Courts and Tribunals Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Young of Acton (Con)]

My Lords, in supporting Amendment 5, in my name, I declare my interest as the director of the Free Speech Union.

I agree with all those noble Lords who have spoken already and expressed reservations about Clause 1, but, if we are going to have to live with Clause 1, I want to suggest ways in which it could be improved by exempting certain classes of offences from it. My amendment would exempt from Clause 1 the removal of the right to trial by jury for those accused of speech offences that are currently triable either way.

The argument for doing this is that whether someone is guilty of one of these offences depends on where the line is drawn, and that question hinges on the meaning of words such as insulting, threatening, abusive, harassment, alarm, distress and grossly offensive, or whether something has a tendency to deprave and corrupt. There are often no hard and fast rules when it comes to understanding or interpreting the meaning of those words, and no unambiguous statutes or precedents that a judge can refer to. Instead, it comes down to a moral judgment about what is and is not socially acceptable. When it comes to making those kinds of decisions, that is properly a matter for a jury, not a judge.

That is not just my view. In Brutus v Cozens, a case heard before the House of Lords in 1973, the Lords held that the meaning of an ordinary word such as “insulting” is not a question of law. It is a question about ordinary language and ordinary standards and where the line should be drawn, and such matters are best left to juries composed of ordinary people, not experts in law.

There is another reason for maintaining the “either way” status of the particular speech offences listed in my amendment. According to research carried out by the Free Speech Union, people charged with speech offences are twice as likely to be acquitted in the Crown Court as they are in the magistrates’ court. That is to say, juries are more tolerant when it comes to what speech is or is not socially acceptable.

I will give an example. In 2024, shortly after the Southport attack, an ex-Royal Marine called Jamie Michael, who was under the false impression that the attack had been carried out by an undocumented migrant, put out a video on Facebook urging his followers to protest outside the offices of elected politicians against illegal immigration. He did not use any racial epithets and he made a point of stressing that such protests should be peaceful. A complaint was made to the police by a member of staff of a Member of the Welsh Parliament, and he was charged with stirring up racial hatred, the maximum sentence for which is seven years in prison. The Free Speech Union found him a good solicitor and barrister, he pleaded not guilty and it took a jury a grand total of 17 minutes to acquit him. Would a magistrate have acquitted him in the same way? I doubt it.

When it comes to our fundamental right to freedom of speech, which is, after all, the most important right, because without it we would not be able to defend any of the others, I urge noble Lords to continue to entrust it to 12 ordinary Britons, who have proven to be a reliable guide to where to draw the line, as they did in the Lady Chatterley trial and have done so often since.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

One answer to the noble Lord is that even good cases sometimes make bad law.

I should apologise, like the noble Viscount and the noble Baroness, that I could not be here for Second Reading. I was able to watch it. My explanation or personal reference does not follow theirs, because my legal practice is very different from both of theirs. I do not know what the collective noun is for a group of those who encompass nobility, learning and a thoughtful approach. If they know what it is, perhaps they can tell me, so I can use it at a later stage. It is really helpful to have their contribution, not just on this issue but later in the Bill. The notion of guidelines is something we must rightly explore.

I am not proprietorial about my Amendment 7. I simply felt that the issue of appeals to allocation must be explored. As the Law Society put it, speed should not be the only criterion where a person

“may be convicted and sentenced to a lengthy period of custody or suffer life-changing reputational damage”.

To me, the issue of reputation is hugely important. We tend to focus on the length of a sentence, but I think any sentence carries a reputational factor. Following a short summary trial, there is a serious risk that efficiency will be perceived to have come at the expense of fairness. Magistrates, as has been said, are very used to deciding whether to send up a case, but the context and their powers will change considerably. What I am suggesting should be addressed is a mechanism for appeal.

While I remember, I will follow a couple of the speakers opposite. I do not like to say “opposite”, particularly in the case of the two noble Lords who have made points. I find it difficult to distinguish between defendants on the basis of character. It is rather like human rights. Somebody can be a really unpleasant person whom you would rather not have to help. However, their human rights are the same as everybody else’s. The amendment seeks to provide for either side, the prosecutor or the accused, with the permission of the Crown Court, to appeal against the decision, a time limit for the appeal to have, in the court’s view, a reasonable prospect of success, and for there to be criminal procedure rules. I know that the issue of the permission of the Crown Court is contentious in some people’s eyes.

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[Lord John of Southwark (Lab)]

My Lords, while I have sympathy for Amendments 7 and 3, my concern is that this simply adds another layer of backlog or chaos to the Crown Court system, which we are trying to eliminate. Appeals going from the magistrates’ court to the Crown Court are bound to take some time, delay the decision on where that case should sit and therefore delay justice again in that case. How does the noble Baroness propose that those additional delays are avoided?

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I am not seeking to instil chaos—at least, no more chaos than there may be at the moment. It is a question of the balance between speed and fairness, appropriateness—any of those nouns. I do not think that everything should be subsumed to speed.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I start from the position that we on these Benches support the right to jury trial in serious cases. I expect fully that we will support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, in opposing this clause, should they put it to a vote, as I certainly expect them to on Report.

I agree with every word of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Mallalieu, and so many others in respect of jury trial. I agree with all those, in this Chamber and in the country at large, who believe that jury trial is one of the cornerstones of our liberty, and that the right to trial by one’s peers is trusted and relied on as a protection against arbitrary abuse of power. I entirely accept that the public trust juries. By and large, they believe that the secret deliberations of 12 jurors in the privacy of the jury room are more likely to produce a fair and unbiased result than the decision-making of one judge. Judges differ, to our knowledge and experience, in background, influences, prejudices and therefore conclusions, from other judges hearing the same evidence and determining the same case.

I also believe that the jury system democratises our justice by bringing the public into the process of making findings of guilt or innocence. My experience of how seriously jurors take their duty when sitting on juries—although it is a distant experience, because I have not practised criminal law for a long time—reinforces that belief in how seriously they take their duties, as does the experience of talking to members of the public who have served on juries.

I agree with all those who see it as a strange and unjustified position that we should take a step as radical as removing the right of election for an ephemeral reason, such as reducing the Crown Court backlog, when there are other ways of reducing the Crown Court backlog. I accept it is dreadfully serious but it is already being tackled in other ways, and quite successfully. In any event, the evidence that removing the right to elect will have the effect of reducing the backlog is painfully thin.

For there to be a right to jury trial, there has to be a right of election in cases that are serious enough to be indictable only or triable either way. But that is not to say that the classification of which offences should be triable either way or, indeed, indictable only cannot change. Of course it can. The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, conceded that point, along with others; the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas Cwmgiedd, made the point as well. However, I suggest that we would lose a democratic right of great value if we were to abolish the defendant’s right of election.

I turn to Amendment 1, on the importance of good character in the determination of the appropriate allocation for trial, which is in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who explained it fully and eloquently, the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie. I argued in the King’s Speech debate, at a stage when the likely length of sentence was going to be the determinant of a right to jury trial—now, thankfully, gone from the Bill—that defendants of good character were at risk only of a low sentence and therefore were much more likely to be denied a trial by jury than defendants with serious criminal records.

Of course I accept that justice needs to be equal for everyone and that everyone has the same human rights, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained. Nevertheless, I am forced to disagree with the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald of River Glaven, on that point. No one is arguing that not all defendants deserve justice. However, the fact is that defendants of good character are at serious reputational risk from a conviction, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee explained. They face not only the risk of the sentence but risks to their careers and to their relationships, to which one can add risks to their mental health and well-being. For defendants with many previous convictions, the likely sentence would be much higher. The effect, therefore, of taking into account only sentence and treating sentence as the determinant is that the defendants of bad character, or with previous convictions, are much more likely to get a jury trial.

It is idle to suggest that the chances of acquittal in the magistrates’ court are the same as the chances of acquittal in the Crown Court. The noble Lord, Lord Young of Acton, explained the difference in connection with speech offences, but the experience of the public at large and of the legal profession is that defendants of good character, at least, have a better chance of acquittal before a jury than they do before magistrates. It is therefore of great importance that good character is taken into account at the allocation stage, otherwise we would not be treating all defendants equally. We would be according a jury trial to defendants with previous convictions but not to those of previously unblemished character. We ignore that at our peril. Those who say that it is an equal playing field between magistrates’ courts and Crown Courts are drawing the wool over their own eyes.

My understanding, though, is that it is intended in the Bill that magistrates will be guided by the seriousness of the alleged offence and will be expected to leave out of account considerations of character and history. I would be grateful if the Minister would elucidate that, and explain and justify—without reference necessarily to the amendment from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and others—the guidance that is expected to be given to magistrates on the criteria for allocation between Crown Courts and magistrates’ courts in contested cases.

I turn to the right of appeal against allocation by the magistrates’ court, which my noble friend Lady Hamwee’s Amendment 7 would provide and which we support. Why should a decision of such fundamental importance be treated as no more than a case management decision for the magistrates alone? Magistrates do not, as a matter of course, have experience of jury trials. They do not know or need to know how jury trials work. The people most qualified to determine whether a case warrants a jury trial are the Crown Court judges who hear jury trials day in, day out. There should plainly be a right of appeal against the refusal of a jury trial. I argue that such an appeal should lie with the Crown Court, with the judge having the right to reverse the magistrate’s allocation decision simply if he or she took the view that it was the wrong decision.

I turn finally to the Clause 2 stand part notice in my name. I have notified the Government that that is not to be pursued. I ask the Minister to treat it as probing and ask him merely to explain how the mechanism in Clause 2 would work. By removing the right to object to the venue for a trial when the case comes before the magistrates, it is proposed that the decision on allocation is for the magistrate alone, but Clause 2 introduces a right to make representations.

I am not objecting to the right to make representations; it is a question of how that right is to be exercised and what the representations can cover. Is a representation to be only on the question of whether the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ court would be adequate to sentence the defendant for the offence? What would the criteria be? How far would they be confined to the nature and seriousness of the offence before the court? To come back to the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would factors relating to character be considered? Would factors relating to the defendant’s circumstances—for example, family ties, housing, children, employment, mental health, addiction and treatment needs, the effect of delaying a trial on sentencing, and the effect of delaying sentence—be permissible subjects for such representations? Would there be a judgment, giving reasons as to why the magistrate’s sentencing powers would be adequate—or why not, as the case may be?

These are important issues as to how this new provision might work. All I seek on Clause 2 is clarity as to what the Government propose and how they envisage that the allocation might work.

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[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

Yes, I share that concern. Actually, it goes further. I do not believe that issues of dishonesty divide neatly into white-collar issues and other issues. Just as juries are told that dishonesty is a matter for them, that they know the ordinary meaning of dishonesty and they recognise it when they see it, I believe that is true of juries at any level. Ultimately, when questions of dishonesty are tried in relation to white-collar crimes that may be complex, ordinary citizens, and a jury of ordinary citizens, can nevertheless tell whether that individual defendant is being dishonest just as well as a judge can. That is certainly so when the wisdom of 12 is combined.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I support the noble Viscount and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, on the distinction between the public interest and the interests of justice. The public interest is a matter of political judgment while the interests of justice are what we are here to serve. I thank both noble Lords—the noble Baroness being a noble Lord for this purpose—for raising this.

I also agree with the noble Viscount about the term “appropriate”. This term has seemed to me, over many years, to have been often used by social workers. I do not intend to disrespect them for this; it is often useful when they use it. I do not regard it so much as a weasel word but rather as one that is appropriate to certain contexts, but not this one.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I have lent my name to Amendment 10, but I recognise that my noble friend Lord Hailsham has provided what he describes as a raft of amendments which are intended together to establish a bulwark that will give a stronger safeguard against the removal of jury trial. In that sense, they are a secondary defence to the provisions in this Bill. We would rely on the primary defence, which is the retention of jury trial as it presently exists, but I acknowledge the reasoning behind my noble friend’s amendments—I just hope they will not be required because the Government will see sense with regard to the primary position.

We will come on to discuss related issues in the next three groups, and in particular whether we should see these fundamental changes to the justice system coupled with Henry VIII powers as reflected in Schedule 1 to the Bill. This is an ecosystem. All these elements are interconnected and if you interfere with one, you have an impact on the other.

Finally, I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about the important distinction between public interest and the interests of justice. I would add only that the interests of justice can be seen as being orientated towards the interests of the defendant in a way that the public interest will not necessarily be, and therefore that distinction is important.

Courts and Tribunals Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Sater (Con)]

I rise to speak to Amendments 36 and 68 in my name, which seek to ensure that magistrates’ courts are properly prepared for the extension of their sentencing powers and that the impact of these reforms is reviewed within 12 months of the Bill coming into force, and annually thereafter. I am grateful to the Minister for meeting with me, together with his officials, and for the constructive discussion and helpful follow-up information.

The Government’s intention is to relieve pressure on the Crown Court. However, we need to be confident that the magistrates’ court will have sufficient capacity to absorb the additional work that noble Lords have discussed today. Amendment 68, which would extend the commencement period from two months to six months, seeks to probe whether the proposed timetable allows sufficient time to ensure that all necessary preparations are in place.

There are several areas I would like to explore with the Minister. First, on recruitment and retention, I welcome the fact that recruitment has almost doubled. In the year to March 2026 1,663 magistrates were appointed, compared with 898 the previous year. However, as mentioned at Second Reading, 988 magistrates also left during that period, which was a 20% increase on the previous year. In August the Magistrates’ Association highlighted that at this rate it would take a further 9.2 years to reach the Government’s target of 21,000 magistrates in post, which they aim to achieve by 2028-29. This really concerns me. Given the assessment, can the Minister give us the confidence and reassurance that the Government will be able to meet their targets?

We must also ensure that progress on diversity is maintained and strengthened along the way. The Government’s own figures show that 17% of new appointments in 2025-26 were from ethnic minority backgrounds, compared with 14% of serving magistrates. Can the Minister assure me that this is being closely monitored and that the Government remain focused on continuing to improve the diversity of the magistracy? Increasing numbers must go hand in hand with ensuring that the Bench reflects the community it serves, and does not get left behind.

One area I did not mention at Second Reading was my concern about whether there would be sufficient experienced magistrates to act as presiding judges. The Government’s own figures indicate that around a third of serving magistrates are currently presiding judges. Have the Government assessed whether this proportion will be sufficient to meet the additional demands arising from these reforms, in particular taking into account the expected departures and retirements? What steps are being taken to ensure that there are enough experienced presiding judges as the magistracy expands?

Secondly, the Lady Chief Justice raised concerns about the additional need for training, following the previous extension of magistrates’ sentencing powers, describing it as

“a huge amount of additional … need”.

As many noble Lords raised at Second Reading, the extension of these powers will create further demands. I understand that the Judicial College has already begun planning for the additional training requirements and that further funding has been made available. What assessment have the Government made of the Judicial College’s capacity to deliver this training alongside the ongoing training needs of the existing magistracy? Is there contingency funding available should demand exceed the college’s current estimates?

The Government have said that the extended sentencing powers will not come into force until sufficient magistrates, legal advisers and district judges have completed the necessary training. How will the Government determine whether this requirement has been met and what do they consider to be sufficient?

Thirdly, as we already know, legal advisers and court staff play a vital role in the effective running of magistrates’ courts. The Government have highlighted that they have appointed additional legal advisers and are recruiting further staff. However, how many additional legal advisers do the Government estimate they will need to support the increased case load, while trying to take into account the numbers that will leave?

I understand that HMCTS is still developing its package of pay, progression and career development reforms to address retention challenges. When do the Government expect this work to be completed and are they confident that these measures will be in place in time to support the additional demands?

Finally, I welcome the Government’s investment in additional sitting days, but these can be delivered only if there are sufficient magistrates, presiding judges, legal advisers and court staff. Taken together, these are significant practical challenges. While I recognise the steps the Government have outlined, I question whether two months will be sufficient to complete the necessary preparations. What assessment have the Government made of the preparations still required and what evidence supports their decision that a two-month commencement period is sufficient when there are so many variables and unknowns? I am not suggesting that six months is necessarily the only possible timetable, nor am I seeking to delay these reforms unnecessarily. The central issue is that these reforms must not come into force before the magistrates’ courts are ready to deliver them effectively, or we risk creating an even bigger problem.

Briefly, Amendment 36 would require the Government to publish a review within 12 months of the Bill coming into force and annually thereafter. Even with the necessary preparation, the practical realities of implementation may differ from the Government’s projections. Having this review and annually thereafter would allow us to assess how successfully magistrates’ courts are managing the additional case load, identify any challenges arising from the reforms and consider whether further support is needed.

Having served as a magistrate, I know that greater powers bring greater responsibility. We must ensure that magistrates’ courts are properly equipped to exercise these powers, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Baroness has raised so many variables and unknowns—a term that she used—and I am very glad she did so. She speaks from experience, which I cannot, but I have been very uneasy about almost everything she has mentioned and I have some amendments which we will come to next week on the same subject. So I am generally supportive of what she is saying.

My name is on Amendment 69. I will not say I added my name because it got added by the Public Bill Office disaggregating one of my amendments and adding my name to that of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. This is a bit of a stretch. I do not know whether you would call the noble Viscount, the noble and learned Lord and me an unholy alliance but, on the subject of collective nouns, I have had an email from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, saying that the term coined by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, of an “exquisite quartet”—this is for future reference, your Lordships understand—is one that he can live with.

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[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

My Lords, Clause 5 provides powers to increase magistrates’ court sentencing powers to 18 or 24 months should future circumstances require it. These powers provide important flexibility to respond to changing pressures across the justice system and to ensure that court resources are deployed proportionately. Drawing on the experience of the past few years, responding to changing pressures across the justice system, including in the prison system, is a very high priority for the efficient management of justice which commands public confidence.

The Crown Court continues to face significant pressures, and many cases sent there for sentence can be dealt with fairly and effectively in the magistrates’ courts, as I have said in earlier groups. Extending magistrates’ court sentencing powers will allow more cases to be appropriately retained in the magistrates’ courts, freeing Crown Court capacity for the most serious and complex cases.

Reducing delay is not simply a matter of efficiency. Timeliness is an essential ingredient of fairness and justice, and freeing Crown Court capacity is critical if victims are to receive justice within a reasonable timeframe. The backlog is one question, and noble Lords have cited various statistics about the backlog in both the Crown Court and the magistrates’ court, but the backlog in the magistrates’ court is dealt with much more quickly than the backlog in the Crown Court, for all the reasons that are obvious. The waiting times in the magistrates’ court are less than half the waiting times for the Crown Court. That matters to victims in particular.

Amendments 69, 71 and 72 from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and Amendment 34 from my noble friend Lady Goudie seek to make these reforms subject to the affirmative procedure and prevent them taking effect unless a prescribed number of magistrates is maintained. The Government do not consider this additional procedure necessary. Parliament is already being asked by this Bill to take the substantive policy decisions, including approving the full range of magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers that may be exercised in future. Once Parliament has established that framework, it is proportionate and consistent with existing practice for changes within those limits to be made by regulations. I know that is not what many noble Lords wanted to hear, but it is our view. The negative procedure is the established approach and has been used previously, both to reduce and to increase magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers in response to the changing pressures across the justice system, which have been vividly recounted in recent months.

Nor do we believe that the implementation or continuation of these reforms should be made contingent on a single workforce metric. The Government fully recognise the importance of magistrates’ courts’ capacity, which is why we are increasing sitting days and undertaking a national recruitment campaign with the aim of increasing the size of the magistracy to around 21,000, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, noted, by 2028-29. However, operational readiness cannot be reduced to a single numerical threshold. It depends on court capacity, workforce deployment, case volumes and wider pressures across the criminal justice system. Amendment 72 would make commencement and continued operation dependent on a prescribed number of magistrates being maintained, regardless of the wider operational position of the justice system. The Government’s view is that such decisions should be guided by evidence and operational need rather than a single workforce measure.

Amendments 36 and 68 were tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Sater—I thank her for meeting me in such a constructive spirit, and we have provided her with more information since. I take seriously all the points that she made about the things that needed to be true, if I can put it like that, for these reforms to succeed. I pay tribute to her experience and collaborative spirit. The Government have already committed in Clause 20 to post-implementation monitoring and review of the reforms, and therefore we do not consider that a further statutory review requirement is necessary. Amendment 68 would delay commencement beyond two months after Royal Assent. We do not consider that necessary either. The Bill does not increase magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers. Magistrates will continue to operate at their current sentencing limits unless and until a future decision is taken to exercise the power. Any future decision to increase sentencing powers will be informed by operational data and engagement with key partners across the criminal justice system, including HMCTS, prisons and probation, the CPS and the judiciary.

Since sentencing powers were increased to 12 months in November 2024, fewer cases are being committed to the Crown Court for sentence, and magistrates are retaining more cases to hear. I reject entirely the comment by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, that the Government have provided no evidence. We have published a magistrates’ capacity plan; I have commissioned a fact sheet that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, has seen, and we have published our modelling. There is a good deal of data out there already. I have spent a good deal of time, including this morning, going over progress on magistrates’ courts’ capacity, recruitment and retention, so I am afraid I simply do not accept that characterisation.

We are going to increase sittings days to 131,000 in 2028-29. A national recruitment campaign is under way to increase the number of magistrates and recruit additional legal advisers and district judges. We are committed to rebuilding the magistracy. We have already made 1,500 new appointments across England and Wales since April. In 2025-26, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, noted, 17% of new appointments were from an ethnic minority and more than a third of new recruits were under 50. Women account for 55% of the new appointments.

I heard the concerns from the noble Baroness about the capacity and funding of the Judicial College. We will monitor those carefully but, as I told her when we met, we have significantly increased the funding to the Judicial College. That is an important aspect of making a success of these things—as is the need for new magistrates to have the mentoring and support of more experienced magistrates, as we have discussed. We have a detailed implementation plan. I would be very grateful if the noble Baroness, given her experience, would continue to work with us on making sure that is a reality. We all have the same ambitions here. I have a good deal of confidence in our efforts to expand the capacity of the magistracy. I am happy to share that with the noble Baronesses, Lady Sater and Lady Hamwee, and others.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

The Minister referred to Clause 20, which talks about a review of equalities issues and, regarding the appointment of reviewers,

“any other matter specified in the appointment that relates to the effect of the relevant criminal justice provisions”.

It would be helpful to know what other matters the Government have in mind. We have been talking about some quite specific issues. I would be glad of a reassurance that that is what the Government intend to look at in a specific and detailed way to report to Parliament.

[Lord Lemos (Lab)]

The review that is promised is specifically on the question of disproportionality as it affects Black and minority-ethnic people. The provisions that we have made for the appointment and so on of the reviewer relate to that. That said, we also intend to review and publish progress on magistrates’ capacity, because we see that as central. It is not the same review, but both of those things are in play.

Of course, the readiness of the magistrates’ courts would be assessed before any decision to increase sentencing powers is taken. The decision would be informed by operational data and engagement. A fixed statutory delay would, therefore, reduce our flexibility without providing realistic additional assurance on operational readiness. It would also delay commencement of the statutory independent review of the structural reforms—just mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—and provisions for when the Crown Court sits in the City of London, despite there being no equivalent operational rationale for doing so.

Amendment 33 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, together with Amendment 35, and consequential Amendments 58 and 70 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would either restrict the sentencing powers of magistrates’ courts to the current possible limits of six or 12 months, variable by regulations, or remove altogether those existing powers to vary their sentencing powers by regulations. The Government do not believe that would be the right approach. Parliament is being asked through this Bill to decide whether magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers may in future be increased to 18 or 24 months. Clause 5 does not itself increase those powers. Parliament is taking the substantive policy decision about those limits through this piece of primary legislation and setting the limits within which any future regulations may operate. The purpose of Clause 5 is to continue to enable flexibility and any future decision to exercise the power would be informed by that evidence.