Offensive Weapons Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th January 2019 Grand Committee

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, the purpose of the amendments in this group is to remove loopholes in the law relating to the sale of offensive weapons to persons under the age of 18. Amendment 40 amends Section 141A of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which prohibits the sale to a person under 18 of knives, knife blades, razor blades, axes and other articles with a blade or sharp point made or adapted for causing injury.

The prohibition does not apply to weapons covered by Section 141 of the 1988 Act. Section 141 prohibits the supply of certain offensive weapons that are set out in secondary legislation. These include knuckle-dusters, push daggers and zombie knives, which are excluded from Section 141A on the basis that their supply, including their sale, is already prohibited and therefore the prohibitions on their sale to a person under 18 and their dispatch to a residential premise or locker is not relevant.

However, a significant number of exclusions and defences apply to the supply of weapons covered by Section 141. These include an exemption for antique weapons and defences for swords with a curved blade of 50 centimetres or more made before 1954 or by traditional methods and for sporting, re-enactment purposes and religious reasons. Given these defences and exemptions, it is possible that offensive weapons covered by Section 141 could be sold to a person under the age of 18. Amendment 40 therefore removes the exclusion of offensive weapons covered by Section 141 from Section 141A of the 1988 Act. Amendments 48 to 53 to Clause 19 are directed to the same end.

Clause 19 defines a “bladed product” for the purposes of the new offence of arranging delivery of a bladed product to a residential premise or locker under Clause 17. “Bladed product” excludes any weapons in an order made under Section 141 of the 1988 Act. It is therefore possible that offensive weapons covered by Section 141 could be dispatched to a residential premise or locker on the basis that they were covered by one of the exemptions or defences available to Section 141 articles—for example, if they were an antique or intended to be used for sporting purposes. Amendments 48 to 53 therefore remove the exclusion of Section 141 from Clause 19.

I hope that, with that explanation, noble Lords will agree that these amendments sensibly close a gap in the existing law and the provisions in Clause 19. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I am glad as always to have the Government’s explanation for their amendments, and my comments are not about substance. Earlier in the Bill as well as on this clause, I found that I spent quite a lot of time going to and fro between Section 141, the order, Section 141A and so on. That is okay for us—it is our job—but one would not like to think of members of the public having to scour through all this to find out what sort of offensive weapon they might have. Will the Home Office give some thought as to how they can produce a Keeling schedule for the public?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I can utterly appreciate the noble Baroness’s point. When I look at legislation, I have to refer to other legislation, and it can be a minefield, but such is the nature of legislation built up over time. The guidance will help people in that endeavour and, as I said on Monday with reference to another issue, it will be very helpful to members of the public in knowing exactly where the offences are and what aspects of the Bill strike out other aspects of legislation.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

43A: Clause 17, page 17, line 37, after “solely” insert “or principally”
Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment, along with the amendments to page 17, lines 38 and 41, is to probe the extent to which the offence in Clause 17(2) covers delivery to a person who works from home.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, in moving this amendment I will speak also to Amendments 43B and 43C. We are still on the issue of residential premises, and I will not go down the route of customs declarations or indeed of the Immigration Bill as it might apply to New Zealand sheep-clippers and so on. There are a lot of aspects that could be raised.

On Monday, the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, asked about farm-houses. The noble Lord, Lord Lucas, and my noble friend Lord Paddick asked how you know about residential premises. My noble friend, referring to UPS and Royal Mail, quoted comments made by a company in this sector about unworkability in the real world. The Minister convinced me on Monday about not wanting to criminalise Royal Mail through my amendment. She mentioned then that Clause 17(6) was there to satisfy concerns about small traders—individual craftspeople and those running relatively small businesses from home. I would like to raise aspects of that in this group of amendments.

The first of my amendments would provide that residential premises are premises used solely or principally for residential purposes. We have gone round in so many circles on this, but it seems to me that the amendment would be of reassurance to individual craftspeople, to take just one group, who use a shed at the back of their house or a room in the home for their business.

Amendment 43B is a drafting point, and not a very good one. I am afraid that Amendment 43C would create a double negative, but, again, it deals with the owner or occupier who resides in the premises. It probes whether the premises can be residential for somebody other than the resident carrying on a business in it, even if the residential area is only a small part of the whole of the premises.

I have been trying to apply the terminology of the clause to what one knows goes on in all sorts of different types of premises, because we are causing—certainly for me—a good deal of confusion. As I have said before, one wants to get it right, and, as my noble friend and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said, we are trying to make this Bill workable and fair. I beg to move.

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[Baroness Barran]

There is no restriction on delivering to a business premises.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Official Report has already recorded my response, as noted by the noble Baroness.

I think we will all want to spend some time after this stage of the Bill looking at the various provisions that together make up what can and cannot be done. I would add to the mix the point raised on Monday which arises under Clause 18—it is not only my noble friend’s campaign about offences and defences—about the terms “all reasonable precautions” and “all due diligence” and how “all” applies in this situation. I want to spend quite a lot of time understanding what we have been told, how it is reflected in the Bill and what we should pursue at the next stage. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 43A withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

43D: Clause 17, page 18, line 2, leave out “imprisonment for a term not exceeding 51 weeks” and insert “a community sentence”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and the other to page 18, line 5, would replace the short-term custodial sentences in Clause 17 with community sentences.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I shall speak also to Amendments 43E, 63A, 63B, 64A, 65A, 65B, 65C, 65D, 65E and 65F. This takes us back to community sentences. We debated their value and the problems associated with short custodial sentences extensively on Monday. I do not want to rerun all the same points today on Clauses 17, 22, 23 and 24, although I have noticed that Clause 23 brings in the possibility of an indictment where the term would be much longer. To the extent that that is relevant to this discussion, it strengthens my view that seriousness can be reflected by the prosecution being sent up to the Crown Court. The Minister directed the Committee to Section 150A of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 reminding us—or in my case, informing me—that a community sentence can be imposed only if the offence might attract a custodial sentence. I would say that was game and set—or some other sporting analogy—but I am not sure it is quite yet match, at least not until I am convinced that this is a good way of going about sentencing as there is a much wider issue behind this.

Section 150A does not apply if Section 151(2), which confers power to make a community order, does apply. Section 151 is about community orders for persistent offenders previously fined. Am I right in thinking that this is not yet in force? Has it been shelved? Is there an intention to review it? More widely, does the Minister accept that, given the potential value of community orders, the generally acknowledged problems with short custodial sentences and the state of our prisons, it would be a good move to review Section 150A as she explained it on Monday? I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, this group of amendments echoes one of our debates on Monday; namely, whether it is appropriate to provide for custodial penalties of less than six months’ duration for certain new offences in the Bill. It will not come as a surprise to the noble Baroness to learn that I remain unpersuaded of the case for replacing custodial sentences of up to six months with community sentences for the knife-related offences in the Bill. As we have already discussed in Committee, we all know that the impact of knife crime on society is devastating. Young people getting hold of knives by using remote sales can have tragic consequences if they go on to use the weapon for a crime. The possession of prohibited weapons is and should be a serious offence. The Government believe it is proportionate and fair that those committing these offences should expect robust sentences.

The noble Baroness will recall that I explained on Monday that community sentences cannot be set as a maximum penalty for an offence as, under the Criminal Justice Act 2003, community sentences are available only for offences which are imprisonable. In providing this maximum custodial penalty, we are providing the courts with a range of penalties. This gives courts the option to impose a custodial sentence, a community sentence, and/or a fine as they deem appropriate, having regard to all the circumstances of the offence and the offender. I know that the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, welcomes this flexibility and the range of sentencing options which we considered earlier in the week.

As I mentioned on Monday, there is also the requirement under the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that the court has to be satisfied that the offence is so serious that only a custodial sentence can be justified. I therefore remain confident that the courts will sentence offenders appropriately, taking into account the circumstances of the offence and the offender. Where a custodial sentence is justified, they will impose it, but where a community order would be better for punishment and rehabilitation, while protecting the public, then nothing in our provisions prevents that.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is not in his place, but he said on Monday that,

“some short sentences do some good because they punish the offender”.—[Official Report, 28/1/19; col. GC 169.]

I wholeheartedly agree with that sentiment, and we should not now be depriving the courts of the full range of sentencing options.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked whether the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act she referred to are in force. I will have to write to her on that specific question, if she is amenable to that. On that note, I ask that she withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

I would expect the Minister to answer no less. She started by saying that I would not be surprised by the Government’s response, and she will not be surprised to hear that we are not persuaded either.

I accepted what she said about Section 150, which is why I looked it up and spent the usual frustrating few minutes trying to work out whether something that applied to it was in force or not. I think it is not, which is why I took the opportunity to ask the question. My overall question is whether it would be a good move to review Section 150A and bring that part of our attitude to sentencing up to date. But we clearly cannot pursue this any further today and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment. I will, however, ask the Minister to accept that I have fulfilled my undertaking to be very quick—the clock had not even reached one minute by the time I had finished.

Amendment 43D withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

43G: Clause 18, page 18, line 21, leave out from “buyer” to end of line 23
Member’s explanatory statement
The purpose of this amendment is to seek clarity as to how the seller can necessarily know the purpose for which the buyer intends to use the knife; and why adaptations are not dealt with in the same way as design.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, Clause 18 sets out defences to an offence under the previous clause. One defence, in subsection (3), is if the person charged proves that,

“the bladed product was adapted for the buyer before its delivery in accordance with”,

the buyer’s specifications and that,

“the adaptations were made to enable or facilitate the use of the product by the buyer or its use for a particular purpose”.

My amendment would take out the latter part of that provision.

I wrote down “designer knife” as a heading for my notes and then thought that it has a very different and much more sinister connotation than referring to a chef’s knife, which is the sort of thing that I understand this provision is aimed not to block, especially when we talk about adaptations in the context of designer knives. No doubt the proof— there has to be proof here—would in the event be a matter for the jury. But in view of the wording I referred to a few moments ago about the defence of taking all reasonable precautions and exercising all due diligence, it is important that the person who may commit an offence knows what precautions to take.

Proof that the product was designed in accordance with specifications that the buyer provided seems likely to be easier. They would be unlikely to make an order which does not set out the specifications but that may not be the same with adaptations, because they might have a conversation on the phone about their requirements. I want to pursue that issue, and why the activities which amount to the defence are to be undertaken “before its delivery” when those words are not in Clause 18(2). I do not see the distinction there nor the distinction between the two subsections, given the words “for a particular purpose”. How does the person who may be charged know the purpose? I beg to move.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for setting out the amendment in the name of her noble friend Lord Paddick. As we have seen from earlier debates, these are complicated provisions but unavoidably so, I am afraid. She wants to know two things: first, how the buyer can know what purpose the bladed product will be used for and, secondly, why the provision relating to the adaptation under Clause 18(3) differs from that for design and manufacture under Clause 18(2). I hope to be able to provide some clarity but perhaps I may first summarise what we are talking about.

The defences at subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 18 are aimed at allowing the dispatch of bespoke, handmade knives to a person’s home address. One issue that came out clearly from the consultation is that there is a significant number of makers of handmade knives. These are often individual tradespersons who make specialist knives for individual buyers. The most commonly cited example, which the noble Baroness gave today, is chef’s knives, which are made or adapted to specifications provided by the chef—for example, on the length or shape of the blade, or the weight of the handle. Such handmade bespoke knives are very expensive and, in most cases, there is a relationship between the seller and the buyer, which means there is no risk of these knives being sold to a young person. We therefore wanted to allow such knives to continue to be sent to the buyer’s home address.

Clause 18(2) covers where a buyer asks a seller, who in such cases is also likely to be the manufacturer, to design or make specific knives to specifications that they have provided. This would cover where a chef, for example, asks the seller to make them a set of knives to very specific specifications. The seller in these cases will often have a relationship with the buyer and it should be easy for the seller to prove that they are making the knife to specifications, because they will have correspondence with the buyer setting out the requirements.

Clause 18(3) covers where the buyer wants an existing knife adapted to meet specific specifications—for example, where a chef wants a blade shortened or changed in shape or where they want the handle changed, or where a disabled person wants changes to a knife so that they can use it—and these changes are to enable the knife to be used for a particular purpose, such as catering, outdoor pursuits or other activities. Again, in these cases the seller will often have a relationship with the buyer and they will easily be able to evidence that the bladed product was adapted in accordance with specifications of the buyer and the purpose for which it was going to be used, because this would be part of the conversation or communication on which adaptations to make. For example, the maker would know that the knife was needed for gutting fish—that issue was raised the other day—or because the buyer had one hand and needed it for sawing branches, as that would be part of the decision on what changes needed to be made. The purpose of Clause 18(3)(b) is to exclude the etching of a person’s name on a bladed product, as we did not want to provide a defence for bladed products where the only adaptation to the product was the engraving of words on, or similar superficial adaptation to, the product.

I hope that, in light of that explanation, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Minister’s last point about engraving a name had not occurred to me, although I do not quite see how it is distinct from the situation under subsection (2), where you might ask for a product to be manufactured with the specification of adding your name. I will go through what the Minister said, but for the moment, at any rate, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 43G withdrawn.

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[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

In terms of better regulation, I do not think that it has but I will double-check before Report. It probably has not.

The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, asked about the position in other countries and the approach we have taken. Of course we always learn from other jurisdictions, and I hope that they learn from us, but we must legislate as we consider it appropriate to address the position as we find it in this country. Regarding the problems underlying drug addiction, we will come on to that when we reach Amendment 63 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who I do not think is in her place at this point.

I want to make one final point about articles with a blade or point: we do not want to capture items such as screwdrivers and crochet needles because they are not usually used for harm—that is not to say they are not used for harm, but not usually. Hence we are referring to “blade” and not “sharp point”. I hope that, with those explanations, the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee]

Before we get to that point, the Minister has mentioned guidance, which will certainly be very welcome. Can we be assured that the practitioners—I do not mean those with real knives, but those in the criminal justice sector, prosecution, the Bar Council, police and so on—are consulted about how the guidance is presented? I can see a nod at that. That will be very helpful.

I cannot help observing that whoever gave the Minister the note about crochet needles is not someone who uses them, because they have a curved end.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

57A: Clause 20, page 20, line 7, leave out subsection (3)
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is to probe why this exemption exists.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I did not move Amendment 55A because there was an equivalent that we debated on Monday. Amendment 57A would have had an equivalent amendment, but I missed it—nobody is perfect. However, this allows us to return yet again to the distinction between sellers outside the UK and sellers carrying on the,

“business of selling articles of any kind from premises in any part of the United Kingdom”,

at the time of the sale.

I was curious about that distinction, and have one or two points I would like to check. Am I right to think that “carrying on business” does not mean that the business has to be based or domiciled to fulfil that description? I assume that the seller does not have to have his own premises and can operate, for instance, from a contractor’s premises; and that the description “selling articles of any kind” will be met if the seller sells teddy bears, for instance, rather than knives from within the UK.

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[Lord Lucas]

Well, my Lords, perhaps we could enter into some correspondence about that. What Amazon does in this country is the fulfilment; the selling is done from Ireland or Liechtenstein, but certainly not from within this country. We need to be clear that these activities can get split, particularly in the case of big companies. The whole action of selling the knife, preparing it for delivery and delivering it is what should be considered as selling it, not just the technical act of selling.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, that is why I asked some of my questions, as the activities can be split—although I do not want to promote Amazon. These issues may not be far from the taxation points that arise in connection with some of these organisations. As it happens, I do not quite agree with the noble Lord about who is selling. Last night, I looked up an item that I have only been able to find to buy through Amazon and the website said, “This is dispatched from and sold by” somebody else. However, a lot of questions remain.

[Lord Lucas]

That is an Amazon Marketplace thing and not an Amazon own product.

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[Lord Deben (Con)]

I was here at our last meeting, when this issue was discussed. It has obviously caused us a great deal of misunderstanding and we have found it quite difficult to undo. I am concerned about the customers; I am not sure that they would understand it at all. Therefore, I hope that the Minister will agree to try to work this out in a way that the public can understand. Part of what we are trying to do is to make suitable controls. I was not able to be here earlier, but I have been here for this discussion. Even so, I am in the same position as I was when we talked about this before: I do not understand it wholly and I am not sure that the noble Baroness does, although she is very clever and often understands things when I do not. Clearly, we do not understand it, so is it possible for us to look at it again? If it means that it is better to be a seller from abroad than to be a seller at home, frankly I would not like to have to explain that on a platform to the public. I would find that difficult. In the end, we ought not to help people who are domiciled abroad in order to avoid paying taxes and who undermine people who are here paying taxes. I am not terribly keen on that and, again, I would not like to explain it on a platform. I always think this about the small “p” political things: if I were standing on a platform and someone asked me the question, could I give them an answer that would not mean that the hall threw rotten apples? I am afraid that this is rotten-apple time.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am grateful for that. I do not think that I would manage even to get as far as the rotten apples, because I would have bored the audience. It is not just the buyer who needs to be clear about this; it is the seller and everybody in the chain. There needs to be more clarity than I have obtained and I look forward to the meeting when we will discuss this further. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 57A withdrawn.

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[Lord Tunnicliffe]

Amendments 59, 60 and 86 in this group, which are tabled in my name, seek to give trading standards powers to enforce the relevant provisions of the Bill and a power to investigate alleged breaches of the relevant provisions contained in the Bill. There are excellent examples of good work already going on, which this amendment seeks to build on. Croydon Borough Council has worked with local retailers to improve their understanding of the law around knife sales through training and to encourage them to go further than required by law through responsible retail agreements and has caught traders willing to break the law on underage sales by using test purchasers in person and online. Croydon trading standards now has 145 retailers signed up to its responsible retailer agreements. It ran eight “Do you pass?” training sessions with retailers over the past year, encouraging additional measures, such as Challenge 25 and the responsible display of knives in stores. The training sessions are a good indicator of which retailers are keen to work responsibly and which might not be. Finally, 61 test purchases of knives have been carried out in the past year to identify those retailers which are not complying with the law. We have also seen excellent work done in this regard by the police in Greenwich through test purchases by cadets.

These additional responsibilities will create a resource issue as this will be an additional power and an additional requirement, but one that I think is needed. I recognise that the Serious Violence Strategy released by the Home Office contained the promise of a prosecution fund for trading standards for two years to support targeted prosecution activity against online and instore retailers in breach of the law on the sale of knives to underage people. The strategy is not clear about how much funding will be made available and gives no clarity to trading standards about support two years down the line. Perhaps the Minister can update the Grand Committee on this.

In putting these amendments forward, I am aware that the budget for trading standards has been cut by half since 2010, from more than £200 million to barely £100 million, while the number of trading standards officers has fallen by 56% in the same period. The cuts I refer to have led to the downgrading of the protections that consumers depend on. In many cases, they have been reduced to a system based on consumer complaints. Relying on such a system is not an effective way to enforce laws, particularly when we talk about the purchase of knives or corrosive substances. I hope to get a positive response and that the Minister will speak to her amendments in this group. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, I am not sure whether the Minister wants to introduce the government’s amendments now, so perhaps I should just ask some questions. At Second Reading, I raised the role of trading standards so it is obviously welcome that it is being addressed.

There are some obvious questions about the Government’s amendments. First, why weights and measures authorities? I confess that I have not looked up the statutory definition of a weights and measures authority, but there must be one. Why is it that rather than local authorities? The Chartered Trading Standards Institute makes the point that if the obligation was placed on local authorities as a whole, they might have more flexibility in how they dealt with the issue. Secondly, why is it not a statutory duty? On that point, the institute says that, in its experience, local authorities are less likely to provide the resources to deal with a problem, let alone with the training and recruitment of staff. The issue of resources is huge, and it is the elephant in the room in this context. We are all aware of the constraints on local authorities. It is a while since I was a local councillor, and I used to think that we had problems then. I do not know how local authorities manage now to juggle the calls on their resources, so I must make that obvious point as well as asking these few questions. It is right that the role of trading standards is recognised here, as is their role with offensive weapons as a whole, given their understanding of how the communities where they work actually operate.

[Lord Harris of Haringey]

My Lords, I apologise for missing the first few words of my noble friend’s introductory remarks on this amendment. I echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said because I wonder whether the wording in the government amendment is as precise as it is intended to be. The Chartered Trading Standards Institute—I refer to my interests in terms of trading standards—says that a correct definition, if you mean just weights and measures authorities, would be,

“a local weights and measures authority”,

in Great Britain,

“within the meaning set out in section 69 of the Weights and Measures Act 1985”.

The Department for the Economy in Northern Ireland may enforce within its area, rather than simply talking in those terms. I wonder whether a broader definition would not make sense, given that in many local authorities now the trading standards function, which is so diminished, is often spread with other responsibilities. That may be something the Government want to take away and look at to make sure that what they are trying to achieve meets the obligation.

The second point about whether this should be made a duty is important as well. People I know very well in the Chartered Trading Standards Institute try to get this both ways: they complain constantly about all the statutory duties placed on local authorities, and therefore the inability of local authorities to take them seriously, but they also say, “Here is something which ought to be a statutory duty”. The psychological effect of making it clear that the Government wish to place a responsibility on local authorities to pursue their role in this matter would be extremely helpful and valuable. If the Government were to find some way of making the resources available, so that, rather than just placing the duty, they could also ensure that local authorities had the wherewithal to take effective action, that would be extremely helpful.

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[Baroness Hamwee]

When that is done, could examples —not a whole list of the grain to which the Minister refers—be given to us?

[Baroness Barran]

We will gladly do that.

The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, asked for more detail about the prosecution fund that was announced in the Government’s Serious Violence Strategy. The Government committed £500,000 in 2018-19 and another £500,000 in 2019-20 to support local authorities to bring prosecutions, where appropriate, in relation to age-restricted sales of knives. The prosecution fund is managed by National Trading Standards, which is the body that brings together trading standards representatives in England and Wales. The fund will be used by 11 local areas identified as having a knife crime problem to test compliance with sale of knives legislation. I think the noble Lord will be pleased to hear that Croydon is among the 11 areas since he referred to the good work that is going on there.

Amendment 86 would enable local authorities and companies to establish partnerships with the purpose of complying with the provisions in the Bill. The noble Lord will correct me if I am wrong, but I suspect that this amendment is aimed at extending the benefits of the primary authority scheme. The primary authority scheme was created in response to recommendations in the Hampton report published in 2005, which noted widespread inconsistencies of regulatory interpretation between different local authorities. It was introduced in April 2009. The Enterprise Act 2016 included measures to amend the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 to enable many more small businesses and pre-start-up enterprises to participate in primary authority.

The primary authority scheme provides greater regulatory consistency for businesses operating across a number of local authority areas. This is expected to improve compliance with the legislation. The scheme is based on the creation of a statutory partnership between a business and its primary authority. The primary authority acts as a key point of contact for a business that it partners with, in relation to the business’s interaction with local authorities that regulate it, known as enforcing authorities. The primary authority acts as co-ordinator of other local authority inspections of that business. The primary authority supports businesses in meeting their obligations by helping them to understand what needs to be done to achieve or maintain compliance: setting out a way of doing so, or providing information that the method of compliance chosen by the business is acceptable. For the benefit of noble Lords, I will mention that all the major supermarkets, Amazon and the Association of Convenience Stores—given that your Lordships have mentioned the importance of smaller retailers several times—are all part of the primary authority scheme. The scheme has been received positively and has had widespread uptake and support from businesses, professional bodies and local authorities. Government Amendment 82 therefore extends the scheme to the sale of bladed articles and corrosive products. Amendments 88 and 90 are consequential on the earlier amendments.

In short, the government amendments in this group achieve much the same end as the amendments in the name of the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Kennedy. On that basis I hope that the noble Lord will be content to withdraw Amendment 59.

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[Lord Lucas]

In moving Amendment 61, I shall speak also to Amendment 62. Amendment 61 is intended to remove or make it clear that certain knives do not fall under the prohibition in Clause 21. There are a number of occupations and trades where it is very important to be able to have a knife that can be opened with one hand. This is often a safety-critical feature—if you are a climber, an at-sea fisherman, a parachutist or in various other trades that involve the use of ropes, you need to be able to cut and at the same time use your other hand to hold on to something. The way that is generally achieved is to have a small button looking something like a wart on the blade that you can push using the pressure of your thumb to open it; sometimes the alternative is a large opening in the blade.

I want to make sure that the Government are clear that those sorts of knives are not intended to be caught by this clause, because—coming on to the history behind Amendment 62—when Clause 139 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988 was promulgated, allowing folding knives with blades shorter than three and a half inches, it was widely assumed that that would allow blades that locked, because nobody who is going to use a knife wants a blade that does not lock. A folding knife with a blade that does not lock is a toy—you can use it to sharpen a pencil and nothing much else safely. If you have any use for it in hobbies or business, you need a blade that will lock open. The locking requirement was introduced as a result of case law.

If the Government wish to maintain that, I would like my noble friend to make it absolutely clear that “good reason” is understood to be really quite wide. A tradesman will generally have among his tools a knife with a blade that locks, because that is all that is safe to use. You can therefore expect to find it in and about their vehicle, when their vehicle is in a public place, or when they are moving between, or might be going to, places where they will need to employ their knife.

At present, people who use knives in such ways tell me that the police are understanding, but if we reach the point of being much harder on the carrying of knives, I want to be sure that it really is understood that a locking knife is an essential tool of the trade, that people who have a trade or hobby that requires it will often have it in their possession and that the police take an understanding attitude to that at a time of heightened tension. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My noble friend and I have given notice that we oppose Clause 21 standing part of the Bill. Our concern was that expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Lucas, about people who need to be able to open a knife with one hand because their other hand is otherwise engaged in the same operation. We wanted also to know how the needs of disabled people who may have the use of only one hand are to be dealt with. A button, spring or other device that the noble Lord has described seems to be exactly the sort of knife that would fall within this clause. I see a problem there, and I am glad that he has identified it more specifically than we have done. I could not quite see the way to deal with it, so I took the rather wider approach of opposing the clause standing part, but we have to pin it down in a way that satisfies everyone—and not just by the police being understanding.

[Viscount Goschen]

My Lords, I draw to the Committee’s attention that that this type of knife is often contained in a multi-tool type product, for which there are numerous applications. Motorists, hobbyists, farmers and all sorts of people regularly carry them. They often have small blades which, because of the multiplicity of functions within the product, are accessed by a knob or protuberance of metal. It would be regrettable if such products were caught by accident within the clause.

Perhaps I may ask the Minister a question to which I would be happy for her to reply in writing—it refers to something that we have recently passed. If an individual were to steal a knife from a shop, would they be considered to be guilty also of being in possession of that knife, of carrying it? If not, I suggest that it might be looked at in regulations and that the law should consider it a more serious offence than stealing something of the equivalent value of a Mars bar or some other food item, but it is a technical point.

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I can only support what my noble friends Lady Meacher and Lord Ramsbotham have said: that their approach offers a much more humane and effective way of tackling this part of the problem. I support it strongly and hope that the Minister will give a sympathetic response.

[Baroness Hamwee]

My Lords, the Minister will expect us to support the principle of what is encompassed in this amendment. I do not need to repeat what has been said about the importance of diverting—in every sense of the word, with or without a capital “D”—people away from the criminal justice system and towards something that can help them to deal with the problem in all its manifestations. I am not quite sure about some of the wording of the clause—about the need to look at whether there has been a charge or certification by the police force—but those points do not detract from our general support for the approach.

[Baroness Chisholm of Owlpen (Con)]

I agree with a lot of what the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, has been saying. In fact, I am involved with a charity in Gloucestershire which deals with women who would otherwise go to prison; instead, the criminal justice system sends them to us. We have three houses in Swindon, Gloucester and Somerset. Most of the women who come to us have been drug addicts and we find that in most cases their problems started when they were teenagers. We have had terrific success in treating them in our houses, giving them the chance of a much better life and of moving on. I ask the Government to think seriously about this amendment.