Lord Vaux of Harrowden
Main Page: Lord Vaux of Harrowden (Crossbench - Excepted Hereditary)(2 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have Amendment 24 in this group, which is an amendment to the Minister’s Amendment 23. It is always rather strange speaking to an amendment to an amendment when the amendment itself has not been spoken to—but I will do my best.
First, I congratulate my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond on his Amendment 6. It is well drafted and encompasses what we understand by additionality in the context of the operations of the UKIB. In Committee, it was widely agreed that additionality was so important that it should be in the Bill. I think it was also agreed that the boundary between what is in this Bill and is in other documents outside the Bill, including the framework document which is not even referred to in the Bill, has been set in the wrong place. When I say that the Committee agreed these things, I do not suggest that the Government agreed, but the vast majority of the Committee was aligned on these matters.
The Minister has been generous with her time with noble Lords, and I thank her for the meetings she arranged and for her letter of last week. She gets a gold star for effort, but I am afraid that that is not matched for content. On additionality, my noble friend claimed that the absence of an agreed definition in the Bill could stop it developing over time. That is nonsense. Additionality, as a basic concept, has barely shifted in the many years that I have been involved in public sector matters. The essence of it is about, and always has been about, something that should occur that would not otherwise have occurred but for the particular intervention or action. It is a universal principle that can be adapted to a number of circumstances.
I then suggested to my noble friend the Minister that, rather than try to produce a specific definition, she could put a high-level definition in the Bill and take a Treasury power to issue guidance to UKIB. That too was brushed aside. The Treasury likes to keep stuff in documents, such as the framework document, which it alone controls. I remind noble Lords that, as my noble friend the Minister informed us in Committee, the framework document is not even legally binding.
Nevertheless, I recognised that the Treasury is something of an immovable object on this issue, so I decided that it would be better to pursue the Minister’s offer of a way forward and include additionality issues in the periodic reports which are required by Clause 9. I thought that half a loaf would be better than no loaf, but I have to say that Amendment 23, which my noble friend has tabled, is a serious disappointment. It represents no more than a quarter of a loaf.
Amendment 23 adds an additional reporting requirement to Clause 9 but it is a lop-sided approach to additionality. Its focus is on the extent to which UKIB’s investments in projects have encouraged additional investments in those projects. It therefore will cover the extent to which projects have enabled crowding in, but it does not explicitly cover crowding out, which has always been my biggest concern, because a bank with a high capital ratio and a low cost of capital can easily outcompete private sector financing. I do not believe that if UKIB were to finance the whole of a transaction to the complete exclusion of the private sector in circumstances where 100% private finance could have been obtained, it would be captured by my noble friend’s amendment—it would not come close to being captured by my noble friend’s amendment. Such a transaction would not have encouraged or discouraged private sector finance; it would have bypassed it completely. That is why my Amendment 24 refers to investments having been made by UKIB
“despite an adequate supply of private sector financing”.
My noble friend the Minister will doubtless say that it is not in UKIB’s strategic plan to do transactions without private sector financing. It was never in the strategic plans of the European Investment Bank to crowd out private sector financing, but it did it anyway, in collusion with private sector borrowers, who were quite happy to take soft loans from public sector lenders who were much easier to deal with than hard-nosed real bankers in real banks.
My noble friend the Minister has also referred in correspondence to the impact of the Subsidy Control Act, which became law earlier this year. I have to say that the Act, which refers to subsidy decisions, sits rather uneasily with the practice of doing investment deals in the context of a bank. I accept that at a high level it would apply to UKIB. I just think that the language is very difficult to interpret in the context of what UKIB would do. My main concern is that there would never be an enforcement action against UKIB because the crowded-out private sector financiers are exactly the same people who want to be invited to any crowding-in party. It simply will not be in their interest to try to get the Act enforced against UKIB.
For all these reasons, I am very disappointed that this Bill, which I have never regarded as a shining example of Conservative economic values in any event, is going to ignore the concept of crowding out, which ought to be something dear to any Conservative Government’s heart. I shall not move my amendment when we reach it in the Marshalled List, but I live in hope that there are still some Conservatives in the Treasury who might have a change of heart before this Bill reaches the other place.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 24 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, to which I have added my name. The noble Baroness has already eloquently explained the rationale for this amendment, so I will try to keep my speech reasonably short.
Like the noble Baroness, I was strongly drawn to Amendment 6 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, which would insert the critical additionality principle into the principles of the Bill. That would be the preferable approach, but, like the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, I have been persuaded, reluctantly, to go along with the Government’s approach of making this something the bank reports on.
That leads me to amendments in the final group about the timing of those reports, which are, at the moment, seven years apart. If this is to be the way we deal with additionality, the report timings need to be shorter.
My Lords, I have added my name to all the amendments in this group, which cover four separate topics, and I will touch on each of them briefly. First, Amendment 13, which the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, eloquently explained, aims to introduce a greater level of scrutiny to the use of the Henry VIII power that is included in the Bill. The activities and, in particular, the definition of infrastructure are fundamental to what the bank can do and how it will be measured. It must be right that changes to this are subject to a meaningful level of parliamentary scrutiny and, as the noble Lord clearly explained, the affirmative procedure has sadly become a bit of a sham. Amendment 13 seeks to find an interesting balance between the rubber-stamping of a statutory instrument and full use of primary legislation. I urge the Government to support this, and I would be quite supportive generally of seeing more of this process in Bills more often: we have seen far too many of these Henry VIII clauses, as we have just heard.
Amendments 14, 15, 16 and 17 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, to which I have also added my name, are aimed at trying to resolve issues around the framework document that we discussed at length in Committee. As we heard, the framework document is a slightly peculiar animal: it seems to have no real legal status, but it is an important document in how the bank will behave. The consensus around the Chamber in Committee was, I think, that the balance within that is too far towards including elements of principle rather than the day-to-day running of the bank. These amendments do not really address that. All they ask is for the framework document to be updated, and that it should be consistent with the statement of strategic priorities. That seems pretty straightforward and simple.
There are a number of areas where the more recent statement of strategic priorities is inconsistent with the framework document. One example—it is relevant to the discussion we had on the previous group about additionality—is that the strategic priorities expressly do not require local authority investments to achieve additionality, but the framework document does. Perhaps the Minister could explain why. I doubt that she will accept the amendments, but could she at least confirm that the framework document will be updated and that it will be brought into line with the statement of strategic priorities?
Amendment 18 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, addresses the extremely important point raised in Committee, I think by the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, that as drafted the Bill—in conjunction with all these other governing documents, including the framework document—would require directions given by the Treasury to be published, but would not require situations where the board disagrees with that direction to be published or explained. Indeed, it effectively applies a gagging order, and that cannot be right. This important amendment brings in some essential transparency to that and I wholeheartedly support it.
I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, that the final amendment in the group is the most important. It introduces a simple requirement to consult the devolved Governments in various situations, and in preparing or changing the statement of strategic priorities. The bank’s activities will cover the whole UK, which I think is a good thing. The Minister has indicated, as does the statement of strategic priorities, that the bank is establishing a good relationship with the devolved Governments, and with the bank’s counterparts in the devolved nations. However, the Bill does not mention this. As someone who lives in Scotland and is a passionate unionist, I am consistently surprised by the fact that legislation that covers the whole UK rarely includes proper consultation requirements. That seems really counterproductive—even dangerous—as not taking proper account of the reasonable views and concerns of the devolved nations further undermines the strength of our union.
It gives ammunition to the nationalists that the Government do not take the devolved Governments seriously. We are heading rapidly towards a break-up of the union if we behave like this. This amendment does not create any veto powers or anything of that nature, which I would strongly disagree with that as you cannot work something if one party has a veto. It just requires consultation and that the reasonable views of the devolved nations be taken into account when setting the strategy or appointing directors.
I urge the Government to accept this. More widely, I urge them to start to be more consultative and include clauses of this nature more generally in Bills that cover the whole of the UK. That will strengthen, not weaken, the union and will ensure that the bank takes actions genuinely in the interests of all parts of the UK. If the noble and learned Lord decides to divide the House on this matter, I certainly will support him.
My Lords, I have added my name to all the amendments in this group but I will try to be brief. I want to pick up on the point just made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. Amendment 21 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, deals with consulting devolved Administrations. It ought to be a matter of course that in every Bill where consultation is important, it is in the Bill. It then underscores the constitutional relationship between central government and the devolved Governments. The expectation that it is to be dealt with either in other documents or just off the cuff is, I suspect, one of the reasons we see so much stress and pressure on the union today. It embodies a lack of respect, to be quite frank, and it ought to be a matter of course that we see these arrangements in a Bill.
I will look at the other amendments tabled and so well drafted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. On updating the framework document, we have heard of nothing but the importance of that document. On almost every issue we raise, we are told that it does not need to be in the Bill because it is in this absolutely critical document—the framework document—which is actually a document agreed between the Treasury and the bank; it is not even necessarily in the public arena. Yet we can see that it is inconsistent with the Bill as it stands, never mind with the issues that have surfaced in the course of this very complex debate. It is a document that desperately needs to be updated. I know there is a plan to update it by the end of this year but that is completely out of touch with making sure that we have proper, consistent and meaningful arrangements in place for a bank that is already functioning as we stand here today. I very much support those amendments.
I now look at the two amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey. Amendment 13, so eloquently supported by the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, addresses another fundamental problem that we see in one piece of legislation after another: the wide use of Henry VIII powers to allow secondary legislation—which cannot be amended and, in effect, cannot be rejected—to change primary legislation fundamentally. It almost makes a joke of primary legislation. I know the Government would say that they would not exercise the power widely and it is just a marginal change here or there, but the Bill is already written to allow for marginal changes. The only time when that clause would be relevant would be if fundamental changes were to be made. I would argue that those should come back to Parliament, at least for the level of engagement of a super-affirmative.
I want to speak most to Amendment 18 because I am truly exercised on the issue of transparency. As others have said, the Bill requires the publication of a direction when the Treasury basically decides it is going to tell the bank what it can do. It can give it instructions that are either general or specific. It could say, “Make this loan and do it this way.” That is entirely allowed and there has to be a publication. But what is not that established is that when the bank says no and then is overridden, that information comes into the public arena. When it says no, it says so in a letter of reservation and the kind of issues it can raise are fundamental, such as issues of propriety, issues of ethical behaviour and issues of departing from the fundamental purpose of the bank.
I think we must have an absolute assurance that those will be published so that they are in the public arena. Let me give an example. The Minister has often drawn parallels between this bank and the British Business Bank, which allows me to draw a parallel with the British Business Bank’s decision to accredit Greensill to provide a Covid-related loan. We know, because it is now in the public arena, that when Greensill applied to the British Business Bank for accreditation, various parts of the Government fairly bombarded the British Business Bank with emails. They did not say “accredit it” but kept saying how important it was that they knew the result, asking whether it was done yet and saying that this would be fundamental to the future of steel in the UK and so on. Anyway, as we all know, the British Business Bank did accredit Greensill and, I suspect, regrets the very moment that it did so.
If a direction from the Treasury had been published on that issue, I am sure it would have said: “This direction is intended to make sure that our very important steel industry survives. It is to support jobs. It is to support communities related to the steel industry.” The reservation would have said something very different. I suspect it would have said: “We do not believe that the entity, Greensill, meets our ethical standards. We believe that it is basically an organisation that has got itself into some very unfortunate and potentially unethical arrangements and is on the verge of bankruptcy.” That is why it is important that the reservation notice is published and the conversation does not exist only in the context of the direction. That is why I say to the Minister that we cannot have an arrangement where the bank could, if it wished, publish its reservation notice; it is crucial that it publishes its reservation notice. I argue that on the grounds of the propriety that should surely lie at the heart of all the legislation that we provide in this House.
My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendment 20. I traversed the reasons for this amendment at Second Reading. I traversed them again in Committee. I need not weary your Lordships by traversing them a third time. The points are obvious.
Enlightened departments have now agreed to put into Bills qualifications for the boards of important institutions. One sees that in the Climate Change Act and the Environment Act. It is a great pity that the Treasury is not an enlightened department. It should have a little more humility and appreciate that if you are to run something as important and, ideally, successful as an infrastructure bank, you ought to tick off the qualifications of the board as a whole. I have listed what they should be; they are drawn very carefully from the Climate Change Act and the Environment Act and adapted to ensure what I spoke about earlier; namely, that you have people who come from the devolved nations or who have a knowledge of the devolved nations. This is another way of dealing with the point.
However, having made those arguments, which are obvious and ought to be accepted, I fear that the Treasury is obdurate on this point. I just hope that in due course there will be a more humble and less entrenched view than its omniscient view about its capacity to do everything without some statutory guidance.
My Lords, briefly, I support Amendment 20 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. It is self-evident that the bank’s board should have the experience and skills that the noble and learned Lord proposes in his amendment, rather than just being Treasury placemen. The success or failure of the bank in achieving its objectives will depend entirely on the experience of the people running it, so I urge the Minister to accept this very common-sense amendment.
My Lords, I offer Green group support for Amendment 20, to which we would have attached our name had there been space.
In Committee, I suggested that the bank should not be in the hands of the Treasury at all. I got some expressions of interest but not enough support to bring it back on Report. However, it is clear that we need systems thinking, as I often say in your Lordships’ House. We need an approach that looks beyond the narrow growth in GDP to something broader and more holistic. This amendment is a step towards achieving that.
My Lords, I turn to Clause 9 of the Bill, on the statutory review. We had an extensive debate on this in Committee and, reflecting on that debate, the Government have tabled several amendments to this clause.
On the timing of the review, in Committee I set out the rationale for the first statutory review of the bank taking place after 10 years. This was for two reasons: first, to ensure that we could accurately measure the effect of the bank’s long-term investments and, secondly, to ensure that we do not overburden the bank with constant reviews. As I have previously noted, the Treasury is currently undertaking a review of the bank’s framework document and will undertake a review by spring 2024 of the bank’s capitalisation. The bank will also be subject to frequent Cabinet Office-sponsored arm’s-length body reviews, which should be conducted by an independent person.
However, I understand the strength of feeling in the House and, for this reason, I tabled an amendment to shorten the timescale for the first statutory review. Bringing forward the initial review to take place no later than seven years after Royal Assent will mean that the first statutory review will be conducted in 2029. This fits neatly with the timing of the levelling-up missions, which the bank’s work will support, that are due to be achieved by 2030.
I turn to my other amendments to Clause 9. I heard concerns in Committee that the Treasury would, in these reviews, be marking its own homework. That was not the intention, and so I have brought forward an amendment to clarify that the Treasury will appoint an independent reviewer to conduct the review. Noble Lords will, I hope, be further reassured that the Cabinet Office-sponsored reviews, as I have just noted, will have a recommendation that they be conducted by an independent reviewer too. I hope noble Lords are content with these amendments. I beg to move.
My Lords, I rise to speak to my Amendments 30 and 32. I am grateful to the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes, Lady Kramer and Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for their support. In fact, I think I may have achieved a world first in getting the noble Baronesses, Lady Noakes and Lady Bennett, to sign the same amendments. I hope, therefore that the Minister might take note of this extraordinary event and take the amendments seriously.
First, I thank the Minister for her amendments in this group, and for listening to and acting on the concerns that were raised by noble Lords as the Bill has proceeded. Her amendments are very welcome, especially those that deal with the issue that was previously raised about the Treasury marking its own homework. Having an independent person carry out the review is an important step. I also welcome the reduction of the period before the first review from 10 years to seven years. I think everyone agreed that 10 years was way too long, but even after that change, there will still be a review only every seven years, which I still think is too long. Amendments 30 and 32 would reduce this to every five years.
The argument in favour of the longer period seems to be that infrastructure investment is long-term, which it is, and therefore it will take a longer period before the success of the bank can be evaluated. I think this rather misses the point. Although it is true that the success of a particular investment may take more than seven years—indeed, it might be 20 or 30—to become clear, the review should be covering how effectively the bank has performed in making investments. Is it making enough investments, are they appropriate, are they in the appropriate parts of the country and, importantly, do they meet the additionality principle and, as we discussed earlier, the crowding-out problem? We do not need to wait until the investments themselves reach maturity to be able to see how well or badly the bank is performing in making investments.