Syrian Refugees: Settlement in the UK

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 7th December 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

We do not want that to happen, of course. We must remember that the priority consideration regarding the vulnerable persons scheme is that the people in question are vulnerable. First, we are talking about women and children who are at risk, along with people who have been subject to torture and those in need of acute medical care. They may not be the ideal people to take up the offers coming forward under the community-based sponsorship scheme. Like the right reverend Prelate, I read that report over the weekend. A meeting is going to take place on Thursday between Lambeth Palace and the Home Office to resolve that difference—I am sure it can be resolved—and to make sure that that very generous offer is accepted and taken up.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware of the recent thoughtful report from the Children’s Society, entitled Not Just a Temporary Fix, on the search for durable solutions for separated migrant children? One of its recommendations is that Home Office decision-makers should be trained in how to assess a separated child’s best interests, rather than simply referring to Section 55, the welfare duty, as if such a reference was enough.

[Lord Bates]

I read that report, which I think is good. We are looking at it and it raises a number of issues. Under the unaccompanied asylum-seeking children scheme—UASC—there is an additional level of guidance from the Department for Education, and the Minister for Children and Families, Edward Timpson, has lead responsibility for it. Also, we cannot get away from the fact that although the Home Office might have such responsibility under the Children Act 1989, local authorities have the statutory duty of care for any children under their care, whether or not they are asylum seekers.

Counterterrorism: Communities

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Thursday 26th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I, too, thank the noble Baroness for giving us this opportunity. Like others, I do not link the components of the title of the debate in the way that they might be read.

Inevitably, events in Paris and Brussels have a greater impact than those in, say, Beirut or Tunis—or Nigeria, which saw almost a quarter of the deaths caused by terrorist activity last year. One of the impacts is how “others” in the UK are perceived. I heard yesterday of a teenage boy at a football club who was found by his coach in tears. He had been abused because of Paris. The language of anti-Muslim prejudice seems to have changed from “groomers” and “paedos” post-Rotherham to “terrorists” and “bombers”. That was a boy who, with his family, had managed to get out of Syria. It seems to me that any non-white person is now liable to be categorised as a Muslim and to be abused on that basis.

I am not aware that the counterterrorism strategy embraces support for teachers and others in that sort of situation, as distinct from using them as a reporting and enforcement agency. Nor am I aware that it is capable of identifying vulnerable young people who may be victims of grooming for different purposes, of which terrorism is one. At this point, I say, too, that I am concerned about issues of trust and confidentiality, and about information gained under Prevent being used for prosecutions. I am sure that this point and others got a very good airing in the previous debate.

Attacks are mainly against visible Muslim women in traditional dress. Is it that men perceive that women can be very influential? I think we are. I recently attended the launch of an organisation called Nisa-Nashim, a Jewish-Muslim women’s network supported by the Government. I, too, pay tribute to the various women’s and other community groups that work towards community cohesion. Maintaining grass-roots and community activity will be all the more important if or when the UK’s activity in the Middle East increases.

I think it is unhelpful to talk of “British values”, and I say that very seriously. According to the Government, extremism is vocal or active opposition to British values. The values listed are by no means exclusively British, and I believe that the phrase turns this into a political definition. “British” in this context is not cohesive.

I am no psychologist but I should like the Minister to assure me that the Government are putting effort and energy into analysing why different individuals and perhaps cohorts are susceptible to being attracted to extremism—especially extremist action. This is intrinsically important, of course, but it is important, too, because we know that alienation is such a good recruiting sergeant.

I think that I just have time to say that there was a time when, in my circles, being labelled as “radical” was a compliment.

Syrian Refugees

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 9th November 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. That is one of the reasons why we want the application and vetting processes to happen under the auspices of the UNHCR in the refugee camps rather than having a group of people attempting to enter the UK so that we have to make those judgments at the border. We want it to take place in the Middle East so that the right people can be brought to this country and the wrong people cannot.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I heard this morning of an asylum seeker from Syria who has been told by the Home Office at Croydon that he cannot even make an application for asylum for another two months, which means that he cannot access Section 95 benefits and is dependent on the charity sector for clothing, food and so on. Can the Minister assure the House that, even though the vulnerable persons scheme is working in conjunction with the UNHCR, there is not a backlog growing in the Home Office as a result of the work which is being done? The person who told me about this also commented that it would be a pity if a backlog grew up because the Home Office seems to be getting much better at processing applications more quickly.

[Lord Bates]

As the noble Baroness knows, many of the people arrive at our border without any identification documents. To come back to the previous point, we need to make those checks and be absolutely sure that we are not putting the people of this country at risk by allowing people in. If there is a specific case, I am happy to take it up with the noble Baroness later. It underscores the importance of getting the message out that the way to approach Syrian refugees is through the UNHCR and the Syrian vulnerable persons resettlement scheme.

Asylum Support (Amendment No. 3) Regulations 2015

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 27th October 2015 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

That a Humble Address be presented to Her Majesty praying that the Regulations, laid before the House on 16 July, be annulled (SI 2015/1501).

Relevant document: 8th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, we should be proud that we have legislation to support asylum seekers who are likely otherwise to be destitute, so should we not be concerned if the reality of that support fails to achieve that? This House has always taken a measured, thoughtful and insightful perspective and has a particularly good track record of protecting children, who are a focus of this Motion.

In 2000, for “essential living needs”—the technical wording of the underlying primary legislation—support was set at 70% of income support plus accommodation and utility bills for asylum seekers, who are prevented from working and therefore dependent on handouts through what is often a lengthy application process. Last year, the High Court found that the Government’s assessment of the amount needed to avoid destitution was flawed and ordered a review. That review concluded that the rate for a single person without dependants was too low, so these regulations increase it for adults by 33p.

Crucially, a flat rate, at just under £37 a week, was introduced for each asylum seeker regardless of age. This change was to “simplify” the arrangements, which I suggest is a weasel word. The Government argued that families have been receiving,

“significantly more cash than is necessary to meet their essential living needs”,

because more is paid for children in a household. So now a single parent with one child receives £73.90, a reduction of £26 each week, and for a couple with two children the total has gone down by more than £30, from £178 to £147. The reductions for the main family groups range from £14 to £39 or in percentage terms from 12% to 26%. I acknowledge that accommodation and the payment of utility bills are also provided.

Let me again stress that asylum seekers are precluded from working and that asylum support, to quote Mr Justice Popplewell in the judicial review to which I have referred,

“is not ‘temporary’ in a sense which justifies any meaningful distinction from the position of those on income support”,

save as regards the non-cash items.

Noble Lords will be concerned about the cost to the public purse of any rate higher than those provided by the regulations, but that cost cannot be significant. The Explanatory Note to the regulations states that no impact assessment has been prepared because no impact on the public, private or voluntary sector is foreseen.

I realise that some noble Lords may be concerned that a fatal Motion is inappropriate, given that these regulations deal with expenditure, but the thrust of my argument will be about how essential needs are assessed and whether the assessment meets the points raised by the judgment. Whatever one thinks about the reference to there being no impact on the voluntary sector, the statement from the Government that there is no impact on public expenditure seems to answer a constitutional concern very neatly.

These changes were introduced in March but were revoked on the insistence of the then Deputy Prime Minister. They were reintroduced just before the Summer Recess. I tabled this Motion after thinking about the impact of arriving in the UK with nothing but the clothes you stand up in, which are probably inadequate for our climate, probably in a fragile state of health, mentally and physically, not being allowed to work and living on sums which I am told are 60% below the poverty line.

Following the judgment, the Home Office reviewed its calculations, and I am very grateful to the Minister for sending me details of the basic clothing that has to be bought and the food, toiletries, travel costs and other basic items that the Home Office has considered. The sample weekly grocery bills included in the package, which are said to reflect the need to eat healthily, would stand some analysis. I do not have time to include all the material sent to me by organisations which work with asylum seekers, for which I thank them, but I am struck by Refugee Action’s research: 45% of respondents reported an inability to buy fresh fruit and vegetables. Concern about a lack of healthy food was very evident, as well as dietary, cultural and religious requirements, including halal meat, and parents forgoing meals in order that their children could eat. It is not the main part of my argument that with few clothes one needs adequate drying as well as washing facilities and, unless you shop frequently, incurring the cost of travel, a fridge.

The court highlighted that the Secretary of State had not included nappies, formula milk and other special requirements of very young children. The Home Office does acknowledge that babies and children have needs different from those of adults, but there is no assessment, only a rough and ready setting-off against the economies of scale one can achieve in a family. For instance, the sample grocery lists are designed for adults and adolescents. Children’s clothes do not feature. Non-prescription medicines for infants are not included. Colic and teething were the second things mentioned by one of my fellow Baronesses; the first was how fast children grow out of shoes and they, similarly, do not get a mention. Perhaps the Home Office was defeated, as I was, by trying to find a ballpark figure for how many nappies a baby gets through. Of course, it depends, but the number cannot be negligible and certainly is not nil. There is additional support of £3 to £5 a week for babies and children under three. It has not increased since 2003 but, in any event, as the court case showed, it is intended for nutrition. To quote the judgment again,

“nappies, baby clothes and shoes which need to be replaced regularly, baby wipes, creams, soap and shampoo suitable for babies, formula milk, bottles and teats”,

were,

“recognised as essential living needs for this group”,

that is, babies and children, but were,

“left out of account by the Secretary of State in setting the level of support for them”.

It may be my misreading, but I cannot identify these essential living needs for babies and young children in the assessment which underlies these regulations.

If simply existing within these constraints is so difficult, living a life in which a child can develop, learn and grow is close to impossible. Noble Lords will be familiar with the duty on Governments to safeguard and promote children’s welfare and with the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child which include a right to a standard of living adequate for physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development, as well as a right to play and rehabilitation. Toys and books are other items that do not feature in the Home Office calculations. While it may seem counterintuitive to older generations, access to the internet is an issue, as are the cost of transport to a library or to leisure and religious centres and school-related costs. I understand from the Children’s Society that as families now have to prioritise food above all else, social isolation is increasing.

I have focused on children, but I must add that adults in 2014 reported problems in buying clothes, toiletries, sanitary items, kitchen utensils and so on and in making the journeys that would have given them access to sources of information and advice and that they were forced to employ risky and unreliable survival strategies. These problems must continue following the 33p increase provided by the regulations.

The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has drawn these regulations to the special attention of the House on the grounds that the explanatory material laid in support provides insufficient information to gain a clear understanding about the policy and intended implementation. My noble friend Baroness Humphreys will, I hope, be able to speak to its report. I refer to a letter to the committee from the Minister for Immigration, who wrote that,

“any extra needs particular to children are comfortably offset by the economies available to a larger household”.

He also referred to economies of scale being part of the approach to support for destitute asylum seekers in Sweden, Germany and France. However, the evidence from the Home Office itself in the case last year, quoted in the judgment of the court, was that,

“other EU systems are not directly comparable because EU law allows for a wide variation in practice”.

Having had access to the explanatory material, I am even more concerned about the simplistic setting-off of items essential for babies and children on the basis of economies of scale.

Finally, I am glad to note that when the Home Office undertakes its next review, it will be holding discussions with organisations working in this area. Given the knowledge that they have and the expertise among academics and others, I urge the fullest consultation, not information by another name. The support is designed to avoid destitution. Does it do so? These regulations clearly do not avoid misery. Some noble Lords might consider a third fatal Motion in two days to be a surfeit of opportunities to express our views, but as a citizen, as well as a Member of your Lordships’ House, I am very concerned. I beg to move.

[Lord Rosser (Lab)]

My Lords, I have tabled a regret Motion in this debate. Although I do not want to repeat everything that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said, I do wish to make some comments.

As we know, under the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, support is provided to asylum seekers who have made a claim for asylum, in the form of accommodation and/or cash. The Government first laid regulations introducing a flat rate of support for all asylum seekers of £36.95, regardless of age, in March this year. They reversed those regulations some two weeks later, on the final day of the last Session, as a result of what the then Government described as “reflection”. On 16 July, the Government laid the regulations again; and once again, they provided for changes in the amount of money that could be paid weekly to asylum seekers, and introduced a flat rate for all asylum seekers, regardless of age, of £36.95 per week.

Previously, children under 16 and asylum-seeking families received £53.96 per week, so the reduction represents a cut of—in round figures—about 30%. Yet it has been estimated that bringing up a child in Britain costs an additional £89 per week for the first child of a couple, and an additional £81 for a second child, excluding housing and childcare. Research by Refugee Action shows that 40% of people on asylum support interviewed said they could not afford to feed themselves or their children. Rates of support for asylum-seeking families have effectively been frozen since 2011. Given that asylum seekers are able to work only in exceptional circumstances, the reduction imposed by these regulations can hardly be said to be aimed at removing welfare dependency.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

There is not a fixed time. The normal time for changing benefits, or for a review to happen, is at the end of the financial year. That could not happen this year for reasons set out by the noble Baroness at the beginning of the debate, and also because of the general election. However, the time that we would be looking at those numbers would be at about the end of the financial year, which would be March 2016. We would certainly welcome evidence and data that could be made available before then, either in the early months of 2016 or by Christmas. That could inform our assessment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am extremely grateful to the noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. In some cases, I had not expected them to take part, and in some I do not think that they had expected to.

No one would doubt that the Minister’s introductory remarks in particular and the concern he has shown for asylum seekers come absolutely from his heart. I do not for a moment wish to challenge his attitude on this. He said that this should be a temporary situation for individual asylum seekers. Indeed it should, provided that each application is dealt with properly. The issue of asylum seekers’ right to work was also raised. I have no doubt that we will return to that during the passage of the Immigration Bill.

Reference was made to Sweden and other countries but the judge in the 2014 case disposed of that as an argument. There is such variation between the approaches of different countries—for example, some will impose more obligations on local authorities than on central ones—that that is not an issue tonight.

The Minister referred to the substantial basis of support facilities. I have not sought to deny that. Indeed, in my speech I volunteered that various facilities and services are provided. Nevertheless, £36.95 is not generous for food, travel—which I learned during my work on this is far more significant than I had realised—and toiletries, and particularly the requirements of babies. No one seeks generosity. We merely seek adequacy.

I am glad to hear about the Government’s attitude to future consultation. The point made about monitoring is hugely important. I challenge the methodology. Yes, there was methodology but it amounted, in the case of babies and children, to rough and ready economies of scale. I was going to use the word “assessment” but there was no assessment. That is the only justification given. I quote again the Minister for Immigration, who said that,

“any extra needs particular to children are comfortably offset by the economies available to a larger household”.

There was no justification or analysis. Of course, cooking a meal for four has an economy of scale but that does not work if two of the four are children. You cannot feed them the same food as adults.

The Minister said that the evidence shows to the Government’s satisfaction that the work has been done thoroughly. As I say, I challenge the methodology. It is not to my satisfaction. I wish to test the opinion of the House.

Modern Slavery Act 2015 (Transparency in Supply Chains) Regulations 2015

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 19th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[The Earl of Sandwich (CB)]

My Lords, I supported my noble friend’s original amendment on the question of monitoring, and I will return to that in a moment. Whether we should go as far as the website and central information, I still am not certain in my own mind.

Having looked through the original consultation and the Government’s response, I am very impressed by the detailed work that has been done on this issue. It is rather a contrast with the Energy Bill, where the Government were castigated for bringing everything in at the last minute. I think that the whole process of pre-legislative scrutiny and consultation on the Modern Slavery Bill has been a model. I believe that the Government are genuinely behind this legislation, especially the Minister, who has shown commitment over many years, including his Nike research in China, his links with Gateshead and Traidcraft and his promise to consult widely following the Bill. This is where my noble friend’s amendment is very relevant. We are delighted that he has come up with the regulation, and I warmly welcome the decision to go for the lower threshold. This was the clear view of the respondents and I am glad to see also that companies will be given some flexibility on the form of the statement. So we are proceeding gradually in the right direction.

This does not mean that I have no misgivings. The first one is about monitoring. I notice that under section J of the impact assessment, the Government undertake to engage with businesses for a further 12 months after commencement. However, it seems that this will be only a limited assessment about reporting requirements and whether organisations have any difficulty in providing information. What about the monitoring of performance by the companies themselves after 12 months? Who is going to assess whether the companies have adequately researched their own supply chains to the point where they can revise earlier statements? I suspect that much of the monitoring will fall to civil society.

I remember the discussion under Section 54 on 10 December, when the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, questioned the Minister very closely on the amount of information that would be required from a company to enable civil society, for example, to make a judgment. This is an important point because it might be easy for a company to make very brief statements with so little content that the Government and NGOs would hardly be able to question them.

Presumably the Government will be involved after the 12-month period. Will they create a forum involving the NGOs, or will the anti-slavery commissioner, Mr Hyland, be involved in the process? I see that he has just published his impressive strategic plan: his workload is formidable. I know that he works with the NGOs a lot but surely he will have to stick primarily to policing and law enforcement and will not have the extra time that is required.

If the aim of the regulations and the Act is to,

“ensure there is no modern slavery in … supply chains”,

and to,

“aid the detection and elimination of modern slavery”,

surely a lot more needs to be done in the direction that my noble friend has mentioned than publishing what could be very limited information.

Finally, I ask the Minister whether charities are covered by the regulations. Section 54 of the Act refers to a “commercial organisation”, but the Explanatory Memorandum to the regulations says at paragraph 10.1:

“The impact on ... charities or voluntary bodies is small”.

Perhaps he could clarify this point, because there are charities with substantial overseas trading interests.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this is indeed a significant statutory instrument. Whether it will fulfil its potential depends on its implementation and the practice that is adopted by organisations, as well as the response by the public. Like other speakers, I think that the content of the statements is more important than the process, and inevitably the statutory instrument is focused on the process.

Actions beyond the legislation—the statute and the statutory instrument—will be important. Like other noble Lords, the first point that I wrote down related to monitoring and whether there would be a central repository and a website to cover what may be, according to the impact assessment, 17,000 or 11,000 companies—a number of figures are given. It seems to me that the demand for that was reflected in the responses to the consultation, as reported on the Home Office website. This is not just for citizens, NGOs, civil society or indeed government to check and to hold companies to account; surely the repository, or depository, also has a function in spreading good practice and disseminating information about methodologies. The responses to the consultation seemed to show a need on the part of companies for assistance in how to identify slavery. The section on supply chains in the commissioner’s strategy, to which the noble Earl has just referred, under the heading “How will we know that the response is improving?”, says:

“Best-practice models of business and supply chain transparency to be established and widely adopted”.

Clearly there is a lot of work to be done in this area, so the guidance on how to do it is important. We are told that this is to be,

“published to coincide with the duty coming into force”,

which, I understand, will be in October. Can the Minister help the House as to whether the guidance will be published before then? Surely if a duty is in effect, one needs to know beforehand how to comply with that duty in the way that, I hope, the guidance will cover.

I note, too, that transitional provisions are to be developed, and I wonder whether the Minister can explain what that means. The first point that occurred to me on this was that the duty comes into effect in October, but how does that relate to any given company’s financial year? Presumably that will be a basis for making a statement and an assessment. The Government must have thought through whether, for instance, the duty will apply to a report only after there has been a full financial year of experience. I may be barking up the wrong tree here but if the Minister can help the House on what is anticipated in the transitional arrangements, it would be useful.

The responses asked whether the provisions could apply to companies below the threshold. I assume that there is no reason why not. In our debates on the Bill, we talked about the reputational benefits of providing statements.

More widely—I do not know whether the Minister can answer this—what sense does the Home Office have of a buy-in of enthusiasm for this process, for instance among institutional investors? During the progress of the Bill, we talked about the position that shareholders have and the influence that they may have on companies, so the institutions, as the biggest shareholders generally, will be in an important position. I used a search engine to see what was being said about this subject and found that a number of City lawyers and accountants are including advice on the subject in their newsletters, but it will be the shareholders—and the concern not to upset shareholders—that will be central to the operation of this measure.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, referred to the effectiveness of these arrangements. In that connection, I noted that the impact assessment seems to deal with the regulatory burden, not with the costs of the investigation leading to the content of the statement. Checking that there is no slavery in the chain is the objective, despite the get-out of the “no statement”, so it seemed to me that there was a danger that the impact assessment might be sending an inappropriate message.

I was interested, too, that quite a lot of respondents disagreed with providing key performance indicators—not a majority by any means, but the indicators are referred to in the legislation and they are important because they will show trends. We are talking here about not just snapshots but trends. I do not know whether the Minister can say anything about that.

Almost finally, we have heard about the requirements on the Home Secretary to report. Is there an intention to report more frequently than the statutory minimum? And finally—this matter was raised by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, during the passage of the Bill—can the Minister tell us what the Government are doing to check on their own procurement?

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab)]

My Lords, first, I generally welcome these regulations but have a few concerns. I am delighted that they have appeared before your Lordships’ House as close as we could get to Anti-Slavery Day, which was yesterday. Slavery and human trafficking are appalling crimes. Estimates have suggested that anything up to 13,000 people who are victims of modern slavery could be living here in the UK, and the Walk Free Foundation has estimated that there are 35.8 million people in modern slavery throughout the world. Those are appalling figures.

During the passage of the then Modern Slavery Bill through your Lordships’ House, many examples were given of multinational businesses using very long and complicated supply chains across the world, which, due to their nature, can sometimes allow slavery to thrive. The regulations before us require companies with a turnover of £36 million or more to produce a statement that sets out the steps that the organisation has taken during the year to ensure that slavery and human trafficking are not taking place in any of its supply chains or in any of its own businesses, or a statement that the organisation has taken no steps at all. The statements must be published on the organisation’s website with a link in a prominent place on the home page of the website.

I am pleased that following the consultation the Government opted to include within this legislation companies with a minimum annual turnover of £36 million and that they did not go for a maximum threshold as a possible option. It was also clear from the consultation exercise that this figure was supported by most—more than 70%—of the people consulted. Like the noble Lord, Lord Alton, I noted that the Home Secretary has to produce a report. Regulation 4(2)(c) refers to “the extent to which” the objectives,

“could be achieved with a system that imposes less regulation”.

I would have preferred something that referred to more effective regulation rather than the word “less”. This is such an important issue that “less” lays the wrong emphasis on the regulation.

The Home Secretary is required to publish a report within five years of the regulations becoming law and thereafter every five years. Five years seems a terribly long time. We should have more frequent reporting—say every two or three years—which would enable us to more quickly identify issues that need to be addressed. This would ensure that the regulations are having their intended effect rather than to having to wait for just one chance in every Parliament.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark]

The noble Lord is absolutely right. We will have the company statements on the company website, but the only issue with the central repository, of course, is that if you have 7,000 to 10,000 companies, it will be difficult if they are not all in one place. I think that there has been some movement from the Minister tonight, but can he explain why he thinks that this should not be done by government? Why should it be left to civil society or a third-party organisation? It is an important point and it seems to be the missing part in all this.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I wonder if I could add to that, because it is part of the same question. I am sure that the Minister does not mean it in this way, but the more it is said that this is not a matter for government, the more one worries about how the Home Secretary is going to fulfil her duties in keeping the matter under review if she does not have that facility available to her. The information is very much a matter for government and therefore the Government must have an interest in ensuring that it is easily accessible.

[Lord Berkeley of Knighton (CB)]

In order to save the Minister from popping up and down like a jack-in-the-box, perhaps I may add one point which may help my noble friend Lord Alton. If by civil society one were able to define that by ruling out commercial interests, that would go a long way towards meeting the point being made.

Trafficking: Children

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Thursday 15th October 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

The noble Baroness makes a very interesting point and I will look at this. It is of course something that the Crown Prosecution Service will produce guidance about, working with the police forces. Also, the national policing lead, Shaun Sawyer, is leading the Modern Slavery Threat Group, which will monitor this very carefully indeed. We are conscious that we need to get to grips with this problem. If in the process of this law—it is just coming into being, with the offences having been introduced on 31 July—that proves to be helpful, I am sure that it is something that we would look at very carefully. I am happy to continue the discussion with the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, what will be the impact of reductions in police budgets on training of police officers to identify victims—I am sure that the Minister will agree that that needs a degree of training and skills—and to question victims in the most supportive and effective way?

[Lord Bates]

The question of police funding will obviously be for the spending review on 25 November. There is a change to the formula there. We have made it very clear that this is a high priority. That is why the national policing lead is taking such a strong role on this. Significant amounts of training are already being done through the Crown Prosecution Service, but we will continue to keep that under review.

Asylum: Sexual Orientation

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Monday 20th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

We have to be very careful that we do not have overlapping investigations. A serious piece of work was done following some very serious accusations by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration last year, and we have undertaken to implement all the recommendations. In addition, as I mentioned to the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, a further action plan is being discussed with non-governmental organisations. We should allow those to go forward and ensure that the independent chief inspector continues to do his job in monitoring how his recommendations are implemented.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, it is good to hear that the action plan has been worked up in consultation with the organisations mentioned by my noble friend. Will they be involved in monitoring, and will the Home Office keep them in line not just for consultation on snapshot investigations and checks, but to ensure that the procedures and practices of the Home Office and of immigration officials are as we would all wish to see?

[Lord Bates]

That was indeed one of the recommendations. Recommendation 4,

“Ensures that all asylum claims recorded on the grounds of sexual orientation are accurately recorded as such”.

I expect that that recording and keeping of records will help us to identify where problems might exist in the system.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2015 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to the noble Baroness’s Amendment 3, and my noble friend Lord Paddick and I have Amendments 4, 5, 8 and 9 in this group.

On the term “novel”, which is the subject of one of our amendments, the Secretary of State in her correspondence with the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs has explained how difficult a term this would be in legislation. I entirely accept that point, but as it was raised by the ACMD, which said that the omission of the term widened the scope of the Bill beyond that originally intended and cautioned against a blanket ban on psychoactive substances—because, for reasons we have heard, it would be almost impossible to list all desirable exemptions—I thought it was appropriate to raise it. As the Secretary of State points out, one might ask: novel since when? The use of the term “novel” as used by the ACMD is in itself slightly novel, but it is a term that is widely used. We have talked throughout this Bill—the term has come into common usage—of “new” psychoactive substances. If “novel” means new, and we have been using the term “new” again today, I think that it deserves some explanation from the Minister.

Importantly, I support the noble Baroness with regard to the term “synthetic”, because surely that is what this Bill is really all about. The Minister spoke in Committee about producers of new psychoactive substances constantly looking for loopholes, and I of course understand that, but the term is more precise than “novel”. I hope the Government can consider some way of addressing concern about the breadth of the ban. To me, the term “synthetic” imports a notion of artificiality, of materials being brought together, a combination. That is probably what it means; I suspect one of those comes from the Greek and one from the Latin. It suggests imitating a natural product.

The Minister referred in defence of the Bill to natural products being available in head shops which are far from safe. He mentioned fly agaric mushrooms. I had a quick look at the Kew botanic gardens website this morning, which calls them,

“the most iconic of … toadstools … commonly depicted in children’s books and on Christmas cards”,

so let us be very careful where we tread. It refers to their hallucinogenic properties, which I do not doubt, but then states that they have been well-known for centuries. Much the same can be said about salvia divinorum. The second part of that name suggests that there are sacred aspects to that substance, as is the case. Again, it has been in use for centuries. So I question whether it is appropriate to ban such substances now through this mechanism. We have a lot of drugs legislation, as the noble Baroness said, and one has to accept that this is a fairly hastily prepared Bill. It is not, I would have thought, directed at natural, albeit dangerous, substances known for centuries.

Is there something about how these plants are treated that distinguishes them from other plant-based drugs which are covered by the Misuse of Drugs Act? In the case of a substance that is integral to a religion, like the variety of sage to which I have referred, is there a mechanism for permitting its use in a religious context?

The question of harm is fundamental to everything we are talking about. As has been said, this issue has been raised by the ACMD and we on these Benches—and, I am sure, the whole House—are concerned about ensuring that harm is the focus of the legislation. My noble friend and I are concerned about the whole premise of the Bill—we have debated this before—because we do not believe that a complete ban can work. Human beings do not take well to prohibitions and if new psychoactive substances become more difficult to get hold of, they will be driven underground or users will turn to more harmful substances. That is why we believe that harm should be the focus of the Bill.

I turn now, as I did at the previous stage, to the Misuse of Drugs Act. This established the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs and gave it an advisory role where,

“the misuse is having or appears to them capable of having harmful effects sufficient to constitute a social problem”,

and in,

“preventing the misuse of such drugs or dealing with social problems connected with their misuse”.

I thought it would be appropriate to import those words into the Bill and our amendments deal with that. We do not seek to put them into Clause 1, as the noble Baroness has done, because that is an overview. It points to the definition clause but we have included the words in our amendment to Clause 2, the definition clause, providing a requirement on Ministers to refer matters to the ACMD and allowing it to oppose exemptions on this basis. The Secretary of State’s letter to the ACMD refers to a discretion about the definition and scope of the exemptions. We want to make it clear that the basis should be harm, not an unqualified, undefined term but using the terms in established legislation.

I have just seen, as other noble Lords will have done, the ACMD’s letter of 13 July. I do not criticise it but I am sure that I am not the only noble Lord who thinks that we could have done a better job on this Bill if there had been consultation with the ACMD before it was published. The advisory council has moved very quickly—it cannot have been easy for it—but it refers in its letter to having had only a narrow window of opportunity to make recommendations for amendments and to begin to formulate advice. This House does its best work when we have a good basis to work from and are not trying to second-guess the experts in the field.

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, it is remarkable that the international community, having been increasingly aware of and alarmed by the dangers of new psychoactive substances, has none the less not so far succeeded in establishing a definition that is watertight in legal terms and available to the Government to use in their legislation as they seek to fulfil their manifesto pledge. The expert panel, on page 38 of its report, advised that the definitions in use in legislation would need to be robust. This group of amendments seeks to specify more closely the generic problem that we are seeking to address through this legislation.

In seeking to tighten and, in a sense, limit the scope of the Bill in this way, let me not give the impression—I know that other noble Lords who have supported these amendments would not want the impression to be given—that we in any way minimise the dangers from new psychoactive substances. This is a serious and challenging social problem.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

5: Clause 2, page 1, line 15, leave out paragraph (a) and insert—
“(a) in the opinion of the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs is capable of producing a psychoactive effect in a person who consumes it, and(aa) is, or appears to the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs likely to be, misused and of which the misuse is having, or appears to them capable of having, harmful effects sufficient to constitute a social problem, and”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, before I speak to Amendment 5, perhaps I should say to noble Lords who are wondering what is happening, “Do not go away”. I did not wish to abuse the House by too much toing and froing during the exchange on the first group of amendments but some points came out in that debate that are relevant to Amendment 5.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, made some interesting points and analysis of the situation in regard to harm. I shall quote again from the ACMD’s letter of 2 July on the concept of harm. It stated:

“Without the inclusion of the words ‘harmful’ or ‘potentially harmful’, the ACMD can envisage situations whereby the supplier of benign or beneficial substances could be prosecuted under the Bill”.

It also stated that the expert panel set up to consider this issue,

“recommended the inclusion of the concept of harm and a ‘safety clause’”—

as it called it—

“whereby substances of low or no harm—

and we know the difficulties of setting a threshold—

“would be excluded from such a Bill”.

Self-harm has been raised. It is a social problem within the terminology I have used, which, as I have said, is lifted from the Misuse of Drugs Act.

Without wishing to expand on this, to think now of using this Bill to ban botanical substances—types of sage and mushroom have been mentioned—which have been legal for centuries raises questions about propriety and whether it is too authoritarian and so on. Perhaps that is not an issue for now.

I accept the point about the time taken to show harmful effects causing social problems but we have to put this in the context of the substance producing a psychoactive effect and the time and difficulty involved with that. My amendment would deal with the question of harm without sabotaging the direction of the Bill.

If amendments are made in the Commons, we may welcome them. However, if amendments are not made in the Commons, we will not have the basis for further discussion because at that stage we cannot reintroduce issues that are unrelated to amendments that the Commons have made. I therefore beg to move and I wish to test the opinion of the House.

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[Baroness Meacher]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 11 I shall also speak to Amendment 12, both of which we debated in Committee. I intend not to repeat anything of the arguments we used then but rather to reflect on developments since. The intention of the amendments is to ensure that all legitimate medicines and substances used for any form of legitimate research are exempted from the scope of this legislation.

I am most grateful for the Minister’s letter to the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in which he says that the Government are looking again at the definition of medicinal products in Schedule 1 to ensure that it is fully aligned with existing medicines legislation. The question is what exactly that means. I seek only an assurance from the Minister that the definition will include all medicines prescribed on a named-patient basis and all unlicensed—or any other—psychoactive substances prescribed by a doctor on the basis that the prescription is believed by that doctor to be in the best interests of the patient. My clear understanding is that a doctor can prescribe any medication, even if it is unlicensed or not recognised, so long as they believe that it will help the patient. Many medicines come on to the market which may have been tested in other countries or in other ways but which have not been through UK systems.

Amendment 12 deals with research. It would be helpful to have an assurance that all legitimate research, including laboratory research, involving psychoactive substances in academic institutions or undertaken by industry will be fully exempted from the scope of the Bill. Alternatively, perhaps the Minister could assure the House that the Government will seek an assurance from the ACMD that whatever wording is used will achieve that objective. We just want all noble Lords to be completely satisfied that these two objectives will be achieved.

I have added my name to Amendment 24, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick. The aim here, as I understand it, would be to ensure that the regulations exempting medicines and research are in place by the implementation date of the legislation. The wording in the amendment itself is slightly different, but I am sure that that is the intention. No doubt the Minister will comment on this in her response to this group of amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Amendment 24, to which the noble Baroness has added her name, comes from my noble friend Lord Paddick and me. Like the noble Baroness, I will not spend long on this, because I am optimistic about where the Government are going with it. I was concerned that the current provisions of the Bill are too limited, because they are limited to medicines. However, I will repeat one comment that I made at the last stage. Professor Val Curran, in her report for the all-party parliamentary group that the noble Baroness chairs on regulating cannabis for medicinal use, referred to a “stranglehold on research”. She sets out, quite pithily, the “costly obstacle course” involved in undertaking any research, because of the time taken by licence applications. Import licences are being granted for so short a time that they expire before the arrangements for the research can be made, so I welcome the Government’s further consideration of this. As Professor Curran says, at the moment, UK research into this area is a “massive uphill struggle”.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I am not sure that the issue of the medicinal use of cannabis is germane to this particular Bill—

[Baroness Hamwee]

I would just make it clear that I am talking about research. It happens to be in that context, but it is research.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

I was not meaning in any way to attempt to refute or reject something that the noble Baroness had just said—I was apologising to the House for being about to mention the medicinal use of cannabis, because it is somewhat marginal to the Bill. However, ensuring that research for medical purposes, or indeed for other legitimate industrial purposes, is not inhibited by the provisions of this Bill certainly is germane, and it is rendered all the more important because of the difficulties that the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 already places, in practice, on certain sorts of research that it is highly desirable should be pursued. I also have the report by Professor Val Curran and Mr Frank Warburton in my hands, and I was going to draw to the attention of the House the observations made by the authors of that report that there is what Professor Curran calls a “stranglehold on research”. She says in the report:

“Carrying out research into cannabis in the UK is a costly obstacle course. It involves a minimum outlay of £5,000 to cover licensing and security; licence applications take about a year”.

She broadens out what she says to deal with other substances in Schedule 1, saying:

“As a result of its Schedule 1 status in the UK only four hospitals have been granted a licence to hold stocks of cannabis although all of them are able to hold heroin”.

So it is a somewhat confused situation. I was encouraged to read in the Home Secretary’s letter to Professor Iverson of 11 July that the,

“Government’s intention is for all bona fide medical and other scientific research to be untouched by the provisions of this Bill”.

I simply draw to the attention of the Minister and the House that the provisions of the 1971 legislation already make for very considerable difficulty in pursuing bona fide research into certain substances in Schedule 1. I am very happy to know that the Government are consulting and looking to amend the provisions of this Bill in the House of Commons, and I hope that they take fully into account when they do the difficulties that the 1971 Act has already created.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

15: Clause 5, page 3, line 7, leave out “is reckless as to” and insert “should know”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the amendment is in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, who cannot be here today. One should perhaps keep one’s mouth shut, because when I said to him, “I think you have a point”, he said, “Will you move my amendment for me, then?”.

The amendment would change the requirement in the clause that the supplier “knows” or is being “reckless” as to whether the recipient would,

“be likely to consume the substance for its psychoactive effects”,

to a requirement that he “should know” that that was the case.

I have seen the letter from the Minister to the noble Lord, Lord Lucas. It seems to me that the examples drawn on by the Home Office to defend the recklessness provision are rather different from the situation envisaged by the Bill. Reference is made to two provisions in legislation where retailers are required to consider the age of a purchaser, and I know that the noble Lord is particularly concerned about retail. A third reference is made to the Licensing Act, under which retailers are prohibited from selling alcohol to people over 18 who are drunk—fair enough.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

I thank the noble Baroness for presenting this amendment on behalf of the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, who clearly thought that discretion was the greater part of valour, being temporarily absent from your Lordships’ House. This is a subject that he feels very strongly about and one that he raised in Committee. We took that very seriously and it resulted in another letter, on 8 July, to which the noble Baroness has referred.

I signal to officials who may be listening to the debate that I want to respond particularly to the point about the guidance that will be developed as a result of the dialogue that is taking place with the Association of Convenience Stores. I say in parentheses that those stores are very supportive of what we are trying to do because a lot of criminal disruptive activity congregates in areas where there are head shops. That is of concern to their members who are in the vicinity of those shops from a public order point of view. I am therefore keen to be able to provide an answer to the question of when guidance might be available.

For a prosecution to be brought for the supply offence in clause 5(1), the prosecution must show, among other things, that the defendant knew, or was reckless as to whether, the psychoactive substance supplied was likely to be consumed by the person to whom it was supplied, or by another person, for its psychoactive effects. The mental element of the offer to supply offence in Clause 5(2) requires that the defendant knew, or was reckless as to whether, the substance that was being offered was likely to be consumed by the person to whom it was supplied, or by some other person, for its psychoactive effects. In formulating these offences, the mental elements were carefully considered. The Government considered whether the mental element should extend only as far as “knows” but we concluded that this could create an inappropriately high bar for prosecutors to overcome, with defendants arguing that they did not know for certain that the substance they were supplying was a psychoactive substance and likely to be consumed for its psychoactive effects. The Government settled on including the recklessness threshold. A test of “knows or is reckless” is commonly used in criminal law, both in the United Kingdom and other common law jurisdictions. Indeed, the formula is used in Ireland’s Criminal Justice (Psychoactive Substances) Act 2010.

Recklessness is where a person is aware of a risk that a result may occur and unreasonably decides to run that risk anyway. As recklessness involves an actual awareness of the risk, the person’s degree of knowledge, or at least understanding, would be relevant. For example, the degree of knowledge a supermarket worker would have about psychoactive products would be less than a member of staff in a household store used to selling solvents, and less still than a member of staff in a head shop, whose trade is predominately in these substances. The mental state of each would be considered separately.

In seeking to substitute a “should know” test, as the amendment proposes, my noble friend is intending to set a higher bar for prosecution and conviction. We need to bear in mind that the Bill is, in part, directed at stamping out the reckless retail trade in these potentially harmful substances. We know that head shops use a variety of ruses in order to stay on the right side of the law, including labelling their products as “plant food” or “not for human consumption” when they are fully aware that their customers are consuming these substances for their psychoactive effect. The recklessness test is directed at such ruses and, for that reason, we would not want to lose it.

This does not mean that everyone on a checkout at Tesco or Homebase needs to subject all customers buying tubes of glue to a full-on interrogation. But they will need to think twice if two or three young people attempt to buy multiple tubes of glue and nothing else or they are making repeated purchases. The Intoxicating Substances (Supply) Act 1985 already requires a retailer to be alert to such cases, and although that legislation applies only where the supply is to persons under 18, we do not envisage that this Bill will significantly change the burden on retailers. If that were the case, the Association of Convenience Stores would not be among those welcoming the Bill.

At this point I should make it clear that the Home Office intends to work with retail trade associations, such as the Association of Convenience Stores and the British Retail Consortium, on the legislation in the run-up to its implementation. We need to provide simple messaging to ensure that the requirements of the law are clear. As to the timing, we are working with the retail trade associations to produce guidance that meets their requirements. That work is ongoing and we need to see the final form of the Bill. I regret that I cannot commit to having draft guidance ready in time to share with noble Lords while the Bill is still going through its parliamentary stages.

Once retailers have knowledge of the law, we would expect them to consider whom they are selling the product to and make an assessment. For example, what product are they selling, what is its primary use, does it fit the profile of the customer and are there any wider considerations that the retailer can infer from the transaction? The guidance will illustrate the grounds that should be considered.

We need to be reasonable. If a retailer genuinely did not know the law, they need to be educated—the civil sanctions in the Bill allow for this, providing for a graduated response where appropriate—but where retailers either know or are reckless as to the consequences of their actions, they cannot be absolved of responsibility and action can and should be taken.

In any event, the proposed substitution of a “should know” test would be likely to capture some people who would not be caught by the recklessness test. This is because the “should know” test would capture someone who did not appreciate the risk but ought to have known that the substance was likely to be consumed for its psychoactive effects. Such a person would not be caught by the current recklessness test. This would appear to be contrary to the objectives of my noble friend and the noble Baroness who moved the amendment.

I hope that I have been able to satisfy noble Lords on the provisions of the Bill as it relates to retailers and therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw the amendment at this stage.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, it would be inappropriate for me to take the matter any further. I am sorry that the guidance—or guidelines; I am not quite sure which I should have said—will not be ready. I realised that it would not be ready before Third Reading, but I had hoped that it might be ready for the Commons to take some cognizance of it. I remain a little concerned, but, in the circumstances, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 15 withdrawn.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 14th July 2015 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

25: After Clause 10, insert the following new Clause—
“Control of cannabis
(1) Within six months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State shall consult the Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs pursuant to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 with regard to the use of her powers to make regulations under sections 7, 10, 22 and 31 of that Act—
(a) to delete from Schedule 1 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 the substances listed in subsection (2), and(b) to add those substances to Schedule 2 to the 2001 Regulations.(2) The substances referred to in subsection (1) are—
(a) cannabis, and(b) cannabis resin.”

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, this takes us back to the control of cannabis for medicinal use. In Committee, there was some interest in, and I would say some sympathy for, the proposal that medicinal use should be permitted through some means or other. I am using those terms extremely loosely but there was certainly recognition of the difficulties and publicly expressed concerns. Very appropriately, concern was also expressed in the Chamber about the need for controlled trials, and a recognition of the difficulties around trials and of the paradox that medicinal herbal cannabis is widely available elsewhere in Europe, either produced in certain countries or imported from them, and in the United States, and that those medicines are much less expensive than Sativex, which is the medicine available—that is quite a wide definition—in this country on limited prescriptions.

I do not want to repeat that debate but I am mindful of the list of conditions we are aware of, and the severity of many of those conditions, which cannabis seems to alleviate—not for everyone, perhaps, but for an awful lot of people, and with very dramatic effects—so I did not feel that I could let the matter rest there. I was also aware that the Labour Front Bench did not feel able to support the amendment at that stage, possibly because of its defective form. The noble Lord, Lord Rosser—as I heard him and as I read in Hansard—was non-committal on the principle of the issue on that occasion. I hope that this evening the Opposition will be able to take the opportunity to indicate their position.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, pointed out that there was already a procedure which would allow for cannabis to be moved from Schedule 1 to Schedule 2 to the Misuse of Drugs Regulations 2001 by regulations made under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The amendment places the proposals squarely within the existing provisions of the Misuse of Drugs Act to allow for that change in the regulations to place cannabis among those drugs which may be illegal for recreational use but can be available via prescription. I am proposing the very much more tentative step—a preliminary step, perhaps; I hope so, at any rate—of consultation with the ACMD under the 1971 Act with regard to the use of the Secretary of State’s powers under the regulations to achieve the alteration that I am speaking of with regard to both cannabis and cannabis resin. I beg to move.

[Lord Howarth of Newport]

My Lords, I hope indeed that, as the amendment proposes, the Government will consult in the relatively near future with the ACMD about the desirability of rescheduling cannabis from Schedule 1 to Schedule 2 to facilitate the use of cannabis-based medications. I draw great encouragement from the fact that the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has added her name to the amendment. She is an extremely distinguished psychologist and a very senior figure in the BMA. If Ministers are less than impressed by any contribution on scientific or medical subjects that I may be able to make, they should be fully aware that the noble Baroness is in support of the amendment.

Perhaps I may refer again to the pamphlet published under the auspices of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Drug Policy Reform, Regulating Cannabis for Medical Use in the UK, authored by Professor Val Curran and Mr Frank Warburton. I remind the House that at the outset of that document, the authors state:

“Based on a review of the research literature, the most established uses of medicinal herbal cannabis in places where it is most widely available such as in the Netherlands include: The relief of pain and muscle spasms or cramps associated with multiple sclerosis or spinal cord damage; chronic neuropathic pain (mainly pain associated with the nervous system, e.g. caused by a damaged nerve, phantom pain, facial neuralgia or chronic pain which remains after the recovery from shingles); nausea, loss of appetite, weight loss and debilitation due to cancer or AIDS; nausea and vomiting associated with chemotherapy or radiotherapy used in the treatment of cancer, hepatitis C or HIV infection and AIDS; Gilles de la Tourette syndrome; therapy-resistant glaucoma”.

That is a significant list of conditions and diseases which good scientific evidence indicates are alleviated by cannabis-based medication. Yet we have a state of affairs in this country, in contrast to others, in which such alleviation and medical benefit is hardly available to people. That contrasts strongly with the countries which regulate the medical use of cannabis and cannabis derivatives, including Canada, the Netherlands, Israel, Spain, Uruguay and some 20 or more states within the United States of America. These are all mature societies which have thought deeply about the practicalities of drug control. They have come to a variety of policy conclusions but none of them has taken the decision flippantly or negligently to ensure that medical cannabis can be available in appropriate circumstances for patients who would benefit from it.

The current situation in the UK is that there are numerous people for whom cannabis would incomparably alleviate chronic pain, for example, but who simply cannot get hold of it. That is because of the rigidity of the regulations, the lottery of prescribing—a small number of doctors are willing to prescribe but very many are not—the cost of research and the consequential additional cost of production, and the inflexibility of the licensing system. This case is thoroughly made out in the document from which I have quoted. It surely must be time that the British authorities thought again about this and made moves at least to reconsider, open-mindedly and in a practical and constructive fashion, whether we should at long last reschedule cannabis from Schedule 1 to Schedule 2.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

That is an interesting point which will, of course, be considered by those committees which advise the Government on these important issues. I would imagine that that factor has been considered, and if it has not, I am sure that the noble Lord will ensure that in future it should be considered in making decisions on this issue.

Home Office records confirm that no university that has applied for a Schedule 1 licence has so far been refused one, and we have not seen any evidence that licensees have been unable to comply with the Schedule 1 licence requirements. About 70 Schedule 1 licences are currently held by universities and hospitals enabling them to undertake research with all substances in Schedule 1 under the terms of that licence, as opposed to being limited to a single drug.

Where that research involves live human subjects, there are other, non-Home Office requirements, such as ethics approval, and I think there is some anecdotal evidence that the ethical demands, processes and commitments that must be gone through are more onerous than the licensing ones and may in practice present greater challenges to researchers than the requirements of the 1971 Act.

I have no doubt the debate on the legal status of cannabis, including its scheduling, is one we will return to from time to time as the evidence develops. For now, I hope I have been able to present some evidence to the noble Baroness that while we carefully considered her proposal, we do not regard it as necessary and do not see the case for there being a change in the Government’s position at this time.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I apologise to the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins; I had not realised that she had added her name. I am very grateful for her support, as I am to other noble Lords who have supported this amendment. I note that the Labour Party is unconvinced that this is the appropriate vehicle, and I am still unclear whether it is convinced of the need to deal with the issue and therefore perhaps to find another vehicle. I saw the video as well—I picked it up online—but I am mindful of the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Ribeiro, at the previous stage about individual cases and the need for clinical trials.

Psychoactive Substances Bill [HL]

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Tuesday 30th June 2015 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

53: Clause 11, page 6, line 10, leave out paragraph (f)

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I shall also speak to Amendment 54. This takes us back to Clause 11, particularly subsection (1)(f), which makes,

“assisting or encouraging the carrying on of an activity listed in”,

the previous paragraphs a prohibited activity. Our first concern, which we dealt with in Amendment 54, was that this should not prevent information or education, in the very widest sense, about psychoactive substances. The approach of informing and supporting people who are taking or considering taking psychoactive substances might include support for reducing their consumption rather than cutting it out, or gentle direction towards the use of what might be thought less-harmful substances. I was reminded of what I might call the dark days of Section 28 regarding the promotion of homosexuality; there was a sort of resonance there that I wanted to pick up on. Amendment 54 would provide that advice and information was not to be a prohibited activity, even though I accept that some noble Lords might think of advice and information in a slightly different way from what we envisage.

Then I wondered why this was necessary at all. What happened to aiding and abetting, and what about Sections 44 and 45 of the Serious Crime Act 2007, which deal with intentionally,

“encouraging or assisting … an offence”?

Are they not adequate? Do we have to provide something specific? Section 44(2) says that the person,

“is not to be taken to have intended to encourage or assist the commission of an offence merely because such encouragement or assistance was a foreseeable consequence of his act”.

I am sorry, I have not introduced this very well, but my question is not only why Section 44 does not apply but whether there is a deliberate exclusion of Section 44(2) regarding the not foreseeing of the consequence of the act. I would be concerned if that was not to apply. I beg to move.

[Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)]

My Lords, I agree with the noble Baroness. I am glad that she has tabled these amendments and made the points that she has. It does not look as if there is anything to worry about but it certainly would be very helpful to have reassurance from the Minister and some clarification. It would also be very helpful if he felt it possible to add explicitly to the Bill the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Paddick; namely, that,

“the provision of advice or information … shall not be a prohibited activity”.

We have a number of charities and organisations active in the field which simply seek to reduce harm and to protect vulnerable people. They are not proselytising for the taking of drugs but are knowledgeable about it and doing what they do with good intentions. We certainly do not want the kind of information websites that we have debated as regards previous amendments to find themselves with questionable legal status. Clarification would be helpful and if the Minister feels able to put something in the Bill so much the better.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)]

My Lords, I think we all agree that the key element of this Bill is the provision of civil sanctions. These are important because they offer an alternative, flexible mechanism to tackle the trade in new psychoactive substances. The amendments in this group relate to the list of prohibited activities in Clause 11. These activities essentially cover the offences in Clauses 4, 5 and 8— namely, the production, supply, importation and exportation of a psychoactive substance—along with the secondary offences of assisting and encouraging those offences.

Amendment 53 seeks to remove paragraph (f) from Clause 11(1) and so remove from the list of “prohibited activity” activities which assist or encourage the production, supply, offering to supply, importation or exportation of a psychoactive substance. In the normal way, the secondary offences of assisting or encouraging a crime apply to each of the main offences in the Bill, which is why the Government have specifically included such conduct in the list of prohibited activity.

If this amendment were to be made it would not, for example, be possible to serve a prohibition notice on someone providing precursor chemicals to another person knowing that the other person intended to use them to produce psychoactive substances. Were that the case, the relevant law enforcement agency might then have no option but to charge that person with the criminal offence of assisting the commission of an offence under Clause 4. Amendment 53 could therefore have the opposite effect to the outcome that the noble Lord is seeking to achieve, as it would force law enforcement agencies down the prosecution route rather than deploying a civil sanction.

The noble Baroness has asked how assisting or encouraging a crime differs from aiding or abetting a crime. This is a complex subject, which has excited much debate within the legal community ever since the Serious Crime Act 2007 created the offence of encouraging or assisting. Perhaps it is simplest to acknowledge that there is potential crossover between the two concepts—on occasion it will be possible both to aid and abet, and encourage or assist—but there will also be offences where, because of the circumstances, it will be possible to encourage or assist, even though there is no aiding or abetting.

Amendment 54 seeks to make clear in the Bill that the provision of harm reduction advice or information does not constitute a prohibited activity. Let me assure noble Lords that giving such harm reduction advice will not be a criminal offence under the Bill. The Government have no desire to hinder the giving of such advice—the opposite is in fact true—but if someone were to publish a manual on the production of psychoactive substances, we would wish to see that activity prohibited. The Bill allows for this. For instance, guidance published by a charity which identifies and highlights the dangers of these substances will be seeking to reduce the harms of these substances and will not fall foul of the Bill. I hope that having that assurance on the record will allay any concerns that the noble Lords and the noble Baroness may have in this regard.

The Government recognise that this legislation is not the silver bullet to tackle psychoactive substance misuse. The Bill must be seen in the context of our wider strategy to tackle the harms they cause. We are also driving forward another key recommendation of the expert panel, that of enhancing our efforts to reduce demand, including through effective prevention programmes and by providing the right health-related services to support individuals recovering from substance misuse. This is, of course incredibly important. On the basis of that explanation and the assurance that I have given on Amendment 54, I hope that the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I certainly will. I am grateful for that explanation. I can understand the structure of the clause and its thrust rather better than I did, which was pretty stupid of me. When I looked up “aid and abet” on the internet to see what that told me, I was pointed straight to the CPS guidance, which seemed to deal with pretty much everything other than aiding and abetting. It starts with “assisting and encouraging”, so it is hardly surprising that some of us are confused. I did not know that there was such a major debate going on in the legal community; they must speak of little else. I am grateful for the clear explanation; I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 53 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

55: Clause 12, page 6, line 23, at end insert—
“( ) In the case of reasonable belief under subsection (3) that the person is likely to carry on the activity, the prohibition notice must set out the reasons for that belief.”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 55 I will speak to Amendments 58 and 60B in my name and that of my noble friend. The first amendment would add to one of the two conditions required for a prohibition notice not only that there must be a reasonable belief that a person is carrying on or likely to carry on a prohibited activity but that the notice must set out the reason for that belief. Clearly, that person should know the basis of it. I realise that this might be covered by Clause 14(2)(a), but I would be glad to have confirmation of that.

Amendment 58 is similar but in the context of a premises notice. Amendment 60B to Clause 14(2)(b)—where we are told that the notice,

“must … explain the possible consequences of not complying”,

with it—would add,

“based on the grounds in paragraph (a)”.

This is probing the extent of Clause 14(2)(b): what it is expected to cover, in what detail, and so on. I beg to move.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Bates) (Con)]

My Lords, as the noble Baroness explained, these amendments relate to the issuing of a prohibition notice and a premises notice under Clauses 12 and 13.

I begin by saying that the Government fully support the principle of these amendments, so much so that the Bill already contains similar provisions which seek the same thing. A prohibition notice can be issued under Clause 12 where a,

“senior officer or local authority reasonably believes that the person is carrying on, or is likely to carry on, a prohibited activity”,

and,

“that it is necessary and proportionate to give the prohibition notice for the purpose of preventing the person from carrying on any prohibited activity”.

A premises notice in Clause 13 can be issued where a senior police officer or local authority reasonably believes that a prohibited activity, as defined in Clause 11,

“is being, or is likely to be, carried on at particular premises, and … the person owns, leases, occupies, controls or operates the premises”.

Amendments 55 and 58 seek to amend Clauses 12 and 13 respectively to require the relevant senior police officer or local authority to set out the reasons in support of their reasonable belief that the respondent is carrying on, or is likely to carry on, a prohibited activity.

Clause 14 contains supplementary provisions in respect of prohibition notices and premises notices. In particular, subsection (2)(a) of Clause 14 requires that a notice must,

“set out the grounds for giving the notice”,

as well as the consequences of failure to comply. The Government envisage that the grounds specified in the notice will be those supporting the reasonable belief.

Amendments 57 and 60 seek to ensure that the respondent is fully informed of the consequences of a failure to comply with a notice. Again, this is already addressed in Clause 14—the relevant provision being in subsection (2)(b).

In relation to Amendment 60B, the possible consequences of a failure to comply with a notice are unlikely to vary according to the grounds on which a notice was issued. Essentially, the possible consequences are twofold: either a prosecution is pursued for the relevant offence in Clauses 4 to 8 of the Bill, or the relevant law enforcement agency makes an application for a prohibition order or premises order, as appropriate. On the basis that the Bill already delivers the outcome sought by these amendments, I trust that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, will feel able to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful for that response. The Minister’s comment that the explanation in the notice would vary according to the circumstances is an interesting one which I welcome because standard-form official explanations which are not designed for particular circumstances are often pretty much unreadable. One cannot necessarily work out quite how they apply. I hope that by highlighting that, I am not causing the hearts of people outside the immediate part of this Chamber to sink with the extra work that might be required in that regard. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 55 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

55A: Clause 12, page 6, line 31, leave out from “notice” to end

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 55A, I will speak also to Amendments 60A and 71A, which stand also in my name and that of my noble friend. Again, the amendment deals with notices.

Amendment 55A would apply Clause 12(6) to people over 18 as well as to those under 18, and would mean that a prohibition notice must specify the period for which it is to have effect—certainty, although in a slightly different context, is something which we have touched on a good deal during the passage of this Bill—and that it must not have effect for more than three years.

I cannot envisage circumstances in which it would be appropriate to apply a prohibition notice to anybody for more than three years. I have my doubts about prohibition and premises notices anyway, but if there is a need to apply a prohibition notice for a longer period, surely the circumstances must be such as to suggest that there should be a prosecution—something rather tougher than a notice. At any age, certainty is important. Amendment 60A would apply both certainty and a statutory maximum to a premises notice.

In neither case has an offence been proved. I cannot see what a notice might do that would not be available under other legislation, particularly anti-social behaviour legislation such as a community protection notice. What is achieved by providing that somebody knows that he should not commit a crime and that the police and the local authority have got their eye on him? In a way, a premises notice is more important. I am assuming that if we are talking about head shops the intention is permanent closure. But the straightforward, honest course would be to address that directly with a proper hearing, giving the recipient of the notice more of a chance to deal with his business interests and have his representations heard in a proper way. I am concerned about the extent there.

Amendment 71A would add that what the court should do in an order should be proportionate as well as appropriate. I assume that that is implied because what courts do almost by definition has to be proportionate—but I am seeking confirmation of that at this point. I beg to move.

[Lord Tunnicliffe]

My Lords, I have some limited sympathy with these amendments. Any notice that has indefinite extent, which seems to be where the Bill is, has a certain discomfort about it. Clearly the Government share this discomfort because they are limiting the period of extent to three years for under 18 year-olds. I cannot see, having accepted that indefinite extent is inappropriate for under 18 year-olds, why it should not be inappropriate for those over 18. “Proportionate” is a word we all like to move around in legislation. I found that the Government have used it quite freely throughout the document. I will be interested in their response to Amendment 71A as well.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I meant to say 1998.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I cannot say that I am comfortable about notices applying for an indefinite or unlimited period. There may be concerns about the detail of the notice. I obviously need to read the noble Baroness’s explanation. I should also wait to see what response we get to my later amendment, which is on appeals against notices. These issues all go together, and I would like then to consider where we have got to in the round. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 55A withdrawn.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, the amendments in this group make a number of changes to the provisions in the Bill relating to notices and orders. The most significant amendments—Amendments 75, 76 and 77—insert three new clauses which make further provision in respect of access prohibitions.

Clause 21 enables a prohibition order or premises order to include an access prohibition, barring or restricting access to specified premises. Such a provision would, for example, enable the closure of a head shop selling psychoactive substances, initially for up to three months. This approach is based upon the provisions in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 relating to anti-social behaviour closure powers. Although a number of elements of that regime are already in the Bill, the Government feel that a number of additional elements of the 2014 Act should also be replicated.

For the civil sanctions in the Bill to be effective, they must be adhered to. Therefore, sanctions must be included to deter those who would otherwise choose to breach the terms of an access prohibition.

The other amendments are largely of a technical or drafting nature, and I would be happy to provide further details if necessary. I trust noble Lords will agree that these are all sensible refinements to the existing provisions in the Bill and on that basis I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I have one or two questions on the amendments in this group. Amendment 75 deals with reimbursement of costs. Would the person being asked to make the payment have the opportunity to make representations with regard to what is being claimed—both about the principle and the amount that has been calculated and ordered?

Amendment 76 inserts a new clause on exemption from liability and refers to,

“an act or omission shown to have been in bad faith”.

I note that that does not extend to negligence. I looked at the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, and we do not have negligence in there either, but it does not seem to me that not having it in that Act makes this right.

It is not quite a read-across, but Amendment 77 again applies similar provisions to those in the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act. Something struck me about this while reflecting on what happened during the last Government and the focus on the rehabilitation revolution and so on. I thought we were trying to avoid short-term prison sentences, and it felt uncomfortable to be providing for short-term prison sentences when we know that so often what happens is that the offender learns more about how to commit crime than he does about how not to commit crime.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

My Lords, I reassure the noble Baroness that Amendment 75 makes provision to enable the relevant law enforcement agency to apply to the appropriate court for reimbursement of costs incurred in relation to the “clearing, securing or maintaining” of premises.

Amendment 76 makes provision to exempt the relevant law enforcement agency from civil liability for anything done or admitted to be done in the exercise of a power in relation to an access prohibition. The exemption does not apply when the act or omission was committed in bad faith or when the conduct was unlawful by virtue of Section 6(1) of the Human Rights Act 1998, acting incompatibly with the convention rights.

Amendment 77 creates an offence for a person, without reasonable excuse, to remain on or enter premises in contravention of an access prohibition or to obstruct an authorised person exercising powers under Clause 22(1). I understand the noble Baroness’s worries about the maximum penalty in England and Wales of six months’ imprisonment. I might need a little inspiration from my officials on that one, but perhaps we could write to the noble Baroness and make that a bit clearer.

[Baroness Hamwee]

This is really a broad matter of policy, and I appreciate that the provision on length of sentences replicates part of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, although there are also provisions in there for different periods. I should have given the Government an indication of these questions, but I am afraid that I did not think of them until very shortly before we came into the Chamber. This may not be consoling to the noble Baroness, but I was listening in on a rather high-powered legal discussion the other day, where someone referred to what the Minister thought at four in the morning when questioned—

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen]

I am sorry to interrupt the noble Baroness, but I have a bit of clarification about Amendment 77. Six months is the standard maximum in a magistrates’ court.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I shall not continue with the anecdote, because I was only giving the noble Baroness an opportunity for inspiration to fly to her. I might tell her later.

Amendment 56 agreed.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

64A: After Clause 15, insert the following new Clause—
“Appeals against notices
(1) A person issued with a prohibition notice or a premises notice may appeal to a magistrates’ court against the notice on any of the following grounds—
(a) that a prohibited activity or the prohibited activity specified in the notice—(i) has not been carried on,(ii) is not likely to be carried on, or(iii) in the case of a premises notice, is conduct that the person cannot reasonably be expected to control or effect;(b) that there is a material defect or error in, or in connection with, the notice;(c) that the notice was given to the wrong person.(2) An appeal must be made within the period of 21 days beginning with the day on which the person is given the notice.
(3) While an appeal against a notice is in progress—
(a) a requirement imposed by a premises notice to take any steps remains in effect, unless the court orders otherwise, but (b) any other requirement imposed by a notice is of no effect.(4) For the purpose of subsection (3) an appeal is “in progress” until it is finally determined or is withdrawn.
(5) A magistrates’ court hearing an appeal against a community protection notice must—
(a) quash the notice,(b) modify the notice (for example by extending a period specified in it), or(c) dismiss the appeal.”

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving my amendment I will speak also to my and my noble friend’s Amendments 65, 65A, 68, 68A, 85A, 85B and 85C. The first of these amendments would provide for a right of appeal against prohibition and premises notices, with judicial oversight. The amendment is based very closely on Section 46 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act, which provides for an appeal against community protection notices. I am not suggesting that a subject of the notice should have free rein to produce or supply a psychoactive substance, and so on, but it could be argued that the steps required by, let us say, a premises notice, are not reasonable.

We are talking, perhaps, about someone’s livelihood here. Whatever we might think about head shops, if what they are doing is legal, we need to be very careful about precluding someone from carrying on a business, and certainly we must be careful that we give him the opportunity to appeal when he considers that the notice is inappropriate and undeserved. I appreciate that a breach of a notice would take us through procedures to an application to the court for an order, with surrounding protections. However, an appeal against a notice seems to us to be right—and, properly, a right—and it should be available so that someone can avoid having what I could loosely call “a record”. It is not for us to argue for it; it is for the Government to explain why the right of appeal is not included.

The other amendments are all about the standard of proof for prohibition and premises orders and changing them from the civil to the criminal standard. The orders would be made by the criminal courts, and so the criminal rules of evidence, and so on, should apply. This is also the thrust of my Amendments 85A, 85B and 85C to Clause 28, which is about the nature of the proceedings—essentially turning them from civil to criminal proceedings. Again, given the subject matter of this, it is for the Government to explain why what they are proposing should not be required to meet the criminal standard of proof and be dealt with in the way that we are accustomed to through the criminal courts. I beg to move.

[Baroness Meacher (CB)]

My Lords, I will not take up the House’s time, but I wish to express my strong support for these amendments. It is eminently reasonable to have right of appeal, as the noble Baroness said, bearing in mind the considerable penalty that somebody will suffer if their livelihood is suddenly withdrawn from them. It also seems eminently sensible to set the standard of proof at the criminal level. I support these amendments and hope very much that the Minister can comply with those two proposals.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Bates]

I shall respond, first, to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe. Clause 23 would require the higher criminal standard of “beyond reasonable doubt”, so that is how the matter would be dealt with.

Turning to the point about appeals, I believe that, as proposed, Amendment 64A would be disproportionate, given the nature of prohibition and premises notices. These notices are the first stage of our graded response to tackling the supply of new psychoactive substances. They are intended as a final warning and can be issued by a senior police officer or local authority requiring that the subject of the notice desist from any prohibited activities.

A prohibition notice can be issued only if the relevant officer reasonably believes that the respondent is carrying out, or is likely to carry out, prohibited activity. Therefore, it cannot be issued without good reason, and the issuing officer must also reasonably believe that it is a necessary and proportionate response, given the circumstances. As I have indicated, a notice acts as a final warning. Breach of a notice is not a criminal offence and there are no other direct sanctions flowing from a failure to comply.

The noble Baroness drew a parallel with community protection notices and pointed to the fact that the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 provides for a right of appeal against such notices. Indeed, this amendment largely mirrors Section 46 of the 2014 Act, but there is an important difference between a community protection notice and the notices provided for in the Bill, in that breach of the former is a criminal offence—hence the right of appeal.

I am not persuaded that, in the absence of a direct sanction for breach, a right of appeal is called for. If the respondent takes issue with a prohibition or premises notice, they can make representations to the issuing agency, which could then, if appropriate, withdraw the notice in accordance with the provisions in Clause 14.

Where the relevant enforcement agency concludes that a prohibition or premises notice had been breached, it could decide to pursue a prosecution for one of the main offences or make an application for a prohibition order or premises order, as the case may be. If the respondent is charged with an offence, they will be able to defend themselves in court in the normal way. If an application is made for a prohibition or premises order, again, the respondent will have his or her day in court and will also be able to appeal against the making of the order. We therefore have judicial oversight where it is appropriate.

I have tried to set out the nature of our graded response to the trade in new psychoactive substances and to state why I believe that an appeal process is unnecessary in the case of a prohibition or premises notice.

The other amendments in this group seek to provide for the criminal standard of proof, rather than the civil standard, to apply when a court is considering making either a prohibition or a premises order—a point on which the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, sought clarification.

Clauses 17 and 19, which Amendments 65, 65A, 68 and 68A seek to modify, make provisions for the application process for prohibition orders and premises orders, outlining a number of conditions that need to be met for an order to be made. Proceedings under Clauses 17 and 19 are civil proceedings. Accordingly, it follows that the civil standard of proof should apply. The noble Lord suggested that, as the proceedings are part of the criminal process, the criminal standard should apply, but this is based on a false premise. The whole point of the civil sanctions in the Bill is to enable law enforcement agencies to adopt a proportionate response to any offending behaviour and, in appropriate cases, to seek to tackle the behaviour by action short of a prosecution.

The application of the civil standard to such proceedings is not without precedent. Under Part 1 of the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, the civil standard applies to proceedings in respect of anti-social behaviour injunctions. The civil standard also applies to proceedings under Section 34 of the Policing and Crime Act 2009 in respect of gang injunctions. Of course, if a prohibition order or premises order is breached, the criminal standard of proof would apply to any proceedings for an offence under Clause 23, as I stated.

One of the key purposes of these civil orders is to enable the police, local authorities and other law enforcement agencies to act promptly to nip problems in the bud before they escalate. If the criminal standard of proof were to apply, it would necessarily dictate that more time was required for evidence gathering and there might be little to be gained by applying for a prohibition order as opposed to pursuing criminal prosecution for an offence under Clauses 4 to 8. These amendments would circumscribe the current flexibility built into the enforcement powers in the Bill, to the detriment of communities and defendants alike.

Much the same arguments apply to Amendments 85A to 85C to Clause 28. The clause provides that proceedings before the court under Clause 18 or Clause 25 are civil proceedings—those clauses relate to the making or variation of orders on conviction. It is the case that such proceedings take place in a criminal court, but it is important to remember that a prohibition order or premises order, as with similar civil orders, is not a punishment. As such, they do not form part of the sentence of the court. These orders are preventive in nature and in these circumstances it is again appropriate that the civil standard of proof and the civil standard of evidence should apply. Given that these are quite properly civil proceedings, I hope that the noble Baroness and other noble Lords with amendments tabled in this group will, on reflection, consider that the civil standard should operate and, in the light of this explanation, that the noble Baroness will withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Minister said that it is not intended as a punishment—I think it was during the debate on a previous group that I wrote down that we heard from the Dispatch Box the term “sanction”. I will need to go back and have a look at that.

As to whether or not we are operating on the basis of a false premise, I do not think that it is quite that, but rather that we have different views as to whether there should be civil or criminal proceedings—it is not so much the premise as the approach.

A premises notice could be given when the activity is being carried on, thought to be carried on or likely to be carried on by somebody other than the premises owner. I am actually quite concerned about how these things interplay.

As regards an appeal, I am glad to hear that representations can be made to the police or the local authority about the notice being withdrawn. However, it does raise the question, certainly to me, of whether there should not be explicit provisions about the right to make representations and how representations should be considered, possibly by providing for a more senior officer to look at the matter. That is not necessarily a very satisfactory way of dealing with it, but there is something in there that we would like to think about—my noble friend is nodding encouragingly; I hope it is encouragingly—as to how to cover the right to make representations and how they can properly be dealt with. Between now and the next stage we will have a think about that—but of course I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 64A withdrawn.