Children and Families Bill

Baroness Meacher Excerpts

Wednesday 16th October 2013 Grand Committee

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the noble and learned Baroness says that the judges would cope with Section 1 of the 1989 Act being amended by this but I do not think we want to wait for a judicial review as to exactly what would be meant if the new words were inserted in Section 1. If they were inserted in the form that we have in Clause 11, we would have Section 1(1) saying that welfare shall be the court’s paramount consideration—if that is not a presumption, I am even more concerned about it; then Section 1(2) saying that in dealing with delay the court shall have regard to that general principle; and then proposed new subsection 2A referring to presumption unless the contrary is shown.

I have never practised in this area so maybe it does not matter, but I am very unclear as to how weighty the contrary needs to be. To put it in different terms, are we talking about the contrary shown on a balance of probabilities or beyond reasonable doubt? The noble and learned Baroness has those words in her amendment, to which I and my noble friend Lady Walmsley, who is not in her place, have added our names. I do not think they would have the same difficulty when tied to having particular regard as they would to a presumption. I become more and more confused as to what Clause 11 means by a presumption unless the contrary is shown. A presumption is a presumption.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I rise with some trepidation to speak very briefly to Amendments 54 and 55. I welcome the comments of the noble Baroness, Lady Hughes, and the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, who both recognise that there are times when fathers are locked out of contact with their children. I applaud the Government for recognising that the involvement of both parents in a child’s life, all things being equal, will further the child’s welfare. No one would question that the child’s welfare has been and must continue to be of paramount importance. There is no question about that, but there have been times when that has been lost and the feeling has been that as long as a child has a mother, perhaps that is okay. That is my concern. I fully recognise what my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss said about the research. I am not suggesting here that there have been wholesale miscarriages of justice but every single miscarriage of justice in terms of parenting one’s own children is a personal tragedy and we therefore need to take these things extremely seriously.

This is being made worse in the modern world because fathers are often intimately involved in their child’s upbringing from birth. In my day it did not happen. Father was a long way away for quite a long time so the big bonding went on with mother, not with father. Often parents are genuinely sharing the parental role. At times a father will be the primary carer—I cannot remember fathers being primary carers in my day—or maybe a better parent than the mother. On occasions a mother may be neglectful, selfish and unloving. They may even emotionally abuse their child. Of course, all these things can apply to fathers, except that fathers, instead of emotionally abusing their child, will tend to hit out. That has been one of the big problems in decision-making on parenting, separation and childcare. As a former social worker, I can say that we found it quite easy to see a bump on someone’s head but found it very difficult to identify and to codify emotional abuse of children.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

I was simply making the fundamental point that adherence to the paramountcy of the welfare of the child is the principle that should rule in all cases without exception.

I understand the problem to which this clause is directed, and I shall not repeat what has been said about where it came from and so on. There is a possibility that Members of Parliament get a slightly distorted picture of what goes on in the courts, because the people they see at their surgeries are generally not those who have won. People do not normally come along to say how well they have got on. I have never been a Member of Parliament myself, so noble Lords will understand that I am only speculating, but that is a possibility.

I believe that all judges—family judges, magistrates and so on—recognise the importance of trying to preserve the relationship between a child and both parents. I entirely agree that that should be affirmed but what I find very dangerous—and they appear in more than one amendment—are the words “unless the contrary is shown”. One can see immediately what might happen. Let us say that the wife decides that she wants to have the child. She concentrates on proving that the father is not fit or that he has done something, unless the contrary is proved. That puts a focus on what are often the most difficult issues.

I suggest that the important factor is the relationship between both parents, as expressed in the clause, and that should be one of the factors that have to be taken into account in considering the welfare of the child. It is obviously important that the relationship with both parents should be preserved if possible. A factor in the checklist that includes that would obviate a great deal of the difficulty that this kind of clause could produce in putting a focus on one party trying to show that the other party is not suitable for some reason or other. It would be much better for the judge or magistrates, in approaching the matter, to take account of the fact that it is very much in the interests of the child and of the paramountcy of the child’s welfare that both parents take an interest and be involved. Precisely how that is done can be looked at as part of the general picture, but it strikes me that focusing on this as a separate matter is very likely to make matters worse rather than better.

It is some time since I had experience of the working of the courts but I used to, and much of what I learnt then remains with me and was part of what I had in mind when the Children Act 1989 was formulated. It is also fair to say that the criteria set out in that Act have proved to be a considerable international instrument in developing justice for children. Therefore, I have a very strong affiliation to what was in that Act and I am not keen to see it much changed. So long as the change is an improvement, I welcome it, but one has to be careful that one does not distort the principle while making improvements.

[Baroness Meacher]

The noble and learned Lord referred to the clause possibly generating parental attempts to downgrade the other parent. Does he agree that that is absolutely the norm at present? That is what parents do and women are particularly good at it. They really go for the father and try to discredit him. I suggest that we already have that in spades.

[Lord Mackay of Clashfern]

It is the job of the judge to do his or her best to lower that. As I say, it is some time since I had experience of dealing with this issue but I have had that experience. However, it is counterproductive to do the opposite and to make important, and put up as a presumption which may be rebutted, something which is absolutely at the heart of the difficulty between the parents. As the noble Baroness says, this situation often arises. I feel that a judge would be better able to keep the situation under control if he or she did not have to focus on whether or not the contrary was proved. The judge would just have to take account of the nature of the relationships and make sure that they were properly taken into account when addressing the major question of principle.