Investigatory Powers Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Report: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 11th October 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

20: Clause 20, page 16, line 11, at end insert—
“( ) A warrant may be considered necessary on the grounds falling within subsection (2)(b) only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed and it is reasonably believed that the communications sought for interception will contain information relevant to the criminal investigation.”

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendments 20 and 67, because they are very closely linked. They both, in essence, would require a reasonable suspicion of a serious crime. They would need the authorities to demonstrate a reasonable suspicion of a serious crime, and a nexus between the communications sought and the crime suspected, for a targeted surveillance warrant to be authorised. I see absolutely no reason not to make this clear. I hope very much that Government see sense on this.

One of the biggest problems in every single power the Bill gives and sometimes creates is the lack of a reasonable suspicion—lack of a threshold that is absolutely clear for surveillance powers to be authorised for the purpose of preventing and detecting crime. Intrusive powers can be authorised to prevent and detect serious crime, but this general purpose is left wide open to broad interpretation and abuse without requiring the authorising authority to verify the existence of that reasonable suspicion of criminality. A requirement of reasonable suspicion, when the purpose of preventing and detecting serious crime is invoked, would protect people and prevent the abusive surveillance of law-abiding citizens that we have seen in the past, without unduly limiting legitimate use of surveillance powers.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Keen of Elie]

My Lords, as indicated by the noble Baroness, the amendments would provide that a targeted interception or equipment interference warrant could be issued in the interests of preventing or detecting serious crime only where there was a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence had been or was likely to be committed.

The amendments are simply not necessary. I assure the House that for a warrant to be issued for the prevention or detection of serious crime, a sufficiently compelling case will always be required. A speculative warrant could never be approved, so these amendments address a concern that is fundamentally misplaced.

The Bill already provides strict and robust safeguards that ensure that a warrant may be issued only where it is necessary and proportionate. That is a well-established test. This decision must be approved by both the Secretary of State and a judicial commissioner. I pick up a point made by the noble Lords, Lord Paddick and Lord Rosser: in the case of a warrant for the prevention and detection of serious crime, the test of necessity and proportionality simply could not be met where there was not a reasonable suspicion that a serious crime had been or was likely to be committed. In these circumstances, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

I thank the noble and learned Lord for his answer. I never tire of telling this House that I was targeted by the Met police, monitored by them and put on to a domestic extremist database with, I would argue, absolutely no cause. Noble Lords will forgive me if I do not quite believe that there are enough safeguards. Quite honestly, I wonder if in five or 10 years I will have the opportunity to come to Ministers and say, “I told you so”. However many safeguards are put in, without strengthening them and making them absolutely clear you leave the door open for abuse. We have seen it in the past. We know very well that part of this Bill’s meaning is to cover abuses of previous legislation. I am deeply unconfident about the safeguards proposed, as are other organisations outside the House. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 20 withdrawn.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Report: 2nd sitting (Hansard - part one): House of Lords
Monday 17th October 2016 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

100ZA: Clause 58, page 48, line 9, at end insert—
“( ) An authorisation may be considered necessary on the grounds falling within subsection (7)(b) or (f) only where there is a reasonable suspicion that a serious criminal offence has been or is likely to be committed and it is reasonably believed that the communications data sought will be relevant to the criminal investigation.”

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, with this amendment I make a further attempt to introduce into the Bill a requirement on the authorities to demonstrate reasonable suspicion of a serious crime and a nexus between the communications data that are sought and the crime suspected before a targeted surveillance warrant can be authorised.

As I pointed out previously when speaking to Amendment 20, one of the greatest problems with the Bill is the lack of a requirement for reasonable suspicion in order for surveillance powers to be authorised for the purpose of preventing and detecting a crime. At the moment, intrusive powers can be authorised to prevent and detect serious crime, but this general purpose is left wide open to very broad interpretation, and therefore to abuse, without requiring the authorising authority to verify the existence of reasonable suspicion of criminality. A requirement of reasonable suspicion when the purpose of preventing and detecting serious crime is invoked would prevent the potential abusive surveillance of law-abiding citizens, which we have seen in the past, without unduly limiting the legitimate use of surveillance powers.

The threshold of reasonable suspicion has long been an important safeguard for both citizens and law enforcers against the risk of the arbitrary use of police powers. The “necessary and proportionate” standard invokes an important assessment of the extent of the intrusion but does not necessitate a threshold of suspicion. Although would one expect that in practice targets of surveillance would meet this very modest burden of proof, in my view it is a great mistake not to include the threshold of reasonable suspicion in the Bill, and it leaves these powers ripe for abuse. Therefore, I make no apology for returning to this issue once again.

The amendment simply requires, first, a threshold of reasonable suspicion that a serious crime has been planned or committed and, secondly, a factual basis for believing that the targeted communications data will contain information relevant to the criminal investigation. This would reassure the public that intrusive targeted surveillance could be used only where there was reasonable suspicion of a serious crime. To that end, I hope the Government will accept the amendment. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Earl Howe]

Indeed, but until we have seen and read what that judgment is, our view is that the Bill is compliant.

In view of the very significant impact that would flow from this amendment, I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw it.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

I thank all noble Lords who have given me some support: it is something that I feel very strongly about. I thank the noble Earl for his full reply. Needless to say, I am not convinced because all of the issues that he talked about are in fact potentially serious crimes, so the threshold would be satisfied.

If the noble Earl had spoken to some of the people who had been blacklisted, for example, and whose lives were basically destroyed because of illegal surveillance and co-operation by the police with various organisations, it is possible that he would have been influenced in the same way that I have been. However, in view of the noble Earl’s answer, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 100ZA withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[The Lord Bishop of Chester]

My Lords, I was a member of the Joint Committee conducting pre-legislative scrutiny of the Bill, along with the noble Lord, Lord Strasburger—I am not sure whether anyone else in the Chamber was. I remember a discussion which was genuinely open and uncertain about the practicality of this above all. The issue of privacy has been raised very powerfully by the noble Lord, Lord Oates, and others from the Liberal Democrat Benches. We thought at the end of the day that the whole Bill was about reaching a balance, with a degree of compromise over issues of privacy alongside the really quite robust safeguards which are in the Bill, such as the role of the judicial commissioners, as all set out in Clause 86. Our real issue was over practicality and cost. When the Minister comes to respond, it would be helpful if we could have a bit more guidance as to what this is going to cost. The cost will not fall on the companies; it will fall upon the Government, who will have to fund it.

However, we were persuaded that under Clause 84, the retention notice may be more specific than has been suggested in the speech from the Liberal Democrat Benches. It is not necessarily every connection to every website: the provision could be targeted to particular websites, for example, which is all set out in Clause 84. We should also emphasise that these records would not be of the content of what was happening: it would be where you had made contact, not the content of the connection as such. That is an important factor which has not been mentioned in the contributions.

That said, a representative from Denmark came and explained to us why the Danes had given up on this, simply on the grounds of cost and practicality. It is the practicalities that I would like to hear about most from the Minister when he speaks, alongside of course acknowledgement of the points that have been made by others in the debate.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

My Lords, I did not intend to speak on this amendment, which I strongly support, so I will be brief. Even I understand the need to balance civil liberties and national security, but comparing this with stopping a few cars simply does not hold water and is not a comparison that we can make—and, personally, I am totally in favour of stopping cars, so that is not an issue.

It is almost as if the Government went to the intelligence and security services and said, “What do you want? What can you imagine wanting to keep us safe?”, and they came up with a huge list. It is like asking children what they want for Christmas: they want a huge list of things and it is not always good to give them everything they want. In this instance, it is certainly not good to give the intelligence services what they want. Indeed, they do not even want some of what the Government are offering them, so the Government have actually gone one step further and offered them more, which to me is totally counterintuitive.

There is also the issue of practicality. When you have this much information coming through, it is incredibly difficult to pick out the vital points and the important things. This could be counterproductive and make us less safe as a nation than we are already. I feel very strongly about this amendment and deeply regret that there is not more support in the House.

[Lord Rosser]

The effect of this amendment, as has been said, would be to leave out internet connection records from the definition of “relevant communications data” in Clause 84, which covers powers to require the retention of certain data. The Bill has had extensive pre-legislative scrutiny, including by a Joint Committee of both Houses, and we supported it at Third Reading in the Commons subject to, among other things, amendments being made which addressed the issue of access to internet connection records not being used in relation to minor crimes. Our amendment on the definition of “other relevant crime”, which raised the threshold from six months to 12 months, has been accepted by the Government. We will be opposing an amendment that now appears to weaken the effectiveness of the provisions relating to internet connection records, at least under Part 4 of the Bill, specifically Clause 84.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 31st October 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord West of Spithead (Lab)]

My Lords, I support these amendments and I strongly support my noble friend Lord Rooker in everything that he has said. This Bill is a classic example of how a Bill should come through this place. The way in which it has been built up across Parliament has been remarkable. It meets all the requirements for our security and for personal liberty, and we should be very proud of it.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I was going to speak later but I will speak now, as I am driven to do so by the comments of previous speakers.

The Bill is undoubtedly better than it was at the start. It could not help but be because of all the effort that people have put into making it better, but it is still a most appalling piece of legislation and I should like to read something to noble Lords:

“Today, an ordinary person can’t pick up the phone, email a friend or order a book without comprehensive records of their activities being created, archived, and analysed by people with the authority to put you in jail or worse. I know: I sat at that desk. I typed in the names. When we know we’re being watched, we impose restraints on our behaviour—even clearly innocent activities—just as surely as if we were ordered to do so. The mass surveillance systems of today, systems that pre-emptively automate the indiscriminate seizure of”,

private records, constitute a sort of surveillance time machine”,

“—a machine that simply cannot operate without violating our liberty on the broadest scale. And it permits governments to go back and scrutinise every decision you’ve ever made, every friend you’ve ever spoken to, and derive suspicion from an innocent life. Even a well-intentioned mistake can turn a life upside down. To preserve our free societies, we have to defend not just against distant enemies, but against dangerous policies at home. If we allow scarce resources to be squandered on surveillance programmes that violate the very rights they purport to defend, we haven’t protected our liberty at all: we have paid to lose it”.

That sums this Bill up. It was written by Edward Snowden, who, as he said, sat at that desk. It was written for Liberty.

[Lord West of Spithead]

My Lords, does the noble Baroness accept that Edward Snowden, by releasing millions of bits of classified material, has actually made all of us less safe than we were? It is a certain fact that he has done that. He is hardly someone to quote as a great and noble person.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb]

I think that we will find in the future that this legislation will return again and again to bite us, and many of us here will regret having passed it.

[Lord Murphy of Torfaen (Lab)]

My Lords, I disagree with the noble Baroness, Lady Jones. She played an important role in the course of this Bill in reminding your Lordships of the need to deal with the liberty of the citizen. But the greatest threat to the liberty of the citizen is the threat to life. This Bill, which is now in its final stage, is extremely important in ensuring that in future our citizens are protected against terrorism and the threats that face this country and beyond.

Of course, there were and are still issues that need to be taken very seriously with regard to the liberty of the subject. But in all the years that I have been in Parliament, I have not seen as much scrutiny of a Bill as this one. Not only did the Joint Committee, which I had the honour to chair, go through all the details of the Bill over a number of months, the other committees in Parliament also dealt with it, not least the Intelligence and Security Committee.

I commend the Government—not something that I usually do, but I will on this occasion—on accepting a great number of amendments to the Bill, which have improved it in the sense of ensuring that our liberties are safeguarded but that the basic thrust of the Bill remains the same. This has been a tremendous exercise in parliamentary scrutiny. As my noble friend Lord Rooker said, it is Parliament’s Bill as much as it is the Government’s.

Investigatory Powers Bill

Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb Excerpts

Ping Pong (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 2nd November 2016 Lords Chamber

[Lord Prescott (Lab)]

My Lords, this measure is not only diversionary, it is an attempt to finish off everything that Leveson proposed after an inquiry that lasted years. Everybody agreed that the hacking which occurred was terrible, particularly me as I was one of those who were hacked. I complained to the police, who did not believe me, to the Press Complaints Commission, which did not believe me, and then to all the bodies concerned with the issue, even the Crown Prosecution Office. They did not believe me. Eventually, I had to go to court to find justice on a human rights matter. Only then did all these bodies admit that they were aware of the evidence but did not declare it to me. I do not think the situation has changed. If the Government are saying that something will be different, will they please spell out what that difference is? What would happen if that situation were to occur now? I might add that the Investigatory Powers Bill will allow an awful lot more hacking than we have at present, as that is what it is designed to do. We talk about terrorism but what is to stop the police pursuing the matter, given their new technology, and perhaps not do so properly? Those affected by that action should then have a right to complain. If abuse occurs through the use of the technology, what do you do then? To whom do you complain?

The consultation went on for years under Leveson and those who played a part in it. We do not need any more consultation to work this out. I listened to the debate in the House of Commons and to all those people who agreed to this legislation and to the royal charter, every one of whom is now saying that we should start consultation. What happened? This started when Mr Whittingdale told the press that he was not minded to implement Section 40. He did not tell Parliament as by then he had moved on from the office of Secretary of State. This is a step-by-step process to get rid of Leveson’s recommendations. That is what it is really about. The next stage is to quash what he said about having a second inquiry into the relations between the police and the press. That is still ongoing. If anybody does not believe that, they can read it in the press every day of the week. The new IPSO, or whatever it is called, not only makes a judgment but also complains in the press. It made a judgment about me a few months ago when I made a complaint. That situation has not changed. Recommendations were made regarding having a new authority, but we have done nothing about it. We are locked in dispute on this. Therefore, to that extent I do not think anything has changed. When the Prime Minister met Murdoch in New York, they might have just thrown it into the conversation whether we should make these changes. It happened before with the previous Prime Minister—meeting secretly and then doing a deal. That is not acceptable. What I find most offensive of all is that we all agreed in this Chamber, and in the other Chamber when I was there, to take action. Admittedly, they wrapped it up in the royal charter. I did not agree with that royal charter argument. I always thought we wanted to keep the Queen out of politics. She is right in the middle of it now, is she not, with the royal charter?

There is a dispute among politicians about what is to be implemented. That is the reason I resigned. I was the only one to resign, apparently, from being a privy counsellor—that is, one who had not been to jail or got caught in some scandalous situation. That was a view of mine about the charter. That was the first weakening of the case for implementing Leveson. That was the first mistake we made.

We now appear to be discussing what we have already passed. We have already agreed it. I listened to the debate yesterday, in which it was said, “This is the wrong Bill”. We said it was the wrong Bill in this House; we recognised that. But it is the wrong Bill because the Government did not carry out what is already in legislation. It is there, we discussed it and we voted on it in both Houses. Nobody, as I understand it, voted against it. Then, we were told that the Minister, like all her MPs yesterday, is saying, “This isn’t the Bill. This is a serious matter”. I understand what they mean by that, but it came about only because they refused to carry out what they had voted for. That is what we are dealing with today. Now we are questioning what we in Parliament are supposed to have made a decision about, and saying that we are going to have a consultation. But it is a consultation to get out of the obligations that this House and the other place agreed to. That is unacceptable.

We have started the battle again about the reality of the press. We talk about freedom of the press, but does anybody complain about the freedom of the victims? No. They have a lot to say but I do not hear their voice. I did not hear them mentioned much in the House of Commons yesterday.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

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