Resolution of Central Counterparties (Modified Application of Corporate Law and Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2023

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Monday 20th November 2023 Grand Committee

In summary, these regulations will help ensure that there is a robust resolution regime in place for CCPs, protecting public funds and the financial stability of the United Kingdom. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, when the original legislation that sits behind all this was debated in the House—for many hours—I remember a conversation afterwards with one of the clerks, who had sat through nearly all of the proceedings. The clerk said to me, “I have sat in this House for years and have been through many debates of all kinds, but this is the first time I have sat through a debate and not understood a single word of the entire discussion”. I am feeling some brotherhood with that clerk at the moment. I remember the past, but I have to admit that I still find utterly daunting the complexity of CCPs and the various pieces of legislation.

I have been digging through my memory and am trying to understand whether these SIs are essentially tidying-up measures designed to give more flexibility to the Bank of England—in its role as the resolution authority—in somewhat changed circumstances, and measures to increase its efficiency. I ask the Minister: is there anything in here to which she would draw our attention as representing a more fundamental change? I admit that I cannot find it, but I thought I should ask the question, given the narrowness of my understanding of this complexity.

As I remember, the resolution of the insolvency of a CCP was structured using a waterfall of liability. First, equity and the CCP came into use, and, after that, if necessary, so did a default fund, to which the clearing members had contributed. My colleague, my noble friend Lord Sharkey, and I pushed on this question, because it seemed apparent to us that the combination of equity and a default fund could work if, say, one clearing member collapsed, or perhaps even two. But, if the collapse were systemic, very quickly only the taxpayer would have the resource to step in. The taxpayer would need to do so immediately to prevent chaos in the financial sector nationally and, probably, globally. The Minister will be aware that virtually all CCPs around the globe essentially have common ownership and, in many ways, need to be looked at almost as a network, rather than a series of individual operations—certainly when one thinks about resolution.

So we asked the then Minister—I believe it was the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon—to clarify why members should not be forced to make bigger contributions in the case of insolvency, above and beyond equity and the default fund, because, obviously, sitting behind CCPs are huge banking institutions and, in other cases, oil companies. As I remember, we were told that, if faced with additional liability, those who operate or participate in the CCPs would choose to use exchanges outside, rather than inside, the UK. So, do these additional SIs empower the Bank of England to require members to make additional cash contributions? I am somewhat concerned that the negative SI—which we are not debating today but which sits with these, as the Minister rightly said—and its cash call powers might have that possibility. I am not saying that I am opposed to that, but I just wonder whether the Minister can do anything to help me understand it and whether there are therefore any implications for the attractiveness of the UK as a location for clearing.

The Minister kindly assured all of us that assets held in the CCPs as margin—collateral, in effect—are fully protected, and there are no implications for netting or off-set. I think I have understood that correctly. But, in a dynamic situation, there must be some adjustment to netting and off-set because, if there is an insolvency, changes in value take place on a moment-by-moment basis. Is there a way to encapsulate how that piece of it works? I am concerned about saying that there are absolutely no implications for netting and off-set, when it is very hard to see that there would not be in an insolvency situation.

I just want to confirm again with the Minister that the “no creditor worse off” safeguard is still fully robust and whether the SIs—the negative and the positive together—weaken it in any way. Is the taxpayer liability, as the ultimate backstop, changed at all by these SIs? Are there, therefore, any implications for public sector net debt? In other words, regarding this liability to act as the rescuer of last resort—it is implicit in CCPs because we are looking at a “too big to fail” situation if we have systemic insolvency—are there any accounting implications for the national debt? Is there any possibility that these changes would drive towards putting the liability on the books?

The notional value of outstanding over-the-counter derivates, which represent the largest body cleared through CCPs, exceeds $600 trillion at any point in time. What is now LCH—I still call it the London Clearing House—dominates that market. A third of that business reflects the clearance of euro-based derivatives under an equivalence granted by the European Commission for UK clearing houses. However, that will last only until June 2025. I know that the City and the Treasury are convinced that the EU will extend that equivalence grant out of necessity, but if it does not, the implications for the City of London will be huge. This is not a time for complacency. I ask again: are there any competitive issues to which we should be alerted in these SIs and which may have consequences for either the EU grant of equivalence or our dealing with the consequences if that grant is not given?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by warmly welcoming the Minister to her new role. I very much look forward to working with her in the months ahead.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

May I offer my apologies for not having welcomed the Minister to her role? We talk to each other across the House so often that I hardly realised a change had happened; I apologise.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

As the Explanatory Memoranda accompanying these two SIs note, the current CCP regime was implemented around a decade ago, in part as a response to the global financial crisis. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 has introduced an expanded CCP resolution regime, with that Act giving the Bank of England, as the UK’s resolution authority, what the Government call

“an expanded toolkit to mitigate the risk and impact of a CCP failure and the subsequent risks to financial stability and public funds.”

Preserving market stability is of paramount importance. The UK’s financial services industry plays a vital role in boosting economic growth and delivering skilled jobs in every part of the UK. Almost 2.5 million people are employed in financial services, with two-thirds of those jobs based outside London, and the sector contributes more than £170 billion a year to GDP.

The City of London is one of only two global financial capitals and is at the very heart of the international monetary system. The UK’s reputation and success as a leading international financial centre depends on high standards of regulation as well as a stable and independent regulatory regime. Much of what is being implemented by these two SIs is a carryover between the old and new CCP regimes. Paragraph 3 of the impact assessment outlines that, if these steps were not taken, it

“would mean that there is no protection in place to ensure that the Bank’s powers do not disrupt normal market procedure.”

We therefore fully support both these SIs.

However, I want to ask the Minister a number of questions. First, an issue frequently raised with this type of SI is the sheer breadth of legislation that it tends to amend and the difficulty that those in the sector may face in familiarising themselves with all the changes once they have taken effect. The first of the SIs we are debating today makes a long list of changes to corporate law to ensure that the new Schedule 11 CCP regime will function effectively. The second SI somehow manages to be even more technical; it deals with partial property transfers and the writing down of liabilities, needed to ensure that they do not disrupt the new system’s operation. I ask the Minister, therefore, how interested parties will be, or have been, notified of the contents of these instruments, and when the guidance referenced in paragraph 11.1 of both Explanatory Memoranda will be laid. Will that guidance be laid before Parliament, or at least sent to the relevant parliamentary committees?