Northern Ireland Protocol

Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town Excerpts

Thursday 21st May 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hayter of Kentish Town (Lab)]

My Lords, I start by making one correction to what the Minister said yesterday. His allegation was that I was

“always critical of the role of Mr David Frost”.—[Official Report, 20/5/20; col. 1182.]

I was critical of the apparent lack of ministerial sign-off on major statements; of a key letter being signed by a “Sherpa”—as he calls himself—rather than by a Minister; and of the inability of parliamentarians to question our EU negotiator.

Today’s Statement, by contrast, is the long-awaited admission by Ministers that the Northern Ireland arrangements will indeed involve border checks between Great Britain and Northern Ireland, with additional checks, declarations on goods moving from Great Britain into Northern Ireland, and tariffs on goods at risk of entering the EU single market.

Nevertheless, the Command Paper leaves many questions unanswered. We had thought that the EU was expecting the UK to levy duties on all goods going to Northern Ireland, unless it could be established that they were not at risk, with the 70% on goods staying in Northern Ireland then being reclaimed. Can the Minister tell the House whether the EU now accepts the approach in the Government’s paper, that duties would be levied only on goods which pose a “clear and substantial risk” of entering the single market? Can he also explain how

“goods at risk of entering the EU’s Single Market”

will be decided? Perhaps he can reassure us that the paper’s promise to

“produce full guidance to business and third parties before the end of the transition period”

is simply a typo, and that such guidance will be available in time to become operational by 1 January?

With goods from Northern Ireland to Great Britain, the paper implies a very light touch. However, Welsh ports will be required to have additional infrastructure to make customs and regulatory checks—some “expansion” of infrastructure, in the words of the Statement—but without proper consultation with Wales, and perhaps not with Scotland, about arrangements which would need to be in operation by the end of the year.

Can the Minister also explain how, in practice, there will not be significant flows of goods from the EU single market into Great Britain through the backdoor of Northern Ireland, especially if, under either a deal or no deal, there are tariffs on goods coming from the EU into Great Britain—such as from France and Benelux —but not from Northern Ireland to Great Britain?

Talk, of course, in the paper of “light-touch” checks and the “latest technology”, neither of which exist other than on paper, naturally raises concerns. After all, we do not seem to have been able to create a rather simple track-and-trace app after 10 weeks of the virus, while “light-touch” seems to include an export summary declaration, with 45 entries for every consignment. Therefore, can the Minister outline what discussions have been held with importers and exporters, and tell us what confidence he has that business, and government checkers, will be ready for this in time?

Turning to how the Command Paper was drafted, we have been given to understand that the Northern Ireland Executive were not involved in its preparation. Is that the case? The other devolved authorities were similarly excluded, despite the impact on their ports and points of arrival, and on their hopes for an internal single UK market. As the Minister knows, we do not have a Welsh, Scottish or Northern Ireland Minister in this House. Does that reflect the low priority given to these areas, even as major policy decisions affecting them greatly are being taken? The absence of territorial Ministers in our House certainly makes scrutiny of their departments somewhat more challenging, even if today’s Statement clearly falls to the Cabinet Office.

For all the effects of Brexit, Ireland is surely the most sensitive and most important issue, not simply for trade but for how the people of Northern Ireland feel about themselves and for the vital importance of retaining all the benefits of the Good Friday agreement. On this, I am sure, the Minister and I will be in total agreement. Therefore, my plea today is for Ministers to talk more to politicians and businesses, and indeed to civil society in Northern Ireland, as well as in Scotland and Wales, to ensure that all parties have confidence in how we move forward with the protocol.

[Lord Bruce of Bennachie (LD)]

My Lords, given the duplicity of the Government, the Northern Ireland protocol has all the semblance of damaged goods. In particular, the repeated denial that it would involve the need for any new UK customs declaration or checks is revealed as the hollow sham that it always was.

In his Statement yesterday, Michael Gove tried to play this down, but the White Paper cannot be gainsaid. It says that

“there will be some limited additional process on goods arriving in Northern Ireland ... There will be no new physical customs infrastructure ... We will however expand some existing entry points for agrifood goods to provide for proportionate additional controls.”

It also says in relation to

“Belfast Port, Belfast International Airport, Belfast City Airport and Warrenpoint Port”

that:

“Expanded infrastructure will be needed at some of these sites for the purpose of agri-food checks and assurance ... we expect to request additional categories of commodities at Belfast Port, and to designate Larne Port for live animal imports ... further designations may also be required at other existing sites.”


This is a clear change of a radical nature. What costs and delays does the Minister expect it to cause? It cannot be done without time being taken to deal with these matters.

The Government choose to refer to the withdrawal agreement as a “deal” when it is no such thing; it is an agreement on the terms of withdrawal. When it suits, they choose to rely on the political declaration, although this is only a declaration of intent and needs to be judged against the backdrop of the Government preparing for a no-deal Brexit and, frankly, blaming the EU for it.

The Government also seek to present the protocol as temporary, dependent only on a vote of the Northern Ireland elected representatives to abandon it after 2024. In reality, it puts Northern Ireland in the unique position of effectively remaining in the EU single market and the UK customs union—a privilege which many businesses in Great Britain would no doubt love to have. Again, the Government seek to downplay the importance of cross-border trade to the Province, yet it is worth over £5 billion and for some businesses may be their chief revenue and profit earner.

If they import components from the UK and process them before exporting to the Republic, they will be liable to tariffs. This will present them with a clear difficulty. It will involve extra bureaucracy and require them to fill out import and export forms and train and possibly recruit extra staff and maybe use agents. All this will add substantial costs. The White Paper says that HMRC will provide help and guidance to businesses, but this is to help deal with a situation they currently do not face. This will come at a cost, so will the Government cover that cost?

The Government make great play of the benefit of lower tariffs that they hope to negotiate at some unspecified future date. Of course, while I appreciate the benefits of free trade, if this comes at the expense of tariff barriers with the EU, the net benefit may be at best limited and possibly negative. It may also be that we accept imported goods of lower standards, such as food products from the United States. This could compromise domestic producers in Northern Ireland. It is not a one-way street.

Depending on what agreement is reached with the EU, the dynamics of trade between the Republic, Northern Ireland and Great Britain could change. This would make issues of customs controls much more live. An incentive for Northern Ireland to become the bridge between the EU single market and the rest of the UK would clearly require more transparent customs controls, especially if there were divergence on tariffs and regulations.

The Government’s refusal in this context to consider an EU presence in Belfast raises questions of trust. Trust will be achieved if there is a comprehensive and mutually beneficial free trade deal. If there is a hard or no-deal Brexit, it is hardly surprising that the EU and the UK will look at each other with suspicion. There are many more questions than answers from this White Paper. As it stands, it does little to build trust with either the EU, the Republic or the business community of Northern Ireland. I hope the Minister can reassure all those bodies that it is being pursued in good faith and is entirely consistent with both the spirit and the letter of the agreement the Government signed with the EU.