UK Infrastructure Bank Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 24th May 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I was not involved with the creation of the Green Investment Bank, but I did have to sit around a table in 2015 to be lectured by Sajid Javid on why the creation of such a bank was, in the view of the Conservatives, a classic Liberal Democrat mistake. Not only did he sell off the Green Investment Bank but he was very clear that he also intended to sell off the British Business Bank and close down the industrial catalysts. It is interesting to see a Conservative Government today taking credit for a vision for which they had only withering comments not so long ago.

I recognise that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, has always been consistent. She did not approve of creating the Green Investment Bank or of a public bank as a mechanism for dealing with market failure. She may be a little disturbed to be joined by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Brixton, and potentially by the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle; I suspect a quick stiff drink may be necessary to cope with that new knowledge. However, we are where we are. My party will do everything that it can to make the UK Infrastructure Bank as effective as possible. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, that there genuinely is market failure here, and that there is a role to play.

There are a number of areas which I want to explore. The first is not within the legislation but speaks to the issue of how effective this bank can be. It is very small compared with the challenges that we face in climate change and levelling up. In many ways, this replaces not only the Green Investment Bank but the European Investment Bank, and along with the British Business Bank it also has to replace the European Investment Fund. The EIB typically provided more than £5 billion per year of financing for infrastructure in the UK. I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Wigley, for testifying that it was effective at delivering infrastructure projects in Wales. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, referred to its role in offshore wind. I saw quite a number of projects in which investors would co-invest with the EIB. It gave them confidence to go to much longer terms and to do much more subordinated lending, risks that they would not have taken without the engagement of the EIB. The EIF was also putting some half a billion pounds per year into UK equity and VC funds. This new bank has only £22 billion of financial capacity over the next five years, of which £10 billion is guarantees—a far less flexible and useful instrument.

The Government will say that the EIB had a much wider remit than the new bank, but let me say that the need for financing infrastructure development to tackle climate change and levelling up has soared in the time since we left the EU. The markets have failed to deliver on floating offshore wind, EV charging infrastructure, battery storage technology, marine and tidal energy, broadband rollout, carbon storage and capture, insulation —the list goes on. By the Government’s own figures, the OBR has said that we need something in the region of £1.4 trillion of investment by 2050 to deliver the climate change objective, and there is general consensus in the Government that we need something like £50 billion a year in additional private financing investment to achieve just the 2030 target for climate change.

We do not have the figures that we need on the huge additional demands of levelling up, especially for transport improvements across the regions. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, for making the point that we must emphasise the regions as we deal with this Bill. Major transport projects have recently been cancelled, including, ironically, the Leeds leg of HS2. That is now gone, for lack of financing. We have seen many rail electrification schemes cancelled. The noble Lord, Lord Wigley, will be very aware that electrification between Cardiff and Swansea was cancelled, again for reasons of finance.

Let us also talk about the remit. Housing, schools and hospitals are deliberately out of scope, according to the Explanatory Notes. Perhaps the Minister will tell me how the Government intend to achieve regional growth without major financing for housing, schools and hospitals. As so many people have said today, there is no mention of investment in nature, despite the high benefits of investment in agricultural improvement, woodlands and peatlands. We heard a series of helpful speeches on that. My noble friend Lord Teverson talked about the importance of biodiversity being given equal priority to climate change, the two interlinked, strengthened by comments from the noble Lords, Lord Macdonald, Lord Ravensdale and Lord Bourne, who referenced the Dasgupta report, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Young, Lady Hayman and Lady Boycott. I probably have not named everyone in that list.

There is also no mention in the Bill of energy efficiency. I thank the Government for the opportunity yesterday to ask questions of the new bank’s CEO, John Flint. He took the view that the retrofit of buildings, including home insulation, to meet climate change objectives could be included in the bank’s remit, provided the right investment vehicles could be found. I was rather dismayed that he did not seem to have much idea of what on earth those vehicles could be. We must have clarity on that issue and an emphasis on its importance. I hope that the Government will confirm that approach and inject some urgency into the new bank’s activity in this area. We know that to achieve net zero, we must deal with the demand side, including home insulation. This is even more vital given the soaring costs of energy and the cost-of-living crisis. I note that the European Investment Bank has identified energy efficiency as a sector that finds private finance particularly hard to access and is targeting support on the sector.

Of course, resources mean far more than money. We have a dire shortage of skilled workforce in the construction industry and in many aspects of relevant engineering. More than half the medium and small-sized companies in building report that they are struggling to find workers. Construction output has been declining as a consequence. Even R&D in this area is starved.

We no longer have a meaningful industrial strategy. The national infrastructure plan is not statutory and is frequently ignored by the Treasury. Even the Cycling and Walking Investment Strategy is statutory. It is unacceptable that the overall national infrastructure plan is not, particularly in the context of its need to work with the bank. The National Infrastructure Commission and the Construction Leadership Council are both pretty toothless. That must be dealt with. None is referenced in the Bill, although they would seem highly relevant. In other words, we have neither a functional strategy nor a credible delivery mechanism.

It is quite instructive to compare the legislation that created the Green Investment Bank with this legislation to create the infrastructure bank. We have moved from legislation that protected its purpose through use of primary legislation to a Bill riddled with Henry VIII clauses. There was even a clause in the GIB legislation to ensure its operational independence—it was in the Bill. The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, cut to the chase when she said that this bank is, essentially, the plaything of the Treasury. The Government can by SI change the bank’s activities or the meaning of “infrastructure”—that is extraordinary. The Treasury, not Parliament, sets its priorities. Many noble Lords, including my noble friend Lord Teverson, the noble Lords, Lord Bourne and Lord Vaux, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, focused on the Treasury’s ability to provide specific or general directions to the bank on how it is to deliver its objectives and then enforce them by injunction.

If the directors are not Treasury placemen before they are appointed, they become so by law as soon as they are appointed. Claims that this bank has operational independence seem completely inconsistent with the powers that the Treasury is given in the Bill.

Let me close with this. As so many here today have said, the infrastructure bank must be successful in crowding in private financing—and doing it by taking risk that the private sector finds unacceptable, so that it sits beneath that private sector financing. It hopes to mobilise something like £18 billion of private money in its first five years. I have already talked about that being inadequate but my question is: can it really take risks when it has only £4.5 billion in capital and a requirement to generate a commercial rate of return? Certainly in the short term—the first five years—it seems that those two parameters will make it very difficult for it to do something innovative that makes a significant difference.

However, Parliament and the public should be able to assess and react to that progress, or the lack of it. The idea that we will not even see the bank’s strategy until late June, after Committee stage, strikes me as very frustrating. We do not know what criteria it will use, how it will ensure additionality or how it will remedy market failure. It is, as so many have said today, including the noble Lords, Lord Sarfraz and Lord Vaux —speaker after speaker—completely unacceptable that the Treasury need not report to Parliament on the effectiveness or impact of the Bank for 10 years, and after that only every seven years. Frankly, that is disrespectful to Parliament.

We need a significant UK Infrastructure Bank but this Bill will need a great deal of amendment. As I listen to the House today, I suspect it will receive a great deal of amendment.

UK Infrastructure Bank Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard - Part 1
Tuesday 14th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, it is pleasure to take part in this first group of amendments on the UK Infrastructure Bank. I support Amendment 1 tabled by my noble friend Lady Noakes. When my noble friend the Minister responds, will she fully explain why the bank would not wish to come under the auspices of the financial regulators—the FCA and the PRA—and why HM Treasury would not want it to do so?

My Amendments 38 and 42 have the same purpose: to underscore in the Bill the bank’s operational independence from HM Treasury. Amendment 38 would put on the face of the Bill that the bank will be able to lend to whatever level and by whatever means it chooses without having to have recourse to HM Treasury. Does the Minister agree that this is implicit in the Bill and that to have this statement in the Bill would make absolute sense?

On Amendment 42, I agree entirely with the point alluded to by my noble friend Lady Noakes. The reason I bring Amendment 42 forward again is to further assert in the Bill that the bank should have the ability to avail itself of the capital markets. Does my noble friend the Minister agree that, again, having this provision in the Bill would clearly underscore the operational independence of the bank, which is espoused in all the briefing notes on the Bill?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, this group of amendments addresses two entirely different issues, as the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, identified. I rather fear that in the minds of the Treasury they are the same issue, which is slightly unfortunate but will probably explain a great deal of our debate today.

I will first address Amendment 42 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, which I very much support. This would allow the Bank to

“borrow on the international capital markets”,

putting that on the face of the Bill. We have a very small bank set-up here with only £4.2 billion in risk capital, which means that, for years, it will be able to do relatively little and will have to do it in such a way as to get substantial commercial returns to build up its equity base. That will allow it to grow and do rather larger things—but, since this is an important instrument for the whole goal of levelling up, you would think that impact and the need to act rapidly would be at the forefront of the Government’s thinking.

Obviously, being able to go to the international capital markets to access capital in the way that the European Investment Bank and KfW in Germany do—that is very well established—would be important. Also, given that there will be a green purpose to much that the bank does, it is important to note that one of the biggest movers in providing green financing has been the decision of the European Investment Bank as it goes to the capital markets to raise climate and sustainability awareness bonds to jet-propel finance into those markets. It is utterly beyond me to understand why those powers have not been given to the UK Infrastructure Bank; perhaps the Minister will explain.

Almost more importantly, perhaps, I want to address the issues raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson. I very much support his notion that we must find a way to incorporate the senior managers and certification regime. Frankly, it has been quite a weak straw in the hands of the FCA. I do not want to entertain folks here for too long by going through the instances in which the FCA should have used it but has declined to do so, or has used it very weakly; but at least it is something to make sure we have real responsibility sited where it should be in senior management.

I want to pick up a rather different issue, which was mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, only in passing: whistleblowing. I will talk about this in more depth in the group of amendments beginning with my Amendment 30 about the operational independence of this bank, but when we get later into the Bill we will find that a framework has been established allowing the shareholder—in other words, the Treasury and the Government—to give directions, both specific and general, to the bank. The framework elaborates on that but recognises that the board of directors of the bank may well look at these specific directions and wish to reject them. The grounds that may be given, not in a rejection but a “reservation notice” to the shareholders, include infringement of

“the requirements of propriety or regularity”

or various other things including on “value for money” or “strategic objectives” and so on; we can go into that later. In the two sections that I want to address, a reservation notice can be sent on grounds of infringement of “propriety or regularity”, or of being

“of questionable feasibility or … unethical”.

In that case, the shareholder—the Treasury, or the Government, in effect—can send a notice to the bank overriding its letter of reservation, forcing it to go ahead with the activity, even if it is considered by the bank to be unethical. The bank is supposed to provide a written direction, which, when you first read this, looks as though it will be published. However, very carefully written into the framework is the phrase

“published (unless the Shareholder has directed in writing to the Company that the matter must be kept confidential).”

I think we can guarantee that any direction that is unethical or infringes on propriety will come with an instruction to keep it confidential. At that point, for the public and Parliament to know, we rely on whistle- blowers.

That brings me to the point raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. First, directors are not covered by the Public Interest Disclosure Act anyway. Senior employees would be, but to have any protection to be able to blow the whistle they would have to go to a regulator to make a protected disclosure. There is no regulator, therefore there is no mechanism for protected disclosure.

I want noble Lords to understand the jeopardy in which those directors or senior executives might find themselves. I suspect they will have been asked to sign some version of a non-disclosure agreement—it has many different names; I always tussle with the Government, because it turns out they have done it under a different name, such as a confidentiality agreement, but it is the same thing. There is even some talk of extending the scope of the Official Secrets Act, which could creep into this as well. I also noticed that the directors—I am sure those who have been appointed are excellent people—really would be taking steps of jeopardy if they blew the whistle, because most are making their careers as advisers to government or as chairs or directors of government-related entities, so they have a great deal of jeopardy at hand.

If this is unregulated, there is no mechanism for disclosure, even where actions within the view of the directors or senior employees of the bank infringe on propriety or are unethical. I would like the Minister to explain why the Government decided that that framework should be in place. I should also like her confirmation of whether there are non-disclosure agreements or their equivalent. If she cannot at this moment, by the time we get to the group beginning with Amendment 30 she will have had the opportunity to consult the Box. It will be a yes or no answer. I am certain we must get an answer either way.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I will ask a brief question about regulation in the sense raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. Chapter 11 of the framework published by the Treasury says:

“Notwithstanding any exemptions that may apply to the Company, the Shareholder acknowledges that the provision of certain aspects of the Company’s activities may be subject to … the ‘FCA Rules’ or guidance or principles … the ‘PRA Rules’ or guidance or principles and … other applicable laws or regulations.”


Could the Minister help the Committee by saying what these “certain aspects” might be?

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

For the sake of the rest of the Committee, it may be worth me answering the noble Lord’s question during a subsequent group. I could make a good attempt now, but I think we will have a lot of discussions about the status of the framework document in the coming hours, so I want to make sure that I give the Committee the absolutely accurate answer. I undertake to do that during this Committee session.

As I was saying, the framework document outlines that UKIB has the freedom to set the pricing of its transactions, and it is already using this power. This is alongside the freedom UKIB has to set the terms and structure of its interventions, subject to delegated authority limits in place to protect the taxpayer for very large investment sizes or novel, contentious or repercussive transaction structures. UKIB can already determine the level of its own investments in line with its capitalisation and annual limits, which are agreed in its framework document. UKIB also already has the power to set the level of its lending rates.

Going any further than the existing freedom UKIB has, as this amendment seeks to do, would not be compatible with its status as a public body and would take it outside the framework through which the Treasury assures Parliament about the appropriate use of public money. With £22 billion of capital, it is right that the Government exercise some spending control to ensure it continues to meet value for money.

I further reassure noble Lords that the Government will review UKIB’s progress and financial performance by spring 2024 to ensure that it has sufficient capital to deliver its ambitions. By that stage, the bank will have closed a broader range of investments and developed a strong pipeline of further projects. I can tell my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, that, as part of this review, the Government will also consider again the question of UKIB’s regulatory position to ensure that it continues to be appropriate.

To give a brief answer to the earlier question about the framework document, it is essentially a memorandum of understanding and does have legal effect in so far as the bank can be accountable to it. I will see whether I can expand on that during discussion of subsequent groups.

I turn to the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. As she suggested, I may come back to her on the specifics when we get to the group beginning with Amendment 30, but I will reassure her now on one point. The Treasury must publish any direction that it gives to the bank. In this regard, what is set out in law in this Bill is the relevant piece of information, versus the framework document. That goes to some level of the discussion we will have when we consider what is set out in the Bill—it is the overriding thing to look at when it comes to UKIB’s operation.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Perhaps the Minister could clarify one thing for me. As I read the two documents put together, the instruction must be published but not the fact that the bank has looked at it and deemed it to be improper, infringing “propriety” or

“of questionable feasibility, or … unethical”.

In other words, that opinion of the bank can be completely suppressed, as I understand it, by the language of the Bill and of this document. If that is not correct, it would be most helpful if the Minister could tell me.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I will definitely pick up on that further point of detail, which relates closely to the noble Baroness’s question about non-disclosure agreements, to which I will seek to get an answer as we undertake consideration in Committee.

I hope that I have set out why the Government have at this stage taken the approach to the regulation of the bank that they have, but, as I say, it will be kept under review, specifically by 2024. I therefore hope that my noble friend will withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I will endeavour to also get back to the noble Lord during this Committee—but, if I do not, I will include my answer in my letter on his noble friend Lord Teverson’s question about what aspects of the senior managers regime we plan to apply to the bank.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I am sorry to remain persistent on this, but the Minister just said that the bank is not required to publish its letter of reservations. Is it not correct to say that what the document says is that the shareholder may effectively prohibit the bank from publishing its letter of reservations—so it is a gagging clause? That is what it says in the framework.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

In picking up the noble Baroness’s other point, I shall ensure that my response covers that specific point.

UK Infrastructure Bank Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage & Lords Hansard - Part 2
Tuesday 14th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, this amendment goes to the core of what the UK Infrastructure Bank should be about, and I am in complete agreement with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, about the importance of the crowding out or crowding in of private finance, which was raised by many noble Lords at Second Reading.

I am stepping in to speak on this group because it impinges on the next, in which I have an amendment. The NIC says that the Bank should act as an “anchor investor” and should

“catalyse innovation, support due diligence functions and enable projects of public significance that may not otherwise take off”.

Most of us would agree that if the bank simply competes with or replaces available private finance, then it is a waste of time, damaging, distorts the markets and wastes taxpayers’ money. As the noble Baroness said, it must aim to solve market failures where otherwise good projects cannot be easily financed by the private sector. The Government obviously agree, but have not put this fundamental point anywhere in the Bill.

I support the principle behind the amendment proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, but I am not sure that the wording fully captures the crowding-in concept. That may be because the framework document does not do it terribly well either. The amendment and the framework document refer to the bank undertaking its activities only where there is an undersupply of private sector financing. Crowding in happens where private financing is available but the private sector is reluctant to invest, perhaps because of a particular risk. In that situation, we would want the bank to be able to invest, precisely to facilitate the investment of the private sector—to remove the blockage preventing the private sector involvement.

As I said, in the next group, we will come to my Amendment 14, which tries to solve the same problem in a slightly different way by putting the operating principles, which expressly highlight the need for the bank to aim to crowd in private finance, on a statutory basis, but that may not be robust enough for some. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, has proposed Amendment 65, which is also aimed at the same problem, but with only a one-off report at the outset rather than an ongoing obligation, so I think that does not go far enough.

We have different ways to try to achieve the end of ensuring that the bank fulfils its primary purpose of crowding in private sector finance and does not fall into the trap of crowding it out. I am agnostic as to how we achieve it, as long as we get that requirement into the Bill—and that we measure it, which we will come to in a later group. Does the Minister agree that this is a fundamental element and, if so, why is it not in the Bill? If she does not like our wording, could she suggest a different way to achieve it? Would she be happy to meet us to talk it through and try to work out how best to get it in?

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I want briefly to join this conversation because, like the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I believe strongly that the purpose of the bank is additionality. It is not to substitute for financing that is available out there, or even to provide it at a freckle below what might otherwise be the market price—although I note that the UK investment bank has to make a commercial return anyway. I think we can help towards that by strengthening the objectives that we discussed earlier, so that it is clear that they focus on those areas which we recognise today are crucial but which are finding it very difficult to access finance. That would be a step forward. I also very much agree with the noble Baroness and the noble Lord that additionality needs, in one way or another, to be in the Bill.

I have one minor caveat, which is that I think it is tricky to craft the language, but that does not mean it is impossible. The reason I say that is that I notice that in the noble Baroness’s amendment, she wants to ensure that the bank carries out its activities only if there is an undersupply. In one of the financings I was deeply involved with, which was one of the very early mobile phone financings in Eastern Europe, we tried to bring in private financing, but until we managed to lock in a commitment from the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and some KfW money, the private sector was unwilling. Once that kitemark was there, that reassurance that entities which they felt had understanding of both the sector and the potential risk were engaged, private sector money came in. Some of it came in pari passu with the EBRD and KfW. If a person were to look backwards at that transaction, they might say, “Well, wait a minute, private finance was willing to take exactly the same risks that EBRD and KfW were, so, essentially, those two organisations were crowding out private finance”, but the reality was that without their presence, the private money would not come in. So we need to be a little careful about how we frame this, but the underlying principle is crucial.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I must admit that I do not have a view on this, because it seems to me that if this bank is to be used only when the risk is such that the private sector is not willing to take it, it suddenly involves a definition of the money that the bank will be using and the extent to which it is de facto underwritten by the state. We know that in the past, when Governments have sought to disguise money provided or underwritten by the state, most notably in Network Rail, when a body came along—I think it was Eurostat—and said, “No, I’m sorry, this is a public loan”, the whole basis of that business had to change. I await clarification and hope it meets the test of being capable of being understood by a bear of little brain.

--- Later in debate ---

It is important to give UKIB the ability to set out its own ways of measuring additionality through its KPIs and its strategic plan. In this case, it is more appropriate to rely on a range of means to measure something that can be more imprecise, even though we absolutely agree on its importance. In the upcoming strategic plan, which we understand will come out ahead of Report, we will see more of the bank’s emphasis on additionality and the importance that it places on it, and its intention to draw on the best evidence and methods to test additionality.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I have a quick question, the answer to which would be helpful. Unfortunately, we have not seen the strategic plan, which the Minister says will appear before Report. Is she suggesting that if we look at those definitions and they do not meet the standards of additionality that we think appropriate, we will be able to change them, or are we merely taking note?

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I am not quite saying that. The Government think that, in this instance, the bank would be well placed to develop and set out its thinking on this, given that, while it is important, there is not necessarily a settled way to measure these things, although there are of course examples of best practice. I am happy to meet my noble friend Lady Noakes and all noble Lords who have an interest in this. I am not predicting that we will solve the problem, but I certainly have no objection to further, more detailed discussion about where we are on the issue. I hope that my noble friend can withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, in his Amendment 14 and the related amendments, which I was pleased to sign, the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has put operating principles into the Bill, but not operating independence. I understand why, because operating independence is so fundamental to the bank and its integrity, character, nature and how it functions that it falls into a different category from other operating principles, which might change from time to time. If I were told that the operational independence of the bank was a moveable feast in the way that other principles might be, I would be fundamentally shocked. For me, it would undermine the existence and integrity of the bank. I support the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has put in this group because it gives more significance to the operating principles that matter, but I would like in a later group to deal separately with operating independence, which is far more fundamental.

I am not going to spend very long talking about this. Like others, I am persuaded that we need to take some major sections of the framework document and put them in the Bill. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. This is the kind of abuse that we have seen happening with statutory instruments, which used to be really narrow and dealt with regulation and have now begun to encroach widely on policy. In the same way, we have a framework document which ought to be a memorandum of understanding. It is almost a working day-to-day document that exists between two parties so that they do not constantly have to get on the phone to each other to work out what the next step is. However, core characteristics of the bank have been moved into that framework document. I am afraid that I am a cynic and I assume that this is in large part so that it can be changed at will. Nobody has read this out, so I shall so that it is in Hansard. This framework document

“shall be reviewed by the Shareholder and the Company at least every three years and reviewed within six months of the formation of a new government.”

So there is a presumption of change.

“No variation of this Document shall be effective unless it is in writing and agreed by the parties.”


There is no mention of Parliament at all. There is not even a scrutiny mechanism. The document does not even have to be published. We are in the most extraordinary situation of the governance document, which the Minister refers to again and again as the principle underpinning of the key elements of the UK Infrastructure Bank, essentially being outside the purview of Parliament and apparently deliberately so. This is a fundamental problem we have going to have to address.

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[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

I am sorry; I have tried to be consensual in my responses. My understanding from Her Majesty’s Government—though I am beginning to be somewhat doubtful of this—is that, post Brexit, we were going to do things better than Europe did. I have constantly referred to well-paid, important, skilled jobs, wherever possible in my various amendments.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I will come very quickly to the rescue. Because we are so often together on finance Bills, I can absolutely assure the House that the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, uses the phrase “well-paid jobs”, as well as “good jobs” and “quality jobs”, very frequently, even if the short-hand today has been just “jobs”.

[Viscount Younger of Leckie (Con)]

My Lords, perhaps I may be allowed to intervene with a response. I thank all noble Lords who have contributed to this short debate. The baton has been passed to me temporarily.

The amendments in this group broadly focus on the operational aspects of the bank and so clearly my remarks will seek to address those. I start with Amendments 14 and 29 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. The approach of the Bill has been to add in what we think is necessary. We do not believe that setting out the details of the operating principles for the bank, which are set out clearly in the framework document, is required in legislation. I am very aware that this takes us back to a key theme of some of the debates today. I was extremely grateful for the views of my noble friend Lady Noakes—if I heard her correctly—supporting the view that we do not want to get into too much detail in this respect, for a very good reason.

Amendment 32, spoken to by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, would ensure that the strategic steer includes a reference to the creation of jobs. I am pleased to inform him that, in the strategic steer issued in March, there were two references to job creation. I of course build upon the comments made by my noble friend Lady Penn in an earlier debate, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, has raised the matter just now. I add to what has been said already two examples I would like to give from the strategic steer in respect of job creation.

First, the bank’s framework document explained this objective as supporting growth

“through better connectedness, opportunities for new jobs, and high levels of productivity.”

Secondly, the bank’s existing objectives are to help tackle climate change, as we know, particularly meeting the Government’s net-zero emissions target by 2050, and to support regional and local economic growth through better connectedness, opportunities for new jobs and higher levels of productivity. I think that these comments play reasonably well in answering the questions raised in an earlier debate, particularly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, who is not in his place, and link with the levelling-up agenda. The noble Lord, Lord Teverson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, are absolutely right that our aspiration, and the necessity, is the creation of high-quality jobs. That is essential as part of our levelling-up agenda.

Amendment 39 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Teverson, seeks to tie any direction given by the Treasury to the National Infrastructure Commission reports. He raised the relationship with the NIC at Second Reading and earlier today, so I hope that I can set that out and reassure him. The bank is intended to complement the work of the NIC. To that extent, there is a definite joining up, as was referred to by the noble Lord and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. It is a complementary rather than a duplicative process, and an assessment of the UK’s long-term economic infrastructure needs. Central government will then decide on any policy response to the NIC’s recommendations, and UKIB will consider the case for providing financing to support projects within the economic infrastructure sectors that are within the remit of both the NIC and the bank.

The NIC provides recommendations to the Government which the Government then act on. It would not be appropriate to remove that part of the process. Additionally, the Government do not have to implement the NIC’s recommendations or reports, so we believe that it is not appropriate to put this in legislation.

Perhaps the noble Lords, Lord Teverson and Lord Vaux, are concerned about the Government directing the bank in a way that is not in line with its objective. That rather paraphrases some of the mood of the debate. That is not possible with the drafting of the Bill at the moment. The bank must comply with its objectives and the Government cannot direct the bank to act in a manner that falls outside its statutory objectives.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, tabled the characteristically thought-provoking Amendment 52. I hope I can convince him that the clause as drafted is sufficient. Much policy thought has gone into setting up the bank and detailing its objectives—which reflect government policy—and governance provisions, including provisions to allow the Treasury and Parliament to review its performance.

In the unlikely event that the bank breached its duties and agreement could not be reached via more usual engagement, the Treasury would clearly be motivated to use its powers, including under Clause 8, to enforce those duties. If a scenario occurred where the bank was in breach and the Treasury did not enforce for some reason, Questions could be asked in the House or a judicial review could be brought against the bank or the Treasury regarding use of its powers, and, if successful, give rise to mandatory or prohibitory orders.

Finally, to help the noble and learned Lord, I see no reason for Clause 8 ever to come into use. The framework document goes into some detail in Chapter 5 on the usual process for engagement between the bank and the Government, and any issues would be resolved much before the need to injunct the bank.

I turn to Amendment 68 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett. She again raised the importance of independence but also focused on oversight. The amendment would allow other departments that she mentioned to have oversight of the bank. I assure her that the infrastructure strategy very much represents the view of the Government collectively, and should the Treasury need to exercise any of its functions, it would not do so in isolation or in silo, to use the language we might know better.

With those explanations, I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, will see fit to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

My Lords, I hope the Committee will bear with me; I have taken an interest in the Bill. My interest is narrow: what bearing the Bill has on pension funds. Members of the Committee may not be surprised.

I have raised the issue on a couple of occasions: at the useful meeting we had with the noble Lord the Minister and the noble Baroness, and at Second Reading. On neither occasion did I receive a reply. My question is: how does this organisation fit with the declared intention, expressed by the Prime Minister and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, to see pension funds investing more in infrastructure? Obviously, infrastructure is a good thing, and there is a tendency to feel that the Bill is about infrastructure so it must be a good thing—but in truth the Bill is an empty vessel. We do not know what is in it or where it is going. It is a structure whose purpose and objectives will be revealed in time.

How does this relate to pension funds and the Government’s apparent intention—we are still waiting for them to make clear what they are proposing—to coerce or cajole pension funds to invest in infrastructure? As I say, I raised this at the meeting with the Ministers and at Second Reading. On neither occasion was there any response from the Minister. It just so happens that the day after Second Reading, the chief executive officer of this bank stood up at a meeting of the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association and expressed what an important initiative this was for pension funds. All I want is a straight answer: what plans do the Government have for the relationship between this bank and their objective to see pension funds investing more in infrastructure? Personally, I am not interested in taking investment advice from the Prime Minister or the Chancellor of the Exchequer, but I think we should be told.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, at this stage—I know we are about to take a short break—I just want to summarise where we might be on these constitutional issues, now that this group of amendments has been debated. I think it will be relevant for the Minister to reply on that.

As we learn from this group of amendments, in the Bill the bank is given activities and objectives in primary legislation—but that primary legislation can be changed wholly by statutory instruments. That is the point of a Henry VIII power: primary legislation is overturned by secondary legislation. As my noble friend Lord Sharkey made clear, this can include issues as fundamental as the bank’s activities and even the meaning of infrastructure. It is hard to get more fundamental than that when you are talking about a UK Infrastructure Bank. That is the first point.

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Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

30: Clause 2, page 2, line 11, at end insert—
“(8) The Treasury must lay before Parliament a copy of an undertaking (the “operational independence undertaking”) provided by the Treasury to the Bank for the purpose of facilitating the Bank’s ability to act as its directors consider appropriate in the light of the objects in its articles of association.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would help secure the operational independence of the Bank.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, just before we took a break, I tried to give a quick summary of where we were on the relationship between the shareholder—the Treasury and the Government—the UK Infrastructure Bank as a company and Parliament. I will not repeat that sequence, but I think Ministers will have picked up my concern that, at every level, there seems very little role, if any, for Parliament and very little accountability in any form.

For that reason, I drafted Amendment 30. It is not my language; it is language I took from the Green Investment Bank, so we know that it works in law and has a precedent. It might be helpful if I read it into Hansard:

“The Treasury must lay before Parliament a copy of an undertaking (the “operational independence undertaking”) provided by the Treasury to the Bank for the purpose of facilitating the Bank’s ability to act as its directors consider appropriate in the light of the objects in its articles of association.”


I did not include it in my amendment, which I slightly regret, but the relevant Act also says about the Green Investment Bank:

“An order under this section may not be amended or revoked.”


Operational independence is captured in a very emphatic and direct way in that Act. That led to my question, which the Minister will remember from an early meeting: why is operational independence not in the Bill? If I understood the reply—she can correct me if I am wrong —it is because the legal advice was that the other clauses in the Bill would not permit it to be validly included as they contradict it. That is the reading of the summary I gave before the break.

Without operational independence, it will be very hard for the bank to thrive and to have credibility among private investors. I also consider it an underlying principle. As the Government so often make a declaratory statement about operational independence, I do not understand why that is not made much more substantive. Perhaps the Minister could explain why a mere declaration with nothing in place to support it is considered adequate.

At the beginning of Committee today, I also referred to the framework document. I think we have all accepted now that the framework document not only has no standing in law but can be changed at any point by the Government with nothing more than an agreement between the shareholder, in the form of the Treasury and the Government, and the company—that is, the bank. That has to be in writing and agreed between the parties, but there is not even a requirement to publish that change in the framework document.

I also referred to the resolution of disputes between the company and the shareholder. That brings me to the other amendments in my name in this group, which refer to Clause 4, “Directions”, and various consequences related to it. The clause states:

“The Treasury may give a specific or general direction to the Bank about how it is to deliver its objectives. The Bank must comply with a direction. The Treasury must—consult the Bank’s directors before giving a direction, and publish a direction.”


The framework document is quite helpful in taking us down to a more detailed level. When it does that, it talks about the capacity of the board, if it objects to the direction that it has been given, to send a reservation notice in response to instructions from the shareholder that would—and these are the circumstances in which a reservation notice could be given—

“infringe the requirements of propriety or regularity … not represent good value for money for the Exchequer as a whole … be of questionable feasibility or is unethical … be contrary to the Strategic Objectives … result in the directors of the Company being in breach of their legal duties; and/or … not be in the best interests of the Company for any other material and demonstrable reason.”

Some of these are quite eye-opening, such as

“the requirements of propriety or regularity”

and something being of “questionable feasibility or … unethical”, resulting in the directors being

“in breach of their legal duties”.

It also makes it very clear, however, that this could apply to an individual project that the bank sought to fund but on which the shareholder—the Treasury or the Government—decided no. Or it could be the opposite: the bank could decide that it should not fund a project, but the Treasury or the Government decide yes. It is very clear that it applies at that level.

It is hard for me to see how that leads to operational independence in any way, which is why Amendment 30 is crucial. I am not proud, and if there are other ways in which we can achieve it, I would be very happy—but at least it is language that has survived a previous legislative process and supported a bank that was in place for quite a number of years.

I told the Minister at the time that I would use this occasion to try to follow up what looks to me almost like a direction for concealment. As I said, if the bank receives an instruction, it can object with a reservation notice; the shareholder can then override that reservation notice and instruct the bank to go ahead, but it can

“inform the Board who shall undertake the Instructed Matter, without delay”

and

“if asked, explain the Shareholder’s course of action; and … arrange for the existence of the Written Direction or any Oral Direction confirmed in writing to be published (unless the Shareholder has directed in writing to the Company that the matter must be kept confidential).”

That is the clause that particularly troubles me; it is a gagging clause, if ever I saw one.

I also asked the Minister: which executives and non-execs, which members of the board, have signed or are expected to sign non-disclosure agreements—we always get trapped by the name “confidentiality agreements”—or any other kind of agreement that would mean they cannot then go to the media? We have already established that there is no regulator so, without one, if they have signed confidentiality agreements, they have no mechanism and no one to whom they can go to disclose. I am exceedingly troubled by the idea that we have a bank that may be asked to do something that its senior members view as unethical or without propriety—or in fact illegal—under the terms of their duties, but they cannot even speak about it, report it or act in any way. I hope we get some fairly full answers from the Minister on that question, but it is frankly extraordinary.

When you put this whole package together, I cannot see that the current legislation in any way provides for operational independence. It may use the phrase “operational independence”, but that is merely window dressing. I think I have pretty much covered the issues, but I hope other noble Lords will have comments to make in this area. I beg to move.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, we have had various discussions around operational independence so far, most of which, until now, have addressed the ability of the Treasury to change the mandate within which the bank operates. Clause 4 goes directly to the heart of the Treasury being able to directly meddle in the activities of the bank. It gives the Treasury the right to

“give a specific or general direction to the Bank”,

at any time, and which the board must follow, with the only safeguard being a requirement to discuss it with the board first. As we have heard, it can be pushed through, and any statements of reservation from the board can be hidden. On the face of it, it completely undermines the operational independence of the bank if the Treasury can actually tell it what to do.

The Minister has previously assured us that the Government would only use this ability to direct in rare circumstances, and she has said that there is a precedent for this type of direction clause. However, the Bill does not put any such restrictions on the use of direction—none at all—beyond the fact that it must be within the objectives of the bank. Therefore, those directions could be about whether or not to make a particular investment, or even the terms on which those investments could be made. It would allow the Treasury to insist on the bank financing vanity projects—I used the example of the bridge to Northern Ireland at Second Reading—or even to indulge in pork-barrel politics by directing investment into particular locations for reasons that may not be totally unpolitical.

The bank should not be put into those kinds of positions, and this Bill should not allow that to happen. Frankly, on the precedent argument, I always recoil when I hear, “We did it before”; those precedents were for different organisations and in different circumstances. It is not impossible that we might have actually got it wrong at the time. Just because we have done it before does not mean that we should do it again.

I have given notice of the intention to oppose Clause 4 standing part. I think that the clause is inappropriate, but I can concede that there might be occasions when it might be necessary for the Treasury to be able to direct the bank—I cannot actually think of any specific examples, but I can see that it could be possible. If the Minister can provide good reasons or examples for this right to direct being needed, then I could get comfortable with allowing direction in those clearly defined, limited and restricted circumstances. However, it cannot be right that direction can be given on the current unrestricted and unscrutinised basis. As I have said, that is not operational independence; it is hard to imagine how anything could be less operationally independent.

So please can the Minister explain, quite specifically, why the Government feel that they need this right to direct, and under what real and specific circumstances they can conceive of using it? If so, we can then work around this and try putting some restrictions and safeguards into the Bill to achieve that.

I have also added my name to the four amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, which attack the same problem from a different angle: to allow the Treasury to make recommendations to which the bank must have regard, rather than to comply with directions. I would prefer to remove all unnecessary meddling by the Treasury, as it were, but this might be a reasonable compromise. Similarly, the noble Baroness’s Amendment 30 is another important way of trying to get this operational independence well imbedded in the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, as we have heard, these amendments are all connected to the operational independence of the bank or the influence of the Treasury over it. The purpose of Amendment 30 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as she said, is to protect the operational independence of the bank.

It may be useful for the Committee if I set out why we do not have a clause in the Bill setting out the operational independence of the bank. As a matter of company law, the bank is already operationally independent. It has been operating as such, with its directors having duties to the bank, during the first year of its existence and in making its first seven investments. The Bill sets out the limited circumstances in which the Treasury, as the sole shareholder of the bank, can exercise more direct control over it. One of the main reasons for the Bill, which enshrines the bank’s strategic objectives in statute, is to protect its independence. The Government are not able simply to change its objectives—

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

The Minister just mentioned the “limited circumstances” in which the Treasury may give direction. Can she point to those for us? It would be extremely helpful.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I intend to come to some examples, as requested, when I move on to directions.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

To confirm, there is nothing in the Bill that provides a limit; it is just that we will have examples to illustrate a self-denying ordinance—is that correct?

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I think the Bill sets out that the Treasury does have the power to issue direction, and it will be published if it is ever used. We have heard about the precedents. Although I know Members of the Committee have different views on the value of that, I thought my noble friend expressed that very well.

To return to the purpose of the Bill, the Government are not simply able to change the objectives or sell the institution without further legislation. The Bill also makes provision for transparency to Parliament and the public around any circumstances in which the Treasury issues directions or statements of strategic priorities to the bank.

Section 172 of the Companies Act also confirms the bank’s independence: it states that the duty of the directors of the bank is to act in the way that is

“most likely to promote the success of the company”

and it requires them to have regard to factors such as the desirability of maintaining a good reputation for the bank, the bank’s impact on the community, the environment, and the need to foster business relationships. A clause setting out that the bank is operationally independent would therefore be unnecessary as that is already the legal default position and has been reflected in the bank’s independence over the first year of its existence, and the process by which it has entered into its initial investments.

Amendment 30 would require the Government to give an operational independence undertaking for the bank. It is, as the noble Baroness noted, a copy of the provision in the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 for the Green Investment Bank. As I have noted, we do not think this is necessary since it is a matter of company law that the bank is already operationally independent, and the Government have been consistent in their statements on this matter.

To respond to the noble Baroness’s point, we believe that the bank’s operational independence is substantive, not a kind of declaratory position, however—

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I think there are two elements to it: the bank is established under the Companies Act 2006, and as a matter of company law is operationally independent, and then, in terms of what this Bill does, the bank—

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I am really confused about why company law would provide operational independence. It would be really helpful if the Minister could address that. I think she just said that it had to behave with proper propriety or reference to its reputation, but that is nothing to do with operational independence.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Perhaps I could help the noble Baroness: as a matter of company law, shareholders have relatively few powers in relation to how a company is operated on a day-to-day basis. Their powers derive from their ability to pass resolutions, either at annual general meetings or special meetings, but there are no powers within the articles of association, et cetera, for shareholders to intervene, except via the mechanisms of calling general meetings and passing resolutions. Almost by definition, they are not involved in operational matters. I think my noble friend made a fair statement that for a company operating under company law, it is already hard-wired into its structure that shareholders cannot intervene on a day-to-day basis, just because there is no mechanism for them to do so.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I will just challenge that slightly, because this all goes hand in hand with the direction, which can be specific. We are talking not just about general direction but about specific direction. I am completely unclear that the shareholders of a company could instruct it, for example, to invest in a particular pharmaceutical process to serve a particular customer base. That is entirely within scope; it is equivalent to the language within the Bill.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

We absolutely will come on to discuss the power of direction. The basis that we wanted to establish is that the Government have two powers in the Bill: the power of direction and the power to issue a strategic steer. However, setting those aside for one moment, day to day, the bank has its operational independence, and the basis of that is in its establishment as a company subject to company law.

We were debating Amendment 30, which seeks to establish that operational independence in the Bill. The Government believe that that is already provided for in the bank and so does not need to be set out separately in the Bill. However, the noble Baroness is absolutely correct that, if we were to set out in the Bill the operational independence clause that she has taken from previous precedent or somewhere else, we would still need to write into the Bill the two powers that we are going to talk about: the power of direction and the power to issue a strategic steer. Therefore, I absolutely accept that those two powers override in some ways, on those issues where they may be used, the operational independence of the bank.

I was trying to make another point on what this law is doing to strengthen the independence of the bank. As we know, the bank is already up and running. As the noble Baroness quoted from its operational framework, the Government and the Treasury already have the ability to issue it with a strategic steer and with powers of direction. The Bill puts those powers in statute but gives transparency requirements around them. In the establishment of the bank by statute, it is not for the Government to be free to then sell the bank or change it without returning to Parliament. UKIB is a separate legal personality in law, which is what I was trying to establish.

It may be worth moving on to the power of direction. As I said, it is a matter of company law that the bank is already operationally independent, and the Government have been consistent in their statements on this matter. The limited exceptions to this, as set out in the Bill, preserve the Government’s proportionate shareholder rights, which is appropriate for an institution which is in receipt of public funds. As I said to the noble Baroness, I accept that if we were to have such a clause in the Bill, any operational independence undertaken would still need to include the exemptions for the strategic steer and the power of direction.

On Amendments 35, 36, 37, 40 and 41, and the clause stand part objection in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Vaux, these would seek to soften or remove the Government’s powers of direction over the bank so that their directions would no longer be binding. I understand that the aim of these amendments is to protect even further the bank’s operational independence. However, it might be helpful if I quickly set out why we have this in the legislation.

The power of direction is one of a small number of exceptions to the bank’s operational independence. It is right that, as a sole shareholder and as the department that must explain the bank’s activities and spend to Parliament, the Treasury exercises limited amounts of control on the bank. Although the Government expect to use this power infrequently, constrained powers of direction are a relatively common feature of similar institutions such as the British Business Bank, HMRC and the Bank of England.

I hope noble Lords will appreciate that the examples are illustrative and intended to set out the circumstances that could potentially justify the use of such a direction in future. There may be aspects of national security where we may need to intervene on specific investments. We may need to direct the bank to invest in a technology that has the potential, if developed, to be particularly beneficial to the environment but may not meet its return on equity targets. That speaks a small amount to a debate we had earlier about the need to meet the double bottom line versus potential further public policy good from taking greater risk than would otherwise be the case. There may be some other emergency scenario where the bank is an appropriate institution to act. It is worth noting that the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy used a similar power to direct the British Business Bank to organise the Government’s Bounce Back Loan Scheme. Although those are illustrative examples, that final one might demonstrate that it is hard to anticipate all the circumstances in which we may want to use this power. Therefore, setting out greater circumscription of the use of the power is difficult in those circumstances where it is hard to anticipate the unknown of the future.

Should we remove the clause, the Government could still rely on our ability to issue directions as a shareholder and as set out in the framework document. However, crucially, there may be situations where the board could refuse a direction if not in statute, given its obligations under the Companies Act. This would likely lead to unnecessary tensions between the Treasury and the bank, which are best addressed in the way that the Bill provides, by introducing transparency to Parliament and the public over the use of the power of direction.

I committed to coming back to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, on issues she raised earlier in Committee. On the use of the power of direction, the Bill sets out clearly the Government’s ability to issue a written direction and the requirement for it to be published. The framework document provides a process that can precede the issuing of a written direction, with a written direction being the final step in a disagreement. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, noted, the powers of the Bill to issue a direction take precedence over the framework document with regard to written directions, but I note the noble Baroness’s point about reservation notices. The Government are committed to giving the bank’s board freedom to operate the company in seeking to achieve its strategic objectives. It is not the intention of the Government nor the drafting of the framework document to gag the bank, and I should be happy to discuss the matter further with the noble Baroness ahead of Report.

To pick up the noble Baroness’s point about whistleblowers, UKIB must adhere to the expectations of the corporate governance code, as well as, more broadly, public sector accountability obligations for the conduct and corporate policies that it has as an organisation. This includes having in place a whistleblowing policy. On non-disclosure agreements, or any name they may go by, UKIB is operationally independent but we understand that it has no NDAs in place.

I hope that has answered the noble Baroness’s earlier questions and some of the further questions about operational independence and the Government’s ability to issue a direction to the bank. I therefore hope that she will withdraw Amendment 30.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I will obviously withdraw in Committee, but I cannot see the harm, only the benefit, of putting operational independence in the Bill, particularly using language that has been well established in a previous Bill. The Minister refers often to precedent. Here is a precedent that I think is quite attractive, and we know that it has been very successful. I see no reason not to make that happen, so that we have not just declarative statements or rely on a very narrow piece of company law. That will be something that we will want to explore.

Moving to the issue of directions, there is some useful language which we might take from the framework document. I see no reason why we should not prohibit disclosures that infringe on the requirements of propriety or regularity, those which are of questionable feasibility or unethical, or that result in the directors of the company being in breach of their legal duties. We could certainly put some constraints on those powers. I was astonished to read in the framework document that it contemplated that directions would indeed fall into all those categories and therefore provide for them. That will be quite interesting. I will be very glad to discuss the issue of gagging orders of various kinds.

Some fruitful ideas that we will want to explore further have come out of this discussion. We always have to take this and all the other constraints that we have discussed in earlier phases of this legislation in context, but I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 30 withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak first to the generality and then to my amendment in this group. As to the generality, all the proposed changes or enhancements to Clause 9—reviews of the banks, effectiveness and impact—seem significant and important; it is a clause that we definitely need to improve. The two areas that reviews currently have to cover, namely

“the effectiveness of the Bank in delivering its objectives, and … its impact in relation to climate change and regional and local economic growth”,

are interesting, but they have not covered even a small portion of the questions raised on the floor just today. A much more comprehensive review strikes me as exceedingly worth while and something one would anticipate the bank to be eager to deliver.

My Amendment 67 deals with the UK Infrastructure Bank. I admit that it arises from a frustration that the national infrastructure strategy is not on a statutory basis. Our cycling and walking strategy is on a statutory basis but not, apparently, our national infrastructure strategy. It seems important that, if any respect is to be given to that strategy, it should be linked in some way to the work of the UK Infrastructure Bank. Where there are differences, we should at least be aware of them, and that could lead either to the strategy being amended or indeed to a rethink of some of the objectives of the bank.

I am trying to take some steps on what others have described earlier in various ways—to pull together things that seem to cover the same territory, rather than constantly having fragmented reports going in one direction, funding in another and decision-making in another. It seems that the review mechanism may be the lightest-touch way to pull together these various strands and give us a sense of coherence about what is happening with the development of infrastructure in this country.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, we can know whether the bank is meeting its objectives and strategic priorities only if the periodic reviews of its work cover the right areas. We will turn to the timing of the reviews shortly, but the number and range of amendments in this group suggest a scepticism around the current provisions. As I said during an earlier debate, we have no desire for parts of the Bill to resemble a shopping list. However, Clause 9 is currently incredibly high level, to the point where it provides virtually no steer whatever.

At a minimum, I urge the Minister to seriously consider Amendment 56 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and Amendment 67 from the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. These requirements would add value. I imagine that some of the other amendments in this group, although tabled with the best of intentions, will be covered by other mechanisms, including the bank’s own annual reports. I hope the Minister can clarify that.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

43: Clause 7, page 3, line 14, leave out “fourteen” and insert “thirteen”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would change the maximum number of board members from fourteen to thirteen.

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[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I recognise that the Clock is moving rapidly, so I will be quite speedy. These amendments are reasonably self-evident. With the amendments that stand in my name here, I have tried to set what seem obvious principles for the way in which a board of directors is set up. That is, as covered by Amendments 43 and 44, to make sure that the total number of board members is an odd number, not an even number. With a board of directors, it is surely appropriate to be as certain as possible that the chair’s casting vote will be used as rarely as possible. Hopefully, decisions will not be so contentious that the board is completely split, but where that happens it is far healthier to have a resolution provided by an odd number of members than to have to look again and again to the chair’s casting vote. It is quite curious that 14 is the proposed number of directors. Now and again, we would find ourselves looking to the chair, and I think that would be genuinely unfortunate. It is not the most important issue in the world, but it seems to me that some decent housekeeping would not hurt here.

I also want to be sure, in Amendment 45, that the majority of board members must be non-executive directors. It does not speak to that in any way and, given that the board can be as small as five, you could easily see a situation in which three of the members were executives and only two were non-execs. It seems a simple principle.

Probably my most significant amendment in this group, on an issue that has been addressed by others, is Amendment 49. We have talked before about the importance of having the right range of skills on the board—people of independence, and people with expertise and knowledge. Amendment 49 simply asks the bank’s chair to keep under review such characteristics and, if he feels that there are gaps, to take steps to address or mitigate those shortcomings.

It is important to put that responsibility on the chair and not just to say, “Well, Treasury will take care of that. The Chancellor of the Exchequer appoints everybody and therefore he will decide what kind of skills are necessary”. We have talked about the operational independence of the bank. Frankly, if the chair cannot even guide what kind of skills he needs to be on his board, we are once again underscoring that there is no operational independence. It seems to me a standard and normal responsibility for a chair, and I simply ask that there be an opportunity for that to happen here.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will be very brief in speaking to my Amendment 46, but first, let me say that I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. Frankly, they seem like normal, good practice and it is almost surprising that they are not already in the Bill.

Amendment 46 is very simple. The bank’s activities will cover the whole of the UK, including the devolved nations. I welcome that—it is a really good thing—but while allowing the bank to operate in the devolved nations, the Bill gives absolutely no right at all to the devolved Governments to have any say in how it operates. I would be completely opposed to giving veto rights or anything of that nature, but I do think it would be appropriate to allow them at least some input into the bank’s direction. As someone who lives in Scotland, I am not the world’s greatest fan of the Scottish Government, but devolution is a fact and we have to live with it and work with it. The devolved Governments have perfectly reasonable interests in how investment is directed in their countries.

It seems to me that the easiest way to achieve this is just to allow the devolved Governments to be represented on the board of the bank. Amendment 46 would simply allow the devolved Governments each to appoint a director to the board. That way, they would have the ability to represent their legitimate interests without introducing any veto rights or anything of that nature, which, obviously, we should avoid.

If we want to keep this union together, we need to recognise that the devolved Governments have legitimate interests, and we need to try to work together.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My understanding is that it has been very constructive, but perhaps I can write to noble Lords setting out further detail on that.

Amendment 49 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, would ensure that the bank’s chair must keep the board under review to ensure that it continues to perform adequately. I think it goes without saying that I agree with the policy of this, but again believe that it is set out sufficiently within the framework document which largely reflects the requirements of the corporate governance code, against which the bank, as I said before, will publicly report compliance each year. It covers most of these points adequately, particularly in paragraphs 5.5.2 and 5.9.5.

I have committed to write on a number of aspects and know that noble Lords have given notice that they may wish to return to this at Report. With that, I hope that the noble Baroness will be able to withdraw her amendment for now.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I thank the Minister for her comments. I am slightly alarmed by two things, the first of which is that she sees no reason why the chair should have influence over the shape of the board, so that it should be the responsibility solely of the Treasury and the Government. That troubles me, particularly in the much wider context of operational independence and so many of the other issues we discussed earlier today.

I am very sympathetic to the issues raised by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. I think that the noble and learned Lord is exactly right: this is an issue of confidence. I am somewhat surprised that we do not have legislative consent yet, even though we are already in Committee. I wonder if the Minister expects that we will have legislative consent before we get to Report. I have not dealt with many Bills, but legislative consent has always come very early in the process and not at this point in time. I am slightly concerned about that.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

Perhaps I can pick that up in the letter. As this is a Lords starter, I believe we might have more time to deliver on legislative consent than when we receive Bills from the Commons—that may be the timetable.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

The Minister makes a good point; I am used to thinking of legislation that starts in the Commons, and therefore legislative consent is in place by the time it gets to the Lords. I hope that this can be very quickly resolved.

Apparently, on the issue of non-executive directors, we have found another item within the framework that we want to consider putting in the Bill. It would be interesting to see that as we get to Report. For now, I am content to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 43 withdrawn.

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[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, like I think almost every noble Lord who spoke at Second Reading, I agree that the reporting schedule set out in the Bill is completely unacceptable. In fact, I think it was possibly the only point in the entire Bill on which there was absolute unanimity. Ten years before the first report and then only every seven years thereafter is just too long. I wonder if even the Minister was surprised at the times when she saw the Bill.

I have added my name to Amendment 59, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, which suggests four years before the first report. I understand her point about having three years plus time to get that first report out, and it therefore makes sense that the first one has a bit longer. Others have suggested three years. I cannot too excited about it, to be honest. Ten years and seven years are too long. We need to bring that down.

As I and the noble Baroness mentioned earlier, it is quite inappropriate that the Treasury should be marking its own homework in this respect, so I support her amendments ensuring that the effectiveness reporting is independent.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will speak very briefly. A couple of the amendments are in my name and I have signed others. I absolutely join the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on whether it is three years or four years. It seems to me that the proposal of the noble Baroness is rather sensible, as three years will have gone by, as she pointed out, before the first report. What are completely unacceptable are the 10-year and seven-year benchmarks. The Minister has heard the arguments over and over. I know she will say that there are many other ways in which we will know what is going on. We will partially, but not in a coherent or holistic way. That is why it is so important that these kinds of holistic reviews should be done properly, appropriately and in a timely fashion.

I stress my support for the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and my noble friend Lord Teverson on their somewhat different proposals for an independent reviewer. Otherwise, the Treasury will be marking its own homework. We have established throughout every part of today’s debate that it can change the objectives through secondary legislation and it sets the strategic priorities. It can provide detailed direction and appoints every member of the board. It is very hard to see any way in which the Treasury’s hand will not have imprinted every aspect of what this bank does.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, I hope noble Lords will forgive me if I do not give the game away too far ahead of Report in terms of our approach to listening to all the points raised in Committee.

As we have heard, these amendments all relate to the review clause in the Bill. I understand entirely the aim behind the amendments of ensuring that the bank is appropriately scrutinised and in a timely way, but I can hope valiantly that I can reassure noble Lords both that there will not be a 10-year period before the bank is given scrutiny and by perhaps explaining to them why the 10-year period was selected.

As I have mentioned previously, we have committed in the bank’s policy design document to review the bank’s progress and financial performance by spring 2024 to ensure that it has sufficient capital to deliver its ambitions and, as we noted earlier, also on our regulatory approach to the bank. On top of this, we have a Cabinet Office-led review in 2024-25 on the effectiveness of arm’s-length bodies generally, and as part of this process we will conduct a review of the bank, which will be repeated in 2027-28 and 2030-31.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

Just for clarification, will the Treasury review the bank in that 2024 piece of work? Will it be reviewing itself?

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My notes say that it will be a Cabinet Office-led review, but as part of that process we—which I would take to mean the Treasury—will conduct the review. If that is incorrect, I will clarify that.

Taken together, this means that the bank will have been subject to four reviews by the time of our first statutory review. The review in statute is designed to encompass all the elements of the previous reviews and has been chosen to be 10 years after Royal Assent because it allows for a fuller analysis—

UK Infrastructure Bank Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Report stage
Monday 4th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale. It was particularly useful that he spoke before me because I have taken some of the words that he and his supporters put down in their amendment but made an additional change, taking out the words “economic growth”. But I agree entirely with everything the noble Lord just said about the need to focus on reducing disparities and tackling economic and social disadvantages. As he said, that takes the wording from the Government’s own approach in another place and it would be very hard for the Government to argue against that.

I argued extensively in Committee about why economic growth as a target in its own right has failed and, indeed, is undeliverable, because you cannot have infinite growth on a finite planet. I will not go over those arguments again now, but I think it is very clear from the fact that we are back here again, after an extensive debate in Committee from all sides of your Lordships’ House, simply saying that the bank will work for regional and local growth. As was said in Committee, that could be regional and local growth in Chelsea and the wealthiest 10 wards in the whole country, which is surely not the purpose, and it therefore needs to be clarified in the Bill. As was said in our earlier debate when we were talking about the environment, we have seen acknowledgement of the need to change the Bill already. This is surely another crucial change.

I was pleased to attach my name to Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and backed by the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. This is again putting levelling up in the Bill. It is what the Government say the Bill is for. Surely, it has to be specified in it.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am going to be exceedingly brief because so much has been said which I support. I want to make a couple of comments on Amendment 12 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and others, that I have been pleased to sign. I want to make a point that I think has not been hit on. It is really important because it signals to those who put together projects and then turn to the investment bank and look for resources and funding that they are going to have to meet tests such as improving productivity and making sure that they are delivering well-paid jobs.

Putting that in the Bill would take it away from being a passive measure by which the bank looks at and decides whether to support projects and moves it into the active category. Those who are going out and investing will look closely at whether they are delivering against those various tests. There is so much that is good in the various amendments within this group—I very much support my colleague on Amendment 2—but I particularly wanted to underscore the message-signalling that is deeply inherent in Amendment 12.

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this important debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale, and the right reverend Prelate—who is not present—for their support in tabling Amendments 4 and 5. Those texts are similar in intent to my Amendment 12, and those colleagues made a powerful case for tightening up the bank’s second objective.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, who joined the noble Lord, Lord Ravensdale and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, in signing Amendment 12, which I shall turn to now. The Government say their absolute priority is to deliver their levelling-up agenda. Ministers say they will use every tool available to them to ensure left-behind communities can catch up economically, compared to London and the south-east. However, anybody reading the Bill would be hard-pressed to identify that intent. Yes, the bank should be operationally independent from government, but that does not mean it cannot support the levelling-up agenda in its day-to-day work.

Amendment 12 would, in essence, place the first mission from the Government’s recent Levelling Up White Paper in the Bill. The amendment would not prevent the bank from acting in a manner that deviates from that mission. It will be free to invest in climate-related schemes or projects in wealthier parts of the UK; that would remain the bank’s prerogative. However, the amendment would introduce a general requirement for the bank to have regard to the public interest in targeting funds in a manner that will improve productivity, jobs, pay and living standards.

The Government say they want to create good jobs, lift people’s pay and improve life chances. However, at the same time, Ministers are slashing the size of the Civil Service and washing their hands of responsibility for pay negotiations in sectors where the Government have a direct interest. We still await an employment Bill that has been promised for many years. That Bill was not deemed a big enough priority to be included in the Queen’s Speech, meaning many workers will lack important statutory rights.

The aforementioned White Paper mentions that by 2030, the Government want to see the gap between the best and worst performing regions of the UK narrowing. We want to see that gap close, too, but let us be realistic: it will require concerted action, not just warm words.

The year 2030 is not very far away. Let us consider the current economic context: the economy is on the brink of recession and is forecast to flatline in 2023. The cost of living crisis is squeezing household incomes to an extent not seen for decades. There is not a huge amount of time to turn this picture around. If we are to do so, we need urgent action to create secure, well-paid jobs, and the bank can help only if it is explicitly encouraged to do so.

Amendments to the framework document or strategic steer are not enough to target the bank’s mind or provide comfort that the Treasury is sufficiently invested in following through with its stated ambitions. It is regrettable that the Government have not brought forward their own amendment at this stage in proceedings. We have pushed for this in meetings with the Minister but have not succeeded.

We will listen carefully to the Minister’s response today but feel that this is an important issue which deserves to be in the Bill. Unless the noble Baroness is able to commit to an amendment at Third Reading, I am minded to test the opinion of the House when Amendment 12 is called.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it was not my intention to speak on this group but, given that all the non-government speakers have been from the other side of the House, I felt I should offer an argument from this side of the House that is perhaps 180 degrees opposite to that presented by the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, but, none the less, makes an argument for either Amendment 6 or Amendment 24.

The noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, suggested that she preferred private bankers to public bankers. Private bankers have been left to provide the direction for our economy and society over the past few decades and look where that has got us: we are having to talk from all sides of the House about the urgent need to level up and to tackle poverty, inequality, our climate emergency and the nature crisis. Therefore, we need to make sure that the bank is not crowding out private finance. If it is, it is spending money in the wrong places. It needs to be doing things that are innovative and different from what we have been doing up to now. That is why I encourage either the mover of Amendment 6 or those speaking to Amendment 24 to consider testing the opinion of House, and I offer them Green support.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, my motivation here is somewhat different: I want to see the bank move along the risk spectrum. There is a temptation, due to the structure of the bank, for it to stay within the range of fairly safe investments. It has to produce a return and it has a very small risk capital base, but I would like it to maximise that to move along the risk spectrum. I see no other way to accelerate the innovative technologies that we need, or development in disadvantaged areas where people have typically turned their backs, unless the bank is willing to take on that much higher risk profile. The various additionality amendments seem to create that kind of pressure to move UKIB much further down the risk spectrum than it might otherwise feel comfortable in doing, meaning that it therefore does not maximise the opportunities in front of it.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, I join my noble friend Lady Noakes in applauding Amendment 6 in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes as a gallant attempt at defining additionality, although I dare say another Peer might draft it differently.

I want to make a more general point about additionality before coming on to the specifics of each amendment in this group. Additionality is a key principle underpinning the bank, and it is something that the Government take very seriously. That is demonstrated by the fact that additionality is one of the bank’s core investment principles, as set out in its framework document and strategic plan. However, following legal advice, the principle is not included in the Bill as there is no single agreed definition of additionality in a financial context that we could appropriately include in the Bill. Approaches to assessing additionality are developing over time and we would not want to stymie that development by creating a statutory definition of additionality at this stage.

While the term “additionality” has been included in previous legislation—for example, the Dormant Assets Act 2022 and the National Lottery Act 2006—additionality in those contexts had a different meaning: of funding projects or activities that the Government would not have otherwise funded. Assessing private sector additionality is more complex because it involves more actors and varied forms of financing. Each deal will have a particular set of circumstances that will indicate the amount of additionality that the bank is bringing. For the bank, as part of that, additionality means ensuring that it both crowds in private finance through its investments and avoids crowding out the market by providing finance that could have come from the private sector.

The bank has set out its approach to assessing and measuring these concepts of additionality in its strategic plan, which was published at the end of June. Currently the bank will assess additionality on a case-by-case basis, assessing the evidence as part of due diligence and monitoring that through a key performance indicator on the levels of private sector finance that it has crowded in. This is a measure commonly used by other organisations such as the OECD.

Crowding out is best assessed through evaluations and medium-term assessments of whether the portfolio of investments has led to crowding out in a particular sector. The bank is developing its thinking on how it will monitor and evaluate its work at both deal and portfolio level, including setting up an independent evaluation.

Further to this, additionality is implicitly covered in the Subsidy Control Act 2022, which of course applies to any subsidies the bank gives. Schedule 1D states:

“Subsidies should not normally compensate for the costs the beneficiary would have funded in the absence of any subsidy.”


Given the protections of the Subsidy Control Act 2022 and the regulatory regime, the difficulty in accurately defining additionality in the Bill, the work the bank is already doing on additionality and, finally, our amendment to the review, I hope my noble friend Lord Holmes will feel able to withdraw his amendment. I must say to my noble friend that the Government do not intend to bring forward any amendments at Third Reading, so I must disappoint him on that front. I should also say that to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, in relation to the previous group, if I was not clear on that front.

The amendment in my name to Clause 9, on the statutory review, will ensure that the review of the bank will measure its success in encouraging additional investment. The drafting of the amendment is based on the reference to additionality in the framework document. I should like to provide reassurance that, given that the review will cover crowding in, it necessarily includes the question of whether crowding in did not happen, with the attendant risk of crowding out. This is because additionality is designed to measure genuine additional private finance—in other words, investment that would not have happened otherwise. I would fully expect the independent review to address the question of crowding out under the terms of this drafting.

The bank could act as the sole financer of a private project if it meets the bank’s investment principles and objectives, but it is highly unlikely that the bank, as the sole financer of a private project, would crowd out private investment, as the bank would be the sole investor in very immature or nascent financial markets for a technology only if no other investors were willing to support the project.

The bank’s initial assessment of the technologies, sectors and markets it plans to engage in, as published in its strategic plan, will allow it to focus its investment in areas with a limited risk of crowding out. This will continue to be developed and reviewed. In cases where the bank would act as the sole financer of a private project, it would expect to have a transformational impact on the market and for the market to be able to attract private capital over the medium to long term. This in part speaks to the concern of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, about the bank being able to operate along the risk spectrum, as it were, rather than seeking to invest solely in perhaps lower-risk or less innovative projects, given the other demands that it has: making a return on its investments and becoming self-funding.

Given this, I am grateful to my noble friend for her commitment not to move her amendment when it is reached. I hope that, in future, my best efforts produce more than a quarter of a loaf.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I have added my name to all the amendments in this group, which cover four separate topics, and I will touch on each of them briefly. First, Amendment 13, which the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, eloquently explained, aims to introduce a greater level of scrutiny to the use of the Henry VIII power that is included in the Bill. The activities and, in particular, the definition of infrastructure are fundamental to what the bank can do and how it will be measured. It must be right that changes to this are subject to a meaningful level of parliamentary scrutiny and, as the noble Lord clearly explained, the affirmative procedure has sadly become a bit of a sham. Amendment 13 seeks to find an interesting balance between the rubber-stamping of a statutory instrument and full use of primary legislation. I urge the Government to support this, and I would be quite supportive generally of seeing more of this process in Bills more often: we have seen far too many of these Henry VIII clauses, as we have just heard.

Amendments 14, 15, 16 and 17 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, to which I have also added my name, are aimed at trying to resolve issues around the framework document that we discussed at length in Committee. As we heard, the framework document is a slightly peculiar animal: it seems to have no real legal status, but it is an important document in how the bank will behave. The consensus around the Chamber in Committee was, I think, that the balance within that is too far towards including elements of principle rather than the day-to-day running of the bank. These amendments do not really address that. All they ask is for the framework document to be updated, and that it should be consistent with the statement of strategic priorities. That seems pretty straightforward and simple.

There are a number of areas where the more recent statement of strategic priorities is inconsistent with the framework document. One example—it is relevant to the discussion we had on the previous group about additionality—is that the strategic priorities expressly do not require local authority investments to achieve additionality, but the framework document does. Perhaps the Minister could explain why. I doubt that she will accept the amendments, but could she at least confirm that the framework document will be updated and that it will be brought into line with the statement of strategic priorities?

Amendment 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, addresses the extremely important point raised in Committee, I think by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that as drafted the Bill—in conjunction with all these other governing documents, including the framework document—would require directions given by the Treasury to be published, but would not require situations where the board disagrees with that direction to be published or explained. Indeed, it effectively applies a gagging order, and that cannot be right. This important amendment brings in some essential transparency to that and I wholeheartedly support it.

I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that the final amendment in the group is the most important. It introduces a simple requirement to consult the devolved Governments in various situations, and in preparing or changing the statement of strategic priorities. The bank’s activities will cover the whole UK, which I think is a good thing. The Minister has indicated, as does the statement of strategic priorities, that the bank is establishing a good relationship with the devolved Governments, and with the bank’s counterparts in the devolved nations. However, the Bill does not mention this. As someone who lives in Scotland and is a passionate unionist, I am consistently surprised by the fact that legislation that covers the whole UK rarely includes proper consultation requirements. That seems really counterproductive—even dangerous—as not taking proper account of the reasonable views and concerns of the devolved nations further undermines the strength of our union.

It gives ammunition to the nationalists that the Government do not take the devolved Governments seriously. We are heading rapidly towards a break-up of the union if we behave like this. This amendment does not create any veto powers or anything of that nature, which I would strongly disagree with that as you cannot work something if one party has a veto. It just requires consultation and that the reasonable views of the devolved nations be taken into account when setting the strategy or appointing directors.

I urge the Government to accept this. More widely, I urge them to start to be more consultative and include clauses of this nature more generally in Bills that cover the whole of the UK. That will strengthen, not weaken, the union and will ensure that the bank takes actions genuinely in the interests of all parts of the UK. If the noble and learned Lord decides to divide the House on this matter, I certainly will support him.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to all the amendments in this group but I will try to be brief. I want to pick up on the point just made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. Amendment 21 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, deals with consulting devolved Administrations. It ought to be a matter of course that in every Bill where consultation is important, it is in the Bill. It then underscores the constitutional relationship between central government and the devolved Governments. The expectation that it is to be dealt with either in other documents or just off the cuff is, I suspect, one of the reasons we see so much stress and pressure on the union today. It embodies a lack of respect, to be quite frank, and it ought to be a matter of course that we see these arrangements in a Bill.

I will look at the other amendments tabled and so well drafted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. On updating the framework document, we have heard of nothing but the importance of that document. On almost every issue we raise, we are told that it does not need to be in the Bill because it is in this absolutely critical document—the framework document—which is actually a document agreed between the Treasury and the bank; it is not even necessarily in the public arena. Yet we can see that it is inconsistent with the Bill as it stands, never mind with the issues that have surfaced in the course of this very complex debate. It is a document that desperately needs to be updated. I know there is a plan to update it by the end of this year but that is completely out of touch with making sure that we have proper, consistent and meaningful arrangements in place for a bank that is already functioning as we stand here today. I very much support those amendments.

I now look at the two amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. Amendment 13, so eloquently supported by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, addresses another fundamental problem that we see in one piece of legislation after another: the wide use of Henry VIII powers to allow secondary legislation—which cannot be amended and, in effect, cannot be rejected—to change primary legislation fundamentally. It almost makes a joke of primary legislation. I know the Government would say that they would not exercise the power widely and it is just a marginal change here or there, but the Bill is already written to allow for marginal changes. The only time when that clause would be relevant would be if fundamental changes were to be made. I would argue that those should come back to Parliament, at least for the level of engagement of a super-affirmative.

I want to speak most to Amendment 18 because I am truly exercised on the issue of transparency. As others have said, the Bill requires the publication of a direction when the Treasury basically decides it is going to tell the bank what it can do. It can give it instructions that are either general or specific. It could say, “Make this loan and do it this way.” That is entirely allowed and there has to be a publication. But what is not that established is that when the bank says no and then is overridden, that information comes into the public arena. When it says no, it says so in a letter of reservation and the kind of issues it can raise are fundamental, such as issues of propriety, issues of ethical behaviour and issues of departing from the fundamental purpose of the bank.

I think we must have an absolute assurance that those will be published so that they are in the public arena. Let me give an example. The Minister has often drawn parallels between this bank and the British Business Bank, which allows me to draw a parallel with the British Business Bank’s decision to accredit Greensill to provide a Covid-related loan. We know, because it is now in the public arena, that when Greensill applied to the British Business Bank for accreditation, various parts of the Government fairly bombarded the British Business Bank with emails. They did not say “accredit it” but kept saying how important it was that they knew the result, asking whether it was done yet and saying that this would be fundamental to the future of steel in the UK and so on. Anyway, as we all know, the British Business Bank did accredit Greensill and, I suspect, regrets the very moment that it did so.

If a direction from the Treasury had been published on that issue, I am sure it would have said: “This direction is intended to make sure that our very important steel industry survives. It is to support jobs. It is to support communities related to the steel industry.” The reservation would have said something very different. I suspect it would have said: “We do not believe that the entity, Greensill, meets our ethical standards. We believe that it is basically an organisation that has got itself into some very unfortunate and potentially unethical arrangements and is on the verge of bankruptcy.” That is why it is important that the reservation notice is published and the conversation does not exist only in the context of the direction. That is why I say to the Minister that we cannot have an arrangement where the bank could, if it wished, publish its reservation notice; it is crucial that it publishes its reservation notice. I argue that on the grounds of the propriety that should surely lie at the heart of all the legislation that we provide in this House.

[Lord Morgan (Lab)]

My Lords, I rise very briefly to say why—my Whip may not be too happy to hear this—I wish to vote for the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, which I know is not the view of my party at present.

I think the distance between central institutions in London, such as the Bank of England, is far too great. We have not really taken account of the mechanics of devolution in our constitutional and legal arrangements. This was shown—very dangerously so—in the Brexit negotiations, when important features of the Welsh economy, notably in agriculture, were not attended to by the Westminster Government. Wales and, I suppose, Scotland were treated in a somewhat colonial fashion and the consequence was that a great deal of ill will was needlessly caused. The noble Lord across the House mentioned difficulties that have arisen in the case of Scotland.

I hope we would accept an amendment that thinks in terms of harmonising the economic strategies in London and the devolved authorities. I speak as one who believes strongly in the union but also in devolution for Wales. I hope very much that the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, who is deeply learned in these matters, will be accepted.

--- Later in debate ---

Seven years is also substantially longer than the parliamentary cycle, and it does seem appropriate that the review period should be brought closer to that cycle. I have proposed a compromise of a five-year cycle, which is a balance between being too much of a burden on the bank and an appropriate level of scrutiny and transparency. I do not expect the Minister to accept this, and I am not going to push it to a Division, but she has mentioned in the past that the bank will be subject to all sorts of different reports, scrutiny, and so on. I ask her to at least confirm that the annual report and accounts will contain information on the progress of the bank, in terms of the sort of investments it is making and, in particular, that that will touch on the additionality question, even if it falls short of a formal review.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I will be very brief. I thank the Minister, particularly, for establishing that the review will be carried out by an independent body. That is absolutely crucial; we really could not have had the Treasury marking its own homework. That is now going to be established on the face of the Bill.

In terms of the review period, I am totally with the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, on this one. I add one reason to the many powerful arguments that he made. The two issues that this bank is set to address, climate change and levelling up, have a great deal of urgency behind them. Therefore, the decisions that the bank makes in its early days, even if they have a long tail to them, will be crucial. If that direction needs to be changed, the bank needs to know that that is Parliament’s view before we get to seven years out, at which point, particularly around climate change, it will be far too late to change a direction that is not meeting the needs of our climate change agenda. So, particularly for this bank, because it is tied to very specific objectives, a much earlier review phase is crucial.

I join the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, in being interested in how the Minister will lay out these other reviews that are meant to fill that gap. Why should we be having partial reviews that partially fill parts of the gap, rather than the comprehensive reviews on impact that could be managed under various amendments before the House today?

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, although I see an attraction in a higher frequency than the Government are proposing, equally, I think that, in many ways, even five years is too long. I take comfort in what I hope to hear from the Minister: that we will have much of the information we need to come to a judgment about the success, and effectiveness—crowding in and all those issues—annually in the report. Her assurance on that matter is crucial, but I have confidence that she will be able to give it.

UK Infrastructure Bank Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

3rd reading & Lords Hansard
Monday 11th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

My Lords, much has happened since last week’s Report stage, when your Lordships passed two sensible amendments. These changes would considerably strengthen the Bill’s climate and levelling-up credentials, ensuring greater external support for the bank and its work.

The Prime Minister has rightly said that the business of government must go on over the coming weeks and months. In that spirit, I hope that the Treasury will reconsider its opposition to these amendments. This will ensure that the next Prime Minister gets a stronger Bill on the statute books. If Ministers, whether the current crop or their successors, do not like the current wording, they are welcome to change it. However, simply overturning the amendments would show poor judgment. The economic picture has become gloomier, while dealing with the climate and biodiversity crisis is ever more pressing. Through this revised Bill, the bank can play an important role in both battles, supporting the creation of good jobs and doing more to protect nature. When one of the many leadership hopefuls assumes the office of Prime Minister, these issues must be at the front of their mind.

Until then, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Penn, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger of Leckie, for taking this Bill through its Lords stages. They have been ably supported by a range of Treasury officials, to whom I am also grateful. I am even more grateful to my Labour Party policy adviser, Dan Stevens, for his invaluable advice and help.

In the meantime, I wish the bank well as it continues to find its feet and comes to its initial investment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, obviously my colleagues and I support the creation of the UK Infrastructure Bank. We regret that it does not have the genuine operational independence that was a clear statutory characteristic of the Green Investment Bank, which was sold off by this Government as soon as the coalition ended, but we are where we are.

The work of this House has improved the Bill significantly. The Government amended it to provide absolute clarity on the UKIB’s role in supporting investment in energy efficiency; we thank the Minister for that. Noble Lords from all sides of the House also supported further changes to establish that the bank’s objectives extend to nature-based solutions in a circular economy. I hope that the Government will not attempt to reverse these meaningful improvements.

However, the Bill has followed what has become a consistent government thrust: diminishing Parliament and enhancing the power of the Executive; I will not repeat all our previous arguments about Henry VIII powers and the power of direction. The Government have promised to amend the framework document by the end of the year to assure us that not only the directions, including their content, but any objections made by the bank to such directions, including letters of reservation, will be made public. This transparency is vital; I thank the Minister personally for making sure that we got a meaningful response to this issue with a commitment not just to removing the gagging clauses originally in the framework document but to ensuring full transparency through the publication of the relevant documents.

I thank the Minister and her team for their openness and willingness to meet. I thank Peers around this House who worked together to get improvement—they are too many to name—but I believe that the Government’s nightmare is an amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, supported by the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Vaux, the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett, and me.

Last of all, I thank my own ranks. I thank Sarah Pughe and Mo Souidi in the Whips’ Office, who provided us with organisation and backing. I thank my noble friends Lord Sharkey and Lord Teverson, who brought their particular and extensive expertise to bear on this Bill; they have earned and enjoy the respect of this House.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their constructive approach to each stage of this Bill. In particular, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer.

The level of scrutiny and debate on the Bill demonstrates the importance of the bank’s mission and has served to demonstrate once again the expertise of this House on topics from corporate governance through to the definition of infrastructure and our target for tackling climate change. Although this is a short Bill—something that may be welcomed—it is an important one given the bank’s potential to deliver a step change in tackling climate change and supporting levelling up through supporting the development of high-quality infrastructure across the whole of the UK.

I am therefore pleased to see the Bill progress towards becoming law, supporting the bank to become a fully-fledged, operationally independent institution able to deliver on its mandate as agreed by this House. I thank noble Lords on all Benches for working constructively on this both during debates and in the many separate discussions that I have had on this Bill.

Finally, I recognise the work of the parliamentary counsel in drafting this Bill and in supporting its passage so far. I also thank the House staff, the excellent Bill team, and my noble friend Lord Younger for his support. I am not alone in this House in looking forward to seeing the impact of the bank’s investments in improving the vital infrastructure of this country. I beg to move.