Building Safety Bill

Baroness Hayman of Ullock Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 28th February 2022 Grand Committee

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Khan of Burnley, will not mind if I ask for clarification on a related point. First, I will say how much I agreed with the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, on the worry one might have about a shortage of experts for this purpose, leading to an escalation of costs that will end up with the ultimate consumer: the leaseholder. Clearly, given the history, we do not want confusion in the Bill.

My question is about how the safety manager will operate in practice. How often will he or she be expected to visit the building? Obviously, I know a lot more about shops, and in shops the safety manager is often a treasured member of staff who may not be an expert in safety but is an expert in making sure that other members of the team behave appropriately. You do not need much expertise on safety if you have a very good system—one that includes sprinklers, for example, which will work well because all you have to do is make sure that the sprinklers and the water that supplies them are checked from time to time. My question, which it would be good to have clarified, is: what is the vision of what this person is going to do, and will they be doing it once every five years, once a day, or whatever? That will affect both the cost and the risk that there will not be enough people to do the important job of ensuring that we have safe buildings. Even in high-rise buildings, there will still be quite a bit of demand.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, I want to say how much we agree with what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said about the importance of having adequate safety measures. That has to run through everything we discuss in connection with the Bill. The noble Baroness also raised the important issue of cost. My noble friend Lord Khan talked about high service charges, and the Minister said she would write about that. This debate has put a focus on ever-increasing service costs, and the fact that in many cases they are starting to become unreasonable. It is very difficult when they go up by 190%, as they have in some areas.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, asked one of the key questions that I was going to ask, about the operation of the managers. What exactly are they going to do, and how are they going to do it? Will they be paid, and if so, how much? There is not a lot of detail in the Bill. This comes back to the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, about accountability, and whether there will be confusion over the role. It is important that we all understand exactly what building safety managers are expected to do, how they will do it and how they will be rewarded for their work. Without that clarification, there are bound to be concerns that the cost of their work will be passed on through increased service charges, or possibly increased rent. None of that is clear. We would like more clarification about the role and the expectations.

[Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)]

My Lords, I start by going back to where the Bill came from, the tragedy of Grenfell Tower. The point of the Bill is to ensure the safety of residents, particularly, in this case, in high-risk buildings, and the building safety manager is the day-to-day eyes and ears. I do not know whether people realise, but I did two or three years’ work after the tragedy in Kensington and Chelsea. Before I did that, I spent a lot of time in high-rise buildings, not in London but elsewhere in the country, and it was quite interesting, on a day-to-day basis, when I went round with fire brigades and dealt with issues such as safety doors. People took them off and put B&Q doors on. Those things cannot be done every five years, or every year; they need somebody going in and out of that building, checking up.

There will be stairwells with stuff stuck in them that is stopping people going up and down. There will be holes between the sealed containment of flat against flat. All those sorts of things need somebody who is not at arm’s-length but is working day to day. Yes, they will need new competences, but those competences are out there, I would argue, within the community already, and we will have to work on those competences. As for cost, obviously, that depends on the building. Some of these managers will be able to do multiple buildings if it is felt, by their accountable person, that they will be able to do a good job on that. One building is not the same size or requires the same amount of work as another building.

I shall now go through the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and I thank noble Lords for their contributions. The crux of Clause 80 is the duty to appoint a building safety manager. The creation of the building safety manager role was recommended made by Dame Judith Hackitt in the independent review to ensure, I say again, that the day-to-day management of buildings is undertaken by suitably competent people. That is what she said and that is what we are delivering in the Bill. Clause 80 establishes the role and creates a duty for principal accountable persons to appoint a building safety manager and provide them with support and assistance to manage building safety risks, except where they have the capability to meet the duties without needing such support. So there will be times when principal accountable persons have the time and the competences to do it without appointing somebody else. The skills, knowledge and experience offered by building safety managers will help drive up safety standards and, we believe, deliver positive outcomes for residents.

While the building safety manager will hold responsibility for certain tasks, to be agreed in their contract, accountability for meeting the duties set out by the Bill cannot be transferred by accountable persons to the building safety manager or anybody else. I think that answers the question of the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, about who is ultimately responsible. Whether the building safety manager is an organisation or an individual, they must possess the necessary competence to deliver the role. If an organisation is appointed, it must have a nominated individual named and in place to oversee delivery, providing reassurance to residents that their safety is being maintained. The noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, brought up the competence issue. Work is ongoing with the British Standards Institute to establish a competency framework for the role, which will be supported by further guidance.

Moving on, Clause 81 deals with the appointment of the building safety manager where there is more than one accountable person for the building. Despite the often complex ownership structures of many high-rise residential buildings, we are committed to delivering a system that ensures a whole-building approach. This was a central tenet of the findings and recommendations of the independent review.

Where there are multiple accountable persons, the principal accountable person will be responsible for appointing the building safety manager. The building safety manager should play a key role in delivering a whole-building approach, drawing on the duty placed on all accountable persons to co-ordinate and co-operate with each other.

Before the appointment is made, the principal accountable person must consult on the proposed terms and costs with their fellow accountable persons. We expect agreements to be reached so that the scope of the building safety manager’s functions and the method of delivery of the whole-building approach are agreed by all. If an agreement cannot be reached, we are providing a process for resolution through applications to the First-tier Tribunal. This approach protects the rights of accountable persons and holds them to account for ensuring residents’ safety.

Clause 82 ensures that building safety managers hold their position through the contractual arrangements agreed with the principal accountable person. If either party wishes to end the contract, they may do so by giving notice to the other party in writing. When the contract ends, a new building safety manager must be appointed by the principal accountable person as soon as is reasonably possible. If a building is not being managed appropriately and is placed into special measures, which is the last resort for taking control of buildings with significant failings, the building safety manager’s contract will end.

I mentioned earlier that there is an exception to the principal accountable person’s duty to appoint a building safety manager. Dame Judith’s review was right to point out that many building owners already operate and successfully manage their buildings through competent in-house teams. Where the principal accountable person’s existing management arrangements deliver safe outcomes for residents and this can be demonstrated to the building safety regulator, their mode of delivery will not need to change. The competency requirements for qualifying for this exception are of course the same as those expected of any other building safety manager.

This approach is likely to be favoured by organisations such as housing associations or local authorities, which potentially have many buildings that fall under the scope of the new regime. Residents of these buildings will rightly expect to be able to identify individuals who play an important role in maintaining their safety, and the clause requires the identification of the individual responsible for overseeing delivery. This person will not be expected to carry out every task alone, but they will be required to provide oversight such that a holistic and systemic approach to managing safety is achieved.

The exception to the duty to appoint a building safety manager also applies where there are two or more accountable persons for the building. The competency requirements remain consistent. As in the case where they would appoint a building safety manager, the principal accountable person must, as I said, consult their fellow accountable persons and seek to reach agreement on the proposed arrangements. We expect the consultation process to follow the same route as already explained for appointing a building safety manager where there are two or more accountable persons.

Safety has to be our main priority and the building safety manager plays an important role in delivering this. The Government will reflect further on all the points raised today. However, at this point we maintain that Clauses 80, 81, 82, 83 and 84 should stand part of the Bill.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, some very good questions have been asked in this debate. I am grateful to the Minister for setting out his proposals. I rise briefly, as it is late, to say that I very much support two practical amendments; as noble Lords know, I am essentially a practical person. They are Amendment 56 in the name of my noble friend Lord Young of Cookham, on aligning building safety charges and service charges, and Amendment 94ZA in the name of my noble friend Lord Leigh, on the dilemma facing leaseholders who have already paid service charges.

[Baroness Hayman of Ullock (Lab)]

My Lords, I have two amendments in this group. Before I introduce them and talk about the things that we are perhaps not so content with in the group, I just want to say that we recognise that the Government have introduced some very important amendments here. We welcome the work they are trying to do to improve the Bill from its previous incarnation.

The first amendment in my name is Amendment 88. The reason we introduced it is that, looking at all aspects of the crisis that this Bill is trying to address, these Benches are concerned that the Government’s approach does not appear to have a central plan. This amendment was also tabled in the other place by my colleagues, so we are repeating their call for the Government to act across the piece to solve the crisis. We ask that the Minister considers accepting our proposals for a building works agency, which would provide a more hands-on approach.

As we have heard, home owners, many of them first-time buyers, have become trapped in a perfect storm in unsafe buildings because they cannot sell their homes, and are forced to pay thousands in remediation works through no fault of their own. We propose that a team of experts does what the Government have not done so far with this Bill: go from building to building to assess real risk, deciding what needs to be fixed and in what order, using the building safety fund to get those buildings fixed and overseeing the work. Crucially, the Government could then sign off the buildings as safe and sellable, bringing certainty back into the market.

To make it clear, we see the building safety works agency as a separate body to the building safety regulator, with no duplication or crossover; in the debate in the other place, the Minister felt that there was crossover. We see the building safety works agency overseeing the remediation works and the other body regulating. One regulates and one does the work. This would mean that the Government could really take on those who are responsible for creating the crisis and who need to pay. This approach was put in place by a cross-party group of politicians and experts in Victoria, Australia, after there was a serious fire there. That is why we think it would work here: it is not just an idea off the top of our heads but something that has been done and worked before. It would enable the Government really to lead from the front on this matter.

Briefly, my Amendment 125 was tabled before the most recent government amendments. It replicates the McPartland-Smith new Clause 5 from the Commons, amending Part XVI of the Housing Act 1985. Now that the Government have tabled their amendments, it has been superseded, but I will still speak to it to remind the Committee that there have been previous attempts to address the fire safety question during the passage of the Bill. This amendment illustrates that there are different approaches to how the issue can be solved in legislation. It was previously tabled with a range of other amendments addressed to Part 5 of the Bill with the aim of allowing the Government and local authorities to enable grants for remediation work—specifically, by allowing the Government and local authorities to designate dwellings with cladding and fire safety defects as defective.

Having now seen the government amendments, I ask the Minister why the Government could not back the original amendment, which was after all tabled by Conservative Members of Parliament. How did the Government then arrive at the decision to table what they have come up with?

I want now to look at some of the other amendments in the group, and in particular at the implications of government Amendment 92. We do not think that any of the announcements benefit leaseholders who have already paid for remediation work—this has been mentioned by other noble Lords today. The fact that there is no retrospective coverage means that even if the proposed amendments become law and are effectively implemented, many leaseholders will continue to suffer the financial impact of the building safety crisis.

I therefore indicate our strong support for Amendment 131, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Young of Cookham, which proposes that the Secretary of State set up a statutory public inquiry. It is really important for us to understand exactly what the situation is. Otherwise, there will be no recovery of these costs to leaseholders. Any steps which will lead to full retrospective protection for leaseholders who have already paid remediation costs should be taken seriously by the Government.

If the Government choose to introduce a cap on non-cladding remediation works—the noble Baroness, Lady Pinnock, talked about this extensively in relation to her amendments, and we fully support what she is trying to achieve—it would mean that the maximum amount payable would be a peppercorn amount, which is effectively nothing and is where we need to be. Leaseholders should not be liable to pay for any costs that have resulted from a faulty regulatory system, whether these are related to cladding or non-cladding remediation, or interim safety measures. As the noble Lord, Lord Naseby, said, all leaseholders should be treated exactly the same.

Further, it is unclear who will be liable to pay for remediation costs or the provision of interim safety measures such as waking watch in cases where the £10,000 or £15,000 cap has been met. Many buildings with fire safety issues can be occupied thanks to waking watches and other interim measures. If these are removed, there is a risk that the building receives a prohibition or decant notice and/or a withdrawal of building insurance cover. I hope that the Minister has his thinking cap on, because I have quite a lot of questions and requests for clarification. There have been a great number of amendments to consider and fully understand, so I hope that he will bear with me.

The combined effect of the various amendments is pretty complex. They seem to create what I can describe only as a system of cascading statutory protection, each stage of which is triggered only if the prior one is exhausted. I shall go through my understanding of it. Can the Minister confirm that I am correct or clarify where I have got it wrong? I know that the noble Earl, Lord Lytton, also asked for clarification in a number of areas.

My understanding is that the system would work as follows. First, developers who are still the freeholders of a given building or are linked to it by a subsidiary, as well as cladding manufacturers, are expected to pay first. Secondly, freeholders of buildings who are not the original developers or linked to the original developers are expected to pay second, subject to an affordability test to be set out in the future via regulations. Thirdly, if those freeholders cannot pay, leaseholders will be expected to pay only a capped amount based on Florrie’s law towards non-cladding costs only. Anything they have paid to date counts towards the capped amount. Assuming that I have understood this correctly, I ask the Minister for more clarity on how this cascade system is expected to work in practice and what estimates, if any, the Government have made.

For example, how do the Government expect to define the affordability test at stage 2 of the cascade in regulations, given that this will make a huge difference to the number of cases that then get to stage 3? Why is there no protection for social landlords at stage 2, given the impact on affordable housing supply? What happens if freeholders of buildings who are not the original developers or linked to the original developer cannot pay and the costs exceed the leaseholder cap by a substantial amount? Who makes up the difference? Would it be from the department’s affordable housing budget, for example?