many noble Lords in this wide-ranging debate. In those circumstances, I respectfully request that the amendments are withdrawn and not pressed.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the only amendment that is going to be withdrawn is my rather small amendment in this group, Amendment 22. My noble friend said that we needed flexibility, and that good reasons were there to allow flexibility. I completely buy the need for flexibility in the procurement rules, but I still wonder whether good reasons without some other constraint around them are sufficient. I was pondering whether the good reasons need to be attached to value for money, or something similar. That may be covered by the interaction with Clause 11, which sets up procurement objectives, but I am probably too tired to work that out in my own mind at the moment. I will consider it further, and my noble friend the Minister, who also said he would consider it further, might like to reflect outside this Committee on how that works out. For this evening, I am sure that everyone will be mightily relieved if I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 22 withdrawn.