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Baroness Levitt
Main Page: Baroness Levitt (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Levitt's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(2 weeks, 6 days ago)
Lords Chamber
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I spent 35 years at the criminal Bar as both a defender and a prosecutor, and then I spent three years as a Crown Court judge dealing with jury trials. From that, it is clear to me that our criminal courts are under pressure that is unlike anything I have seen in my professional career. From inside the system, every day it can be seen that delay is not just a question of statistics but a daily reality that shapes the experience of victims and defendants, and, increasingly, takes a toll on the judges, advocates and court staff who work tirelessly to keep the system functioning. This is not spoken about as much.
There is insufficient time in this debate to explore the recruitment and retention crisis at the criminal Bar, or its looming equivalent in the judiciary, but, in summary, it is contributed to by the working conditions created by the backlog, which puts pressure on the system to speed up throughput, sometimes at the expense of careful consideration of an individual case. That is not justice; it is administrative crisis management, and it is not good enough. We can therefore all probably agree that the Bill matters, but it may be less easy to agree on what to do about it.
What I say next is said with great affection for my own profession: lawyers have a tendency to regard procedural reform as the first sign of constitutional collapse; experience suggests otherwise. The history of criminal justice is a history of adaptation. The question is not whether change should occur, because change has always occurred; the question is whether it leaves the system fairer, more effective and better able to deliver justice. Some of the debate generated by the Bill has proceeded as though jury trial were the only fair means by which guilt or innocence can be determined. With respect, that has never been the position in England and Wales. The vast majority of criminal cases—usually some 90%—are and have always been dealt with by magistrates. I am a supporter of jury trial; it is one of the strengths of our system, but we have to be honest and realistic: it is expensive and time-consuming. That is precisely why, throughout our history, we have reserved it for cases Parliament regarded as sufficiently serious to justify that expenditure of time and resources.
However, what is meant by the most serious cases changes over time, and every Government redraw the line as to which cases require it. That is why we no longer use juries to try breathalyser cases, as we did in the 1970s. The system was adjusted so that drink-driving cases were dealt with by magistrates, and rightly so.
Whenever somebody suggests that only a jury can be trusted to determine guilt or innocence in a fair way, I find myself wondering what precisely it is that they are saying about magistrates. Lay magistrates—a majority—are members of the public, just like juries. They give their time voluntarily; they bring experience, judgment and common sense; and throughout my career, I saw them dealing conscientiously and fairly with difficult cases. Magistrates deserve recognition as a cornerstone of our system, not dismissal as a second-class form of justice.
There is an uncomfortable truth which we owe it to the public to acknowledge: at present, there are too many cases going to the Crown Court. We also have to recognise that delay does not only affect victims and innocent defendants; it also changes behaviour within the system. The question before us is not whether defendants deserve protection—of course they do—but protecting the innocent cannot be at the expense of allowing the guilty to play the system. Every Crown Court judge has encountered cases where one cannot help wondering whether a guilty plea owes as much to the attractions of delay as it does to the merits of the defence. A defendant may calculate that, by contesting the case, they can secure not merely this Christmas at home but perhaps the next one as well, and possibly even the one after that—and perhaps, if they are lucky, in the end the victim will just give up.
A justice system that rewards delay should not be surprised when delay becomes part of the strategy. There were certainly occasions during my time on the Bench when I looked at a case in the Crown Court and found myself asking, “What exactly is that case doing here?” We should trust our magistrates to decide where the justice of the case means that it should be tried—and we can trust them. Even in the system as it operates at the moment, the statistics show that magistrates often err on the side of caution by sending cases to the Crown Court where the eventual sentence was actually lower than the one the magistrates could have passed.
The Bill is not simply an exercise in reducing a backlog; it is an opportunity to address aspects of the criminal justice system that have required attention for years. Take appeals from the magistrates’ court. I have never really understood a process that effectively says, “You’ve had a trial before a properly constituted court. You didn’t like the outcome. So, now you can have another go in front of another court”. That may have made sense in the days when there was no accurate record of what had happened in the magistrates’ court. But in the 21st century, the recording and transcription of magistrates’ court proceedings can—and is—going to happen. So, only those cases where there is an arguable appeal should go ahead, and that is of course exactly what happens in every other court, including appeal from the Crown Court to the Court of Appeal.
My concern about the current system of magistrates’ court appeals is not in fact principally that it is grossly inefficient—even though it is—but that it is also unfair. Behind many of those appeals is a victim: someone who thought that the process had finally ended with the conviction but who will now be required to relive the entire experience again, in all likelihood months, if not years, later. A proper appeals system is not about giving defendants a second bite at the cherry; it is about the convicting the guilty while acquitting the innocent.
This Government have rightly assessed that to improve the criminal justice system requires investment and efficiency, but the modelling makes it absolutely clear that alone these are not enough; there must also be sensible modernisation of our procedures. The question before us is not whether reform is risk-free—it never is. The real danger is not that we change too much, but that we change too little, too late. After a lifetime practising in the criminal courts, I have concluded that the public care far less about preserving our procedures than they do about actually receiving justice in a timely way. So, our duty is to preserve what is best in the system, reform what is not, and leave behind a criminal justice system that works better than the one we inherited.
Baroness Levitt
Main Page: Baroness Levitt (Labour - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Levitt's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(6 days, 20 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)
My Lords, the backlogs are now so great, and the delays in trials taking place so vast, that we are talking about cases being listed two or three years in the future, which is a hopeless situation for witnesses, victims, complainants and, of course, defendants. Some sort of structural change is necessary, but the question is what form it should take.
As I made clear at Second Reading, I do not have a difficulty with courts making the decision about where cases should be allocated, rather than defendants. In fact, granting defendants that right is comparatively unusual across the common-law world and does not even exist universally across the United Kingdom. It is not the system that pertains in Scotland, and I imagine your Lordships would all agree that Scotland has a civilised, decent and fair legal system—that is certainly my view, as someone whose parents were natives of Scotland.
My concern, however, as I expressed at Second Reading, is whether the magistrates’ courts can cope with the new levels of work that they are going to receive. I entirely agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson of Liverpool, that it is not simply a lack of funding or the Covid pandemic that have caused the backlogs—although lack of funding has been a very significant contributor, and Governments of all persuasions have deliberately starved the justice system of cash because it was an easy target, and it is obviously true that Covid played its part. As the noble and learned Lord said, the increasing complexity of criminal trials and the bulk of evidence—CCTV evidence, DNA evidence, scientific evidence and all the rest of it—have made trials longer and contributed to the backlog.
The obvious flaw in that argument, however, when it comes to the Government’s proposed reform, is this: why would those cases be any less complicated in the magistrates’ court? How is the magistrates’ court to cope with the increasing complexity? There is no doubt at all that most of our magistrates’ courts in greater urban areas are presently in a state of chaos: the backlogs are enormous and growing; we are failing to recruit sufficient magistrates; and we do not have enough district judges. Unless we significantly increase the number of magistrates and district judges, magistrates’ courts will simply be unable to cope with the increased volume and complexity of work that is destined for those courts because of this legislation. The Government are going to have to devote significant funding to this change if it is to work.
All these issues make even more important Amendment 2, in the names of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and other noble Lords, on the question of allocation. It is going to be critical that magistrates’ courts have some allocation guidelines in this area. If not, there is an obvious risk—I speak as someone who knows a number of magistrates—that magistrates simply continue to send everything up to the Crown Court because their courts cannot cope. That will happen if there is not some form of allocation and increased funding for the magistrates’ courts. I do not say any of this with great pleasure. Funding has played a major part in the situation in which we find ourselves, and the lack of funding on the part of many Governments has been reprehensible.
Finally, I cannot support Amendment 1. Why should people of good character have more rights in our justice system than people of bad character? I practised in the criminal courts regularly for almost 40 years. I do not any more; I last did a trial in 2012. Why should defendants of bad character have fewer rights when it comes to allocation? I say this frankly and with due respect to them, but most of the defendants who I represented over my 30 or 40 years at the criminal Bar were people of bad character. I never felt that they should have fewer rights in the criminal justice system than people of good character, but that is what Amendment 1 proposes, and I am surprised that it does so. Allocation should apply according to fair and rational guidelines, regardless of the character of the individual who is being allocated.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I speak in support of Clause 1. At its heart, this clause raises a simple question: do we trust magistrates? Throughout my professional life, I have regarded magistrates as one of the great strengths of our criminal justice system. Every single day, magistrates determine guilt. They pass sentence and make decisions that affect liberty, livelihoods and futures. If they can be trusted to do that, why can they not be trusted to decide where a case should be tried? That is the question I have yet to hear satisfactorily answered by the opponents of Clause 1.
Some argue that magistrates may underestimate the seriousness of a case. My experience suggests the opposite; magistrates frequently err on the side of caution. Indeed, many cases sent to the Crown Court ultimately result in sentences that magistrates themselves could have imposed. If there is a tendency, it broadly appears to be towards caution, not recklessness. With respect to my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti—with whom I agree on almost everything, but not on this occasion—I am slightly mystified by the suggestion that magistrates are going to keep the person of good character in a magistrates’ court but send a serial shoplifter to the Crown Court. My instinct is that rather the opposite is likely to happen. I could not agree more with the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, that all those who appear before the courts must be treated in exactly the same way.
I am a strong supporter of jury trial; it is one of the strengths of our constitution. However, it does not follow that every case capable of being tried by a jury must be tried by a jury. If that were the principle, the vast majority of criminal cases presently heard by magistrates would need to be transferred back to the Crown Court, and nobody is sensibly arguing for that. Magistrates’ courts do not provide some lesser form of justice, and lay magistrates, like jurors, are members of the public performing a public duty; both reflect the principle that justice should not be administered exclusively by professionals.
As has been frequently said at Second Reading and during this debate, more than 90% of criminal cases are dealt with in the magistrates’ court, and without lay magistrates the system simply would not function. Throughout my career, I have seen magistrates approach difficult cases conscientiously, thoughtfully and fairly. They have earned the confidence of judges, practitioners and the communities which they serve, and they have earned the confidence of Parliament as well. Clause 1 does not ask the magistrates to undertake some radical new judicial function. It asks Parliament to trust them with a decision that is modest when compared with the responsibilities they already discharge every day. The real question is not whether magistrates are ready for this responsibility; it is whether we are prepared to recognise the responsibility they already shoulder.
Lord Young of Acton (Con)
My Lords, in supporting Amendment 5, in my name, I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union.
I agree with all those noble Lords who have spoken already and expressed reservations about Clause 1, but, if we are going to have to live with Clause 1, I want to suggest ways in which it could be improved by exempting certain classes of offences from it. My amendment would exempt from Clause 1 the removal of the right to trial by jury for those accused of speech offences that are currently triable either way.
The argument for doing this is that whether someone is guilty of one of these offences depends on where the line is drawn, and that question hinges on the meaning of words such as insulting, threatening, abusive, harassment, alarm, distress and grossly offensive, or whether something has a tendency to deprave and corrupt. There are often no hard and fast rules when it comes to understanding or interpreting the meaning of those words, and no unambiguous statutes or precedents that a judge can refer to. Instead, it comes down to a moral judgment about what is and is not socially acceptable. When it comes to making those kinds of decisions, that is properly a matter for a jury, not a judge.
That is not just my view. In Brutus v Cozens, a case heard before the House of Lords in 1973, the Lords held that the meaning of an ordinary word such as “insulting” is not a question of law. It is a question about ordinary language and ordinary standards and where the line should be drawn, and such matters are best left to juries composed of ordinary people, not experts in law.
There is another reason for maintaining the “either way” status of the particular speech offences listed in my amendment. According to research carried out by the Free Speech Union, people charged with speech offences are twice as likely to be acquitted in the Crown Court as they are in the magistrates’ court. That is to say, juries are more tolerant when it comes to what speech is or is not socially acceptable.
I will give an example. In 2024, shortly after the Southport attack, an ex-Royal Marine called Jamie Michael, who was under the false impression that the attack had been carried out by an undocumented migrant, put out a video on Facebook urging his followers to protest outside the offices of elected politicians against illegal immigration. He did not use any racial epithets and he made a point of stressing that such protests should be peaceful. A complaint was made to the police by a member of staff of a Member of the Welsh Parliament, and he was charged with stirring up racial hatred, the maximum sentence for which is seven years in prison. The Free Speech Union found him a good solicitor and barrister, he pleaded not guilty and it took a jury a grand total of 17 minutes to acquit him. Would a magistrate have acquitted him in the same way? I doubt it.
When it comes to our fundamental right to freedom of speech, which is, after all, the most important right, because without it we would not be able to defend any of the others, I urge noble Lords to continue to entrust it to 12 ordinary Britons, who have proven to be a reliable guide to where to draw the line, as they did in the Lady Chatterley trial and have done so often since.