(2 years, 7 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is a great pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. I entirely agree with what he has just said, and I associate myself with the other amendments in this group in speaking to Motion K1. I also refer to relevant all-party parliamentary groups of which I am an officer, and my role as a patron of the Coalition for Genocide Response.
The Minister set out the terms of Motion K1 at the beginning of our debate and explained what it does. At Second Reading, she challenged us—quite rightly—to come up with safe and legal routes, and that is what this genocide amendment seeks to do. I should say in parentheses that I am grateful to the noble Baroness, not least for the support and consideration that she gave to the amendment that I moved earlier in proceedings on this Bill, on the position of young people in Hong Kong who did not qualify under the BNO scheme but who now, under the regulations which the Government will introduce, will do. Like the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham, I also applaud what the Government have done in the case of refugees from Ukraine. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, however, I ask the question: should we not make the same provision, as far as the right to work is concerned, for all those who seek asylum in this country?
Of course, I am disappointed that the all-party amendment on genocide, which had its origins in the Yazidi genocide that began in 2014, has not been accepted by the Government. I place on record my thanks to those Conservative Members of Parliament, including former Ministers, the Opposition Front Benches and other Members of the House of Commons, for their strong and welcome support. I must admit to sharing some of the frustration that has been expressed during this debate—even bewilderment—as we heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood, and the noble Lords, Lord Cormack and Lord Horam.
I spent pretty well two decades as a Member of the other place, and I read with perplexity the debate on 22 March when the guillotine was imposed after just three hours. That was three hours of debate on amendments that had been considered one by one in your Lordships’ House in great detail and with great scrutiny: Amendments 1, 4 to 9, 52, 53, 10 to 20, 54, 2, 3, 43 to 51, and 21. All these amendments were taken together in an inevitably disjointed debate in which Members ranged across multiple issues. By way of example, in the case of the genocide amendment, it was linked with Amendment 11, on the issue of numbers coming into this country, so it was impossible even to vote with any differentiation between those amendments.
As the Minister told us earlier, the Minister in the Commons, Tom Pursglove, opposed the genocide amendment, because, he said, “many thousands” would apply for asylum. Confusingly, however, he admitted that the amendment as it left your Lordships’ House contained a cap on the numbers. Then he said that that it would put the lives of our officials in our embassies at risk. These are victims of genocide whom we are talking about. They do not pose a risk: they are hunted down by the perpetrators. It is the victims, not British officials, who are at risk. Mr Pursglove went on to argue that bespoke schemes were a better approach, but there has never been a bespoke scheme for the Yazidis or other victims of the ISIS genocide. This demonstrates that this, too, is a straw man argument.
I received an email just two days ago from one of those who works for Yazidi interests, and she told me that she believes that there is bias in the implementation of other programmes because of the exclusion of people from minorities in the leadership and oversight of these programmes. It is an issue I have previously raised, as the Minister knows, with the Home Office. My correspondent copied in the Bishop of Truro, whose excellent report is being reviewed by the Foreign Office this year. This lady said:
“We failed Yezidis who have been left to rot in tents; only 8 are recorded as resettled from Iraq and 44 from Syria, although without knowing who they are we cannot say they are truly Yezidi. I doubt the Home Office would know the difference.”
Quoting Home Office guidance about ethnic and religious minorities, she says:
“Recognising their vulnerability and ACTUALLY including them in these schemes are obviously two different things.”
For years, the Government have emphasised that Yazidis have been facing horrific atrocities, especially when Ministers have met Nadia Murad and other victims. But opening doors in “a bespoke scheme” to welcome at least some from their community simply did not happen. Let us contrast that with Canada and Germany, among others, which have provided protection.
One of those who spoke in favour of the amendment in the House of Commons was the former Conservative Minister, Tim Loughton. He and I are two of the seven parliamentarians who have been sanctioned by the Chinese Communist Party for raising what the Foreign Secretary has described as the genocide of the Uighurs. During a very helpful and encouraging meeting which sanctioned parliamentarians recently had with the Prime Minister and Elizabeth Truss, the Foreign Secretary, we were told that the Government would look again at this country’s response to genocide. I put this on record and greatly welcome what they have said. It is significant progress. Accepting today’s amendment, which would place on the Home Secretary a duty within one year to publish a report on the Government’s approach to the treatment of genocides—at least as it pertains to those seeking asylum—would be a good start. Failing that, I hope that the Minister will at least commit the Home Office to taking part, which has been promised by the Foreign Secretary and the Prime Minister, in looking again at the duties that are laid out in the 1948 convention on the crime of genocide. That requires us to prevent and protect, and to punish those responsible. Given what has been said to me, I am willing to take back this amendment this evening and not take it to a Division. Needless to say, of course, I will keep pressing the Minister until progress is made on what I regard as an incredibly important issue.
My Lords, I hesitate to rise after that excellent contribution from my noble friend Lord Alton, but I just want to express very strong support, obviously, for Motions C1 and D1 and, indeed, all the amendments in this group. I want to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and support her Amendment E1 on the right of asylum seekers to work. She made a very powerful speech, and I certainly will not repeat any of the words that she said. We can do without repetition—everybody wants to get to the votes—so I will take one minute maximum.
The main argument of the Government against this amendment is that it would be a pull factor, attracting asylum seekers to come here. It is worth mentioning at this point that there have been fully 29 academic papers assessing whether a more generous right to work has anything to do with a pull factor for asylum seekers. All those 29 academic papers showed that there was no correlation whatever between the right-to-work aspect and asylum seekers’ attraction to this country. It is also worth saying that even if this amendment passes, we would still be the toughest of all European nations—there would be seven nations then—with a six-month ban on asylum seekers seeking work. All the rest of the European countries are more generous: they have shorter bans. That is incredibly powerful.
It costs money to do this. Is it really sensible to spend an unnecessary £300 million stopping people working; albeit we only pay these people—what is it—£5.75 or something a week, plus a bit for utility bills? We could save £300 million: is that not worth doing, just to be no more ungenerous than any other country in Europe? I suggest that we should support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud.
My Lords, from these Benches, I want to speak just to Motions E and H; my noble friend Lord Paddick will speak for us on the other amendments in this group. The Commons reasons on asylum seekers’ right to work seem to be completely circular: asylum seekers should not be permitted to work because they should not be permitted to work. In a way, I cannot argue with that.
The condition that the noble Baroness has added to her amendment is completely sensible. Ministers speak about undermining our economic migration schemes. I am aware that a great many asylum seekers disappear into the black economy. That undermines an awful lot of things.
The asylum seekers in question are impelled by significant push factors. I take issue with people who find it difficult to accept that. There is a distinction between what prompts fleeing one’s own country and choosing where to go. I accept that the English language plays a part in that second matter, but it really does not deal with the Government’s position.
Leaving aside—though I do not leave it aside—the importance of work to self-worth, dignity and so on, the overwhelming majority of asylum seekers in our country, and no doubt in others, want to play their part in society and want to pay tax. They have skills they want to use and which we should want them to use. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has talked about the financial interests. I absolutely agree with her, and I am not going to repeat that. But it is in the interests of our society to allow asylum seekers to work. We support Motion E1 very enthusiastically.
With regard to family reunion, I agree completely with the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, regarding the Commons reasons and with others who have made comments on Commons procedure—it is not up to us, I suppose, to comment on it—and the importance of scrutiny. I doubt that the Commons reasons would go down very well with those many British people who have responded to the powerful images of, and other information about, families in Ukraine and leaving Ukraine which are incomplete, without husbands or fathers. The noble Lord has narrowed his amendment down, and I congratulate him on finding a way to bring it back. The crisis for Ukrainians is no different from other crises in conflict zones in countries where actions and the threat of actions against individuals are so extreme.
The noble Lord, Lord Dubs, my noble friend Lady Ludford and I have made it clear on a number of occasions, including in the various Private Members’ Bills, that what is being proposed today is the bare minimum. It is not even, in my view, the least we can do. But it is what we must do, and we support Motion H1.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I declare my interests, which include being a vice-chairman of the Human Trafficking Foundation.
I would like first to thank the Minister, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, for including me in the letter to the noble Lord, Lord Randall. Very unfortunately, the noble Lord, Lord Randall, has just tested positive for Covid, as a result of which I shall move Amendment 68A at the appropriate point on his behalf, as my name is down.
I would like to start by asking two questions of the Government. First, why do the Government, as they have for years and years, always see victims of modern slavery through the lens of immigration? It is extremely sad. In the years I have been in this House, I have fought against this, as many other noble Lords have, with absolutely no success. It remains not only in the Home Office but absolutely wedded to issues of immigration. No more stark an example of that could be seen than Part 5 of this Bill.
Secondly, why not listen to the whole modern slavery sector, opposed to the whole of Part 5, including, as we have already heard, the Salvation Army, the anti-slavery commissioner, the United Nations rapporteur and, perhaps most interestingly, Caroline Haughey QC, who has been advising the Government for many years on issues of modern slavery? The Government seem unable or unwilling to listen to a sector that knows what it is talking about. It really is extremely sad. The sector has been telling the Government this from the moment that the Bill came on the stocks.
I am also very concerned about the impact of Clauses 58 and 62, particularly in relation to the statutory guidance issued on modern slavery last month—in Committee, I read passages, which of course I will not do on Report. Throughout that statutory guidance, it is clear that those who will be dealing with potential victims of modern slavery will have to bear in mind the trauma of what they have gone through. Very careful advice is given, and particularly helpful parts are at pages 102 and 106, under Annex D, that set out the difficulties that victims of trauma have in giving appropriate and truthful answers at the very beginning. Then, for goodness’ sake, one looks at Clauses 58 and 62 and sees that, if information is not given quickly, you are seen as someone who is not reliable and likely not to be a genuine victim. It is utterly contrary to the Home Office’s own statutory guidance.
I find this absolutely astonishing, because, as all of us who have any interest in or knowledge of this area will know, it is very difficult for victims of trauma, in whatever situation, including modern slavery and human trafficking, to come clean about what really happened to them at an early stage. My goodness, Members of your Lordships’ House have now heard about this over a number of years on various Acts of Parliament. This part of Part 5 will do irreparable damage to those sort of people, who are the majority.
I turn now to children. I vividly remember talking to a Minister in this Chamber—it was probably the noble Baroness, Lady Williams—when I suggested that it was wrong for children to go through the NRM. The Minister agreed that children should not go through the NRM. Part III of the Children Act 1989 places an obligation on local authorities to take children into voluntary care when they come to their area and need help. Most children generally go through this process. The local authorities look after these children and the Modern Slavery Act has provided what we now informally call “guardians”. That is the right process.
Amendment 70ZA should not be necessary. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, quite rightly tabled it because the Government refuse to exclude children from Clauses 58 and 62, but they should not be in Part 5 at all because children, from whichever country, should be dealt with through the care service. I find it very sad that the Minister did not say in Committee, or indeed in the letter to the noble Lord, Lord Randall, which I have been able to read, that these children will not go through the NRM. He assumes that they will and they will have to be dealt with like adults. Other noble Lords have spoken about that, so I will not repeat it.
Amendment 68A is intended to do what Clause 62 requires but without being as vicious. It would ameliorate the clause and it certainly deserves to be supported, but I also support the other amendments in the group.
My Lords, I have written a short speech but I will not deliver it in view of the time pressure. I have put my name to Amendments 65 and 66. I feel very strongly that Clauses 57 and 58 show a complete lack of any understanding about the impact of trauma. Three members of my family went through a terrible trauma 10 years ago. It is only now, 10 years later, in the safe context of trauma therapy, that each of them has been able to talk at length about what they went through. The idea that traumatised people—children or adults—are expected to talk to a complete stranger early on in the process about what they have been through is terrifying. They will not be able to do it. I ask the Minister to please listen in particular to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, who really understands these things—I understand it on a personal level—the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and others, and remove the whole of Part 5. I support all the amendments in the group. Noble Lords will be glad to know that I will certainly not talk to them, but I leave that request pleading, if you like, with the Minister.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I strongly support Amendment 30. In Committee, the Minister said that the Government’s opposition to the right to work was based less on the pull factor argument than on the impact on the integrity of the labour market. That is just as well. As the noble Baroness said, we have yet to see convincing evidence of the pull factor any better than the selective and somewhat misleading quote from a study that the Minister offered in Committee. She mentioned an impact assessment on that, which I believe is yet to materialise. When can we expect it?
If we consider the numbers involved, it is difficult to see how labour market integrity will be compromised. Indeed, the combination of the effects of the Bill and the welcome promised speeding up of applications, to which Amendment 53 in the name of my noble friend Lord Coaker should add some teeth, should reduce the numbers affected significantly. I imagine that the Migration Advisory Committee will have considered the integrity of the labour market before recommending the right to work after six months and in any occupation. Yet the Minister did not even mention the MAC report raised by a number of noble Lords in Committee.
Neither did she mention the MAC’s argument, and one central to the case I made, concerning the impact of the ban on working on integration, mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, which supposedly remains a government goal. Nor did she acknowledge the statement I read out from MIN Voices, made up of asylum seekers, who said that not being able to work made them feel less than human and corroded their self-respect and dignity—again, echoing what the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, said. As the chair of Surrey Heath Conservatives pointed out on ConservativeHome —my new favourite reading—this very much chimes with Conservative values, so that in his view the ban is “fundamentally un-Conservative”.
I conclude by repeating the plea of MIN Voices’ plea to
“see us as human beings not a number. Let us build our life and future and not waste our time and skills”.
I should also mention the article by Sarah O’Connor of the Financial Times, who ended her recent analysis of the labour market implications of the ban by saying that
“if people want to work, we should let them”.
My Lords, I very strongly support this amendment, to which I have added my name.
In Committee, the Minister referred to the integrity of the labour market as a route being one reason to reject this amendment and the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, dealt with that very well, so I will not repeat her comments. The only other real argument against reducing the UK’s exceptional period before asylum seekers can apply for permission to work was, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, said, the so-called pull factor encouraging asylum seekers to come to this country. I want to say a bit more about that because it really is very difficult to take seriously under the circumstances. When Germany allows asylum seekers to work after three months, Italy after two months, Portugal after just one week, can our Government really justify the current one-year ban and argue that if we changed it, there would be this serious pull factor problem?
If the Minister accepts this amendment, we will have the same employment restriction as France, Spain, Denmark, Poland, the Netherlands, Ireland and Greece, and we would remain more restrictive than all other western European countries. Ireland was the only other western European outlier until it recently reduced its nine months restriction down to six months in 2021. This amendment would do no more than Ireland did to bring it into line with the list of countries I have already referred to.
The fact is, the UK has a longer employment restriction for asylum seekers than any other comparable country. I just feel ashamed of us, to be honest—I think it is disgraceful. Moreover, it seems the Government have no grounds to argue that enabling asylum seekers to work will, in fact, act as a pull factor. A recent review of 29 academic papers on this subject found that there was no correlation between the right to work and where people seeking asylum chose to seek protection; the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, explained that perfectly clearly so, again, I do not need to repeat her words.
The other very important reform in this amendment is to end the iniquitous limitation on asylum seekers, even after the 12-month ban, to jobs on an extremely limited shortage occupation list—I seem to remember one of them was a ballerina or something. How many asylum seekers can really take up ballet? This renders employment impossible for the vast majority of asylum seekers until their application is finally approved.
The assumption behind this amendment is that asylum seekers would, after six months, become automatically eligible for a work permit, enabling them to become self-employed or to take up any job, to pay taxes and national insurance, and so on. It will be very difficult to justify not accepting this amendment.
In summary, I do not accept the arguments put by the Minister in Committee. I just hope that she and her colleagues have reconsidered their position. On 8 December 2021, I understand that the Home Office said in a Written Statement that it had concluded its review of the current policy. This is surely a perfect moment to introduce reform.
My Lords, I join my noble friend Lady Stroud and others in strongly supporting this amendment. The proposition is that asylum seekers who have waited six months for an initial decision should be allowed the right to work.
Clearly, and as has already been said, this measure can provide important safeguards. Not being held up from work assists motivation, attitude of mind and mental health, as it also preserves dignity and protects against the danger of modern slavery. Yet it might be alleged, or wrongly assumed, that such benefits to the applicant come at a high price—even at an unacceptable price—to the host country: that the workforce would thereby become top-heavy causing much national resentment and attracting too many to come here from other countries. Yet, on all these three counts, the truth is the complete opposite.
As my noble friend Lady Stroud pointed out, 125,000 people await an asylum decision. With our current labour shortages these numbers, if allowed to work, would considerably boost our economy; that is also well recognised. Far from fear and resentment, there is wide national approval, with over 70% believing that asylum seekers in the system longer than six months should have the right to work.
(2 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I support Amendment 64, to which I have added my name. I also strongly support Amendment 65.
The right to work—and the lack of it—for asylum seekers has concerned me for a very long time. I am rather relieved finally to be able to say so. I strongly support the comments already made in excellent speeches by other noble Lords. I shall try to avoid duplication.
First, the current law forces people to try to live on £39.62 a week. We all know that this is completely impossible. Utility bills, council tax, food, transport—you name it—cannot be paid for on this sort of money. These people are forced into something that they would never dream of doing in any other circumstances. It also prevents them from earning and paying taxes. Why would the Government force able-bodied workers to be unemployed and draw benefits at a vast cost to the taxpayer? Actually, the cost is not vast; these are trifling amounts of money, but it is a cost to the taxpayer. The cost to the community is considerable. As others have said, in many cases, these effects last for a very long time.
The Government say that they have undertaken a review of the policy. I believe they have not published the results, nor given any estimate of cost. Can the Minister inform the House whether their review considered the number of normally law-abiding asylum seekers who have been driven to crime by this policy? This is the worst possible thing a Government can do. All the asylum seekers want to do is to earn, pay taxes and lead a good life. Instead, they feel that they have to do something they have never done in their lives before and never dreamed that they would do: commit crimes. Perhaps the Minister can tell us the estimated cost in the review, and whether that includes the cost of courts, prisons and police in dealing with the crimes that these people absolutely do not want to commit.
Believe it or not, 40 years ago I wrote a book about the consequences of a similar sort of policy—a rule which deprived single people of benefits after four weeks. My research showed that the rule caused a dramatic increase in crime among that population. Government officials asked for a copy of my manuscript before I published the book. The policy was immediately scrapped. It did not help the sales of my book but, nevertheless, it was worth doing. I feel that this policy has to be scrapped for exactly the same reason. Noble Lords have pointed out all sorts of other reasons, but there cannot be a government policy which drives people into crime. Continuing it cannot be justified.
My second question concerns the basic cost to the Exchequer. The voluntary sector has come up with a figure of £194 million a year. I believe this is a massive underestimate. I am quite sure the cost is far more than that when all the unintended consequences are considered—if you want to put it that way.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, and others have already dealt with the pull factor. We have the evidence. Asylum seekers who are desperate to get away from persecution, rape and other ghastly things—you name it—do not even think about the detail of what there will be when they arrive at the other end. It is just a European country. If I may say so, the pull factor is rubbish, rubbish, rubbish. If it made any sense, it would be the only possible justification for this policy. I implore the Minister to go back to colleagues and see what she can do.
My Lords, it is quite daunting to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. I very much hope that she will not be driven to writing a book about this, although if she did, maybe we would see some change.
I shall speak to Amendment 65 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, with the support of the noble Baronesses, Lady Lister, Lady Ludford and Lady Prashar. As has been discussed, this aims, quite rightly, to introduce the right to work for asylum seekers who have been in the UK for more than six months.
My noble friend the Minister will know the gist of my argument from my comments on Tuesday. I am grateful for her forbearance then. Suffice it to say, I believe that this amendment is a matter of complete common sense. It is exactly the sort of policy that should underpin global Britain’s new immigration system.
This is a moment when we have to decide who we are as a nation. We want an immigration system that takes back control—one where the British people can see that we are trying to manage our borders and are actually doing so. They can also see that we have compassion for those in need when we, as a nation, have so much already.
This is not a niche opinion. I note that all wings of the Conservative and Labour Parties, the Liberal Democrats, other Cross-Benchers and the Deputy Prime Minister support the extension of the right to work for asylum seekers.
The arguments for this right to work are overwhelming. I will restate a couple of them. I hope that it will be helpful to hear them from these Benches. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, said, the latest figures show that 125,000 people are waiting for asylum decisions. Every study shows that the net benefit to the state would be in the tens or even hundreds of millions of pounds a year in increased tax take if this measure were enacted.
The UK economy is recovering after Covid. A lot of jobs have been created but this has, in turn, created labour shortages. It makes no sense whatever for asylum seekers who can drive HGVs or serve in the NHS to be forced to sit around doing nothing for over a year while they await a decision from the Home Office. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, made that point very powerfully.
Secondly, there is very persuasive evidence that the right to work has a large, positive impact on the integration of asylum seekers who successfully settle. As other noble Lords have already mentioned, the Government’s Migration Advisory Committee recently underlined that shorter waiting times have a large, positive impact on long-term employment outcomes for asylum seekers.
As noble Lords have noted, these measures have overwhelming public support. I will mention one niche statistic. According to recent polling, 73% of red wall voters questioned support a right to work. As others have mentioned, business leaders back the easing of the ban on the right to work.
There is a basic human dignity argument for this policy. I believe that every individual should be able to support themselves and their family. I would go further and say that, as Conservatives, we believe that every family has a personal responsibility to do so where they can. I have often made the argument that work is the best route out of poverty. The aim and intention of this amendment are to do precisely that: let people support themselves and create their own pathway from poverty to prosperity while they wait for the decision.
The lack of the right to work leaves people vulnerable to exploitation, declining mental health, poverty and modern slavery. If the human dignity arguments do not seal the deal, the amendment could also be viewed as purely pragmatic. Reforms to the asylum system proposed through the Nationality and Borders Bill will take time to come into full effect. In the interim, while asylum cases are being processed, the asylum system continues to be under considerable strain. By offering asylum seekers the right to work, the Government would take pressure off themselves.
I anticipate that the Minister and other colleagues might be inclined to respond to this amendment using the pull factors argument, and I know others have addressed it. However, let me address those points from these Benches. First, it is push factors such as war and famine which drive refugees to these shores, not pull factors. If there are any pull factors, they are those which encourage people to come to the UK: our language, culture, rule of law, democracy, historic ties through the Commonwealth, family connections, and liberty, not the welfare payments.
It is worth noting that the UK is currently an outlier in enforcing a 12-month wait period for work and then placing long restrictions on which employment can be taken up. No other nation across Europe, USA, Australia or Canada has such stringent requirements. It is worth asking why they have not considered the right to work to be a pull factor. This view is totally backed by the experts. The Migration Advisory Committee underlined that there is no evidence in academic research that people decide to claim asylum based on these kinds of factors. The Home Office commissioned a study, which others have mentioned, that also shows that there is little evidence of this.
All of this is to say that I believe the Government could quite legitimately, without nervousness and in line with their poverty strategy for families working their way out of poverty, adopt this amendment that allows asylum seekers to work after six months of being in the UK.
(2 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to move Amendment 90G in my name, and to speak to some of the other amendments in the group—but, with the leave of the House, I shall not speak to all 23 of them. We now come to what the Government optimistically call “serious violence reduction orders”. These would allow the police to stop and search people without any suspicion that those targeted have anything on them that they should not legally have in their possession.
This is yet another form of stop and search without suspicion, which is notorious for three things. First, understandably, it is notoriously ineffective, even compared with stop and search based on suspicion. Secondly, it is, notoriously, disproportionately focused on black people, even compared with stop and search based on suspicion; and, as a consequence, it is notorious for the damage it causes to the relationship between the police and the communities they are supposed to help.
The Minister cited in Committee the fact that young black people are 24 times more likely to be victims of homicide than young white people. That is exactly why the police need to work together with those communities to build trust and confidence, and to demonstrate that they are on their side, and not using powers disproportionately against them, as these new powers, by the Government’s own admission, will continue to do.
It is not just me saying that disproportionate use of powers against certain communities—the very communities that need to work together with the police to tackle knife crime—is “undermining police legitimacy”. Those are the words of Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Serious violence reduction orders are likely to make serious violence worse, as they further alienate the very communities that the police need to co-operate with them to identify the perpetrators.
I was a sergeant in Brixton at the time of the Brixton riots in 1981; I was a chief inspector in Brixton 10 years later; and I was then the police commander in charge of Brixton 20 years later in 2001. In my professional judgment, serious violence reduction orders—in fact, any form of suspicionless stop and search—are counterproductive. That is why Amendment 101 would repeal Section 60 of the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. Only one in 100 Section 60 searches results in a weapon being found, and black people are 18 times more likely to be targeted by the police than white people—compared with nine times in the case of stop and search, where the police must justify their decision. I remind the House of what I said in Committee: Section 60 is not used at all in Northern Ireland for fear of the damage it would cause to police-community relations. It should not be used anywhere in the UK and should be repealed.
Amendments 90G and 90M follow the well-worn path that we on these Benches have consistently trodden, and where previous Governments have agreed with us. They realise the injustice, as we do, of allowing the breach of an order made on the balance of probabilities to be a criminal offence. When it was realised that ASBOs—the first of this kind of civil order with criminal sanctions—led to large numbers of people being criminalised, the then-Government changed course and replaced them with wholly civil orders and sanctions. The Minister in Committee cynically cited precedent for this approach, but it is an approach that we on these Benches have opposed every single time it has been proposed. Amendment 91C would also apply the higher standard of proof—beyond reasonable doubt—to renewals of SVROs. Amendment 90H, which I have signed, would disallow an SVRO being applied on the grounds that someone simply had a knife on them when an offence was committed.
The Minister’s quite extraordinary letter of 6 January tragically fails to answer my criticism, made in Committee, that someone who was carrying a knife lawfully and who did not use the knife in the commission of any offence could still be made the subject of an SVRO. The letter says:
“Whilst you are correct … this could include… where a person is caught unlawfully carrying a bladed article or offensive weapon.”
If they are caught unlawfully in possession of a bladed article or offensive weapon, they can be charged with that offence and then be made subject to an SVRO. Referring to the examples I gave—of a chef, an electrician or a Sikh in lawful possession of a knife—the letter goes on:
“In the examples outlined in the debate it would be difficult to see how a court might consider that an SVRO is necessary to protect the public.”
Is the Minster not aware of the Metropolitan Police gang matrix, where even innocent bystanders at a shooting were characterised as gang members? Any evidence, whether normally admissible in a criminal court or not—hearsay, gossip or rumour—can be given in support of an SVRO.
As the Minister has recently admitted, public trust in the police has been seriously undermined and distrust is even worse among the communities most seriously affected by knife crime. Allowing the police free rein to say whatever they want in support of an SVRO will make a rapidly deteriorating crisis of confidence in the police service even worse. Hence, Amendments 90N, 90P and 90Q would restore the standard of evidence used in the granting of SVROs to that which would have been admissible in the proceedings for the substantive offence. We also strongly support Amendments 90J, 90K and 90L but I will leave others to speak to them.
We have tabled Amendment 91A for the reasons that my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames gave in Committee. There needs to be a reasonable excuse defence for wrongly telling a police officer that they were not subject to an SVRO—something that the police officer could immediately check in any event. Amendment 91B removes the new offence of obstructing a constable in the execution of his duty in relation to SVROs as this is already covered by existing legislation. Amendment 91D limits the renewal of SVROs to a maximum of four years, allowing those subject to them to move on with their lives rather than being targeted and harassed by the police indefinitely, even if they commit no further offences.
Amendments 95A and 95B, to which I have added my name, would prevent SVROs being introduced beyond the pilot phase until a report on the pilot had been laid before Parliament and both Houses had agreed to its rollout. We need to be sure that these orders will not be counterproductive. Amendment 95C would strengthen the pilot; I am sure that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, will explain this further.
If the Government insist on proceeding with this dreadful measure, they should at least limit the damage until they are sure that it will not make matters worse. We support all the amendments in this group.
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 90H and 90J, as well as 95A, 95B and 95C, but, before going into the arguments for those amendments, I express my strong support for Amendments 90G and, indeed, all the amendments in this group. I have such considerable concerns about the detrimental impact of these serious violence reduction orders that I believe that any way in which we can limit their detrimental consequence should be supported.
I begin by addressing why I hope the Government will make adjustments to the Bill in view of those considerable concerns—expressed not just by those of us in this House but by many organisations in the community, including Amnesty International—about the severe consequences of SVROs for so many innocent young people and the need to restrict these provisions appropriately.
As Ministers know, SVROs would expand stop and search powers to enable the police to stop and search someone whenever they are in a public place, without any suspicion of current wrongdoing, simply on the basis of a past conviction that may or may not be a knife offence. The purpose of Amendments 90H and 90J is to put right this apparently unintended wrong.
The Minister repeatedly stated in Committee that
“at the point at which … someone is issued with an SVRO, they will have been convicted by the court of a knife or offensive weapon offence”.—[Official Report, 17/11/21; cols. 310-311.]
However, the legislation as it stands makes it clear that an SVRO can be issued to individuals who have not been convicted of a knife or offensive weapon offence. New Clause 324A(3) clearly allows for an SVRO to be issued if the offender had
“a bladed article or offensive weapon with them”
or, under subsection (4)—this is in many ways much worse—if the offender
“knew or ought to have known”
that someone else had a knife. This could include someone convicted of shoplifting who happened to have a penknife in their pocket. It could also—this is really important, and I hope that the Minister will respond—include people in abusive and coercive relationships, who may have known or, according to the Bill, should have known that their abuser had a knife.
Will the Minister say whether she believes that individuals involved in these ways should be regarded as having committed a knife crime and therefore liable to have an SVRO imposed? I feel quite certain—because I know the Minister and know that she has great integrity—that she will not want these people to find themselves caught up with an SVRO.
There are many reasons to amend the Bill as proposed in Amendments 90H and 90J. First, as Agenda has said, the proposed terms of an SVRO render invisible the impact of coercion in relationships experienced by many young women drawn into the criminal justice system or at risk of criminal exploitation. Ministers need to take account of a study by Metropolitan University and JENGbA which examined 109 joint enterprise cases involving women and girls, the majority of whom had convictions for serious violent offences. The study found that none of the women involved had used a deadly weapon and in 90% of cases they did not engage in violence at all. In half the cases, the women were not even present at the scene. Perhaps the Minister can comment on this study and its implications for Amendments 90H and 90J. We are simply asking the Government to adjust the Bill to bring it into line with the Conservative Party manifesto, which makes clear the aim to make
“it easier for officers to stop and search those convicted of knife crime.”
The removal of new Clause 342A (3)(b) and (4) would achieve this alignment, and I hope the Government may be willing to do that. As Minister knows, the College of Policing has expressed its concerns that the use of stop and search without an intelligence-led approach is unlikely to reduce crime.
In addition, there is no evidence to suggest that SVROs will be effective in reducing knife crime. This point brings me on to the other amendments I have tabled in this group—Amendments 95A, 95B and 95C— which focus on the need for the pilot of SVROs to be comprehensive and meaningful. Amendments 95A and 95B require a vote by both Houses. It is crucial to have this democratic control before these SVROs are introduced. This must happen under these amendments before SVROs can be commenced.
Amendment 95C strengthens the pilot to ensure that key issues are examined. A key reason why these amendments are vital is the experience of a pilot into the relaxation of the best use of stop and search safeguards. The rollout of these changes was announced by the May Government prior to the publication of the evidence arising from the pilot. The Government were forced into a U-turn by a legal action, but they have continued to refuse to publish the evidence on the grounds that they need a safe place in which to discuss changes. Are we going to be up against this sort of argument in this context? Amendments 95A and 95B would ensure publication of the evidence and parliamentary scrutiny before SVROs could be rolled out.
We know that the proposed new measures pose significant human rights impacts, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, pointed out. Black people are 18 times more likely to be stopped and searched than white people. They do not commit these crimes 18 times more than white people. Also, only 4% of stops find a weapon. The pilot will need to show that SVROs meet their stated aims of breaking the cycle of offending and protecting our communities from harm. The pilot also needs to analyse the effect upon others who will be severely affected by SVROs as the Bill stands—for example, exploited women. It is for them, in particular, that SVROs must not be applicable to people who knew or ought to have known that someone else had a knife. I am sure the Government do not wish to bring these women into the criminal justice system, as others have already said.
Amendments 95A and 95B are hugely important because they ensure that SVROs can be introduced only if Parliament is satisfied on the basis of the evidence from the pilot that they will reduce serious violent crime and that the consequences for the human rights of individuals and communities are proportionate and justified.
My Lords, I hope the House will forgive me if I say a few words in response to the Minister on Amendment 95A. The fact is that Amendments 95A and 95B would require the Government not only to lay the results of a full pilot before Parliament but to enable Parliament to decide whether SVROs should be rolled out across the country. We know that there is no evidence to suggest the wholesale expansion or extension of stop and search where there is no immediate evidence of potential wrongdoing in the situation. Therefore, all we are asking is that Parliament should be satisfied from the pilot that there is evidence that SVROs will reduce severe violence and protect communities—which we want to happen—and that that can be done without disproportionate detriment, particularly to black communities and to very vulnerable women but also to people in general.
We are asking for the pilot to be presented to Parliament and for Parliament to approve that SVROs should be rolled out. Because the Minister was unable to suggest that there should be any such democratic decision-making on this issue, I would like to test the opinion of the House on both Amendments 95A and 95B —but the vote will be on Amendment 95A, with Amendment 95B as the consequential amendment.
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, noble Lords will know that when you follow the Opposition Front Bench on a Statement you are concerned that you might have your thunder stolen, but as we are talking about drugs there was no danger of that today.
The Statement sets out the impact of the illegal drug trade on individuals, families, and the economy, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has reinforced that. What assessment have the Government made of what the impact would be if there was a regulated market for cannabis, for example? What evidence is there from other parts of the world? Did the Minister see, for example, the documentary authored by the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, the former Commissioner of the Metropolitan Police, whom the Government often rely upon to support their position, where his conclusion from looking at how such a policy operates in the United States called for a feasibility study into how such an approach could be adopted in the UK? In particular, he noted the marginal impact on drug use and the positive impact on tax income, providing resources for community policing and drug rehabilitation programmes. Does the Minister think there could be similar benefits to the UK?
The Statement talks about “a blueprint for driving drugs out of our cities, towns and villages”, but the so-called war on drugs has failed to have any impact on the demand for and use of illegal drugs. There has been temporary success in taking out county lines, which are soon replaced by others, temporary success in arresting drug dealers, who are soon replaced by rivals, and temporary success in occasionally seizing large quantities of drugs, which are dwarfed by the huge quantities of drugs that get through to users, all of which demonstrate that these so-called victories are pyrrhic. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, has already asked about what progress has been made on county lines. What evidence is there of a net reduction in county lines?
Does the Minister think the sight of the Prime Minister dressed as a police officer, as we saw on Monday, looking like Paddington Bear in fancy dress, is likely to strike terror into the hearts of drug dealers? “Tough enforcement action”, to quote the Statement—attempting to control the supply of drugs when demand for drugs continues to grow—is completely the wrong approach. It was the wrong approach at the time of prohibition in America in the 1920s and it is now. Does the Minister think that, instead of tough enforcement action, a similar approach to that taken with alcohol—a system of regulation and control to mitigate the harms caused—is what we need in relation to drugs other than alcohol?
We need to focus on demand. Behind the smokescreen of Paddington Bear against the drug dealers, there is some welcome news on that front in this Statement. Increased funding—in fact, the majority of the increase —is to support drug-dependent people to move from chronic use into recovery.
Dame Carol Black’s review called for an additional £552 million a year by year 5, on top of the baseline annual expenditure of £680 million from the public health grant, to provide a full range of high-quality drug treatment and recovery services. The Government are providing £530 million over three years—less than Carol Black was asking for in year 5 alone. In fact, Dame Carol asked for £119 million extra in year 1, £231 million extra in year 2 and £396 million extra in year 3, a total of £746 million, against the £530 million promised in the Statement. That £746 million can be achieved within the budget announced by the Government, but only if the majority of the £300 million the Government are putting into enforcement is diverted into treatment, where it would be far more effectively spent. Will the Government consider reallocating the budget even further in favour of treatment?
When the Labour Government moved cannabis from a class C to a class B controlled drug, with harsher penalties for possession and supply, there was no impact on cannabis use. Later, when the media covered the fact that excessive use of extremely strong, genetically modified cannabis, particularly by young people, could have serious health impacts on users, cannabis use declined. Does the Minister not agree that the evidence shows that a health-based approach, where demand is reduced by informing users of the danger and where the supply and strength of the drugs is controlled, is likely to be far more successful than continuing the failed and pointless war on drugs?
I am looking forward to hearing from the noble Baroness; I think I know what she is going to say.
I will respond to the noble Lords, Lord Coaker and Lord Paddick. On the impact—the question of what the problem is—I think most people would agree that illegal drugs inflict some devastating effects on a quite horrifying scale. The cost to society is colossal, running to about £20 billion a year. There were almost 3,000 deaths relating to drug misuse in 2020. This represents two-thirds of registered drug poisoning deaths and accounts for 52.3 deaths per million people. Heroin-related deaths in England have more than doubled since 2012 and make up the largest proportion of drug misuse deaths at 45%.
In 2020 alone, referrals of children suspected to be victims of county lines—I will get on to that shortly—increased by 31%. Drugs drive nearly half of all homicides and a similar proportion of acquisitive crimes such as robbery, burglary and theft. More than 3 million adults reported using drugs in England and Wales in the last year, and more than one in three 15 year-olds report having ever taken drugs.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked whether we had done an assessment on the impact of a regulated market for cannabis. I do not think we have. Our position on cannabis remains the same as the last time I spoke about this, but if I have anything new to add I will let him know.
On the additional three-year investment from April next year, the total is £900 million. There is a £300 million three-year Home Office investment, and we commit to making up to £145 million of funding available for county lines—as I said, I will get on to that in a second. There is £533 million—more than half a billion pounds—for DHSC to increase and improve treatment services, £120 million for MoJ for drug treatment and probation services, £68 million for DLUHC for treatment and support in England for those with a housing need, and £21 million for DWP to roll out individual employment support across all local authorities in England. As noble Lords can see, it is a cross-Whitehall effort—across six departments, in fact. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, talked about co-ordinated programmes. He is absolutely right: if we are operating across six departments, we must certainly have a co-ordinated approach.
The noble Lord asked whether the statistic of 1,500 county lines being shut down means we have caught 1,500 criminals or just that 1,500 phone numbers have been taken out of circulation. In the last two years, our county lines programme has delivered more than 1,500 lines closed, more than 7,400 arrests, £4.3 million in cash and significant quantities of drugs seized, and more than 4,000 vulnerable people safeguarded. It means that 1,500 active county deal lines have been closed and found to remain out of use, which is good news. Through our programme we will continue to focus on arresting and charging the line holder and securing criminal justice outcomes to ensure that we put offenders behind bars. The National County Lines Coordination Centre determines that a line is closed when there is evidence that the controlling gang is no longer capable of distributing drugs using that telephone number, with check-backs to ensure that the telephone number remains out of use.
The noble Lord also asked me how we would measure ourselves and what progress looks like. By 2024 we expect the whole-of-government mission to have prevented nearly 1,000 deaths, reversing the upward trend in drug deaths for the first time in a decade. We expect it to have delivered a phased expansion of treatment capacity, with at least 54,500 new high-quality treatment places, which would be an increase of 20%, including 21,000 places for opiate and crack users, delivering 53% of opiate and crack users into treatment. We expect at least 7,500 more treatment places for people either sleeping rough or at immediate risk of sleeping rough, which would be a 33% increase on current numbers. We expect to provide a treatment place for every offender with an addiction, because the two are so often linked.
We also expect that this strategy will have contributed to the prevention of 750,000 crimes, including 140,000 neighbourhood crimes, through increases in drug treatment. We expect it to have closed over 2,000 more county lines through our relentless and robust action to break the model and bring down the gangs running these illegal lines, and to have delivered 6,400 major and moderate disruptions—that would be a 20% increase —against the activities of organised criminals, including arresting influential suppliers, targeting their finances and dismantling their supply chains. These are the ambitions on which we should be judged.
On the noble Lord’s point that we are simply reversing the cuts made since 2010, the strategy is underpinned by a record investment of nearly £900 million of additional funding over the three years, as I said, taking the total investment in combating drugs to £3 billion over the next three years. It sets out our landmark whole-of-government approach to tackling drug misuse, with more leading departments than ever before.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, asked about county lines, on which we are already delivering real impact. In the past two years, our county lines programme has delivered more than 1,500 lines closed, as I told the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, with 7,400 arrests and £4.3 million in cash. The latest national co-ordination centre assessment of county lines shows a reduction in the total number of potentially active lines, an important point, with numbers reported to have fallen from between 800 and 1,000 in 2019-20 to 600 in 2021. There is more to be done on county lines programmes through this strategy. We will be investing up to £145 million to tackle the most violent and exploitative distribution model seen yet. We will continue funding the National County Lines Coordination Centre to provide that vital national strategic oversight. We will also focus on the largest exporter areas, alongside dedicated surge funding for local police forces to tackle county lines and grip the transport network through the dedicated British Transport Police’s county lines taskforce, invest in new technology including ANPR, and fund provision of specialist support for vulnerable children, young people and families involved in county lines activity.
We do not have plans for decriminalisation of drug possession generally. Our approach to drugs remains clear. We must prevent drug misuse in our communities and support people through treatment and recovery, which is one of the main planks of the strategy.
My Lords, in the absence of any evidence-based drug policies in this country, which would include heroin treatment centres linked to staffed consumption rooms to tackle very effectively polydrug use and heroin use, and in the absence of readily available medical cannabis to about 1 million people who need it—I could go on—can the Minister confirm that the small increase in funding for treatment envisaged in this strategy will not, even in the third year, fully compensate for the cuts in spending on treatment? Taking into account, as the Government tend not to do, the cuts to Home Office and probation service funding of treatment, as well as the funding from local authorities, can the Minister confirm that even in year 3, when the largest increase will come into play, we will not even get back to all those years ago, before the cuts began? As the Minister knows, Carol Black was prohibited from looking at any change in the law, and it is only with change in the law that one will achieve good evidence-based policies on drugs.
I think that the noble Baroness knows, even before asking the question, that we do not intend to change the law. However, I thought that she might be quite pleased by the focus of one of the pillars, which is treatment and support for drug users. She will also not be surprised to know that we do not have any plans to introduce drug consumption rooms. Anyone running them would be committing a range of offences including possession of a controlled drug and being concerned in the supply of a controlled drug. We support a range of evidence-based approaches to reduce the health-related harms of drug misuse, such as maintaining—oh, I cannot find the page in my notes, so I will get back to her on this in a second.
(2 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise to move Amendment 11, and speak to Amendments 22, 25 and 30. I thank the Minister for our very helpful meeting this morning, and for the detailed letter I received at 4 pm. I have carefully considered the points raised, and reread the letter to ensure I had understood it, but the basics facts remain the same—as I think the Minister realises—and I will do my best to explain them.
My comments also apply to Amendment 25, but I will focus on the three identical amendments to the three clauses. They ensure that disclosure of information by one public body to another under Part 2 of the Bill does not contravene data protection legislation. This is an incredibly important principle, yet the data sharing provisions in Part 2, as the Bill stands, would enable data protection legislation to be breached. Data protection legislation does permit information to be shared for the purposes of preventing crime, which is important too. If Amendment 11, along with identical Amendments 22 and 30, is passed, personal data could be passed to be police, but professionals could not be forced to do so against their professional judgment. That is the key principle we want to achieve.
The Minister’s letter says that the data shared under the duty is intended primarily to consist of aggregated and anonymous data, et cetera. But we have to focus on what the Bill says, rather than what our excellent Minister may intend. As I said to her this morning, if our Minister were Home Secretary, I might be content with the wording in the Bill, on this issue—I am not sure about everything else—as I have great respect for both our Ministers.
The Minister also says the duty applies to duty holders, not directly to front-line professionals, including youth and social workers. But it is these professionals who hold the information which the police may find helpful, not directors of social services, for example.
It is vital that, if we are to deal with serious violent crime, we do not undermine prevention work. It is therefore important that young people trust their teachers and youth workers. We believe these professionals must be able to exercise their professional judgment about whether it is more effective and important, in preventing serious violence, to be able to continue working with vulnerable and potentially dangerous young people to steer them away from drugs and crime, or to pass on information to the police. There will be times when the sharing of information with the police may be the first, and immediate, priority. However, if in the professional judgment of the teacher or youth worker working with the young people is the top priority, then she or he must be able to exercise that judgment, in my view.
The Minister is likely to argue that the modification of the disclosure of information legislation envisaged in the Bill is similar to that in other Bills and therefore should be accepted. We had a lengthy discussion on that issue this morning. On checking these other Bills it appears the context is quite different, as is the nature of the information that may be shared. The closest example is the Environment Act, which uses similar wording to that in Clause 9, under which information sharing may be required. However, in the Environment Act, this relates to whether public authorities are complying with environmental legislation; it has nothing to do with personal information for law enforcement purposes, which is an entirely different matter. The Medicines and Medical Devices Act only requires information to be shared without consent in a veterinary context—you cannot really ask a cow for her consent to pass on information about her. Therefore, this is not relevant to this Bill.
It seems the Government may not have drawn the right conclusions from the criticism of the Met Police’s gangs matrix system. As the Minister knows, Corey Junior Davis was murdered after his details in the Met Police’s gangs matrix were shared and fell into the wrong hands.
The system that produced that breach is being reproduced in the Bill. Surely, we will see replicated across the country other harms generated by the Met Police’s gangs matrix: young people losing college places that would probably have given them a route out of trouble; the application of eviction notices likely to lead them on a downward spiral of drugs and crime; and endless costly and pointless stop and searches, thereby undermining young people. We could also expect a repeat across the country of the discriminatory profiling that was inherent in the Met Police’s gangs matrix.
I very much welcome the Government’s acceptance of the need to respect the professional judgment of medical and social care personnel. All that we are asking for in the amendment and, indeed, the other two in the group is that the same respect for personal judgment be applied to teachers and youth workers as the Government now recognise should be given to doctors and others. Without these amendments, the work of the key public servants to prevent serious violence will be jeopardised, an issue that I should have thought the Government would be concerned about.
The Bill also gives the police the power to monitor compliance with the duty to require other bodies to share information with them, and it gives the Secretary of State enforcement powers to back those police powers. The amendment offers vital protection for professionals in exercising their judgment on how best to reduce serious violence by their clients.
The Minister has said that the collection of data is necessary in order to identify the kinds of serious violence that occur in an area and, so far as it is possible to do so, their causes, and then prepare and implement a strategy with bespoke local solutions. I am sure that the Minister knows that no personal information is required in order to do that. It is well established that anonymous data is sufficient to develop appropriate strategies. The draft statutory guidance says that most information will be depersonalised, but it does not say in what circumstances it will not. If it were clear that it was all about professional judgment, that would be fine—and that is what we are seeking.
These are incredibly modest amendments that, added to the government amendments, would go some way towards protecting the efficacy of our public services and enable young people to benefit from preventive and therapeutic interventions. These are the best hope of preventing serious violence over many years. We are not talking just about a one-off crime here. We are talking about the culture and style of life, and these public servants are working on the front line to try to divert these young people into education, training, jobs and so on. Instead of doing that, it is a huge thing to somehow divert those people into the criminal justice system. Punitive responses are never the right answer to vulnerability and deprivation—generally the backdrop to serious violence.
My Lords, I thank the Minister and her officials in the Home Office and the Department of Health and Social Care for meeting me, the noble Lord, Lord Ribeiro, the General Medical Council, the British Medical Association and the National Data Guardian, and for listening carefully and agreeing that a patient’s personal information should not be disclosed under regulations made under Clauses 9, 15 or 16 by a health or social care authority, which currently includes a clinical commissioning group in England and a local health board in Wales, or under regulations made under those clauses. However, I wonder whether the Minister can help me and confirm that Clause 17, where the Secretary of State can instruct the transfer of information, even if a specified authority refused, will definitely not apply to patient data.
I am entirely supportive of the amendments in the group tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and my noble friend Lord Paddick. While I am grateful that the Government have recognised that there is something particular about a patient’s personal health data, there still remains the issue relating to staff in a specified authority being asked to hand over personal data to the police and other bodies. There are some roles, such as youth workers and children’s home workers, where trust has had to be built up with the people who come to them. Any data relating to those at-risk people, whether potentially violent or potential victims, should not do anything to harm that relationship. As the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has said, anonymised data can be used.
As we know from doctors’ and nurses’ ethical arrangements, there are exceptional times when it is important for such information to be passed to the authorities. I believe that we can rely on the workers in other sectors to see that responsibility. Amendment 24 specifically sets out the ethical and legal rules that should apply.
Finally, I believe that the Secretary of State should not have these powers, however rarely they might be used, so I also support my noble friend Lord Paddick’s Amendment 35.
My understanding is that the police are able to require information to be given and Clause 17 gives the Secretary of State the power to reinforce that. As the Minister suggested this morning, the matter would then have to be determined in the courts. This is really the nub of it. We want professionals to feel able to undertake their work to prevent serious violence, with children and young people who really are pretty problematic, without feeling that, in the end, it will go to court to decide whether they are allowed to exercise their professional judgment.
If the noble Baroness will be patient, I will get on to Clauses 16 and 17 in just a second.
Going back to Clause 15, this will permit, but not mandate, authorities to disclose information to each other. It simply ensures that there is a legislative basis in place to enable information to be shared between all authorities exercising functions under Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Bill. The clause also ensures that any disclosures must only be made in compliance with data protection legislation and cannot be made if certain prohibitions on disclosure set out in the Investigatory Powers Act 2016 apply.
Clause 16 provides a power for a local policing body—a PCC or equivalent—to request information from a specified authority, educational authority, prison or youth custody authority for the purposes of enabling or assisting the local policing body to exercise its role to assist duty holders and monitor its functions to prevent and reduce serious violence. While Clause 16 places a statutory requirement on the specified authority, education authority, prison or youth custody authority to comply with such a request, a disclosure is not required if it would contravene data protection legislation or prohibitions in specified parts of the IPA 2016. The provision does not place any mandatory requirements directly on individual professionals to disclose information they hold under the duty, be that confidential information or otherwise.
There are also a number of safeguards in relation to the information that can be required. As proposed by government Amendment 20, local policing bodies must request only information already held by that authority. Requests must be related to the organisation or function to whom the request is made, except when functions are contracted out. Additionally, the information supplied under Clause 16 must be used by only the local policing body that receives it to enable or assist that body to assist the relevant authorities or monitor the activity it undertakes under the duty. The information received is not therefore to be used or disclosed onwards to any other bodies for other purposes, such as law enforcement.
It is against that backdrop that we need to consider the provisions in each of Clauses 9, 15 and 16 which Amendments 11, 22 and 30 seek to strike out. These provisions state that, in determining whether a disclosure would contravene the data protection legislation,
“the power conferred by this section is to be taken into account”.
This allows the power or duty to disclose to be taken into account when determining the impact of the data protection legislation. This is to preserve the effect of the data protection legislation, dealing with the logical difficulties that can arise where an information-sharing gateway, such as that proposed by these provisions, prevents disclosure in breach of the data protection legislation, but the data protection legislation allows a disclosure which is required or permitted by the enactment. This is to ensure that these provisions can be taken into account when authorities are determining the legal basis for processing data under Article 6 of the UK GDPR.
This Bill is by no means unique in including this drafting. The provisions have been used for a number of other information-sharing clauses, including most recently the Environment Act 2021 and the Forensic Science Regulator Act 2021. I know that I am not allowed props in your Lordships’ House, but if I hold up the list to myself, there are a huge number of Bills to which this pertains. This is a standard provision. I also reiterate that both Clause 15 and regulations made under Clause 9 provide for permissive gateways, meaning that they do not impose any obligation to share information. That is a crucial point.
On Amendment 25, I totally agree that any decision to disclose an individual’s personal data should not be taken lightly. The rationale for not excluding all personal data sharing under the duty is clear. Private and confidential health data has a unique status and needs special protection or trust between patients and doctors. That could be undermined, with individuals actually going as far as to avoid treatment for fear of their data being shared. However, in order for the duty to be effective, we really must still support sharing of case-specific information on individuals at risk to both safeguard them and support vital interventions; I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, agrees with that point. Decisions about whether disclosures of personal data can lawfully be made under these provisions would always need to be made on a case-by-case basis, and always in line with data protection legislation.
As I said in previous debates, we are not seeking to replace existing data-sharing agreements or protocols, including those under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. All authorities subject to the duty should have clear processes and principles in place for sharing information and data. Any and all exchanges of data and information under Clauses 15 and 16 or regulations made under Clause 9 must not contravene existing data protection legislation or provisions of the IPA 2016.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. Amendment 18 seeks to ensure that relevant authorities are obliged to comply with the serious violence duty only to the extent that it does not conflict with its other statutory duties. We do not support this amendment, as it is essential that all relevant authorities are legally required to collaborate with the specified authorities or with other education, prison or youth custody authorities in their work to prevent and reduce serious violence when requested to do so, and to carry out any actions placed on them in the strategy. There are already sufficient safeguards in place, including considering whether the request is deemed to be disproportionate to the local serious violence threat level, whether it would be incompatible with an existing statutory duty or, indeed, whether it would have an adverse effect on the exercise of the authority’s functions, or would mean that the authority incurred unreasonable cost. In determining whether any of those conditions apply, the cumulative effect of complying with duties under Clause 14 must be taken into account.
We think that this approach strikes the right balance in ensuring that institutions which are affected by serious violence, or may have a valuable contribution to make to local partnership efforts, will be drawn into the work of the local partnership without placing unnecessary burdens on those which may not. This approach is also consistent with the structures and processes in place for existing safeguarding legislation and would allow for an effective and targeted approach within both the education and prison sectors.
Amendments 24, 32 and 33 require that any information disclosed under Clauses 15 or 16 or under regulations made under Clause 9 must comply with any duty of confidence owed by the person making the disclosure, where disclosure would amount to a breach of that duty, the Human Rights Act 1998, the Equality Act 2010, the data protection legislation, the Investigatory Powers Act 2016, and any other restriction on the disclosure of information, however imposed. In addition, Amendment 33 also specifies that no regulations may be published under Clause 9(2) prior to the Secretary of State publishing an equality impact assessment, a data protection impact assessment and a description of any guidance or codes of practice.
My Lords, as I understand it, they must be read with Article 6 of the GDPR, so it is a read-across. Yes, I am tired—my brain is not working very fast today.
Clauses 9, 15 and 16 also already ensure that data can be disclosed only in compliance with the data protection legislation; I mentioned that that requires a case-by-case consideration of the necessity and proportionality of a disclosure.
Obligations of confidence and other restrictions on disclosure are not breached by a disclosure under Clauses 15 or 16, or regulations made under Clause 9, but patient information and personal information held by a health or social care authority should not be shared in line with our proposed amendments, as it is vital that authorities are able to share their data when necessary to determine what is causing serious violence in local areas. Our draft statutory guidance provides some additional steers on this, and the guidance will be subject to formal consultation following Royal Assent and can be revised if it needs further clarification.
I turn to Clause 17, and first I shall answer a point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton. A direction under Clause 17 cannot be made to require information requested under Clause 16 to be provided if the information is patient information or if the health or social care authority is requested to provide personal information. I hope that she finds that clarification helpful.
Amendment 35 strikes out Clause 17, which confers a power on the Secretary of State to direct a specified authority, educational, prison or youth custody authority, where it has failed to discharge its duty imposed under the Bill. I assure the House that we expect these powers to be seldom used and utilised only when all other means of securing compliance have been exhausted. However, in order for this duty to be effective, there needs to be a system in place to ensure that specified authorities comply with the legal requirements that we are proposing to help prevent and reduce serious violence.
I hope, in the light of my explanation, that the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, will be content not to press their amendments and support the government amendments.
My Lords, first, I thank the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, very much for their support for these amendments and their excellent contributions, and I thank all other noble Lords who have contributed today—in particular the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, who has been very helpful behind the scenes, despite a slight issue this evening, as we know.
I thank the Minister for her reply. Her remarks must have left noble Lords completely confused because, of course, if these clauses really were benign, we would not have Amnesty International, Liberty and about a dozen other organisations desperate for these amendments to pass this evening. The fact is that they are not benign, and I congratulate the Minister on the brilliant wording that has somehow left me bemused, along I am sure with everybody else in this Chamber.
I regard the issue of the ability of professionals to exercise their professional judgment in deciding whether to pass information to the police, which could jeopardise the very vulnerable young people they are working with, as a very important issue of principle. It is for that reason that I wish to test the opinion of the House—albeit I know our numbers are severely limited at this very late hour—and call a vote.
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberI rise to explore whether Clause 17 should in fact stand part of the Bill. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, for his support. He knows a great deal more about all this than I do. I will focus my remarks on Clause 17(1)(a), which refers to Clause 16(4). That subsection makes clear that a person employed by any specified authority who is requested to supply information to a policing body must comply with the request. Of course, these bodies may include a health authority as well as an education authority, prison authority, youth custody authority or any other authority named by the Secretary of State.
My objections to Clause 17, if I have understood it correctly—and I am humble enough to know that I may not have—are rooted in my objections to the earlier clauses requiring disclosure of information by public servants to the police. Clause 17 seems to add insult to injury by giving the Secretary of State powers to issue directions to any public servant failing to provide information in order to secure compliance with the duty. Clause 17 goes on to say that a direction can be enforced by a mandatory order. Can the Minister assure the House that these clauses exclude the disclosure of information that could identify an individual? This is vital, as the Minister knows—and I have a great regard for our Minister, who understands these things.
A doctor or teacher, for example, may take the view that to pass information that risks identifying a patient, pupil or other individual to the police would be contrary to the interests of that person and would not contribute significantly to preventing or reducing serious violence. They may make a professional judgment not to disclose information that could identify a patient, pupil or other. I seriously question the Government’s proposals in Clause 17, unless this issue can be clarified.
For example, a patient may suffer from mental health problems and may be causing difficulties, but may still be making good progress in a therapeutic programme. It is likely to be utterly destructive to draw that person to the attention of the police. Likewise, if a child has severe behavioural problems at school, is vulnerable and is being targeted by a drug dealer but has agreed to co-operate with a cognitive behaviour programme and other support designed to deal with his or her problems, it would be incredibly damaging to involve the police at this point. That child could be driven into a life of drugs and crime instead of being carefully steered away from such a path.
Having worked as a social worker many decades ago—goodness knows how many—and worked with families with problems, and having also been on the Police Complaints Authority for nine years, I think I can look at these issues from both points of view. I have considerable regard for the police, despite being—indeed, perhaps because I was—involved in investigating complaints against the police for all those years. I understand that they do want information about young people who may be committing crimes. The noble Baroness, Lady Williams, knows well my view that a radical review of our Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 to focus on drug treatment, rather than criminalising sick addicts, would be a great deal more fruitful in reducing drug abuse and serious violence, including county lines, than this Bill, the serious violence prevention orders and these disclosure clauses.
I hope that the Minister will explain what penalties the Government have in mind if a public servant fails to provide information in accordance with a mandatory order. Are the Government at risk of criminalising public servants? I hope the Minister can reassure the House on these issues and that she will, if necessary, seek the agreement of her colleagues to reconsider the approach in Clause 17 before Report. I look forward to her reply.
My Lords, I have to support what I have just heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, for reasons we began to articulate on Monday evening. Noble Lords will remember we began to have a discussion about what is to be shared and in what circumstances existing duties of confidence and existing professional duties need to be overtaken in the public interest. But who decides? The Minister kindly gave me a very specific answer at one point in our discussion, when she said that it will be decided by the person who holds the data, but, obviously, that can be subject to challenge. That of course is my traditional understanding of professional confidence.
Way before this, and way before the Crime and Disorder Act, that was the traditional position: if the doctor, the teacher or whoever is not minded to hand over to the police the data about a specific person, or more general data, the police will have to go to the courts and try to get a warrant. That is the place for those hopefully rare disputes between professionals and the police, who are coming at this from different positions, to be decided, rather than being decided by direction from the Secretary of State.
Of course, normally, we want the health professionals, the policing professionals and the educational professionals to be working in discussion and collaboration, but, where there is a rare dispute because of their different professional angles and ethics, it really is for a judge to decide and not for the Secretary of State to trump all those existing ethics and duties. I think the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, is nodding at me. That is the concern I hope the Minister can address in her explanation and defence of Clause 17.
I am grateful to the Minister. I think I need to read what she said and compare it with what is in other clauses in the Bill because, although it is difficult to hold everything in one’s head, I am not sure that everything she said is consistent with what is in the Bill.
However, there are two specific questions that the Minister did not answer. The noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, asked what the sanction would be for failure to comply. Is it right that a mandatory order is an order of the Administrative Court to comply with a legal duty, and therefore failure to comply with a mandatory order would be in contempt of court? The second question, which I asked, was: can the Minister give examples of where public authorities involved in preventing and tackling serious violence have obstructed the efforts to achieve those objectives? If not, why is the clause necessary? I do not expect the Minister to have examples at her fingertips but perhaps she could write.
I thank the Minister for her response on Clause 17. However, I wish to express a bit of concern. Although she assured the Committee that an individual doctor or youth worker would not be required to provide information, nevertheless an authority might well provide information, without consulting the individual doctor or youth worker, that would identify individuals who were receiving services in that authority. After the Minister’s response, I am not at all clear that we can be completely sure that this will not happen; I believe that there should be some wording in these clauses to specify that information from authorities about individuals would not be accepted if they provided it. This is an incredibly dangerous situation if individuals find that their authority has been divulging information to the police; it could destroy the efficacy of our public services—it is that serious.
I am not trying to be awkward; I just feel that we need some assurances in these clauses that individuals will not need to be concerned about the disclosure of information about them. Various subsections in Clauses 15 and 16 and so on indicate that, in looking at data protection, you must take account of the regulations in this Act. It is quite complex but it is not reassuring, if I may say so.
My Lords, I am keen for this not to be left hanging in uncertainty. Perhaps a bit of further explanation will be helpful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Meacher and Lady Chakrabarti, and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick.
This is a backstop power that will be used rarely. However, if needed, it could be utilised; for example, where one of the specified authorities fails to participate in the preparation of the local strategy. If a direction was issued and the authority still refused to comply—that was the question asked by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick—on the basis that it believed that doing so would breach data protection legislation, the Secretary of State would need to apply for a mandatory order and the court would ultimately decide, but I do not think that there is any question of breaching data protection legislation.
(3 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I am sorry; I have a bit of asthma having had Covid last December, so I am not wearing a mask, and I have cut my speech somewhat. I hope I get through it.
I give notice of my intention to oppose the Questions that Clauses 9, 15 and 16 stand part of the Bill. The noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Moylan, will respond to Amendment 65, and I very much agree with their concerns.
Amendments 34 and 60 would ensure that public authorities were obliged to comply with the serious violence duty to co-operate only to the extent that such co-operation did not conflict with their other statutory duties. Of course I wholeheartedly support helpful co-operation between statutory authorities, but not at the expense of the public services that we treasure so much. The work of doctors, teachers and other public servants relies considerably on the trust of their patients, students and others. If it became known, as it would do, that these public servants were working with the police and possibly divulging information to the police about them, it would have catastrophic consequences for those public services. I am sure that the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Moylan, and others will elaborate on this concern, but will the Minister do all she can to ensure that the Government table amendments to deal with these concerns about these demands on our public servants?
Clause 14 focuses on collaboration between educational, prison and youth custody authorities to prevent and reduce serious violence in an area. Of course, the aim is admirable. However, the three clauses, Clauses 9, 15 and 16, introduce the authorisation of disclosure of information by staff within the authorities listed in Clause 9(3). That list includes the prospect of the Secretary of State authorising disclosure not only by the named authorities—the local policing authority, educational authority, prison authority and youth custody authority—but, under subsection (3)(a), any other specified authority. This could, therefore, include doctors and other staff in a health authority, or staff from any other authority. Perhaps the Minister can explain what the Government have in mind.
It is helpful to consider these three clauses together, because they all relate to disclosure and all raise very concerning issues about the potential for regulations under this Act to take precedence over confidentiality obligations or even the Data Protection Act. Clause 9(4) says that a disclosure of information authorised by this section
“does not breach … any obligation of confidence owed by the person making the disclosure, or … any other restriction on the disclosure of information (however imposed).”
In my view, those words, setting aside these protections, are really concerning. Admittedly that is in order to achieve an important objective—reducing violent crime—but nevertheless it is unacceptable to do this.
Clause 9(5) suggests that the regulations should not contravene the data protection legislation. Fine, but the next phrase, in brackets, seems to undermine that commitment, which surely is important and should not be undermined:
“(but in determining whether a disclosure would do so”—
that is, contravene the data protection legislation—
“any power conferred by the regulations”
to the Bill
“is to be taken into account)”.
This provision reduces existing safeguards and protections. Clauses 15 and 16 use almost identical language to Clause 9, but Clause 16 focuses on the supply of information to local policing bodies. That would appear to be covered by Clause 15. This is not a matter of concern to me but it seems somehow extraordinarily shoddy to have a completely unnecessary clause in a Bill—unless the Minister can explain why it is there.
It would be most helpful if the Minister could clarify whether Clauses 9, 15 and 16 in fact provide for the regulations to the Bill to override or weaken the power of the data protection legislation and other confidentiality obligations of statutory authorities. If they do, the implications for trust in public services are devastating. The duty gives the police the power to require information from the named and unnamed statutory authorities, and mandates widespread data sharing without proper safeguards.
I want to focus for a minute on the fact that these clauses put on a statutory footing many of the failings identified by the Information Commissioner’s Office and MOPAC of the Met Police’s gangs matrix. The stated aim of the matrix was to enable the Met to identify and keep track of people involved in gangs—a laudable aim indeed. However, data sharing between the police and other agencies without safeguards meant that a stigmatising red flag followed people in their interactions not only with the police but with other service providers, including housing, education and jobcentres.
Some 78% of the people on the matrix were black, despite black people being responsible for just 27% of serious youth crime. Are we going to see a similar result across the country as a result of these clauses? Perhaps the Minister can explain. Some 75% of the people on the matrix had been victims of violence themselves but were still subject to enforcement-led interventions. The lifestyle consequences for people on the matrix, 40% of whom were not suspected of any violence, were appalling. People lost college places; others were threatened with eviction or, for example, were forced to report to the police in London despite having started a course at Cambridge University.
Can the Minister respond to the very real anxieties that the Bill, particularly Clauses 9, 15 and 16, will be counterproductive and lead to serious injustices, as was seen in the Metropolitan Police? Far from preventing serious violence, the risk is that these provisions will make it very difficult for young people to escape a life of drugs and crime and to turn to education and work as the way forward. No doubt the Minister is aware that the Met Police’s gangs matrix remains under review after the Information Commissioner’s Office ordered the force to rectify its breaches of data protection laws. The clauses seem to make lawful across the country the very same problems that the Met was criticised for and which caused such harms.
The clauses risk undermining trust in our local public services, thus undermining all the good work done by our committed doctors, teachers, youth workers and others, as well as trapping young people in a life of crime. I look forward to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, the hour is late. Might the noble Lord permit me to discuss, perhaps in the next few days, the seeming contradiction between those two things?
My Lords, as the Minister says, the hour is indeed late. I thank the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Moylan, in particular for their support, and other noble Lords for their speeches. I was going to make a rather similar point to the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, because the Minister made this provision sound very amenable and voluntary—“Don’t worry about it. There is no problem with trust. It is all just about general information.” That is not my reading of these clauses at all.
The noble Lord, Lord Paddick, made one issue very clear, but there are actually various bits of these clauses that build that general picture of anything but voluntary disclosure. There is a lot about modifying data protection and so on.
I hope that, one way or another, we can have a discussion with the Minister before Report because, otherwise, I fear that we will have to bring these amendments, or something like them, back. We would much prefer to sort this out, if we possibly can. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, this is indeed an important piece of legislation, which has some useful proposals but could do so much more to reduce crime. Instead, it could deepen existing problems within the criminal justice system. In these few minutes, I want to touch on just a few issues.
On crime reduction, the worst aspect of the Bill is the absence of any attempt to prevent serious crime through radical reform of our drug laws. There is also the absence of any reference to the need to extend the use of restorative justice. These are two huge gaps in the Bill.
To refer to a key innovation in the Bill, I share the considerable concerns of the interested NGOs and many noble Lords about the proposed serious violence reduction orders. I understand that serious violence certainly needs to be tackled more effectively than at present, but it should not be as proposed in the Bill. At our recent meeting, the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, which others have mentioned and of which I am a member, expressed concern about the powers delegated to the Secretary of State to issue guidance on the exercise of police functions in relation to these orders. Such guidance could increase the risks of harm to innocent individuals and yet have no parliamentary oversight. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, set out, we have other concerns about the delegation of powers in the Bill. I want only to endorse our excellent chairman’s comments.
The gaps in the Bill are so serious that they cannot be deemed just baubles that we are trying to put on to a Christmas tree Bill; they are huge issues, with huge potential. We know that a majority of prisoners have an addiction to or problem with drugs, which undoubtedly lies behind their crimes. We also know that the proportion of inmates who report developing a drug problem in prison almost doubled to about 15% in five years. This will of course lead to more crime.
It is clear that our drug laws are dramatically increasing rather than reducing crime. We have the most draconian drug laws in western Europe yet the highest level of hard drug addiction. If this country looked at the evidence on how best to reduce drug addiction and drug harms, therefore reducing crime, this Bill would be full of drug policy reforms; instead, the topic is entirely absent. Switzerland has shown that providing legal, clean heroin in a therapeutic setting can lead to two-thirds of heroin addicts leading perfectly legal lives within 18 months. The Swiss research shows that heroin addicts typically commit 80 crimes every month. I would have thought that is the sort of reduction we would want. Portugal has shown that decriminalisation of drug use can reduce teenage addiction, increase the number of those in treatment and reduce the prison population. If we want to reduce crime even more, we should, I suppose, go even further and regulate cannabis, separating it from the hard drug market and smashing the profits of the drug dealers and criminal gangs while massively reducing crime.
The APPG on Restorative Justice has just completed an inquiry report which shows, among other very positive results, that 96% of offenders taking part in restorative justice said that the process directly increased their motivation not to reoffend—again, reducing crime. If we are serious about reducing offending, this highly cost-effective approach should surely be mainstream. One study showed that for every £1 spent on restorative justice, criminal justice agencies saved £8. The Government-commissioned Shapland reports found that restorative justice has an 85% satisfaction rate for victims. I hope the Minister will respond to these few points.
Many other issues need attention: aggressive anti-abortion protesters; hit-and-run drivers; the issue raised by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, of non-consensual, intrusive photography of women—to mention just three. We have a great deal to debate in Committee.