Resolution of Central Counterparties (Modified Application of Corporate Law and Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2023

Monday 20th November 2023 Grand Committee

Considered in Grand Committee

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Moved by

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton]

That the Grand Committee do consider the Resolution of Central Counterparties (Modified Application of Corporate Law and Consequential Amendments) Regulations 2023.

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Vere of Norbiton) (Con)]

My Lords, these draft regulations make necessary technical and consequential legislative changes and provide legal protection for contractual arrangements to ensure that the expanded resolution regime for central counterparties, or CCPs, operates as intended.

Resolution is the framework for managing the failure of certain financial institutions. Within this framework, the Bank of England is the UK’s resolution authority and leads on resolution processes once instigated. The UK’s current resolution regime for banks and building societies was introduced in 2009, and this was partially extended to CCPs in 2014. A new, bespoke and expanded regime for CCPs was created this year through Schedule 11 to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023.

CCPs are firms that provide clearing services for large volumes of financial trading activity. They sit between buyers and sellers and guarantee the terms of the trade. They are systemically important pieces of market infrastructure—without them, the financial system cannot function effectively. The failure of a CCP and the resulting loss of its clearing services could lead to serious consequences for financial markets, financial stability and public funds. The UK’s expanded CCP resolution regime will enhance the Bank of England’s resolution powers and ensure that the UK is aligned with international standards on CCP resolution. To fully implement the expanded CCP resolution regime, the Government must lay a number of statutory instruments. Two of these are being debated by your Lordships’ House today.

The first set of regulations, the Resolution of Central Counterparties (Modified Application of Corporate Law and Consequential Amendments) Regulations, make the necessary changes to existing legislation to ensure that the expanded CCP resolution regime can function as intended. These modifications have two main parts. The regulations will ensure that resolution powers under Schedule 11 will continue to be treated in a similar way to the existing CCP resolution regime in the Banking Act 2009. This largely consists of mirroring changes made under the Banking Act to the Companies Acts 1989 and 2006.

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Secondly, the regulations make wider consequential amendments to broadly ensure that the consequences for CCPs of the use of resolution tools are consistent across the existing and expanded regimes, and that the Bank of England can continue to use its powers in a similar way to now. For example, the regulations ensure that corporation tax and stamp duty are applied and disapplied in the same way under the expanded regime as under the existing regime. They also disapply shareholders’ rights to call general meetings and amend the articles of association of the company in a resolution, and allow for appropriate disclosure of confidential information in a resolution. All this underpins the Bank of England’s ability to act quickly and effectively when resolving a CCP.

On the second set of regulations—the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 (Resolution of Central Counterparties: Partial Property Transfers and Safeguarding of Protected Arrangements) Regulations—Schedule 11 gives the Bank of England the power to make partial property transfer and write-down instruments when resolving a CCP. These regulations ensure that these instruments do not affect protected arrangements that underpin the effective operation of financial markets, including set-off and netting arrangements.

Netting is one of the mechanisms through which a CCP reduces risk in financial markets. Multiple financial obligations are aggregated to create a single net obligation amount. Given the importance of this function to the operation of clearing services, these safeguarding regulations ensure that set-off and netting arrangements are protected when the Bank of England uses its property transfer powers. This is particularly relevant for partial property transfers, where the Bank of England can transfer all or some of the rights and liabilities of a CCP. For example, the regulations provide that the property or rights against which a liability is secured cannot be transferred unless the liability is also transferred. This ensures that these arrangements are maintained throughout a resolution, reassuring industry and minimising wider impacts on financial markets. The Bank of England also has the power to write down liabilities, meaning it can cancel, modify or change a security or the form of an unsecured liability owed to the CCP.

In summary, the regulations ensure that usual market practice continues and disruption to financial markets is minimised when the Bank of England takes action, while also providing certainty for market participants as to how they will be treated during any resolution proceeding. Together, these regulations ensure that a resolution can be conducted as effectively as possible, while reducing the impact on normal market functions.

In addition to the regulations I have outlined which are being debated by your Lordships’ Committee today, the Government have also laid before Parliament two statutory instruments subject to the negative procedure that are required when the new regime comes into force. The first set of these regulations relates to the use of cash-call powers. These regulations set out the maximum amounts of cash the Bank of England can require clearing members to pay through a cash-call instrument. The second set of regulations sets out the process by which the Bank of England can waive, suspend, or subsequently enforce a provision it has made in a resolution instrument. If all the SIs relating to the regime pass through Parliament, the expanded resolution regime will come into force on 31 December.

The Government have worked closely with the financial services industry in preparing this package of legislation and consulted on the expansion of the CCP resolution regime in 2021. Those engaging with the consultation and in industry engagement sessions were broadly supportive of the proposed framework. The Treasury is also advised by a CCP Resolution Liaison Panel, which comprises industry and regulator stakeholders. The panel was instituted earlier this year and was consulted on the substance of these statutory instruments.

In summary, these regulations will help ensure that there is a robust resolution regime in place for CCPs, protecting public funds and the financial stability of the United Kingdom. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, when the original legislation that sits behind all this was debated in the House—for many hours—I remember a conversation afterwards with one of the clerks, who had sat through nearly all of the proceedings. The clerk said to me, “I have sat in this House for years and have been through many debates of all kinds, but this is the first time I have sat through a debate and not understood a single word of the entire discussion”. I am feeling some brotherhood with that clerk at the moment. I remember the past, but I have to admit that I still find utterly daunting the complexity of CCPs and the various pieces of legislation.

I have been digging through my memory and am trying to understand whether these SIs are essentially tidying-up measures designed to give more flexibility to the Bank of England—in its role as the resolution authority—in somewhat changed circumstances, and measures to increase its efficiency. I ask the Minister: is there anything in here to which she would draw our attention as representing a more fundamental change? I admit that I cannot find it, but I thought I should ask the question, given the narrowness of my understanding of this complexity.

As I remember, the resolution of the insolvency of a CCP was structured using a waterfall of liability. First, equity and the CCP came into use, and, after that, if necessary, so did a default fund, to which the clearing members had contributed. My colleague, my noble friend Lord Sharkey, and I pushed on this question, because it seemed apparent to us that the combination of equity and a default fund could work if, say, one clearing member collapsed, or perhaps even two. But, if the collapse were systemic, very quickly only the taxpayer would have the resource to step in. The taxpayer would need to do so immediately to prevent chaos in the financial sector nationally and, probably, globally. The Minister will be aware that virtually all CCPs around the globe essentially have common ownership and, in many ways, need to be looked at almost as a network, rather than a series of individual operations—certainly when one thinks about resolution.

So we asked the then Minister—I believe it was the noble Lord, Lord Sassoon—to clarify why members should not be forced to make bigger contributions in the case of insolvency, above and beyond equity and the default fund, because, obviously, sitting behind CCPs are huge banking institutions and, in other cases, oil companies. As I remember, we were told that, if faced with additional liability, those who operate or participate in the CCPs would choose to use exchanges outside, rather than inside, the UK. So, do these additional SIs empower the Bank of England to require members to make additional cash contributions? I am somewhat concerned that the negative SI—which we are not debating today but which sits with these, as the Minister rightly said—and its cash call powers might have that possibility. I am not saying that I am opposed to that, but I just wonder whether the Minister can do anything to help me understand it and whether there are therefore any implications for the attractiveness of the UK as a location for clearing.

The Minister kindly assured all of us that assets held in the CCPs as margin—collateral, in effect—are fully protected, and there are no implications for netting or off-set. I think I have understood that correctly. But, in a dynamic situation, there must be some adjustment to netting and off-set because, if there is an insolvency, changes in value take place on a moment-by-moment basis. Is there a way to encapsulate how that piece of it works? I am concerned about saying that there are absolutely no implications for netting and off-set, when it is very hard to see that there would not be in an insolvency situation.

I just want to confirm again with the Minister that the “no creditor worse off” safeguard is still fully robust and whether the SIs—the negative and the positive together—weaken it in any way. Is the taxpayer liability, as the ultimate backstop, changed at all by these SIs? Are there, therefore, any implications for public sector net debt? In other words, regarding this liability to act as the rescuer of last resort—it is implicit in CCPs because we are looking at a “too big to fail” situation if we have systemic insolvency—are there any accounting implications for the national debt? Is there any possibility that these changes would drive towards putting the liability on the books?

The notional value of outstanding over-the-counter derivates, which represent the largest body cleared through CCPs, exceeds $600 trillion at any point in time. What is now LCH—I still call it the London Clearing House—dominates that market. A third of that business reflects the clearance of euro-based derivatives under an equivalence granted by the European Commission for UK clearing houses. However, that will last only until June 2025. I know that the City and the Treasury are convinced that the EU will extend that equivalence grant out of necessity, but if it does not, the implications for the City of London will be huge. This is not a time for complacency. I ask again: are there any competitive issues to which we should be alerted in these SIs and which may have consequences for either the EU grant of equivalence or our dealing with the consequences if that grant is not given?

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by warmly welcoming the Minister to her new role. I very much look forward to working with her in the months ahead.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

May I offer my apologies for not having welcomed the Minister to her role? We talk to each other across the House so often that I hardly realised a change had happened; I apologise.

[Lord Livermore (Lab)]

As the Explanatory Memoranda accompanying these two SIs note, the current CCP regime was implemented around a decade ago, in part as a response to the global financial crisis. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2023 has introduced an expanded CCP resolution regime, with that Act giving the Bank of England, as the UK’s resolution authority, what the Government call

“an expanded toolkit to mitigate the risk and impact of a CCP failure and the subsequent risks to financial stability and public funds.”

Preserving market stability is of paramount importance. The UK’s financial services industry plays a vital role in boosting economic growth and delivering skilled jobs in every part of the UK. Almost 2.5 million people are employed in financial services, with two-thirds of those jobs based outside London, and the sector contributes more than £170 billion a year to GDP.

The City of London is one of only two global financial capitals and is at the very heart of the international monetary system. The UK’s reputation and success as a leading international financial centre depends on high standards of regulation as well as a stable and independent regulatory regime. Much of what is being implemented by these two SIs is a carryover between the old and new CCP regimes. Paragraph 3 of the impact assessment outlines that, if these steps were not taken, it

“would mean that there is no protection in place to ensure that the Bank’s powers do not disrupt normal market procedure.”

We therefore fully support both these SIs.

However, I want to ask the Minister a number of questions. First, an issue frequently raised with this type of SI is the sheer breadth of legislation that it tends to amend and the difficulty that those in the sector may face in familiarising themselves with all the changes once they have taken effect. The first of the SIs we are debating today makes a long list of changes to corporate law to ensure that the new Schedule 11 CCP regime will function effectively. The second SI somehow manages to be even more technical; it deals with partial property transfers and the writing down of liabilities, needed to ensure that they do not disrupt the new system’s operation. I ask the Minister, therefore, how interested parties will be, or have been, notified of the contents of these instruments, and when the guidance referenced in paragraph 11.1 of both Explanatory Memoranda will be laid. Will that guidance be laid before Parliament, or at least sent to the relevant parliamentary committees?

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Secondly, both Explanatory Memoranda note that a consultation on the expanded CCP regime ran in early 2021, with 14 written responses received. The impact assessments cite figures from the Futures Industry Association that point to 215 clearing members. Fourteen respondents out of 215 members feels like a very small number, even for something so specialised. Is the Minister satisfied that the consultation was sufficiently thorough? The Explanatory Memorandum goes on to state that these responses fed into the policy ultimately contained in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023, but there is no real explanation of the process. Could the Minister elaborate on how responses to the consultation were taken into account?

Finally, given that the consultation took place back in 2021, why were the changes we are debating not included in the Financial Services and Markets Act itself, rather than coming now in the form of SIs after Royal Assent? I thank the Minister in advance for her answers to the questions I have raised.

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and to the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, for their kind welcome to my new role. From Transport to Treasury—how exciting. This is indeed my first outing, and I get to do some very, let us be honest, technical SIs. Like the noble Baroness, I too looked for the exciting or the unusual in these SIs and, unfortunately, I have not necessarily succeeded either. They are important and necessary to bring the new expanded regime into operationalisation, but I do not think there is anything in them that would trouble noble Lords. Judging by the questions raised by the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, it is more about the process, making sure that people are aware and ensuring that the CCPs actually function, which the noble Baroness pointed out.

I turn first to the noble Lord’s questions, because he was kind enough to give me sight of them before the debate, which is always incredibly helpful, because I always try to do my very best. I know I will not answer all today’s questions so I will, of course, write. I will start with notifying the interested parties. It should be noted that the CCP resolution liaison panel was convened in June this year to discuss the secondary legislation under Schedule 11, including the substance of these instruments. This panel includes a variety of industry stakeholders, including the three UK CCPs, organisations that represent large numbers of clearing members, insolvency experts and regulators. We have a wide range of people there, which feeds into the noble Lord’s point that it is disappointing to receive 14 responses to a consultation. However, for a consultation such as this we got responses from trade bodies and we are satisfied that the industry is well aware of what is going on and that it will be implemented on 31 December. The panel was not only consulted on these SIs but also on the code of practice, which describes how the Bank will use its powers under Schedule 11. This will be published when the new regime comes into force.

I am content that the industry is well aware of what is happening. We will continue to liaise with the industry as the regime comes into force and as the code of practice is published. That code will, of course, be laid before Parliament and updated and reissued—and therefore re-laid—as appropriate should any amendments be made.

In addressing the consultation responses, it is fair to say that we looked at all the feedback we had from the initial consultation and covered all the issues that were raised in the response. There has been ongoing consultation since then to ensure that the detail is correct, and that the relevant trade bodies and CCPs were fully involved in ensuring that not only the provisions of the FSMA but the subsequent delegated legislation required were robust. So we have done quite a lot of consultation and I do not believe that we could have done much more. It is certainly not my feeling that we have missed anybody out or that there is a groundswell of opinion out there that people needed to be heard.

With the FSMA, we very much tried to set out which elements should be in primary legislation versus some more technical measures which should be in secondary legislation. This legislation does not change the policy set out in the FSMA; it makes necessary changes to company law, which sometimes needs to be changed separately. It creates protections for important contractual arrangements, as necessary.

Noble Lords will have noticed the cash call limit. There are some things that everybody knows may need to be lifted in 10 or 20 years’ time; these are entirely appropriate for secondary legislation.

The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked me a number of questions about the operationalisation—not only the way that these clearing houses work but who bears the biggest cost when they get into financial trouble. At the moment, given the potential impact on the UK’s financial stability from a CCP’s inability to continue to provide these clearing services, what we have done, and it is prudent to have done so, is ensure that the Bank of England has all the powers it may need in a full range of possible market stress scenarios. As the noble Baroness rightly pointed out, these things are often global and happen very quickly. Some may fare worse than others. In the unlikely event that this happens, it would be a highly unpredictable scenario. That is why we have tended more to set out a framework for how it would happen rather than go through the detail of any possible scenario.

The UK already has effective rules for CCPs’ own recovery arrangements. These include the requirement that a CCP’s total prefunded financial resources cover the losses from the default of two clearing members—not just two clearing members but those with the largest exposure. That is a fair balance between the likelihood of something happening and the necessity of tying up capital to provide a sufficient cushion. However, the Bank of England has a range of other powers that it would be able to bring to bear over the course of resolution not only on the CCPs but on those members within them to ensure that we end up with market confidence and that the system continues.

The noble Baroness mentioned “no creditor worse off”. The Treasury is required to have regard to the “no creditor worse off” safeguard in the event that a resolution occurs. Therefore, no individual will be worse off after a resolution than they would have been if the CCP had gone into insolvency. So, yes, these are not tidying-up measures but just key technical points to bring the regime into being.

I will write to the noble Baroness on how there can be no implications for set-off and netting. I understand what they are, but I want to reassure myself that I used the right words, and I will reply in writing, if that is okay. I have a little more information on whether clearing members should be required to make a bigger contribution, but I will also set that out in writing. There are probably one or two other points but, for the time being, I commend this instrument to the Committee.

Motion agreed.