European Union (Withdrawal) Bill

Baroness McIntosh of Pickering Excerpts

Wednesday 14th March 2018 Lords Chamber

[Lord Callanan]

We have never used the term “a meaningful vote”. We recognise clearly the desirability of maximising as much as possible the time between negotiations concluding and a deal coming into force. Knowing the terms of a deal as early as possible is good for business and the public in being able to prepare.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)]

Pursuant to the earlier question, perhaps I have completely misunderstood what the Prime Minister said, but my understanding was that she promised a meaningful vote. Therefore, it would help if the Minister in summing up the debate we have just had would say what “a meaningful vote” means.

[Lord Callanan]

I have said on a number of occasions that we will put the outcome of the negotiations to a vote in this House and in the other place and of course we will respect the outcome of that vote.

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I am surrounded on this side, obviously, by people from the Labour Party. They are, on the whole, experienced at what we call compositing—it may also happen in the other parties. We have compositing meetings where a whole lot of amendments are put together—I see that we are not alone in this—and I say to the Committee and to the Government that I hope it will be possible to devise a single redrafted amendment, building on what we have heard today and on the wording of different amendments in this group, around which we can all rally. There is clearly a meeting of minds on this: there should be a timely and meaningful vote; it should be on the deal or, in the case of no deal, it should decide what happens next.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness. If she is minded to bring forward such a composite amendment, if we have established that the CRaG rules apply—this is clearly an international treaty that we are discussing—would she add that the meaningful vote in Parliament should be before votes in the national parliaments as well? That is missing from the current drafts.

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town]

My understanding is that this will not go to them. We are talking about the withdrawal deal, which will be a deal between the UK Government and the European Union. It is not a mixed agreement; it will not need to go to the parliaments and it is not a treaty. That is what all the legal advice I have had says, but I am happy to be put right. This will not go through that process. We are dealing with two things. The first is how we come out, which is the withdrawal deal. The second, quite separate thing is what will then be our relationship as a third party with the European Union, which will be the treaty. That is what will need to go through the parliaments—sadly not the Welsh Parliament, but there you are. I had understood that this is what CRaG would cover; I had not heard that quote until now.

This amendment focuses on the withdrawal deal, and it is this that should—indeed, must—be taken through Parliament in advance of the European Parliament and, even more importantly, in advance of where the Government finally get to, so that if it has gone the wrong way, we have the chance to put it right. That is what I hope we will be able to bring back on Report, but in the meantime I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

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[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

My Lords, I support the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, in this regard. My question goes to the comment of the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, about scrutiny. Of course, he is the living expert on the level of scrutiny that an Act of Parliament enjoys in each House at every stage of parliamentary procedure. If the Government are seeking by regulation to achieve the equivalent of what has previously been achieved by an Act of Parliament, do the Minister and the Government have in mind what the level of scrutiny will be? Will it be the usual statutory instrument procedure, and will it be by affirmative or negative resolution?

[Lord Goldsmith (Lab)]

My Lords, we strongly support these amendments, Amendment 153 having been co-signed by my noble friend Lady Hayter. It would remove Clause 9(2) from the Bill entirely, and the more limited Amendment 154 would remove what are probably the most damaging words from it but not the whole of it.

This is the widest of the Henry VIII powers that the Government want to take in this Bill. It would permit regulations to do anything that an Act of Parliament could do, including even amending this Bill, when an Act. Those are the words that Amendment 154, in particular, focuses on. Therefore, as has been said, we could find that, after lengthy debate and a vote in this House and in the other place, the resulting provisions so painfully and lengthily resolved could simply be removed by the decision of a Minister.

The noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, gave some examples and the noble Lord, Lord Beith, gave more dramatic examples, but the critical question is: why is this needed? First, as the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, rightly said, nobody should be misled by the words that are used. The word “modifying” might suggest at first blush that the provision is doing something less substantial, but in fact the definition of “modify” in Clause 14(1) makes it clear that it,

“includes amend, repeal or revoke”,

so the modification in question could take whole provisions away altogether.

The second point to underline—again, the noble Lords, Lord Lisvane and Lord Bilimoria, made this clear—is that what matters is not good intentions expressed at the moment by the Ministers in charge but what the Act actually provides. As parliamentarians, we would be failing in our job of scrutinising and controlling the Executive if we left Ministers with untrammelled powers simply on the basis that we would expect or hope that they would use them in a particular way or on the basis of them saying that they would not intend to use them in a particular way. That is not what we should do at all.

Therefore, it is no wonder that your Lordships’ Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, in paragraph 23 of its report, described this power as “wholly unacceptable”, and that the Constitution Committee, in paragraph 197 of its report, described it as one for which it “cannot see any justification”. I know that the Government’s argument will be that they do not know what will be in the withdrawal agreement and therefore they do not yet know what changes will need to be made, including to primary legislation—for example, to the Immigration Act. However, there is neither a need to take these powers, nor is it right to do so, for two reasons.

First, it is clear that our withdrawal must be subject to the prior enactment of a statute by Parliament approving the final terms of withdrawal—that is what Clause 9 will provide. So if the withdrawal agreement requires changes which cannot be effected by other powers—such as the power to deal with deficiencies under Clause 7—such changes can be incorporated into the statute approving the terms of withdrawal. Not only can such changes be included in that statute; they ought to be, because then they could be subject to a degree of parliamentary scrutiny. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, and the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, said about the significance of scrutiny in this context. They could be subject to the degree of parliamentary scrutiny and approval which important changes to primary legislation should require.

The Delegated Powers Committee noted:

“The Government propose to take very wide-ranging secondary and tertiary legislative powers in the Bill, which would appear to cover every possible need to deal with failures and deficiencies in retained EU law as we leave the EU. Given the sheer width of these powers, it is difficult to conceive of areas where the proposed powers are not sufficient. However if the final withdrawal agreement includes something that is not capable of being legislated for under the regulation-making powers of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, then Parliament should legislate rather than Ministers. Parliament is capable—


we all have experience of this—

“of passing urgent Bills with extraordinary expedition”.

Paragraph 197 of the Constitution Committee’s report, to similar effect, said

“As the clause 9 power cannot be used until a further Act has been passed—likely to be the withdrawal and implementation bill”—


which is what the Minister told us in a previous debate—

“we cannot see any justification for the inclusion of the power in this Bill. Parliament will be better placed to scrutinise the appropriateness of such a power, and the restrictions and safeguards it might require, when the terms of the withdrawal agreement are known”.

The committee recommended removal of that clause.

That is the answer I give to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern. I hope he knows the high regard in which I and the House hold him, but in circumstances where there is to be an Act, where there are other powers to remove and make changes, this particular wide, untrammelled power is not necessary.

In addition to the strong constitutional reasons why this extraordinary power should not be left to be used by one of the many Ministers who have the power to issue regulations is the reason that it is remarkably widely drawn. We have debated in previous amendments that the formula used here—such provision as the Minister considers appropriate—suffers from the defect that it is both subjective and open ended. As I ventured to advise your Lordships in a previous debate, speaking from my own experience as a former Minister, adviser to Ministers and a practising lawyer, the exercise of a power so broadly expressed would be difficult, if not impossible, to challenge. The noble Lord, Lord Wilson of Dinton, put it memorably in the debate last week as another example of Ministers being given plump pillows of legal protection. That is an additional reason to object to this provision.

However, the primary constitutional reason that I have tried to identify still remains. I hope therefore that, in addition to answering the questions that have been put—including the question put by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and others as to why the power is needed, and the question raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, as to the application of the Sewel convention—the Minister, when he replies, will indicate why the Government, in these circumstances, consider the power necessary; and whether they can now see, in the light of the changes made to Clause 9 and the other powers that exist, that they do not need it.

[Baroness Goldie]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Lisvane, for his contribution and other noble Lords for their comments. This has been a genuinely interesting debate on a very important issue. When I was asked to respond to this group of amendments, I suspected that I had drawn the short straw. I realise that there are various parts of this Bill which for your Lordships are indigestible, but I think that what tops the list of gastric turbulence is the deployment of Henry VIII powers. Let me start by saying that if, when I have finished speaking, it remains the view of this Committee that subsection (2) of Clause 9 is a constitutional abomination, I shall faithfully reflect that view to my colleagues in the other place who ultimately determine the Government’s position. Having given that undertaking, I hope that noble Lords will permit me the opportunity to attempt to persuade them that subsection (2) is in fact a proportionate approach to the position in which we find ourselves, a question which has been very legitimately posed by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith. For the benefit of them both, here I go.

It all starts from the Government’s commitment, which I hope is welcomed by all noble Lords, to ensuring that the outcome of the negotiations under Article 50 can be implemented in time for day one of our exit from the European Union. This Bill is designed to provide the essential legislative mechanisms to ensure that the UK statute book can continue to function once we have left the European Union. It would be wrong to pre-empt the outcome of the negotiations, and it is crucial that we have sufficient flexibility to make changes to the Bill to ensure that its provisions do not ultimately contradict the agreement that we have reached as to the terms of our withdrawal.

It is not unprecedented to create powers that are able to amend the very Bill in which they are created. Of course, we would expect the exercise of such powers to be subject to parliamentary control, as is the case within this Bill. Your Lordships may ask with some justification whether there are any precedents for this. I can point noble Lords to the Enterprise Act 2002 and the Third Parties (Rights against Insurers) Act 2010, which also confer powers to amend their own Acts. Noble Lords will note that these Acts were passed when those opposite me were sitting on the Government Benches. Arguably, we are being transparent in that we have made it explicit that this particular power might need to be used to amend the Bill once it is enacted. By doing so, we are also making it clear that the other powers in the Bill cannot be used to do so, and of course, as with all the other uses of Clause 9, it could be used only to make provisions to implement a withdrawal agreement on which Parliament would already have voted.

In the present circumstances and given the inherent uncertainty of what the withdrawal agreement will contain at the detailed level, it is vital that we are prepared for scenarios where we need to modify any Act to give effect to the withdrawal agreement in domestic legislation. It is recognised by both the Opposition and the Government that in our preferred negotiated outcome, some amendments may have to be made to the EU withdrawal Act—for example, to facilitate an implementation period. This is an inevitable consequence of the uncertainty that arises from the ongoing negotiation.

[Baroness McIntosh of Pickering]

My noble friend is referring to a situation that presumably would take place under the next Bill, when we have agreed the deal and then lay out the ground rules of the transitional arrangements and our future relationship. I am confused by what the timeframe for these regulations under Clause 9(2) will be, because subsection (4) clearly states:

“No regulations may be made under this section after exit day”.


If the Bill reaches Royal Assent by June this year, for example, how will we have enough time to scrutinise—under subsection (2)—any regulations adopted before that time? It is all very confusing.