Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer
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Protection of Freedoms Bill
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer Excerpts(12 years, 5 months ago)
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Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer
My Lords, it is very interesting that the Opposition have chosen to table a fairly narrow amendment to RIPA to explore these issues. In fact, the criticism from the very moment that it was conceived, let alone drafted or passed into law, was that it was poorly drafted and had many problems which I shall enumerate more fully under my Amendment 128.
It is interesting that the Opposition have chosen to table such a narrow amendment. Have they ignored all the other constructive suggestions that have been made? They are focusing their attention simply on this one issue when, in fact, as the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, has pointed out, it is probably the area of RIPA with the least problems.
Lord Henley
My Lords, I am grateful for that intervention from my noble friend Lady Miller.
The measures in Clauses 37 and 38, together with the changes that we propose to make through secondary legislation, will deliver the coalition commitment to limit local authority use of RIPA—a commitment we made when the coalition came into being following the last election. The Bill also gives effect to the conclusions of the counter-terrorism review which was published in January. That review recommended two changes to the use of RIPA powers by local authorities.
First, these clauses will require that the exercise of RIPA powers by local authorities be subject to prior judicial approval. The second change, which will limit local authority use of directed surveillance to the investigation of offences which carry a maximum six-month sentence, will be implemented through secondary legislation made under RIPA. That will ensure that direct surveillance cannot be used to investigate relatively low-level matters, such as littering, dog fouling and schools enrolment, while still allowing it to be used against large-scale matters such as fly-tipping or waste-tipping, extensive criminal damage and serious or serial benefit fraud cases.
In response to representations received during the review, we have decided to make an exception to the seriousness threshold for offences relating to the underage sales of tobacco and alcohol. The investigation of those offences relies heavily on the use of directed surveillance and so in these circumstances the review concluded that it was appropriate to have a limited carve-out so that trading standards officers could continue to take effective action against businesses which seek to flout the law on age-related sales.
The conclusions of the counter-terrorism review were endorsed by my noble friend Lord Macdonald, who provided independent oversight of the conduct of the review. However, the amendment seeks a rather wider review of RIPA. I will say straightaway that, although the Government agree that it is essential that people’s privacy is protected from any unnecessary or disproportionate access by public bodies discharging their duties, this is precisely why RIPA was introduced, debated and passed by Parliament. And it is precisely why the way it is working is kept under constant review—not just by the Home Office but by the independent commissioners who report to the Prime Minister and publish annual reports which are laid before Parliament.
In bringing forward the current proposals to limit local authority use of RIPA, we are responding to public concern about a specific area in which the law operates. The measures are intended to restore confidence and ensure that any fears of future misuse are unfounded. But there is no well-founded indication that there is a need for much more fundamental reform of RIPA. Indeed, any regulatory regime would need to be built on precisely the same principles and contain the same human rights safeguards as RIPA is built on.
No one should be complacent about how our right to privacy is safeguarded. The measures before us come from one review and were endorsed by a public consultation. We need to get on and deliver them, but I put it to the noble Lord that another review before we have delivered the recommendations of the first would be premature and no doubt expensive—I do not know how many other reviews he will propose during the passage of the Bill. We will continue to monitor how the new arrangements are working in practice and adjust our approach if necessary. The developments will be reported on also by the independent RIPA commissioner, whose published reports, as the noble Lord will be aware, are laid before Parliament each year. We are confident that the measures in the Bill, together with the associated secondary legislation introducing the seriousness threshold, will prevent local authorities using RIPA in a way that undermines public confidence. Therefore, I hope that the noble Lord will feel able withdraw his amendment.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer
My Lords, the first seven amendments in this group would enable the Committee to examine a little further the existing complicated system for administrative authorisation. Where the Bill refers to judicial authorisation, one imagines that somebody from the judiciary will authorise whichever investigatory power is being used. However, in the section in the Bill to which my amendments apply, the administrative officer and his superior agree that surveillance is necessary, and the initial authorisation remains an administrative decision that does not come into effect until the approval of a magistrate is given. However, the magistrate will not examine why authorisation is being applied for or anything about the individual concerned; it will be just a review to make sure that the process has been reasonable.
The amendments examine whether the Bill will make the system any more transparent and whether it will be any easier to challenge unfair applications through the Investigatory Powers Tribunal. They examine also whether the system will become more efficient or cheaper. I welcome the Government’s desire to bring judicial authorisation more into the system, but I wonder whether it is sufficient.
Amendment 128 is much wider. I heard the Minister reply to the previous amendment to the effect that the misuse of the Act has been sufficiently addressed, but Amendment 128 has been tabled to probe the Committee’s view on the urgency of reviewing the whole RIPA fabric. This is for several reasons. First, since RIPA was conceived back in the late 1990s, technology has moved on enormously and things are able to be done now which were unimaginable then. It has nothing to do with phone hacking and the News of the World issue—which is still illegal—but with technical and storage capacity. In the 11 years since RIPA was passed, both of those areas have changed out of all recognition.
On re-reading that Act, there appears to be an enormous patchwork of different authorisation schemes, of which this is just one example. That does not seem an efficient way to proceed. The Minister referred to the expense of reviewing. There may be an expense in the inefficiency and patchwork of systems, but what concerns me most is that there are sufficient safeguards against unnecessary and disproportionate use of the surveillance powers.
As to the sheer scale of the use of the powers, we have come to accept that their use is necessary for serious crime and terrorism issues. However, since the Bill was passed, there have been some 3 million decisions made under it by public bodies; 20,000 warrants; 4,000 authorisations for intrusive surveillance and 30,000 for directed surveillance—and that does not include the intelligence services because those figures are not made public. So there is an issue with the scale of what is happening.
The Minister may feel that an inquiry will be expensive and he may be correct—obviously it will incur some expense—but there may be savings to be made if we consider whether the kind of umbrella that RIPA provides is adequate for purpose. It seems to be an umbrella that is full of holes, not only in the authorisation process but in its classification of the different kinds of intrusions—for the sake of the Committee’s time I shall not go into them—which are immense. For example, a phone call that is listened to from outside a house and one that is listened to from inside a house with a bug are different kinds of intrusions and carry different authorisations. As far as the public are concerned, that is a complicated regime—it may be necessarily complicated—and it can pose enormous problems in the complaints procedure if an individual has been subject to that intrusion.
If, as a member of the public, you want to complain about unfair investigatory powers, it is obviously extremely difficult. I have mentioned the figure of 3 million. Out of that, 1,100 complaints have been heard by the Investigatory Powers Tribunal, of which only 10 have been upheld. That tends to suggest that there is a problem.
I am sure that many Members of the Committee have seen the thorough Justice report, Freedom from Suspicion: Surveillance Reform for a Digital Age, which lays out the issues in a detailed manner and gives all the references. Given the evidence that is presented in that report alone, Parliament has a duty to hold the kind of inquiry that Amendment 128 seeks. I beg to move.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Haskel)
Perhaps it will be for the convenience of the Committee if I explain that in an earlier edition of the groupings all the Amendments 115 to 128 were grouped. In a later edition there are two groups: first, Amendments 115 and 120 to 128; and then a second group with Amendments 116, 117, 118, 119 and 122. So there are two groups.
Baroness Miller of Chilthorne Domer
My Lords, I must congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Selsdon, on his success in having his amendment taken forward to the next stage. Every small move in this direction is very important, because, as my noble friend Lord Phillips of Sudbury said, this is a matter of civic trust. I thank the Minister for his reply. The issue of civic trust comes up because of the inability of current legislation to deal with the scale of interference in areas such as internet use. The intelligence agencies and the police have better systems in place; I have in mind instances where people do not know about the interference, such as in the BT and Phorm case. A natural tension exists: it is the duty of government to consent to intrusion in the interests of security and crime prevention, but it is the duty of Parliament to make sure that those intrusions are proportionate. Although I shall on this occasion withdraw the amendment, I hope that we will return to it. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.