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Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
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(6 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, as legislators, all sorts of laws pass through our hands—the good, the bad and the ugly. All are consequential for our fellow citizens, but rarely does a Bill weigh as heavily as this one. Wherever we stand, this law change could have a seismic impact on social attitudes to life, illness and death. Our task is formidable because of how many norms the Bill will overturn; I will mention a few.
The Bill unsettles centuries-old medical ethics. It rebrands assisting someone to die as a medical treatment, upending its understood meaning. The Bill rewrites the role of doctors. They will no longer be guided by the “Do no harm” ethos of preserving and protecting life; instead, the Bill mandates that they actively engage in taking a patient’s life by supplying lethal drugs that will kill them. The Bill especially shakes the foundations of society’s attitudes to suicide—and, yes, that is the accurate word; we know this because, at present, intentionally assisting someone to end their life is a criminal offence. So the Bill is forced to amend the Suicide Act 1961 to allow medical professionals to plan, prepare and assist in intentionally ending the lives of a particular group of citizens.
My greatest dread is that this state licensing of suicide could unleash a regressive culture change. For decades, we have made concerted efforts to deter people from taking their own life; this was brilliantly documented last week by the noble Baroness, Lady May, and the noble Lord, Lord Jackson.
Now, I pause. Any of us who have known family or friends who have committed suicide know that it is gut-wrenchingly tragic; it brings an especially visceral, raw grief. This is compounded by guilt as loved ones endlessly soul-search, totally unfairly blaming themselves: “What more could we have done?” This is why, if we see someone about to jump from a bridge, even if they give us 100 objective reasons why their life is not worth living or even if they have only a few months to live, we do not just shrug and walk on—we cling on to them and plead, “Don’t do it. Don’t jump”. All this reflects our deep humanistic intuition that, when a person acts to end their life, it should be resisted with all the energy society can muster. What happens culturally, though, when the state shouts, “Jump”, or agrees with those who say that ending their life is a compassionate choice?
I worry especially about what message this sends to the young, who are already often nihilistic and prone to anxiety, self-harm and mental health problems. When we debated the censorious Online Safety Bill, those of us who raised its negative impact on free speech were metaphorically slapped down and hectored. The one indisputable reason for that law was to close down suicide sites—something echoed by the Prime Minister only yesterday. We had to protect the young from malign online suicide influencers, but I worry that this Bill is the legislative embodiment of a suicide influencer. What do we think will happen when we tell newly franchised teens that, in some instances, taking your own life equates to dying in dignity? Saying that it will be restricted to those with a terminal illness just will not wash with a generation immersed in the language of rights and entitlements: “Why not assist me when I am suffering so much? Why am I being discriminated against?”
That brings me to my final point. We have heard some fine speeches from supporters of the Bill, stressing the importance of autonomy and giving people control of their life. I usually champion such sentiments in a political sense, but not when they are used to justify the state having a role in ending human life—forgive my squeamishness. For those who state passionately, “My body, my life, my choice”, why back a Bill that limits that choice to the terminally ill? Surely logically that right should apply to anyone who wants to kill themselves. No doubt this logic will lead to demands to expand the law—God help us once human rights lawyers get involved. As I say, we have a weighty responsibility to ensure that such nightmarish unintended consequences do not become a reality.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
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(4 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberI will deal first with the central issue in this debate, which is the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The wording currently mentions:
“A terminally ill person in England or Wales who … has the capacity to make a decision”.
The noble Baroness proposes that “capacity” should be changed to “ability”. From what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, says, I understand that we should read that with Amendment 115, although there is another amendment that the noble Baroness proposes in relation to Clause 3. But I accept what the noble Lord says in relation to Amendment 2.
With the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, she is suggesting that we remove “capacity” and replace it with “ability”. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put his finger on it when he said that “capacity” is well known to the law. You could not possibly have a Bill that did not refer to capacity because what it means, in the eyes of the law and of people in practice, is the ability to make the decision. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, if you do not have capacity, you cannot make the decision. That applies right across the doings of human beings, and the law recognises that. If, therefore, you replace “capacity”—
On a point of clarification, I thought that the idea of adding both words was very helpful, but when the noble and learned Lord says that you cannot make the decision without capacity, it is not any decision but this particular decision in this Bill. Can he reflect on a point that was made very well by one of his noble friends on something that happened in my family as well? Somebody with dementia was said to have capacity for a particular decision, but I would not have wanted my mother to have been trusted as having the capacity to decide whether to ask for assisted death.
The Mental Capacity Act is fantastically important, but is it appropriate for this decision—not any old decision but this decision—which is a bit more challenging than some of the decisions that the Mental Capacity Act is used to decide on?
That is very well put and is exactly the question. Is it appropriate to bring the Mental Capacity Act into this Bill? I understand that whether you have an assisted death is an incredibly important decision. You cannot remove the word “capacity”, so you have to reject the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay.
Her Amendment 115 effectively draws on how the Mental Capacity Act 2005 is currently drafted, except it adds two things. It removes the presumption of capacity and, separately, it requires the person making the decision to be aware of a variety of things that are connected with their illness. To summarise, the way the Mental Capacity Act operates at the moment is that if you are unable to understand information relevant to the decision, to retain that information, to use and weigh that information or to communicate your decision, you do not have capacity under the current Mental Capacity Act. The extent to which the things that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has referred to in her amendment would be relevant would have to be weighed in the context of the decision that has to be made.
I am more than happy to debate whether we need to make the changes to the Mental Capacity Act that she is suggesting. For my part, I do not think we do. One thing that is absolutely clear is that the amendment proposed, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, identified, is completely ridiculous. You cannot remove the question of capacity from this choice. Putting aside some detail hurdles, there are two hurdles that need to be overcome in how this Bill is constructed. You have to be capable of making the decision, as the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, said, and—completely separately—you have to make that decision completely voluntarily. It has to be your own decision, not the product of pressure.
We have had—and I say this with warmth and respect—a rambling debate going over a whole range of issues, miles away from the question of whether one should remove the word “capacity” and put in the word “ability”. If this House wants to make the law completely confused in this area, either put in the word “ability” or put in “capacity and ability”. I echo the speech of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, when she says we have to approach this in a grown-up manner, and to remove the word “capacity” is not a sensible way to deal with this.
I also echo those who have said that the idea of running two systems at the same time—the Mental Capacity Act system and the separate system proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—is wrong and confusing. I congratulate the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for spotting what the right decision is. Of course, under the Mental Capacity Act some unimportant decisions are taken, but a decision such as whether to have the ventilation removed from you if you have motor neurone disease, that will almost certainly lead to your death, is without a shimmer of a shadow of doubt a life and death decision.
The Chief Medical Officer of England and Wales, in evidence to the Lords Select Committee, said:
“it is far better to use systems that people are used to and that are tested both in practice and, where necessary, in law”.
He went on to say:
“I have a concern that you could have a conversation in one bed in a hospital where someone is talking about, for example, an operation where they might well lose their life, because they are frail and there is the operative risk, done under the Mental Capacity Act, and, in the next-door bed, someone is trying to do the same process of having a difficult conversation about someone who might die, or could definitely die, as a result of that decision, but using a different legal framework. The risks that that could lead to confusion are not trivial”.
I also echo what the noble Baroness, Lady Browning, who sadly is not in her place, said. There are problems about practically every aspect of how various parts of the health service work, but she was part of a process that considered how the Mental Capacity Act worked. The broad conclusion was that it was a good, workable Act, and we should not stray from it in this particular case. I invite the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
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(4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I rise in support of Amendment 118 tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and I am introducing Amendments 118A and 118B which follow it. I also support Amendments 45, 46, 47, 49 and 58.
This is an atheist Bill that assumes there is nothing after death, which is not a neutral but an ideological position. To those without an active belief that there is something after death, I would say, “How can you be so sure?” What makes the point that it is an atheist Bill? It is that it desacralizes death and by so doing it opens the door to very many evils including coercion and pressure, the subject of this group. The Bill is coercive: it gives oxygen to dark thoughts which can loom especially large when our best days seem to lie behind us, and when we are no longer contributing to family and society in the way we once did. Culturally and societally, it encourages and influences them as much as any person referred to in Amendments 45 and 46. Two of my friends with terminal conditions both followed earlier stages of this Bill in the other place and told me the subject’s very airing made them feel that they were a burden. The message that legislation and policy should amplify is, “You will not walk the valley of the shadow of death on your own”. We should encourage people to make and keep those relationships that will carry them through life and through that dark valley.
Others might also have dug out the words of the Times columnist Matthew Parris, quoted in a debate on assisted suicide in the other place in April 2024. He said that although
“‘Your time is up’ will never be an order”
to the elderly, disabled, severely ill and the others to whom assisted suicide will, inevitably, be extended eventually, it
“may one day be the kind of unspoken hint that everybody understands. And that’s a good thing”.
As the right honourable Stephen Timms said in that debate:
“I cannot see that that would be a good thing. It seems to me that legalising assisted dying would impose a terrible dilemma on frail people, elderly people and others when they are at the most vulnerable point in their lives, especially on conscientious frail people who do not want to die but do not want to be a burden. I do not think that there is any way to avoid imposing that dilemma”.—[Official Report, Commons, 29/4/24; col. 18WH.]
We have heard from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, about the data from Oregon, where over half the people who have applied for assisted dying since 2017 did so not because they wanted to die but because they felt that they were a burden. Amendment 47 from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, would guard against this “internal coercion”, to use the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ phrase. Further, her Amendment 49 includes,
“body corporate, institution or organisation”,
alongside “person”, which would of course catch the Government themselves. Tragically, and I declare my interests as a Hampshire farmer, there are farmers who have committed suicide ahead of the imposition of the family farm tax, choosing to die early so their land is passed on intact. Law and policy starkly influence personal decisions, hence our responsibility as lawmakers to take these unforeseen consequences into account and not brush them aside.
In her Amendment 58, the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, is right to focus on lack of care as a disadvantage that pressurises. If death looks as if it might be painful and protracted then going through it alone, unmissed and uncared for, is too terrible to contemplate, but surely we can do better than help someone act on that dread thought, “No one would miss me; no one cares”.
Amendments 118A and 118B, which are my amendments to Amendment 118 in my name and that of the noble Lord, Lord Hunt, would ensure that wills were scrutinised and the backgrounds of friends, as well as family, were not overlooked if sinister motives suggesting financial abuse were not assumed but at least considered. Legislating for motivation is notoriously difficult, because motives are private, subjective, and easy to disguise. Instead, assisted dying legislation must use clear, objective safeguards to remove the possibility of improper motives influencing the process.
As an aside, I am not sure the Bill prevents any doctors involved profiting from early death, but Dr Harold Shipman did of course inveigle himself into the wills of some of his victims, and that would also be a red flag if found in the commissioner’s checks on wills.
Therefore, I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, why the Bill does not do more to exclude anyone with a financial or personal interest, and by extension anyone who might have been under their influence. We cannot draft either for compassion or for malice, but we can protect applicants by making it clear from the outset that if anyone with suspect motives has any involvement, their application will fall.
My Lords, I, by contrast, speak as an atheist and humanist, mainly to address my Amendment 45, which would add the word “encouraged” after “coerced”. I support the general theme of the other amendments in this group, which largely tackle the need to strengthen safeguards against patients being indirectly influenced into opting for assisted death—often coerced, in all but name. All these loopholes undermine any certainty that the “choice”, in inverted commas, is made autonomously.
My amendment, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Goodman of Wycombe, may appear to be a small change, as it would add just one word. But before anyone concludes that I am tabling trivial amendments to waste time, I note that, when dealing with a fundamental change in the state’s relationship with its citizens and the NHS’s relationship with patients, and life and death decisions, the specificity and appropriateness of the words in the changed law matter.
At present, the Bill requires doctors to ascertain only coercion or pressure. They are the only two words given in Clause 1; there is no duty even to probe or ask broader questions about more subtle, insidious influences that could affect a person’s decisions. I note that the concept of encouragement is not arbitrary; the encouragement of assistance in suicide is illegal under the Suicide Act but would not be in this Bill. Indeed, CPS policy guidance on prosecuting those who have assisted suicide acknowledges “encouraging”—it uses that word—the victim as a factor in favour of prosecution. It is also criminal to encourage a person to commit an offence under the Serious Crime Act. Therefore, the question is less about why I am bothering to table an amendment to add just one word; the question is why the sponsors of the Bill left out that word “encouragement”.
Adding the word “encouragement” would allow a shift in perception about what undue influence could look like. Even though there are real problems in spotting coercion or pressure—we have heard many examples of that—the concepts at least have a hard edge or overt sense, at least in everyday parlance, that you are talking about people doing something that they really did not want to do. You do not say, “I had a really lovely day today; my husband coerced and pressurised me into doing” something. There is a grey area of much more subtle intervention; an individual could motivate, lead on or nudge someone into opting for an assisted death, rather than making that person aware of all the ways that they might live out their limited time as comfortably as possible. This amendment is trying to get at that sort of encouragement.
As I explained at Second Reading, one of my big dreads is that, once assisted dying is normalised as a positive treatment option, that vibe shift will not be confined to medical scenarios. It can and will mean that it is popularised as a go-to option in broader society. Consider this scenario: you have just received the news that you have a terminal diagnosis and have about six months to live. You are frightened, shocked and seeking reassurance. It is a bleak time and you are depressed because you do not want to die.
But then a third party—a family, carer or friend to whom I ascribe no motivation—says, “Have you thought about asking your GP for an assisted death? I’ve been reading about it all over the place and you can do that now. At least that way you’d have dignity in dying. You know how much you hate hospitals and all those doctors fussing about you, and we all know that you are not good with pain. How would the kids cope with running around having to visit you when you’re in and out of hospital? Wouldn’t it be so lovely to choose when you go, then we could all be with you at the end?” All of this is said in soothing, kind tones. Therefore, you think, “Well, I really don’t want to die. My instincts are to
‘Rage, rage against the dying of the light’,
but I don’t want to be a nuisance either, and they know me so well. They know what I’m like and that I won’t cope. They have my best interests at heart, so I suppose so”. It does not sound exploitative or coercive, but it is an iron fist in a velvet glove.
We have some cultural reference points here. In discussions about how the Online Safety Act will tackle suicide sites, there is consensus about the problems of online influencers encouraging vulnerable people into believing that suicide is a positive way out of their suffering. There is widespread revulsion at those cajoling siren voices encouraging death as an attractive option. In that context, none of us concludes that this encouragement is not problematic because it is not explicitly coercive.
The Bill makes it absolutely clear that it must be your own decision. Let us suppose that your views of the world are affected by the internet and that you are ill and an organisation is urging you to commit suicide, that organisation should be liable if that happens.
In Amendment 49, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, wants “person” to include a body corporate or an organisation in relation to pressure. If an organisation or a body corporate is putting pressure on a group of people or on individuals and that makes them do it—this is putting it crudely, but if an organisation says, “Do have an assisted death; it is the right thing for everybody or for you”—that should be covered by the Bill. The noble Baroness adverted to how “person” can generally include both corporate person and human person, but I can talk to her separately about that to make sure that it is covered.
Some clarification is needed in relation to a number of points that you have made. How does anybody know, how does the doctor know, whether any of these scenarios have happened? Is there anything in the Bill that makes the doctor ask and explore? The word I proposed was “encouragement”—that you would ask not just “Were you coerced or pressurised?” but “Were you encouraged?”—because it would develop a richer conversation. Is there anywhere in the Bill where all the things that you have just said—apologies; I should not have said “you” but “the noble and learned Lord”—can be fleshed out, discussed and teased out?
Maybe I have got this wrong, but at the moment as I understand it, you fill your form in, somebody might even ask “Were you coerced?” and you say no, and that is that, out the window and then, Bob’s your uncle, you are eligible and off you go. It does not matter how often that process happens. The noble and learned Lord spoke about “first doctor, second doctor”, but if they do not all explore it, how will we know whether it was anything other than a yes/no? The noble and learned Lord has given a very rich explanation of what could have happened, but the Bill does not allow us to find out whether any of that will have occurred before the assisted death is enacted.
I do not feel insulted by being called “you”, but I do not think that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, properly understands how the Bill operates. The two doctors and the panel have to be satisfied that the person is reaching a voluntary decision of their own, uncoerced and unpressured. Codes of practice will determine how that is done and, what is more, the panel with the three experts on it also has to be satisfied. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is saying that that is a tick-box exercise. With respect, no: this is obviously a very serious matter. I expect the doctors and the panel doing it to take it seriously.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
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(3 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have an amendment in this group and I support the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, in this. I just want to add to earlier comments. The transition from children’s to adult services at 18 is well known to be a very confusing and destabilising period during which key clinical relationships are lost and important elements of a young person’s history may not be carried forward. These factors are directly relevant to assessing decision-making capacity and identifying safeguarding concerns for individuals aged 18 and above who may seek assisted dying. I think that raising the minimum age would allow for any medical advances—for example, with emerging new treatments that might change a young person’s prognosis. It is important not to be too hasty.
I also want to comment on the Scottish Sentencing Council and to add that, again, there is something about the developmental process which is still under way which can increase susceptibility to influence, vulnerability to risk-taking and the likelihood of short-term, emotionally driven decision-making. We have only to think about the fact that in that age group, the biggest cause of death is actually accidental death. Research done by the Sentencing Council and other research shows that maturity may be delayed by adverse childhood experiences. It is therefore reasonable to assume that some young adults with serious illness may carry such developmental vulnerabilities into their decision-making around the end of life. The Sentencing Council guideline suggesting lower culpability and a greater capacity for change than in older adults endorses the suggestion that we should change the minimum age to 25. This is an irreversible decision. We need enhanced safeguards for this age group, and I support the amendments.
My Lords, let me just state that, for very different reasons, although I have a great deal of respect for both the noble Baronesses, Lady Lawlor and Lady Berger, in this instance I have serious qualms about these amendments in relation to raising the minimum age for receiving assistance to end one’s own life to either 21 or 25. I think we need to hold on to the standard age where we consider adult responsibility to begin—that is 18—as the Bill does. I worry that we are already getting ourselves into a tangle on age issues. For example, the proposal is now to lower the voting age to 16. I wonder how the sponsor of the Bill will hold the line at 18 when those newly enfranchised 16 to 18 year-olds start demanding equal entitlements from 16. Logically, those teens will have a point when they argue, “If you trust us to decide on the future of our country, why not trust us to decide on the future of our own fate if we fit the other eligibility criteria?” I would like some reassurances from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, that this age slippage will not happen, but also that 18 is a watertight age in terms of eligibility, and there are other amendments later on.
Conversely, I ask the noble Baronesses whether there is a danger of unintended consequences in using the argument that the young brain has not developed sufficiently at 18 to make such important decisions. It makes me anxious when neurodevelopment research is cited about cognitive development and a lack of maturity about anyone under the age of 25. That is used to challenge the decision-making capacity of anyone below the ages of 21 or 25. I fear that it could be used regressively. How can we trust 18 to 25 year-olds to vote, or be asked to take on any adult responsibilities, if their brain is still developing? Where are we going to end up? I think we need to avoid unintentionally institutionalising state paternalism that robs young adults of their individual rights and limits the choices on their own fate in various ways. The cultural shift to infantilise the post-18 cohort, which is a broader problem, is, in my opinion, regressive.
Finally, I am very sympathetic to the concerns that have been raised here already. It might be worth considering some kind of carve-out for 18 to 25 year-olds on EHCPs, but that would be an exception, not a rule. Viscerally, the idea of any young person of 19 or 20 having a terminal diagnosis and then being offered the choice of an even earlier death fills me with horror, gives me the chills and is tragic. But I still think that 18—if tightly protected by the sponsors of the Bill—is adequate in relation to age safeguards. There are plenty of other safeguards that I am worried about without adding to them.
I also think that there is a problem of the Bill creating a culture, for the young in general, of suicidal ideation. However, these amendments do not resolve those broader problems.
On the comments that the noble Lord refers to, in relation to whether you should impose a whole-life term on somebody under 21, I recognise, as the Sentencing Council does, that issues of immaturity might make that inappropriate in certain cases. However, on this position, the question is: what is the age at which you might be capable of taking a settled decision? The concerns that the Committee has expressed about people aged between 18 and 25 make me think that the right course is to consider whether there are ways to deal with that that the House would feel are satisfactory on Report. I think that is the right course.
Could I have some reassurance that with changing the franchise to 16, there will not be any slippage in relation to this Bill from 18 downwards? That is a reasonable question because, according to some people, 16 is now mature enough and adult enough to decide the fate of the country and decisions made here. Is there not a danger? Can he guarantee that this will not happen?
I guarantee to the noble Baroness that the age is not going to go down from 18 as far as this Bill is concerned. The future is not in my gift, unfortunately. However, as far as the future is concerned, it is extremely unlikely that a subsequent Parliament is going to reduce that age.
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, explained some of my concerns, which I found very helpful. I have a couple of questions for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.
Why does an independent doctor’s report no longer have to say why there was a refusal? I do not understand why the words “reason for refusal” have been omitted; could that be clarified? One of the things that will be very important in reassuring those of us with concerns about safeguarding being taken seriously is having as much transparency as possible in the process and ensuring the constant recording of information.
I am troubled by Amendment 418 and the word “unwillingness”, and not understanding, probing or having any way of finding out why somebody is unwilling. I understand that unwillingness might well refer to not being available or not being able to be so. However, if a doctor steps away, maybe because they feel uncomfortable about family members, undue influence or some kind of coercion taking place—all the things we have heard about—it seems relevant that that information be recorded somewhere, because it is a red flag and an early warning. That doctor’s opinion is only an opinion—the second doctor does not need to take any notice of it—but it would at least say that something is wrong; whereas, if the information just says that the doctor is not doing it because he is unwilling, we do not know anything.
In this process, there surely has to be a way of checking all the time that everybody knows that things are being done in good faith. I am afraid that some of these drafting amendments seem unintentionally to make things more obscure. The wording does not help to give us more information; rather, it removes information. Therefore, I would like the noble and learned Lord to look at redrafting his redrafting, so that we can have a bit of clarity.
I think I understand what has been said there but, for clarification, is the withdrawal explicitly queried anywhere? I am under the impression that there is nowhere where you say, “Why are you withdrawing? Is it for this reason or that reason?”. I am delighted that the noble and learned Lord agrees with me that certain withdrawals suggest something that should be noted down. Where in the Bill—forgive my ignorance—does that happen? I do not see it anywhere and I would be grateful if he could refer me to it.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
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(3 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, it is very regrettable that the noble Lord had a patient in an abortion situation. We are not, in this group, discussing the doctor’s wishes or otherwise and his views about abortion. I ask the Minister, because I can hear mutterings here, what provision says that you cannot intervene in a debate where you have not been present, perhaps, at the very first moment of the debate? What is the section in the Companion that provides for that?
My Lords, returning to the amendments that we are discussing, I want to commend the sponsors of the Bill in the sense that, when I read the Bill, multiples clauses referred to the applicant’s GP. There is an assumption, however, of an ongoing relationship with that GP. If there is not, we can come back to that. I had assumed that there is an ongoing relationship. The noble Lord, Lord Rook, has raised some of the real challenges to why that might not be realistic.
The problem is that, if there is no assumption of an ongoing relationship but simply a visit to a GP, it seems to me completely meaningless. You go in for a 10-minute meeting with a GP, which is transient and patchy at best, as they are unlikely to be able to make any clinical assessment of great merit. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, referred to the real-life situation of not seeing a GP but how pleasant it was.
I will just finish, because it relates to this. I appreciate that, once given a terminal diagnosis, that might be true, but not necessarily. That is the honest reality of the situation.
We have a moral dilemma here. GPs are being called on as though they are important to this Bill, but if they are just passing and you do not have continuity of care, they are actually being treated with contempt. On the other hand, in truth, the demand that you have to have continuity of care before you can ever be offered assisted dying seems unrealistic in today’s modern health service.
Baroness Lawlor (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendments 30B, 220 and 265A in my name. They share the aim of other amendments in this group to ensure that the GP knows and has looked after the person who wants to end his or her life, but go beyond them in proposing the extent and length of the relationship needed and in requiring a letter from the GP to provide important additional safeguards. I will explain the amendments.
First, I propose that the patient be known personally to a doctor for two years through having been seen for at least six appointments. Secondly, I propose that the doctor submits a letter to the assessment panel on the patient’s physical and mental health during that period, and a prognosis. Thirdly, I stress that the doctor, as we see their involvement in this Bill, may be the patient’s GP, but that is not required; the doctor may be the first doctor, but, given Clause 11(8), this is unlikely, and it will probably not be the second doctor. The important point is that a medically qualified practitioner knows the patient over time and can write an assessment for them.
Why does this matter? Advocates of and those concerned about the current arrangements in the Bill want adequate safeguards. We all do. We want to protect the weak, the elderly and people with physical or mental health conditions from being influenced, pressured or coerced into wanting to end their own life. But if the request for assisted suicide can be accepted without a doctor who knows the patient personally over time, there will be no such safeguards. “Knows” does not mean a fleeting acquaintance but a professional knowledge of the patient built up over years. That is the aim of my amendments. By contrast—
I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. I also want to raise the risk of domestic abuse, which is much higher during pregnancy. The Maternal Mental Health Alliance says that up to 30% of domestic abuse cases begin during pregnancy.
Ending someone’s life with lethal drugs while they are pregnant raises additional layers of moral, legal and medical concern—for example, consent, the viability of the baby, conflicts of interest, et cetera. Pregnancy causes drugs to be processed differently. The rate of absorption is affected by physiological changes. That could mean a slower or more prolonged death from the approved substances for both mother and child. Women are particularly vulnerable, and the safeguards just do not seem to be in the Bill at present.
The amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, in this group relate also to those up to the age of 25 who have an EHCP, which may be provided to vulnerable children, including those with special educational needs and mental health concerns.
Finally, the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, has told us that young people with complex needs may be at a higher risk of internalising negative societal values about their disabilities. The National Down Syndrome Policy Group states that people with learning disabilities can be highly suggestible and prone to acquiescence bias, agreeing with authority figures to please them.
There may also be diagnostic overshadowing, the risk that a young person’s desire to die might be as a consequence. In this context, a young person with an EHCP, for example, might request assisted dying not because their condition is intolerable but because the social care and support legally promised to them has failed to materialise, making their daily life situation unbearable. That could be misinterpreted by clinicians as a rational choice due to their disability. It is therefore the case that special provisions, such as those identified in these amendments, are necessary to ensure proper support, and that the various vulnerable groups of people do not feel that they have no choice.
My Lords, I want to speak specifically to Amendment 22, about why prisoners should not be eligible for assisted dying. The amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, are also pertinent here.
The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester raised the real and specific safeguard issues from the lack of medical records of prisoners, and I am sure we will hear more about the problems of medical care for prisoners. The terrible terminal diagnosis that one might get as a prisoner would be particularly frightening, I would think, because of the lack of medical care.
That is actually not my concern. Regardless of where one stands on assisted dying in general, I really hope that, when it comes to this Bill, noble Lords will consider the very particular circumstances of those incarcerated by the state. I hope the sponsors of the Bill will still be open to excluding prisoners and keeping them out of the Bill, on the basis, if nothing else, of their lack of autonomy.
I have to confess that I was rather taken aback when I heard Minister Stephen Kinnock in the other place state that excluding prisoners from this Bill would lead to a difference in treatment between prisoners and non-prisoners, an inequality, citing Article 8, private life, and Article 14, discrimination, of the ECHR. He noted that differential treatment would require objective and reasonable justification. It seems a bit shocking to me to have to explain this to a Minister, but my objective and reasonable justification is that, if you are in prison, you do not have the same rights as if you are not in prison. I did not make that up—although I know the Sentencing Bill has gone a bit liberal.
Actually, I think that, you know, you are deprived of your liberty. Many of the arguments made by the advocates of the Bill about autonomy and giving people choice towards the end of life, in particular circumstances —which I completely understand, philosophically and politically—are entirely appropriate for free people. But when you are not free and do not have autonomy, it brings with it a whole new range of ethical dilemmas.
The purpose of prison is, as I have said, to suspend certain rights from people to protect the public, to ensure deterrence and to uphold a sense of justice in society—I could go on. When the state has deprived an individual of so much autonomy, for all the criminal justice reasons we know, offering the option of an assisted death does not increase their autonomy in a meaningful way. It is saying, “Oh, well, we’re giving them choice”—but their real choice would be being able to leave. In other words, we have limited their choices.
Why does this matter? It is because, when the state decides to deprive somebody of their liberty, it is a very serious decision. For me, it is the worst possible punishment you could give: you are limited in being free, which I obviously consider to be very important. Prisoners, inevitably, are depressed: and often they are vulnerable in the first place. That is why they are prone to suicidal ideation.
Those of us who have had the privilege of doing some work with prisoners will know that we spend a lot of time tackling self-harm, with people hating themselves and the circumstances they are in. We do a lot of work on that. I and many others have worked on IPP prisoners, who are, ridiculously unfairly, still in prison indefinitely based on an abolished sentence, often for minor breaches of the law in the past. It is always shocking when you hear of another IPP prisoner who has taken their life. It is particularly horrible, as many noble Lords here have articulated far better than I can, because it is almost like it is on the state’s conscience. That is the reason why coroners make such a fuss about it. Those prisoners should not be there; they are in prison because the state made a mistake with the sentencing regime that it will not resolve and then they take their life. The state is somehow implicated in those suicides and we make a particular point of that.
Those of us who have worked in prisons will also know that suicide prevention is something we take very seriously. It does not matter how heinous the prisoner’s crime is. They could be a child abuser, a rapist or a murderer, but, if there is even a hint that they might commit suicide, there is suicide watch. We do all sorts of suicide prevention. The reason is that, as a humane society, we do not think that people should be allowed to take their own life, if at all possible. We have suicide watch in prison because the state has somebody incarcerated. Therefore, as a humane society, you take seriously not letting them kill themselves: otherwise, you could just say, “Carry on boys, it doesn’t matter”. We do not do that because we think that we have to protect those prisoners in the state’s care.
Right, I will finish. Letting prisoners have access to and be eligible for assisted death would be very close to reckless state abandonment of those prisoners to something very deeply dark. Philosophically, if a penal sentence in Britain ends up with the state effectively putting a prisoner to death via lethal drugs—I do not want to go on, but that is what would have to happen: they would be locked up in a prison, in the state’s care, the state would then make them eligible to ask for assisted dying, with limited autonomy, and would then hand them lethal drugs—that is far too like capital punishment, which I have long opposed and do not approve of. Therefore, even if you do not agree with me on the rest of the Bill being a completely difficult challenge to humanity, which I think it is, I none the less suggest that, if we pass it, we should absolutely exempt prisoners from it.
My Lords, I support these amendments, particularly those relating to prisoners and, indeed, what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, so eloquently expressed. Just before I do, I will also support something that the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, who is now not in his place, said earlier, when he complained about some of the exterior noise around those of us who are debating this Bill.
I declare an interest as a general practitioner, not of medicine but of journalism. I know very well what happens and how to recognise when we are being pushed to do a story. In the past two weeks, all the British media have been pressed very hard by lobbyists in favour of this Bill to produce a series of highly contentious arguments that attack anybody who tries to debate the Bill fully. This is very much at odds with the spirit of legislation of this sort, and with what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, keeps trying to do. He says at the end of each group what a valuable debate it has been. He does not say, “What a waste of time this debate has been”; he says it has been valuable, which it has been. I have learned a lot today, for example, about GPs and their difficulties, and we are learning more about prisoners. There was a virulent article in the Times by Nicholas Boles, who was an informal—
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
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(2 months, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I have added my name to two amendments in this case.
Lord Blencathra (Con)
My Lords, could we please first hear from those noble Lords who have tabled and signed amendments before the rest of us speak? I apologise if the noble Baroness is a signatory, but I did not think she was.
I have my name on a number of amendments. I did not know that those rules applied—anyway, they do not.
I have added my name to a number of amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Carter of Haslemere, in this group.
In general, I am glad to support many of the amendments on palliative care in this group. The Bill asks us to accept that assisted dying is a medical intervention, albeit an irreversible life-ending one, which is something I am not entirely happy with. It seems obvious to me that there must be guaranteed input from the best-placed medical experts in end-of-life care: that is, palliative care specialists. That is essential for the informed consent of the patient.
I imagine and hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is very sensitive to the importance of palliative care. I know that he is in the much-cited Demos Commission, which I will not bother quoting again, and I am hoping that he has not changed his mind. I think the noble Lord, Lord Carter, made a very important point earlier to the sponsor of the Bill about the number of amendments, for which we have all been chastised and finger-pointed at and tut-tutted at. I kept my patience last night, although my blood pressure did go up.
None the less, I genuinely think that the number of amendments could be really slimmed down if the sponsor of the Bill were to go through, for example, all the amendments on palliative care and say to us, “I accept the principle of this and I will come back with my own amendment” or what have you. We would then not have this issue. We are not an organised political grouping; people table amendments and add their names to them in good faith, which is what I have done, and they then speak in good faith. We are not trying to repeat things for the purpose of delaying the Bill but because we think that it matters and is important. That is what we are doing here.
On this group, and the concept of 10 important themes, we need an assurance that real choices will be offered to a patient with a terminal illness and they will be given the option of a palliative care assessment and, hopefully, then, possibly palliative care. That safeguard would really reassure us, and it is a key theme, and so on. One of the reasons why I say that is, under the Bill, GPs can mention palliative care to a patient. I am a great fan of GPs; they are fantastic generalists who do a good job. But very often they do not have all the expertise of a palliative care specialist in knowing how precisely medical intervention can improve a patient’s condition, or indeed change their will to live.
It is important for the Committee to note that research has shown that those who wish to hasten their own death often change their mind when they receive more information. Palliative care can mean that people who want to die then want to live, and that is important if we are going to talk about choice. It is possible that you might want to die, that you are determined you want to die in assisted death terms, having had your terminal diagnosis. But why is it that you want to die? That is the motivation behind the discussion in this group.
One of the things that happens is that many people are frightened and fearful, and one of the things they are fearful of is pain and terrible symptoms, which by the way are often graphically described by supporters of the Bill, and I think that they can scare people. It is the idea that your pain and symptoms cannot be controlled. When I talk to supporters of the Bill—some of my friends, colleagues and members of the public—they are completely compassionate in talking about how the Bill will help people who are suffering intolerably and in excruciating pain. None of us wishes that on anyone—or, indeed, on ourselves. It is a frightening prospect.
That is actually often a fear and a dread that the right kind of care can mean will not be realised. Patients are understandably frightened of being in that kind of pain, so they need to know that. Toby Porter, the CEO of Hospice UK, summed up the way I feel about this. He said:
“An outcome in which someone chose an assisted death because of a real or imagined fear that they could not get pain relief or other symptom alleviation, or because their family would not get support through their illness, would clearly be a moral and practical disgrace to any country”.
That is absolutely right.
We all know family and friends and so on who have died and who have had terminal illnesses. People will say that morphine is simply not enough to control the pain. That is the kind of thing that I would say, because I know nothing about medicine. So, it is a great relief to discover that palliative medicine resident doctors say that morphine is the tip of the iceberg for pain management. There are countless other options available, but to know this requires training and experience, which I have not got. When you are having a chat in the pub with mates—or indeed, when I was in hospital pumping in the morphine—it is good to know that somebody, somewhere, has got the experience. That is the palliative care specialist and every terminally ill patient should at least be offered the option to go to see one. This is a modest but meaningful addition to the Bill and I hope that the noble and learned Lord, in the spirit of listening, accommodating and compromise that we heard about last night, will make changes to the Bill accordingly.
There is also a question for the Government and the Minister here. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, explained this very well. In relation to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, yesterday, it was a shocking revelation that the Minister responsible for palliative care said that the Government would not publish their modern framework until after the Bill had passed through Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens—
With respect, he did not say that. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, said it would not be done “in effect”, the implication being—I do not disagree with what the noble Baroness is saying—that the Government have given a date which is beyond when this is expected to be law. The Minister did not say, “We’re waiting until after the Bill”. The crucial words of the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, were “in effect”. He was very careful in what he said.
I had thought I was implying that. I was not trying to imply some conspiratorial holding back; it is just that the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, said this was
“a dangerous reversal of the timetable we require”.—[Official Report, 8/1/26; col. 1416.]
That is the point I was really getting to. That is shocking: not because anyone is malignly behaving in this way but because the Government therefore need to commit to bringing forward that report, so it is available before we reach Report. I urge the Minister to reassure us that that is the case.
I will finish off by saying that the noble Baroness, Lady Brown of Silvertown, explained excellently that, for all of the importance of palliative care, hospices and so on, not everyone has equal access to them, which is well documented. I want to see that framework, because this is one of the chilling aspects of the Bill. For those of us who campaign to raise money for hospices, and who are desperately keen that palliative care is well resourced, to hear, as we heard earlier today, from the noble Lord, Lord Carlile, who stated baldly and perfectly reasonably that whichever choice we had in the previous group would cost a lot of money, makes me think, “Oh, spend the money somewhere else”.
My Lords, I had not intended to speak on this group but, as the only nurse present, I want to say that nobody could deny the principles of the amendments that are being discussed today. They are right and proper in respect of good health care for the nation.
I have two concerns, however. One is that we have talked considerably about my medical colleagues, who are absolutely essential, but the vast majority of palliative care is delivered by specialist nurse practitioners. I feel that it is essential I draw the Committee’s attention to that. I want to read from the ICN Code of Ethics for Nurses, which says that nurses—and, I believe, other healthcare professionals—have four fundamental responsibilities, including
“to promote health, to prevent illness, to restore health and to alleviate suffering”.
What we are talking about today is alleviating suffering.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
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(2 months, 1 week ago)
Lords Chamber
Baroness Monckton of Dallington Forest (Con)
My Lords, all these amendments address motivation, one of the areas that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, identified as a key area in his email sent to some noble Lords on Wednesday. This therefore feels an appropriate moment to make some short observations on general matters arising from that email. My amendments focus on risks to people with learning disabilities and autism, and there is also an amendment to exclude hospices that provide palliative care, which is, I believe, true assisted dying.
As I understand it, the email’s proposal has two parts: first, that we move away from this House’s established line-by-line scrutiny and condense 74 groups into 13 areas; and, secondly, that any concessions will be limited to those areas. My question is straightforward and has been asked in various ways by my noble friends Lord Harper, Lord Deben and Lord Blencathra. When will we see the detail? What amendments will the noble and learned Lord make to address each of the areas of concern he has identified as key in the Bill? What are the terms of the noble and learned Lord’s proposals to address the concerns raised by the Delegated Powers and Constitution Committees?
We are told that amendments will be brought forward on Report to address a limited number of these concerns: advertising, independent advocates and some regulation-making powers, but we have not been told which ones. There are now 42 such powers and a further seven Henry VIII powers, but no detail has been provided. Commitments to respond to these reports were made months ago. We need to know.
The email identifies only three further changes: on the position of those aged 18 to 25, those deprived of their liberty through the Court of Protection, and the role of multidisciplinary teams. These are important but they do not go very far. Nor is there any reference to excluding hospices, as suggested in the email from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Finally, there is no mention at all of the serious concerns raised by five major royal colleges. They were flagged as long ago as May.
To conclude, we need answers long before Report so that all Members of this House can properly consider what is proposed.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton of Dallington Forest, for that excellently clear way of expressing some of the discomfort and what we would like to see. I would be much happier and feel that I did not have to speak too much if I was getting reassurance and seeing on paper what exactly will address our concerns. At the moment, we are not getting that. We wish the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, were here. The fact that he is not is a real shame for the quality of this debate.
Inside and outside this House, I know plenty of people who support assisted dying and this Bill, inasmuch as they know the broad sense of what it is about. I try to avoid living in echo chambers. Whenever we discuss why they support the Bill, and potentially have a bit of an argument, they invariably say, in a very humane and compassionate way, that they think it will help people who are suffering, and that anyone who says they are suffering should have access to assisted dying. It is assumed, therefore, that the motivation of illness-induced suffering is at the heart of the Bill. That is what most people think. It has come up a lot in this Chamber but, ironically, suffering is not mentioned in the Bill, and neither is there any reference to motivations in the way that one would imagine. That bothers me, because the Bill checks on capacity, prognosis and residence, but it does not enforce a check on motivation. It seems to me that we should ask somebody who says that they want assisted dying, “Why?” It is a crucial absence in the Bill, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, might rectify that or explain exactly why the Bill does not think that doctors should ask, “Why do you want assisted dying?” I think it would throw up a whole range of red flags in relation to coercion.
I have added my name to two amendments in this group, Amendment 30 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Foster, so ably moved by the noble Lord, Lord Weir of Ballyholme, and Amendment 56 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. To save time,I will concentrate on Amendment 30, which seeks to ensure that those who seek assisted dying are not substantially motivated by a number of factors. I will focus on two of those—not wanting to be a burden on others or public services, and not being motivated by mental disorder, including depression.
This week was the 29th anniversary of the death of my father, John Fox. He was only 66. He was diagnosed with cancer and given three months to live, although he actually made it for four and a half months. When he was told, the whole family was devastated, as anyone would be. The one thing that really shocked me to the core, and stays with me, was that when I had that initial, very emotional father to eldest daughter conversation, my father kept apologising. Believe me, that was not usual. In our relationship, he did not say, “Sorry, Claire” lots of times. He was so distraught. He was convinced that he would be a burden on us, and that his daughters and my mother, in looking after him, would all have to miss work and all the rest of it. He kept saying, “I’m really, really sorry”. He was worried about how we would cope. He did not want to distress others—a point that the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, was making on her amendment to this amendment.
I also noticed that he kept saying sorry to the nurses and the doctors. To everybody, he kept saying, “I’m really sorry for taking up your time. I’m really sorry that you’re having to give me so much attention”. There were stories in the media at the time about bed blocking. He was a vociferous reader of newspapers, and I was hiding the newspapers because I thought he would say sorry even more, convinced that he was taking up NHS resources. It took some time and determination for the family to reassure him, but I kept thinking afterwards how sad it would have been if he had been on his own or in a care home or whatever. To be honest, if a GP had suggested that assisted death was a medical option, in today’s circumstances, I think my father would have said yes—not because he wanted it but because he felt he was a burden on the family. It would not be the GP’s fault, as it is an internal feeling of being a burden. That is not the same as choice.
I was struck by a letter from Lord Sumption in the Times that is worth reflecting on. He says:
“The current bill contains a number of provisions designed to ensure that patients are not ‘pressured by any other person’ into taking their own lives”—
that was in relation to something else. He continues:
“The real problem, however, is not the pressure applied by ‘other persons’. It is assumptions which many old and ill people spontaneously make about the attitudes of the society around them. They are afraid of being an emotional or financial burden”.
That is very important.
By the way, I had better say that, in the four and a half months following his diagnosis that my father lived, we had some of the most meaningful time of our lives with him. It was through a veil of tears, but there was love, joy and reconciliation, there were conversations that would never have otherwise happened, and so on and so forth. It was a time that was important to him and to us as a family in a way that I cannot really describe.
Another motivation that I feel strongly we need to explore is on the part of those with a mental disorder. As many noble Lords have noted, a number of mental health conditions have suicidality as a feature. Again, I am sorry to do the personal stuff, but the first time I encountered that was as a young mental health community worker. I met a young man who was bipolar. I and others—psychiatric medics and social workers—worked hard not just to prevent his suicide but, using all our skills in pharmacological and psychological interventions, to alleviate the terrible “black dog” of depression and the horror of the obsessive suicide ideation that that young man had. I have to ask, then, whether the Bill would allow such a suicidal person’s depression-induced desire for death, and whether all those who had worked with him would suddenly be expected not just to welcome it if this young man made the choice of an assisted suicide but to say, “Oh, look, a perfect exemplar of autonomy and choice”.
I was therefore a little taken aback that the noble and learned Lord, in his summation of the last group on eligibility, said in relation to those with a mental disorder that it is their choice, and that if they want it and they have capacity then that is all right. I point out that, for anyone who wants to commit suicide, it is their choice and they want it, but some of us spend a lot of time asking them please not to do it, not saying, “Yippee!” I cannot think that, in that situation, if that young man had said, “I’ve got a terrible story. I’ve got a terminal illness in addition to my bipolar depression, and I want your support and help in assisted dying”, I would say that it is all perfectly fine and he should get on with it, and be delighted for him being able to show that he is a free, autonomous individual. I would say, “Please don’t”. The four and a half months that we had with my father was the kind of quality time that I would want to ensure that young man had, every day of his life, even if he was terminally ill and dying. I would want to make sure that he was not depressed or suicidal during the time he lived.
My Lords, I am associated with some of these amendments. I do not think we want to get completely hung up on the minutiae of each particular line, because there are variations that one could make. I guess that when one is drafting a Bill there are choices to be made and language can be better if one gets professional assistance.
The fundamental point, as has been outlined by the noble Lord, Lord Weir, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is that anyone here who has represented an inner-city, working-class constituency will know that the approach that a lot of people have towards doctors and the medical profession is perhaps different from the approach that we have. If we want medical assistance, I guess most people in this room can pay for it if they so wish. That is not an option that other people have.
It is very difficult and would be inappropriate to try to examine exactly why people make particular choices. Look at the first Amendment 30 proposal:
“not wanting to be a burden on others or on public services”.
Why does the thought that they are going to be a burden on their children become an unbearable thing for some people to go through? They might make that choice because of what has gone on in their lives, but it is totally inappropriate, impossible and wrong in a Bill such as this to say that we have to ask why they are in that position.
The next proposal refers to a mental disorder—
If the doctor was required to ask what someone’s motivation was, and the patient said, “I just really don’t want to be a burden on my family; it’s too intolerable”, but they have been told they are terminally ill relatively recently, is it not possible that there could be an intervention that would say, “Maybe you won’t be a burden” and to go and talk to their family? One of the problems is that it is assumed the endpoint is there already, whereas if you ask the question, there is a possibility that you could offer an alternative. If somebody says, “I can’t face the pain”, you can tell them there is pain relief available. This is not trying to undermine the Bill totally, but it is possible that if the doctor responds with some options, the patient would be on their way. Why not ask for the motivation? That would surely be positive.
That is a very important question. There is a difference between excluding certain motivations, which is what Amendment 30 would do, and asking why, which the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, raised. I see force in the proposition that somewhere in the Bill, somebody has to ask why—for two reasons. First, as was raised previously, if you ask why, it might throw some light on circumstances that suggest classic coercion. Secondly, and separately, it might deal with exactly what the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is referring to.
Take an utterly absurd example: someone says, “I want an assisted death because I cannot deal with the noise that’s going on in my head”. The doctor could then reply, “Well, actually, that’s a building site that will stop tomorrow”. If it is something like that, one should know.
I am attracted by the idea of something in the Bill that says why. That has to be asked somewhere down the line. This also connects with our previous discussions about the multidisciplinary team engaged in looking after the person, which might well have a much better view about why.
I am saying that everybody should have the choice. The way that one makes the choice is inevitably determined by how one got to the point where one had to make it. It is an impossible question. Why do we all make choices? They are all affected. Some people make them because they are richer or poorer than others, but I am not in favour of drawing financial distinctions. I hope that, in the light of my remarks, the noble Baroness— I cannot remember who started this—will withdraw her amendment.
I blame myself for this, but the noble and learned Lord was about to say something about the mental health issue when I made a point, and we have not gone back to it. That is a very distinct question, so will he reflect on it?
This is not a technical point, but the way the amendment is drafted is very confusing. If your mental illness makes you come to this conclusion, that may well go to capacity. I am not clear what is being got at in relation to the mental health issue. However, if the position is that you may have a mental health condition but are perfectly capable of making a decision, you should be allowed to make it.
Lord Shinkwin (Con) [V]
My Lords, I begin by quickly welcoming back the noble Baroness, Lady Campbell of Surbiton, and thank her for reminding us so eloquently why we have missed her contributions.
I rise to speak to Amendment 34, and I thank my noble friend Lord Frost for tabling it and for his excellent speech. I also thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, for his past commitment to ensuring the law is communicated as clearly as possible by removing the Latin names of the prerogative writs through the Civil Procedure (Modification of Supreme Court Act 1981) Order 2004. Can he explain in his closing remarks why, 22 years later, he appears to have changed his mind on the guiding principle, which I assume informed his earlier decision, that the law should be accessible and unambiguous? Perhaps, and maybe he could clarify this in his closing remarks, he now believes it should be accessible only to some, and that for others it is fine for it to be clouded—or shrouded might be more appropriate, given the fatal consequences of an ill-informed decision on assisted death—in euphemism, nuance and even deceit.
After all, those with a learning disability or Down’s syndrome, for example, are only disabled people, are they not? What does it matter if their disability means they cannot quite grasp the enormity, finality and irreversibility of the decision to seek, as my noble friend’s amendment states,
“help to commit suicide by provision of lethal drugs”?
We know that language matters, but do we know how much it matters to those whose disabilities make them understand less or make comprehension challenging, and, in the case of Down’s syndrome, those whose innate desire to please makes them more prone to agreeing with the question, especially when its implications are not fully grasped?
I hope the noble and learned Lord will accept this amendment and thereby protect not only those whose disabilities make full comprehension difficult but the reputation of your Lordships’ House. Let it never be thought that we do not care if those whose disability-related need for the clarity provided in my noble friend’s amendment are somehow misled to death because of nuance. I hope the noble and learned Lord will show, by accepting this amendment, that those whose disabilities make them particularly vulnerable to ambiguity must not be treated as unfortunate collateral damage.
My Lords, I signed the amendments from the noble Lord, Lord Frost, which seek to probe the ways that we can make this Bill more transparent to the public. That is my main driver—I believe in plain speaking. The public deserve to know what this Bill involves.
As it happens, I think the noble Lord’s wording would add clarity. His proposal is to replace
“assistance to end their own life”
with
“medical help to commit suicide by provision of lethal drugs”.
That wording is factually accurate, even if it makes you gulp. The reason it makes one gulp is because it is factually accurate, and we do not often recognise what is being advocated here. There is a danger that the Bill’s terminology creates ambiguity rather than clarity, and it is important that we are frank and open.
Why use the word “suicide”? As has already been explained, the Bill needs to amend the Suicide Act precisely to carve out the legal space to allow this type of assisted suicide, as mentioned in the Bill, to be within the law. That is accurate. But I am wary of having a culture war over the word “suicide”—I use the term “assisted dying” all the time, so I do not want to be called out for hypocrisy here—because I am aware of the fact that suicide as an issue is far too serious and tragic to be glib about or to have verbal ping-pong over.
On the other hand, I am worried that avoiding the word “suicide” in this debate, and making it verboten, might desensitise public debate. Let us be honest, language choice can influence opinion. “Assisted dying” sounds softer, palatable and more sympathetic. It is interesting that evidence shows that support for assisted dying changes if you call it “assisted suicide”; it drops significantly when the terms are plainly defined.
Some may flinch at the proposed words used by the noble Lord, Lord Frost—
“medical help to commit suicide by … lethal drugs”.
As I have said, it is hard to accept that. It makes you think. Is there going to be a complete change in the way medicine is operated, so that medics could hand you poison and lethal drugs? The answer is yes. When people hear that phrase, it might hit them what a fundamental shift this will be for medical professionals and so on. That is exactly why a number of us are not prepared to nod this Bill through. It is perfectly reasonable to completely disagree with what I have just said, but I want everyone to know what the Bill is about and why it is a very big change in our society, causing all sorts of ethical discussions. The public deserve to know that, and therefore we should be as clear as possible.
I recall that, on the first day in Committee—and subsequently, but particularly on the first day—there was a lot of tut-tutting and reprimands, with a lot of people being shouted at when Peers used the term “assisted suicide”. A lot of people stood up, saying, “You can’t say that. You’re just being emotional, manipulative and so on”. But clear language promotes public and patient understanding. In a way, I advocate a patient-centric approach rather than a euphemistic approach, which could, arguably, be seen as an act of misinformation in some instances.
Baroness Fox of Buckley
Main Page: Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-affiliated - Life peer)(2 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Birt, to reflect on the equality implications of this suggestion of a special treatment service for those seeking assisted death. Following on from the previous contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, it seems to me that everybody would want, if they are a patient or for their loved ones, a personal, state-funded navigator. But maybe for care, those people on trolleys, waiting for operations, or trying to find their way into the care system would all say, “Can we all have one?” If we do not afford every patient in the country a personal navigator, is that not an unequal access to services? It seems a two-tier system, and one that I think the public would not approve of.
On another issue, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Birt, to detail the workforce demands that this service would require from the NHS, following on from the excellent contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Stevens. I note that the assisted dying help service—which, by the way, would be awarded significant regulatory powers by these amendments that would not be subject to approval by Parliament—would have the power to set training and qualifications for practitioners. That seems like a blank cheque. I would like to know what the skill set of a navigator would be and who decides that. In all seriousness, this whole new shadow service being set up, with its own qualification system and recruitment, is a bit worrying. We are not sure who they are going to be.
My final query is that I know that a lot of the Bill’s supporters are frustrated and have raised problems with some of the amendments that have been tabled on the basis that they would somehow create bureaucratic, preventive barriers to people who genuinely want to afford themselves an assisted dying service. In other words, there is an attempt to overengineer the process. Therefore, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Birt, on this creative attempt at cutting red tape. However, on these amendments, we all know that mandated timelines can mean shortcuts that could make the process unsafe. Could he comment on that?
Speed and process-driven decision-making are risky in any instance but, where careful assistance and safeguarding are contested, it seems rather dangerous that panels would have to decide within two days of referral, even sitting over the weekend or bank holidays to make decisions. By the way, I think we should apply that to everyone in the NHS: they should do operations and doctors’ surgeries should be open over weekends and bank holidays. I wish the courts would sit over bank holidays and weekends, because then we would not have to get rid of jury trials, allegedly. That would mean that a referral on a Friday evening would have to be decided by a Monday. How would a panel have time to investigate and read everything thoroughly? Surely it would just end up skimming things.
I also really worry about the reflection period being cut to 24 hours, when experts warn that initial depression after diagnosis, which is completely understandable, might well be temporary, treatable and certainly remedial. It could last a few weeks but then be replaced with a more positive attitude. In fact, the CEO of Mind told the Lords Select Committee that they have
“gone to the brink, have come back and have then been able to say three or six months later, ‘I’m so glad that that did not happen’”.
All I am saying is that saying, “Oh we’re being really efficient; we’re going to make sure that your reflection is cut to 24 hours so that you can get what you want”, might well mean that you do not get what you would have wanted if you had had a bit longer to reflect.
Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)
My Lords, there is an unreality about this debate that gives rise to a question for the sponsor of the Bill and the Minister. The unreality is this: the noble Lord, Lord Birt, has made the case for his amendments, and my noble friend Lord Harper and others have made the case against them, but there is hung on this whole debate an assumption that the NHS will deliver assisted dying. I remind the Committee that there is no guarantee of that in the Bill.
If noble Lords would kindly turn to Clause 41(4), they will see that the only reference to the National Health Service is:
“Regulations under this section may for example provide that specified references in the National Health Service Act 2006 to the health service continued”,
et cetera. That is the only reference to the NHS in the Bill. We do not know whether the NHS will or will not deliver assisted dying services. It is an extraordinary weakness in the Bill.
I am sure that the noble Lord and others will find other ways of asking the same question. I refer to my earlier answer.
I honestly believe that noble Lords are asking this question in good faith. I reiterate to the Minister—maybe she can think about this and come back—that we are being asked to make a decision about a huge change in healthcare provision, staffing and money, and the nature of what the NHS is. We are not trying to catch the Government out. We simply want to understand. Nobody could vote for this—even if you supported it, you could not vote for it. Can the Government please tell us, even if not now, what the implications will be if we vote for the Bill?
The Labour Government would say that the NHS is the most important, precious jewel in the crown, that nothing should damage it, and that we had to sacrifice an awful lot to save it only recently. I do not then want to vote for a Bill that is going to upturn the nature of the NHS inadvertently because the Government say they are neutral and cannot tell us otherwise. That is a big risk—risking the NHS, so that they do not have to answer. Even if the Minister cannot answer, we have to have that question answered; otherwise, we cannot seriously be asked to vote for the Bill.
I repeat that I am happy to write to noble Lords further on this point. I do not think that Members are going to move away from this point, so I am very happy to do that.
The noble Lord, Lord Gove, asked whether the assisted dying help service could be set up through statutory instrument, and I am happy to write to him to clarify that point. I will write to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, on the point of the constitution. That is the most straightforward way to deal with this.
With the undertaking that the Government will write on the points that have not been addressed, I hope noble Lords will understand that, on the areas that I have not raised, we cannot confirm that the amendments are workable. That is the point I must make. With those comments, I hope that the noble Lord will withdraw his amendment.
The one issue that unites the whole Committee is that we have to have an effective service of palliative care in this country. The data in Australia, which varies from state to state, tells us that somewhere between 70% and 90% of people who come forward already have palliative care.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, talked about navigation. It is a complex process, even in the Bill as it stands. If you analyse the likelihood, you will find that it will probably take, without the right process involved, 30 to 60 days, which is completely inappropriate in the context of the Australia experience. By the way, the navigator is an administrative role to help the person manage a complex system with multiple practitioners, who themselves have real authority.
To clarify, I am sure the noble Lord knows people who have tried to get a hip replacement or a wide range of other medical treatments. It is the most complex process that you could ever go through. Many people are vulnerable and could do with a navigator. Does he understand the two-tier nature of appointing a navigator in one instance and not in another? This follows on from the earlier question from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. Can the noble Lord see that anything that seems to give preferential treatment to those seeking assisted dying over those who are suffering pain from a bad hip or who have a rare cancer and are terminally ill would cause political problems? Immorality might be part of the issue there.
Believe it or not, I have had cause, at various times in my life, to navigate the NHS, as probably everybody in this Committee has, and of course it is very difficult. However, when you go into A&E, you effectively do have a navigator. I do not think this is about the hip operation example; it is about people in a genuine emergency situation.
As I said, these are not people who want to die; they are people who absolutely want to live. The only reason they are entering into this process, and the only reason they would be eligible—
I completely sympathise with the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Markham, that these people do not want to die; they want to live. Would he then agree with some of the amendments that I tabled last week and spoke on? If, for example, they want to die and are then diagnosed with a terminal illness, that would be relevant to not allowing them into the process; that is, they want to die, and then the trigger of terminal illness allows the state-sanctioned administration of lethal drugs so that they can commit suicide, which is why people have raised problems about suicide ideation and mental illness. I therefore hope that the noble Lord will back some of the amendments on safeguarding that I tabled.
The noble Baroness is talking about a slightly different circumstance where there are prior reasons, which could be mental health or other reasons, and why that could be a cause. What we are talking about here is basically the criterion on which you can first be assessed for assisted dying, which is, of course, that you have been diagnosed in the first place. To the point that, of course, people might then live longer, my experience is that they are delighted by that. Just because they have been assessed as being able to have assisted dying does not mean that they will take the medication. Again, evidence shows strongly that they will take the medication only right near the end when the pain, the loss of dignity or whatever the reason is becomes unbearable. My experience is that those people would be delighted if it was a misdiagnosis, and if they are fortunate enough to be living 30 years later, as per some of these examples, that would be fantastic. Of course, they will not have taken the medication. The point is that they take it only right at the end where there is no other choice, so to speak.
Within that, accepting that these are the people we are talking about, of course there are all sorts of different motivations why, when they are unfortunately at the point where they are looking at such a death, they might want to go ahead with it. Research shows that there are multiple reasons; it is impossible to put it down to just one. Loss of autonomy, less ability to engage in enjoyable activities, loss of dignity, loss of control of bodily functions, burden, inadequate pain relief or finances are all part of the reasons. They are all part of the research, and, on average, you will find that there are three or four reasons to do it.
So it is quite wrong to say, “No, we’ll only allow you to go ahead with this if you only have that single motivation”. As I said before, they would rather not be there in the first place, but given that they are in that unfortunate circumstance, surely they should be allowed the choice of why they wish to die.
The way the noble Lord has put the question to me means that, plainly, this would be because of the illness, would it not? I want an assisted death because the illness is going to kill me. That seems quite a bad example.
I appreciate that the noble and learned Lord is saying that we have covered a lot of this ground before, but there is one reason that people keep coming back to similar threads. The noble and learned Lord has in many instances said, “I’m listening to you. I’ll think about that”, and nothing happens. It is not reassuring and there are different ways of approaching this. I thought I had made some inroads. The noble and learned Lord was quite positive about the question of motivation being relevant.
A patient arrives at the doctors and says, “I’ve got a terminal illness”. The doctor says, “Why do you want an assisted death?” The patient says, “I’m costing my kids a fortune—their inheritance. The care home costs tens of thousands of pounds. I’m a burden”. The noble and learned Lord just suggested to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that you would say, “That’s your choice”. As in an earlier discussion in relation to the NHS, we are talking about NHS doctors, whom you would think would say, “Let me have a chat with you about that” and challenge them. They cannot just say, “If that’s what you want, carry on”.
All those examples I gave—I will not go over the millions of better ones used in the past—show that this undermines autonomy and suggests that the state is indifferent to somebody, in effect, asking for help in a different way but the form it takes is, “I might as well have an assisted death”. If you listen to them, they might be asking for something else that the state can intervene and help them with, whereas we just go, “Assisted death? We can provide that. Any of that other stuff you want, like financial help or help with loneliness and all that—we can’t afford that. That’s not happening, but assisted dying? You’re on your way”. That is why we are worried, and it is why these amendments are worth taking seriously. The noble and learned Lord needs to come back with written amendments that will reassure some of us so that we do not keep repeating ourselves.
That was not really an intervention; it was just a statement. I should have said to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, that, as I said last week, I will make an amendment so that the question of why will be asked, but I do not depart from the proposition that autonomy should be the leading reason for it. We disagree about that, and the House can reject that view on Report, but I am explaining what my position is.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
Main Page: Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Fox of Buckley's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(1 month, 3 weeks ago)
Lords Chamber
Baroness Pidgeon (LD)
I am coming to the end of my speech; I do not think I have to take an intervention, so I would like to finish my point.
It seems to me that this is about making the choice of an assisted death difficult or impossible. We need to think carefully about the checks that we are putting in place for people in the last six months of their lives. We need to make sure that the system really will work for them.
My Lords, we should thank the noble Baronesses, Lady Gerada and Lady Pidgeon, for raising important counters to a lot of these contributions, because it is important that we do not fetishise face-to-face communication as infallible. It offers no guarantee that comprehension happens, that people listen and that there is no misunderstanding. We should know that because we sit face to face in this Committee every Friday and goodness knows it has not guaranteed much of that.
I have put my name to several of the amendments in this group because, despite what the noble Baroness, Lady Pidgeon, just said about how we must make this as easy as possible for people with six months to live, the Bill’s sponsors have rightly built the need for eligibility into the Bill. You cannot just wander in and say, “I’ve got six months to live, get rid of me”; you have to pass the eligibility assessment. We are trying to work out whether face to face as the default would be a better way of guaranteeing that there is no abuse, which is reasonable.
I remember the ITV documentary referenced by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, in which I heard the Bill’s sponsor in the other place, Kim Leadbeater, admit that she was uncomfortable with what has been labelled “death by Zoom”—the model that she was watching in Oregon. Despite what the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, said, it was actually Kim Leadbeater who rightly noted that it looked too much like a tick-box exercise. We need to be wary of anything that goes in that direction, but, because this is what I saw in that documentary, I expected a basic requirement in the Bill for face-to-face assessment, except in exceptional circumstances. So I ask the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, to respond on why the Bill still permits so many encounters with doctors, including the panel, to be conducted remotely, meaning that somebody may access assisted death without having seen a doctor face to face. One might pause on that, at least.
Despite the virtues of telemedicine, of which there are many—we can all see the reasons why, on occasion, it is important, just as we all use Zoom for meetings and so on—this is a question of whether it is superior and whether it can be relied on. The noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Newnham, gave a vivid example in response to the contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Jay, in which she said, “At least the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, knows what it is like to be the doctor doing the consultation”. Well, some of us know what it is like to be the patient on the other end of it. To be honest, it is not always a case of “trust the expert” and all that, because there absolutely may be crossed wires, hanging around, frustration and all sorts of things going wrong.
Professor Martin Vernon, who chairs the ethics and law special interest group at the British Geriatrics Society, said:
“Assessing somebody remotely, digitally, without a face-to-face assessment, particularly if they have complex health and social care needs, is nigh-on impossible”.
There is something in that, too, which we should consider. Non-face-to-face Zoom or phone encounters are particularly challenging for certain groups, such as people with communication difficulties. The noble Baroness, Lady Nicholson, reminded us of the issues for people with hearing difficulties in our debate on a previous group. We all know that there are difficulties of language.
Of course, older people are likely to make up the majority of those being assessed for assisted dying. Without wanting to caricature oldies as being technically illiterate—although there is a smidgen of truth there—there is something else to consider. Older people sometimes present their best selves on the phone. They put on their best voice. There is nothing wrong with that, but they chat away as though everything is fine and, even on Zoom, they sit there looking their best.
However, when you see them face to face—I am not now talking about a doctor assessing them—they are dishevelled, pale and frail. Something else happens. Because the assisted dying decision involves highly emotional and existential issues, purely remote assessments potentially undermine the relational aspects of care that will help ensure that decisions are well considered and autonomously made. We have to think about those direct, personal interactions. The noble Baroness, Lady Jay, is right: these are the last six months of your life—allegedly; that is what you have been told. People are vulnerable, distressed and not quite sure. All these amendments are suggesting is that it would possibly be better to see the doctor. If you cannot get there, that is all fine, nobody is being inhumane; but the doctor sees you and assesses what is going on. It is a necessary if not sufficient way of establishing the eligibility criteria.
Finally, the noble Lord, Lord Empey, talked about how this might be appropriate for online legal proceedings. I am sure that the noble and learned Lord is aware of the evidence on the use of video links in court proceedings and trials. In Transform Justice’s survey of court users, 70% of respondents said that it was difficult to recognise whether someone who was on video had a disability, while 74% believed that those who had no legal representation were disadvantaged by appearing on video; in other words, the vulnerable always suffer in those instances.
The report similarly found that there were significant issues in assessing evidence and character. We can learn from other areas, but the main thing is that the default should be face to face. That should be in the Bill. I agree with Kim Leadbeater on that one—that is a headline. I do not understand why, Kim Leadbeater having noted that, it is not in the Bill. There should be exceptions if people are too ill, too far away or having a ball in Tenerife for their last six months. Yes, we get all that, but the default point is: face to face, where possible, as much as possible.
My Lords, if we are to have remote assessments, it is very important that we have an exception for one group of people who might be seeking assisted dying: those who require the services of a public service interpreter. Elsewhere in the Bill, the provision of interpreters is acknowledged and provided for. This is one situation where face-to-face consultations are essential. During Covid, there was a huge rise in remote interpreting in the criminal justice system. A number of studies, including a very robust piece of research by the Magistrates’ Association, showed that there were problems with remote interpreting, for reasons ranging from dodgy technology to missed cues because of missed body language.
In these circumstances, more than anything else, a face-to-face consultation or assessment is right and appropriate, where the services of a public service interpreter are needed for the benefit of the person seeking help.
My Lords, in the previous debate we had an interesting discussion about the importance of face to face. I think the conclusion was that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, should bring forward amendments that would make face to face the default mechanism, while accepting that there would be exceptions. At that point, I raised the question of recorded statements made by someone who then could not speak. It is important to remember that speech can now be faked and can sound exactly like the person. I hope that, in drawing up those amendments, the noble and learned Lord will be able to encompass some protection to ensure that, when a presentation is made of a recording that seems to be in somebody’s voice and in their words, we are still protecting against abuse and coercion and against those with malintent who may have faked that. Unfortunately, we are already hearing stories of criminal activity where such fake voice recordings are used, and we find that people believe them as being from the person, when actually they have been part of a criminal activity. This amendment has been important—although I accept, of course, that it is only a probing amendment—because it has actually made us think on a much wider scale.
My Lords, the Government’s 10-year health plan for England seeks to
“make the NHS the most AI-enabled health system in the world”.
Like others, I think that is an incredibly exciting prospect. I do not want it to be dystopian. I think that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Hereford makes an important point in warning us against going completely over the top. I think it is important that this amendment has been tabled, because it makes us think about what the possible problems are, which have been well expressed by others. Despite my excitement about what AI might do, even in terms of treatments—there are wonderful possibilities in terms of helping people to walk, what is happening with the brain, and so on—we do not want to be naive.
The question for the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is: as the NHS digitises and doctors become increasingly reliant on AI for notes and diagnostics, given that the diagnosis is so important in a life-or-death situation in this instance, how can we ensure that a time-poor doctor does not use AI as an assessment tool or a shortcut? We would be naive to imagine that that does not happen elsewhere; we would only have to think of politics. People now use AI to avoid doing research, in a wide range of instances, and I do not want that to be translated over.
As for the patients, algorithms are supremely impressive and can take things that have happened on Facebook or TikTok, from when you have been on a Teams meeting or Zoom—all sorts of indications—and detect chronic illness conversations. The algorithms can then push pro-assisted dying content such as the Switzerland adverts or positive end-of-life options. Interestingly, when discussing banning social media for under-16s, which I completely disapprove of, or bringing in the Online Safety Act, which I argued against, everybody kept saying, “Algorithms, oh my goodness, they can do all these things”. We should consider not that chatbots are malevolent but that AI tends to agree with people via the algorithms; to quote the title of a piece in Psychology Today, “When Everyone Has a Yes-Man in Their Pocket”. If you say that you are interested in something, they will just say, “Yes, here are your options”. That is something to be concerned about, and it will come up when we discuss advertising.
I finish with that BBC story from August of a Californian couple suing OpenAI over the death of their teenage son. They allege that ChatGPT encouraged him to take his own life, and they have produced the chat logs between Adam, who died last April, and ChatGPT that show him explaining his suicidal thoughts. They argue that the programme validated his most harmful and self-destructive thoughts. I am just saying that AI is a wonderful, man-made solution to many problems, but if we pass a Bill such as this without considering the potential negative possible outcomes, we would be being irresponsible.
My Lords, I have supported AI for as long as I can remember, and I think it is the future for this country. If we are looking for improvements in productivity, there is no doubt that we should look to the National Health Service and the public sector, where we can see AI having its greatest effect and improving the health of the economy of this country.
However, we are in early days with AI, although it has been with us for some time. We must be very careful not to rely on it for too many things which should be done by human beings. The noble Lord, Lord Stevens, has already referred to the appalling rate of misdiagnosis. We can look at these statistics and say, “Well, it is only a small number who are misdiagnosed”. Yes, but my noble friend Lord Polack was misdiagnosed as only having six months to live and he is still with us 32 years later. You must think about this, because if you get the situation with misdiagnosis badly wrong, it undermines the basis of this Bill. Therefore, we must be very careful that AI does not contribute to that as well.
I pay tribute to the right reverend Prelate. AI is having a tremendous effect in the health service and helping a large number of people to get better, and it may well be that AI introduces cures for people who are being written off by their doctors—perhaps wrongly. We must not dismiss AI, but we must be very wary about where it leads us. There will be an awful lot of bumps in the road before AI is something in which we can all have complete confidence and believe will deliver better outcomes than human beings.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
Main Page: Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Fox of Buckley's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(1 month, 2 weeks ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak to Amendment 89. I think that everybody in the Committee is more or less on the same page in what we are trying to achieve here. This amendment would add,
“or withdrawing medication, hydration, or life-sustaining devices”
to Clause 2(2). This has perhaps been forgotten about, but people sometimes rely on ventilators and other equipment to sustain their lives, so it is not a big leap forward to add this to the legislation. It is simple and straightforward, and amending Clause 2(2) seems to make sense. I cannot think of any reason why the noble and learned Lord should not adopt the amendment as a sensible way forward. It indicates—we have had this conversation a number of times, but we have to bear it in mind—that there are still significant weaknesses. We have to make the Bill safe.
On the hostile reaction to what we are trying to do here, I gently remind the Committee that when we last discussed this subject on 22 October 2021, at the Second Reading of the Assisted Dying Bill that Baroness Meacher brought forward, her Private Member’s Bill had 10 pages and 13 clauses. The Bill before us has 51 pages and 59 clauses. People have to understand that this is a massive Private Member’s Bill and is not normal in terms of how we deal with such Bills—it is much bigger. With that, I hope that the noble and learned Lord will have no difficulty in accepting Amendment 89.
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 103. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, for adding her name to it. It is a modest amendment simply seeking to ensure that a person is not categorised as terminally ill if they have refused life-saving treatment because they are influenced by a mental disorder. The noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, was perceptive in addressing some of the issues that concern me and are why I tabled this amendment.
We are talking about any individual who, in effect, voluntarily brings themselves within the definition of terminal illness as defined in the Bill. As we heard on the previous group, supporters of the Bill often present the six-month prognosis as clear-cut and argue that we all know what we mean by terminal illness. In public discussions, the example given is usually cancer, which again seems fairly clear-cut. But we heard on the previous group that life and death and diseases are rather more complicated. The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, raised some very thought-provoking issues around that.
I want to make a bit more concrete what terminal illness would mean in the examples that I talk about. I have noted that the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, started this theme in the previous group, and I was very affected by the moving speech made by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, which also pertains to this. Where someone suffers a serious depressive episode, perhaps related to a debilitating physical illness that is difficult but none the less treatable, what would happen if, in a temporary period of despair, they refuse treatments such as dialysis or HIV antivirals, therefore potentially leading them to a terminally ill prognosis? Would they be eligible for assisted death in that instance?
Or let us take the case of a suicidal person, perhaps a prisoner suffering mental distress, who has attempted to take his own life several times before but suicide prevention policies have saved him. I think in particular of prisoners I have long campaigned for who are on IPP sentences. Tragically, suicide figures among that group of prisoners are very high and suicidal ideation is a real factor for those prisoners. Our imagined prisoner is not just mentally disturbed but physically dependent on insulin for diabetes and needs to take it to remain alive. If that person refuses to take that treatment and becomes seriously ill, bringing upon himself the inevitability of having a progressive disease and it becoming terminal, would he be eligible for assisted death under this Bill?
This example would seem to contradict the slogan of many of the Bill’s supporters, which we frequently hear: “They’re dying anyway”. As it happens, it is a phrase that I find particularly chilling, but, in this instance, they would not be “dying anyway”; they would be dying in a self-induced way. How will the idea of terminal illness in such instances be weighed up? In the case of our IPP prisoner refusing to take treatment such as insulin—perhaps even refusing to eat or drink—this could lead to an inevitable assisted death, because he would meet the physical criteria of terminal illness when, actually, the root cause was not inevitably progressive.
I like to imagine that we as parliamentarians, along with campaigners, will be successful in ensuring that IPP prisoners are freed from the hopelessness of an abolished prison sentence that psychiatrists uniformly and consistently say is a major factor in making people suffer mental illness in prison. If the IPP was ended, that prisoner could resume their medical treatment and their mental ill-health would have changed because the social circumstances would have changed. Therefore, they could resume their treatment, start engaging again, feel that they have a reason to live and become treatable, with recovery possible—but not if it is too late as they have already had an assisted death. In other words, terminal prognosis is not inevitable in that instance but self-induced, driven by a disturbance of the mind.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has some insight into the issues in this amendment, as he has explained. He has tabled an amendment and talked about any disease caused by a person not eating or drinking when that occurs as a result of mental disorder. Obviously, the focus there is on anorexia and eating disorders, but is this not a similar example?
I raise these issues because this is a loophole that has been nagging at me. I cannot see anywhere in the Bill where safeguards exist to prevent such undoubted unintended outcomes. Without those safeguards, the drafting of the Bill could inadvertently incentivise self-destructive choices about treatments for illnesses that are treatable, and lead to irreversible early death facilitated by state medical services when life-saving medical treatments could have ensured that people lived and were not categorised as terminally ill. It is this confusion—about who defines terminal if you put yourself into that category—that I would like the noble and learned Lord to reassure me about and clarify.
My Lords, the noble Lord says that we should understand the ordinary meaning of words, and I agree with him. I must say to him, however, that my own mother—who turned her face to the door and stopped eating and drinking—did not commit suicide. We did not feel that. She was at the end of her life, she was terminally ill and she decided that she had had enough. She did not want the next blood transfusion, and she did not want any more time. I find it really offensive to be told that she committed suicide.
I also want to respond to the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada. Words do matter, which is why plain speaking matters. Being told that you cannot say certain words because they might offend someone is unhelpful. Can the noble Baronesses respond to the fact that, in opinion polling, if people are asked whether they support assisted dying, many will say yes? If they are asked whether they support assisted suicide, they say no. In other words, calling something what it is—namely, suicide—is not necessarily something that the noble Baronesses should be frightened of. They cannot instruct us as legislators to do the job of spin doctors in trying to make something more palatable by using kind words. We have to be honest with the public and then they will decide; it is up to them.
Does the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, agree that the cardinal difference between suicide and voluntary assisted death is that voluntary assisted death applies to people who are already dying? There is no way that they are going to survive, and that seems to make the whole difference. What we seek in this Bill—and I very much support the safeguard proposed by my noble and learned friend in Amendment 87—is that the process of dying should be free from terror, pain and humiliation. It will not stop the person dying. Therefore, it is not suicide.
I can see a point to that, but the message I was given by the mental health practitioner who rang me from the mental health team—I think he was a psychiatrist—was basically that once somebody is in a home, these tests become much more difficult because of the nature of the environment. That may differ from home to home—and yes, when my father had pneumonia and was clearly delirious, he was at home. If there are concerns, we should surely make sure, if people have a cognitive impairment, that we know that is the case, but if somebody does not—if there are the short-term issues that are being discussed in the amendments, in particular Amendments 111 and 112—then surely those people who want an assisted death would want it ruled out that they had some sort of cognitive impairment if it were temporary and reversible. That is the sort of thing we really need to get right, not only for those people who have an impairment but for those who actually do not have one but would not then be able to have the assisted death that the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and others might wish them to be able to avail themselves of.
My Lords, this small group, which I did not expect there to be so much rich conversation about, indicates why care homes really are an important focus for the Bill. I absolutely want to echo the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, about care home workers: they have not been consulted. Might the noble and learned Lord make a commitment to meet up with representatives of the care sector to discuss the very real issues that the Bill will create for them if it passes? We can recognise that many of the people in society who will, at some point, be eligible for assisted death if the Bill passes will probably be in care homes, because that is where elderly people are, who might well get terminal diagnoses—rather than 14 year-olds. We are talking about a different cohort; that has at least to be considered. Some of the previous contributions have therefore been very helpful. I really thank the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, for laying out so clearly why this should matter to us all.
I am somewhere between the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, on care homes because, for the purposes of this discussion, I would rather not go down the care home horror story route. However, even if you accept care homes as positive places in general, there are still huge challenges in the Bill in relation to them. I will lay out some of these challenges.
Despite the horror stories, in most instances, care homes are incredibly important to society’s care of the elderly and frail. Although they are too often neglected—understatement of the year—by state support, they are fulfilling an incredibly important public service. By and large, the care workers I know and have encountered—far too many of them, for a variety of reasons—are heroic. They are poorly paid, underappreciated and overworked, and we know there is a massive turnover of staff. These things have been well covered in different discussion. I also find that many care workers are amazingly generous and creative in their care of our older citizens who are in need of residential care.
Despite all that, we must be realistic. There are difficult, challenging circumstances in care homes, and we have a social care crisis, which we talk about all the time. This is the living example of that crisis. There is not enough space in care homes, and they can be chaotic—not because of the staff. In a day-to-day sense in care homes, standard mental capacity assessments are done by overworked care workers who are not clinical professionals. I worry that these assessments used for treatments might bleed, in some way, into the future as a way of signing off a new medical treatment on the block: assisted dying. We must recognise that as a possible concern.
I am slightly contradicting myself now, but we must recognise the kind of pressure that people are under. Many elderly people in care homes have had things like do not resuscitate orders or inappropriate diagnoses. I think it was the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, who made a point that I too can relate to, where an elderly person was given their meal and drink, and it was ticked off by care staff as having been eaten and drunk but it was not; the elderly person did not even know what it was, but it was ticked off anyway. That was not cruelty, on behalf of the staff; it was rushing around. They did not feed that elderly person, but they were not starving them; they simply did not have time to sit down and do anything about it.
This matters because a large number of people who may fall into eligibility because they are terminally ill will be people whose capacity needs to be assessed, and they will live in care homes. The problem is that care homes are a gathering of people who have fluctuating cognition. The main thing that goes on in care homes, beyond care, is that cognition changes all the time. The idea that a firm, autonomous decision will be made in those circumstances needs to be, at the very least, queried slightly.
We are talking about UTIs, dehydration, infection or the effects of medication, but the big one, of course, is undiagnosed dementia or early dementia that no one has yet noticed. Alzheimer’s Society data shows that only two-thirds of those with dementia have received a formal diagnosis. Sadly, there are massive waiting lists, so the diagnosis rate is low—and in Wales, inevitably, it is sadly even lower. There is also hidden dementia, where no one is trying to get the people assessed but it is there none the less. Due to the heightened risks of cognitive impairment issues and the instability of cognition, we definitely need to take these amendments seriously. We need to have specialist clinical assessments to ensure that capacity means capacity and is not part of a “good days, bad days” scenario.
Anyone who has had relatives in care homes, or spent any time in one, will know all about the “good days, bad days” situation. You can go in one day and chat away to a coherent and articulate older person, but the next time you see them they are completely incoherent and confused. You then go back and they are chatting away again.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
Main Page: Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Fox of Buckley's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(3 weeks, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, my remarks follow on, very usefully, from those of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay of Llandaff. She made some points I was going to make, so I will not make them, but I will make some others.
We should consider the interaction between the rather murky world of politics and the role of the commissioner. I would not raise that issue if this role were not entirely, as I understand it, a political gift of the Prime Minister—effectively a patronage office. We surely all know the problems that can create; it has been rather vividly illustrated in recent months. I want to probe what happens if this goes wrong, or rather how we can stop it going wrong in the first place, because there is genuine concern about a lack of accountability and transparency around the appointment process for the commissioner. For that reason, I added my name to Amendment 126 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Udny-Lister. He is unable to be here today, but he is spot on to suggest that the appointment should be accompanied by a public statement by the Prime Minister, whoever the Prime Minister is, attesting to the suitability, independence and neutrality of the candidate, so that the Prime Minister is ultimately held to account for this appointment and it is clear why they have made it.
The commissioner has a crucial role, with the power to both run and monitor this service, yet the Bill seems to leave the commissioner’s role open to self-definition. They are appointed by the Prime Minister, and that is it; we are all meant to trust it. I do not want to be cynical, but the question of independence and neutrality is important, because this is a controversial and polarising issue. If we did not think it was, we have only to look at the rather testy atmosphere every Friday in this Chamber, let alone on the airwaves in between. We owe it to the public that they feel that they can trust the process if the Bill is made law.
We have to ask what happens if a partisan figure is chosen—how can that be addressed democratically? What is the process if there is a problem with the conduct of this commissioner? Who is accountable for that? That is one of the reasons I added my name to Amendment 913A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson of Tredegar, which seeks ways for anyone with concerns about the conduct of the commissioner to make representations to the Prime Minister. The amendment seeks to probe the process by which the commissioner can be held accountable for their conduct.
That takes me back to neutrality and independence. Let us consider: if we leave this appointment, as the Bill seems to, to the Prime Minister, who is given complete discretion about who to appoint, how will we protect the role from political controversy and being seen as possibly partisan? The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will not want to compromise the role in that way, I am sure, so some of these amendments might be helpful to insulate it from any accusation of bias.
Is the noble Baroness not concerned, as I am, that we are conflating expertise with bias? People think that because somebody is expert, they are independent. It does not necessarily follow. There could be people who are expert but at the same time very biased in their approach to any subject.
I think that is self-evidently true in the real world, if I can put it that way.
I note that the present Prime Minister is himself personally not neutral. As we now well know, he promised Esther Rantzen that assisted dying would be made legal, although that was not a promise made to the British electorate or in the manifesto, but it was certainly made in public with much singing and dancing. Would the Prime Minister’s personal views influence whom he chose as a commissioner? Noble Lords might think that is far too cynical and I am being grubby—that is fair enough. However, I want to know if there is anything in the Bill that guards against such grubby behaviour, because if anyone thinks there is no grubby behaviour in politics, they need to get out more. If the commissioner is perceived—
If I may intervene again, let me say that this is a post which will happen only if the law has been passed by Parliament. I am not aware—but perhaps the noble Baroness can help me—if there is any other public appointment process which says that someone cannot be in favour of the law that they will be in charge of implementing. Is the noble Baroness aware of any others for which that is the case, or is she saying that this should be the only example in which someone cannot be in favour of the law of the land and the job that they have been appointed to do?
I should clarify that I do not anticipate that those who have reservations about assisted dying will be queuing up to be the commissioner. I am not at all arguing that the commissioner could not be an enthusiast, but what happens if they become an activist and an advocate for it, and mission creep follows? That is very different. It is fine if it is somebody who says they voted for it—somebody in this Committee might well be that person, and they might have disagreed with me. How do you stop someone if they say, “Great, I am the commissioner. I am now in charge of monitoring this”, and so on? We have heard good examples so I will not repeat them.
Sorry, I am not sure if the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, wants to intervene, but I am trying to finish.
In response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Markham, does the noble Baroness agree that senior and significant public appointments always involve an independent assessment panel making a recommendation, but moreover they also involve Select Committees of this House and/or the House of Commons taking evidence? In a recent example from July last year, my successor was questioned interminably, if I can exaggerate a little, by the Women and Equalities Committee over a small donation made years earlier to a campaign group, and she did not win approval from the committee, presumably on that basis. Parliamentary scrutiny and/or the independent panel are profoundly important. Does the noble Baroness agree that these are significant prerequisites?
That is a very helpful intervention. We can therefore see that the process of appointing the commissioner should not simply be in the gift of the Prime Minister and that there are processes—we have illustrated that. The difficulties in relation to accusations of neutrality or partiality and so on will come up in that process. However, at the moment, there is nothing in the Bill that would allow any of that to have come up before the appointment.
I suggest that there are a range of amendments in this group that the noble and learned Lord might want to look at carefully and accept, so that the role can be insulated from party politics, accusations of advocacy and speculation about what if this or that goes wrong. Maybe nothing will go wrong, but if something does go wrong with the commissioner’s conduct or they are seen to be acting as an advocate activist, there is nothing in the Bill that would mean that Parliament could do anything about it. We would just be stuck with it. Can the noble and learned Lord say what checks he sees for impartiality and guardrails against activism in the choice of commissioner and their role? What process will there be to ensure a commissioner’s impartiality in their role, even if not in their personal views? How can we make that guaranteed? How can we hold conduct to the highest account? At the moment, it seems to me there is no mechanism in the Bill to do so. Without that formal oversight, the way the Bill has set out appointing a commissioner is unsafe, and it should be looked at again.
My Lords, I have tried in my contributions, which have been few although I have in fact been present for almost every moment of this Bill, to point out to the noble and learned Lord those occasions when his actions can make a great deal of difference. It seems to me that this is one of those.
I have been pressed by the media to speak about the Bill. I have refused every opportunity because I believe that the Bill should be debated in this Committee and there should be no attempt outside to make it difficult for us to say what we need to say in our proper carrying through of our business. If I had appeared on the radio, I would have said that the problem that we face is that there is so much in this Bill that is uncertain, unexplained and left to Ministers and particular appointees that we do not know how the Bill would work in practice.
This is not a question of whether you are on the side of the Bill or against it. It is that we have a duty to make this Bill work. I do not like the Bill and I do not agree with the principle, but I am not speaking from either of those points of view. I am speaking to try to get this Bill to be a suitable Bill to do the job which the promoters want it to do. I much resent the way in which people attack that, as if one is behaving improperly. There has been some disgraceful behaviour attacking one of the most distinguished Members of this Committee, who is knowledgeable and able, with a history of fighting for rights and the kind of behaviour that we should have for the terminally ill and the ill who need palliative care. I hope that the sponsors of the Bill will apologise publicly for what has been said to the noble Baroness, because it is unacceptable.
Let me say why this is perhaps the most important groups that we have had. Outside, there is genuinely held concern about the mechanisms which will make this Bill the safest Bill there is. The person who does this job is clearly not going to be somebody who is against the whole principle. The noble Lord, Lord Markham, is perfectly right that, if this becomes the law, the law will be carried through. The question is whether the person who is going to do this job is someone who will command the respect and support of the nation as a whole. The amendments before us are simply an attempt to find ways of making sure that happens. They are not suggesting that it should be somebody who is opposed to the principle. I cannot imagine anybody applying for it if they do not believe in the principle—I am certainly not going to apply for it myself. The fact of the matter is that it is going to be somebody who supports the Bill and is prepared to carry it through, but that person must have the respect of the public as a whole, and the appointment therefore becomes very important.
I do not want to tread on sad circumstances, but we do not have a terribly good history of appointments in recent years, on both sides of the House, so this is not a party-political comment. It makes it very important to get it right at this point.
There is no question of filibustering in saying to the noble and learned Lord that this is at the heart of the problem. The Bill is supported in principle by many in the organisations that are going to carry it through, but it is opposed in particular by them all because the Bill has not met their concerns.
My concern is that if you take money out of a healthcare budget that is already in deficit, you will end up with an incentive for people to go down the road of saving money by working towards promoting assisted deaths for patients for whom additional care would mean them no longer feeling in despair in any way and having their quality of life returned to them. The NHS budget appears to be in such a difficult and parlous state that we have to be very careful that we do not spend NHS money on what is not a healthcare treatment.
My Lords, the amendments in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie, are very useful in making us think about what an assisted dying service would or should look like if the Bill is enacted and what the implications are for funding it—public funding or who is going to pay.
We will come to a more detailed discussion on this in later groups, but I will just raise a few things. As I understand it, and I probably need some clarification from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, the idea is that integrated care boards will be mandated to provide a fully funded assisted dying service. I would just like to get a sense of what is envisaged. If that is what is envisaged, we have to ask the question: is that reasonable?
As others have said, contrast that with hospices, which receive only a portion of their funding from ICBs and are heavily reliant on donations. I am sure we have all been to those coffee mornings and bought cakes, sold cakes and all the rest of it, trying to raise money for hospices. Meanwhile, palliative care services rely heavily on charity funding, recovering only 30% of their funds from the Government. I understand and note the important caveat from the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser. I am not trying to say that the state should run everything at all times and that anyone who is doing anything in the charitable sector is a problem, but underfunding end-of-life care at the same time as fully funding ending-your-life non-care is a bit peculiar.
The danger is that if the sponsor’s aspirations come to fruition—if I have got them right—funding for assisted dying will start competing with and risks diverting resources away from palliative and end-of-life care, and both will compete for a share of a limited health budget. I note that professional bodies, such as the Royal College of GPs and the Association for Palliative Medicine, argue that the assisted dying service must have distinct funding to avoid such competition.
It was very important that the Health Secretary, Wes Streeting, was frank with us when he noted that
“setting up this service will also take time and money that is in short supply … Politics is about prioritising. It is a daily series of choices and trade-offs”.
I would like to address a couple of questions to the Minister, who I know is confined to discussing workability, to ask how this prioritisation will work. Have the Government considered this? If funding will come from reprioritisation of existing budgets, are we not at this point being asked to legislate a direct conflict of interest, where integrated care boards will have to choose between, for example, funding palliative care and funding assisted dying? If it is not palliative care—I have overused that—which other services will be deprioritised in these choices in order to fund this? It is a limited budget. We keep being told that there is a scarcity of funds, so I want to understand that.
Finally, another reason to raise this—it is not directly to do with funding, but it counts—is that if assisted dying is to be paid for by the public purse and/or associated with the NHS, it could mean that assisted dying is treated as a standard healthcare solution. That surely could have a corrosive impact on trust between patients and clinicians, breaking their “first do no harm” contract with the public and flouting the Hippocratic oath.
Should doctors be expected to incorporate ending life into their routine roles if it is publicly paid for, when the major professional bodies explicitly warn against this? The BMA says that
“our view is that assisted dying should not be part of the standard role of doctors or integrated into existing care pathways—it is not something that a doctor can just add to their usual role.”
That more existential kind of question, or about medical ethics, will obviously be compromised when, if public funding and the taxpayer are paying for assisted death, those taxpayer-funded NHS doctors are surely going to be asked to do something that goes against their ethical code.
My Lords, some intricate and sophisticated schemes have been put forward concerning the nature of the panels. In listening to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, I thought how fascinating it was to hear about the ways in which the Law Society has approached this issue. We have heard a lot of fine speeches challenging everything from the size of the panel to whether it should have investigatory, prosecutorial and even quasi-judicial powers. I suddenly felt like I was in an episode of “CSI” or something; I thought, “They’re only panels”.
At this stage, things are getting so demanding and confusing—and, potentially, overlayered and bureaucratic—that I think we should take a step back. I am very sympathetic to why this has happened. It is driven by a desire for safeguarding and for these panels to have teeth. It is created by the loose wording in the Bill—in my opinion, it is poorly drafted—that means people are asking, “What will these panels be able to do? What should they be able to do? Can we join the dots?”
I want to go back and, more simplistically, if you like, take at face value the panels as they are described by the sponsors of the Bill. They will have three members: a social worker, a legal person, and a psychiatrist or somebody from the psychiatric profession. What will we expect of them? I ask this because just announcing that is not sufficient. Let me say why. I have put my name to Amendment 925A in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, who explained very well what he is trying to do with his amendments. What is needed is a process for how you end up on a panel if you are one of those three people the sponsors want.
Amendment 925A would set up an independent appointments process. It talks about appropriate tests, interviewing people, vetting and so on. That is important, because the one thing we know from all the speeches we have heard is that these panels are going to be important and will make important decisions. You cannot put an ad in the paper saying, “Are you a social worker? Call in”. We have to think about what will be required of them. The noble Lord, Lord Murray, has done us a real service by straightforwardly saying that we need to have a system and that this is necessary, albeit by no means sufficient, to counter any risk of these panels being inadequately staffed by the wrong or inappropriate people and to fulfil the aspirations of the Bill’s sponsors. It is absolutely necessary to counter any notion that the panel members will be just yes-men and yes-women who have turned up. In my opinion, we need to know that they are of the right calibre.
The role of panels is not just crucial in terms of safeguarding for those who go down the assisted dying route. We have heard some important speeches about safeguarding, but we must also consider that a proper process is required to protect panel members themselves from what is potentially likely: the blame game.
I have some qualms about the privacy issue that the noble Lord, Lord Jackson of Peterborough, raised. He conceded that there might be some problems with this. It was another testy exchange with the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, but we have to consider both sides of that exchange as being valid, because the panels are going to have to take on some difficult issues.
I am sure that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will remember what I thought was a tricky exchange on “Newsnight” last year, when he was asked about a situation where a 21 year-old could successfully request an assisted death and their parents would find out about it only after they were dead. Reference has made to the fact that that would happen with suicide, but in this instance, the difference is that heartbroken, grieving mums, dads or other family members would find out not only that their 21 year-old child was dead, but that they had been to a panel of social workers and so on, it had been okayed, and they had not known about it. It is only fair to note that they would want to know exactly on what basis that panel made the decision. They would ask what the qualifications of the people on that panel were. It has to be said that that 21 year-old could have a learning disability, Down syndrome or a previous history of mental illness and had tried to commit suicide in the past. Any people with a similar illness could actually be granted the right to an assisted death by that panel.
You can imagine the multiple scenarios. I thought of that, because I remember in Committee in the other place, Naz Shah, the Labour MP, made an excellent thought-provoking contribution when she said that when such cases happen, the public, including family members of the person who has died, will rightly demand answers and so will the media. They will want to know who the panel members were and why they made the judgment that they did.
There is a lot at stake here. I do not necessarily agree with the view of the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, that everything should be in the public domain, but there will be demands to know what is going on. Is it being hidden away?
The way that Amendment 925A sets up a process will, in the end, protect people, because otherwise, panel members are likely to be on the receiving end of some intrusion whether they like it or not. We have to make sure that the right people are on the panel.
I also just wanted to raise the staffing of these panels. This feels very banal after some of the things people have been talking about, but are there enough social workers and psychiatrists around to go on to the panels? This seems to be a rather practical problem before we get anywhere. At the moment, in terms of professional panellists, there is one psychiatrist on each panel, yet the most recent workforce data shows that one in six consultant psychiatric posts is unfilled. So, that shortfall must cause problems. The Royal College of Psychiatrists has said:
“As things currently stand, mental health services simply do not have the resource required to meet a new range of demands”.
I am just worried that, if the commission struggles to find enough psychiatrists, the temptation will be to appoint anyone available and willing who can be ticked-boxed as a mental health professional. That is a bit nerve-wracking, which is why interviews, qualifications and so on are important.
The same resource deficit challenges exist in terms of legal members who, after all, we are told will replace judges in a way, according to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. But who are these legal members? Where will they be found, given the immense financial and resource constraints on the justice system that are so bad, we are told, that the Government are embarking on judicial vandalism, in my opinion, in sacrificing jury trials? If there is a problem of scarcity, is the recruitment of real legal expertise to the panel guaranteed?
Finally, on the third panel members, the social workers, given what the British Association of Social Workers have said about the sector being at capacity—and it has noted that the panel proposals are not resource-light—noble Lords can see that there might be a problem. The shortages of all three panel member professionals are not evenly distributed throughout the country, so what does the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, think about a postcode lottery? What if you cannot find the legal expertise, social worker and psychiatrist in one part of the country where there is a great need? Has he consulted, as the sponsor of the Bill, with the likes of the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the British Association of Social Workers about workforce pressures?
My final question is for the Minister, with regard to the panels. What assessment have the Government made of their workability, given the problems raised by the professional bodies of social workers and psychiatrists? If there are not enough people available, surely the panels will not be workable and therefore this part of the Bill needs to be sorted out; otherwise, there is no point passing it as it stands, because it will never happen.
My Lords, I am pleased to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, not least because I often do not agree with her but I did agree with several of the things she has just said. She started off by talking about the dangers of intricacy in what we lay down in the Bill—about how the panels should conduct themselves. The more I listened to the speeches and the more I read the amendments, the more worried I was about not only the overly bureaucratic nature of this, and the over-engineering of the processes the noble Baroness referred to, but the invasion of privacy on many levels.
We all recognise the role of the panels in safeguarding against abuse, but there will be a range of people. I was thinking of how I would feel on one of the panels, being interrogated along the lines of some of these amendments. The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Gray of Tottenham, says that I must be asked whether I have discussed the request with my next of kin and any other persons I am close to. Where someone has not done so, they will be asked to discuss their reasons for not doing so. That is way too intrusive and well beyond a way of finding out whether I have been coerced in this situation. It goes much too far, is over-engineered and, in the words we started off with today, is not kind to the majority of those who will be seeking help in circumstances they find intolerable. They find the way in which they are dying intolerable; it is not that they want to end their life, but it is because they are dying. I find that the whole tenor of this conversation does not think about the people who are going to be involved in, and subject to, this process. We have to think about them as well, and balance it with the sort of protections that are needed to make sure that bad things do not happen within these processes.
I was also surprised at the level of involvement in the amendment about children and information in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay—and she and I agree on many things. This is desperately personal stuff within families. The idea that not only should you be consulted on why you have not spoken to a child about this, but that you should have to nominate someone else to report your death, and then you should make sure that there are bereavement services, opens up a whole area. Just like palliative care, bereavement services are very patchy—all over the place—and vary tremendously. Why should this category of parental loss be subject to the obligation of the state to provide bereavement services, as against every other sort of parental loss?
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
Main Page: Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Fox of Buckley's debates with the Ministry of Justice
(1 week, 5 days ago)
Lords ChamberThe panel has the power. Clause 17(4) says that the panel
“may ask any person appearing to it to have relevant knowledge or experience to report to it on such matters relating to the person to whom the referral relates as it considers appropriate.”
That power would include a power to ask the local authority to provide any information it wants.
I thank the noble and learned Lord for a comprehensive and useful set of answers. I asked a rather more banal question—it was a long time ago—about workforce challenges. What if the social workers or the psychiatrists cannot be found? We are already acutely short of psychiatrists and social workers in general, and that is problematic in particular geographic areas. Could the noble and learned Lord comment on what will happen if the legal expertise, social workers or psychiatrists are not available in one part of the country? Will it be a postcode lottery?
My second question is this. Has the noble and learned Lord consulted the likes of the Royal College of Psychiatrists and the British Association of Social Workers about what the Bill will do to workforce pressures? It seems to me that it will affect workability. If these panels are so important and there are not enough people to sit on them, I am worried that there will be a watering-down, with the grabbing of any old social worker who wanders past. Maybe the noble and learned Lord could clarify that.
If there are not enough people with the requisite expertise to people the panels then there will not be panels to do the job. That is why the broad categories have been adopted in the Bill. The Royal College of Psychiatrists has expressed views in relation to this, as has the British Association of Social Workers. However, it is necessary for us to find people to do this process, because the workability of the scheme depends on it, and we believe it is possible to do that. We recognise the concerns that have been expressed, including by the noble Baroness, who is right to say that if we do not have people who can people the panels then we cannot do the process.
On the broader issue of what happens if we have people in one part of the country but not another, it will be for the voluntary assisted dying commissioner to ensure that, when a panel is required, it can be provided.
My Lords, I will speak to my Amendment 155, which is different to the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, on patients who opt out. My amendment ensures that when a person has previously cancelled the process of obtaining assisted dying—having considered it as an option and then rejected it—they can continue to discuss their terminal illness freely with their medical practitioner without being pressed to reconsider assistance to end their life.
As we are hearing, we have had a great deal of evidence on this issue. In its written evidence, the Association for Palliative Medicine of Great Britain and Ireland observed:
“Doctors influence decisions made by their patients in conscious and unconscious ways and are themselves shaped by their personal and professional life experiences … if the patient clearly rejects AD, they may suspect that other treatments suggested by this doctor are driven by an agenda to shorten their lives or may otherwise result in this. This could lead to patients opting not to engage with palliative care or to the loss of trust in a medical practitioner or in the medical profession at a crucial time in people’s lives”.
There is a clear danger here. If a patient has already considered and rejected assisted dying and their doctor raises it again, it may appear as though the doctor is pursuing an agenda to shorten that person’s life. That risk to trust at the very moment when trust is most needed should not be created by the legislation before us.
I also want to refer to evidence given to the Commons by Dr Vicki Ibbett, an NHS specialty doctor in psychiatry with extensive professional and personal experience of suicidal ideation. She expressed serious concerns about the impact of the Bill on suicide prevention work and highlighted that the voices of people with lived experience of suicidal ideation were not heard in oral evidence sessions. Speaking about terminally ill people who may experience thoughts of not wanting to be alive, Dr Ibbett wrote:
“Thoughts of wanting to die have a known association with being given a cancer diagnosis and learning of being terminally ill … Suicidal ideation may have arisen as part of the response to a new diagnosis with a terminal prognosis. It may, therefore, be part of an ‘adjustment reaction’. Adjustment Disorder often settles without professional intervention. If it persists additional support may be beneficial. Assisted suicide should not be facilitated”.
My Amendment 155 therefore seeks to ensure that a doctor may not raise assisted dying with a patient whose medical records show they have previously cancelled a first or second declaration. When somebody has already walked back from that decision, the law should protect them from renewed pressure, intentional or not.
Finally, I will quote from a recent article by Jim McManus, national director of health and wellbeing at Public Health Wales, writing in a personal capacity. He wrote that
“no end-of-life decision happens in a vacuum. Choices are shaped by many things, and sometimes these are inequality, unmet need, patchy palliative care, and the grinding pressures of an overstretched NHS … People expressing a wish to die may be experiencing treatable depression, loneliness, or feelings of being a burden. The Royal College of Psychiatrists has raised concerns that the Bill’s safeguards are insufficient to protect people in exactly these vulnerable states”.
Amendment 155 is a small but vital safeguard, ensuring that when someone has stepped back from assisted dying, their decision is respected. At such a vulnerable moment, no patient should face renewed pressure; our priority must be to protect, trust and uphold compassionate, high-quality care at the end of life.
My Lords, what influenced me to look positively at a number of amendments in this group, and to table Amendment 150, was that some jurisdictions with assisted dying legislation explicitly prohibit doctors from initiating assisted dying discussions. I know that there was a bit of a row earlier about Australia, South Australia and New Zealand, but the truth is that people who have this legislation thought it was important to say that if a doctor raised this with the patient, it would breach professional misconduct. In fact, South Australia even used the wording “must not … suggest”. That is quite hard.
However, it is very interesting that this group of amendments holds importance for all of us. In other words, it cannot be assumed to be either filibustering or messing around, because we are citing places that have assisted dying, and they think that this is a very good and important safeguard—or that it is at least worth debating.
One reason they do that is the issue of autonomy, which I know is very close to the noble and learned Lord. The concern is that, if a doctor initiates discussions about assisted dying, it undermines the very principle of the Bill’s supporters, which is to ensure that the decision regarding assistance to end your own life is yours taken freely; it is patient-initiated. I was rather surprised to hear the noble Baroness, Lady Blackstone, cite the BMA. What happened to the patient-centric approach? We now have the BMA versus the patient. If a patient wants an assisted death, good—well, not good, but they can initiate the discussion and raise it themselves, if they want to; it is an autonomous decision.
It was so moving to hear the contribution from the noble Baroness, Lady Monckton, and the points that others made about the words that people may hear, including people with learning disabilities. I was reflecting on the evidence we heard at the Select Committee from the National Down Syndrome Policy Group. It is not just the words that people may hear; it is also what they see in front of them. In particular, what was really striking—I had not thought about this—was that even the uniform of the doctor who is having that conversation could suggest a position of authority that someone with a learning disability should show acquiescence to. I thought that was something for us to consider in the light of all these important amendments.
That is very helpful. When I see a uniform, I get a bit quivery as well—
We are obviously at that time of day.
As we have gathered, I do not want doctors to initiate raising assisted dying as a healthcare option at all but, if they do, I do not want there to be any linguistic whitewashing. Sarah Wootton, the chief executive of Dignity in Dying, wrote in her book Last Rights:
“We have to move away from idealised, sanitised, nursery-rhyme accounts of what death can be…towards truthful”,
no-BS—I have abbreviated that—and
“plain-spoken explanations of what could happen”.
Surely these words, which are very powerful, should also apply to conversations about assisted dying or assisted suicide. Let us ensure that, if a doctor is to raise it with patients, there is no attempt to hide behind idealised and sanitised nursery-rhyme accounts of what assisted death would be like.
That is why I was particularly keen to emulate this no-BS approach, which is why I added my name to Amendment 160 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor. This would ensure that, in any discussion that a doctor initiates, they make it clear what is being suggested—namely, that this about ending a person’s life. If a doctor said to you, “Would you like a dignified death?”, that might sound very appealing, but if they say, “Would you like me to give you a lethal drug that means that you can take your own life?”, it might suddenly feel a bit different. We genuinely need to say what we are talking about. A similar concern is raised in Amendment 167 by the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie. The doctor must not hide behind opaque language and euphemism that avoids spelling out clearly what they are suggesting and offering, from the first preliminary step to the ending of a patient’s life by, as I said, basically helping them take their own life.
My final point is that we are saving the doctors here. Doctors starting to suggest that you can end people’s lives will completely change the relationship between doctors and patients. You are forcing a doctor to think, “Is it in the best interest of this patient to die, with my help, through the ingestion of a lethal substance?” That must mess up the mind of a doctor, who is trained to keep life going as much as possible. It would erode trust in healthcare relationships moving forward because if, for example, your doctor suggested assisted dying and you said no, you would then have to go back and face the same doctor. I am not entirely convinced that I would be confident enough in the medical practitioner who had told me I would be better off dead to ask, “Can you help me extend my life a bit longer?” I might want to doctor-shop, as they say.
I am perhaps imagining the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, as a quivering wreck. If that is how she feels, you can imagine what it is like for most of us when we face our doctors, so the point was made very strongly.
There are so many good amendments here and I cannot possibly refer to all of them, but I want to drive home, by force of comparison, a point that arises from two things that were said—one by the noble Lord, Lord Rook, and one by the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, who is no longer in her place. The noble Lord, Lord Rook, said that there is no duty under the Bill to raise assisted dying, which is obviously true. It is very important to pursue what that implies.
The noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, said that by raising assisted dying a doctor is not performing a neutral act, so the question we have to ask is what is going on when a doctor proposes assisted dying. I am saying that if it is not a neutral act it is an ideological act, and that is not something appropriate for a professional.
I shall draw a comparison that will illustrate that point. The Government keep promising to introduce a Bill to ban conversion therapy—and I think that they will do so. The objection to conversion therapy is that it is a form of coercion of the weak and of exploitation, forcing an ideology on people that is considered to be wrong and exploiting their feeling of weakness. That is the danger we face here. Many noble Lords will object, of course—and they will be right—that conversion therapists are quacks whereas doctors are real doctors. In my view, that makes it even more important that the doctors stick to their professional obligations and do not start advocating things they happen to believe are right. If we think about it that way, we will see just how important these amendments are.
Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill Debate
Full Debate: Read Full DebateBaroness Fox of Buckley
Main Page: Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-affiliated - Life peer)Department Debates - View all Baroness Fox of Buckley's debates with the Department of Health and Social Care
(5 days, 2 hours ago)
Lords Chamber
Baroness Smith of Llanfaes (PC)
I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention. However, that is not the case in terms of the practical reason why the Senedd Members raised those points; it is also in relation to the fact that they passed an amendment to this LCM, which I was lately going to touch on, which states that the Senedd “regrets” that this Parliament has not properly considered the
“constitutional implications of this Bill for Wales”.
It is important to note that, yes, they passed the LCM, but they amended it with a point about this Parliament not having done its duty and gone through the implications for Wales in detail. A lot of those in Wales who support the Bill just do not feel that they have had an opportunity to shape this Bill. I thank the noble Baroness for her intervention, and I hope that that clarifies my point a little further.
The point was concisely put by Adam Price during that debate:
“Supporters of assisted dying do not argue for access determined by wealth. Opponents do not argue for a system outside NHS governance in a matter as grave as this … No country’s Parliament should have to stand aside while another decides the terms on which its own citizens live and die”.
He went on to say that he sincerely hoped that the vote was the last time that the Senedd—and other devolved Parliaments—was put in that situation.
The Senedd passed the LCM with an amendment stating, as I just mentioned, that the Senedd:
“Regrets the lack of thorough consideration of the constitutional implications of this Bill for Wales during the legislative process”.
As I just said, the passing of that amendment also showcases that we have failed in our own duty here in relation to those implications.
Amendments 903 and 905 in my name aim to restore an amendment that was agreed in Committee in the other place. The amendment was later taken out on Report without resolving the purpose behind it having been put forward and agreed in Committee. Simply, my amendments would give the Senedd a vote on the final Bill passed here before regulations could be created by Welsh Ministers for the delivery of an assisted dying service in Wales. The reason for this amendment is simple: as I highlighted at Second Reading, although the criminal law is a reserved matter, the legality of assisted dying in this case, and the delivery of such a service, is a devolved matter. Not allowing the Senedd to have a vote nor the opportunity to fully scrutinise and amend this Bill infringes on devolution and disrespects the roles and duties of Members of the Senedd.
Health and social care makes up over half of all spending from the Welsh Government’s budget. Do noble Lords not agree that it is therefore essential that Members of the Senedd are able to scrutinise all health spending? Not allowing Members of the Senedd to shape this Bill limits their ability to do that. The Covid pandemic is the most recent prominent example of how Wales does things differently when it comes to health. This Parliament needs to wake up to this reality and let devolved Parliaments do their job. This matter is an anomaly from a devolution perspective. As in Scotland, this is a fully devolved area. The Scottish Parliament recently had the opportunity to debate and shape its own Bill that could be suitable for Scotland. If the Scottish Parliament has the right, why can this not be the case for Wales?
I turn to Amendment 844, which would create a new clause to address this exact issue. The amendment would deliver parity between Scotland and Wales on this matter by amending the Government of Wales Act to remove offences related to suicide from reserved matters. This would allow the Senedd, if it chose to do so, to introduce its own Bill on assisted dying. It would allow the Senedd’s health committee to take its own evidence, including from NHS Wales and the Welsh Government’s Health Secretary. Your Lordships will be aware of the list of witnesses who were called to recent Select Committees ahead of this Bill. The chief executive of NHS England was called to give evidence, but there were no representations from Wales. I respect the work that members on that committee carried out; however, would they agree that the Senedd should also be able to take evidence from within Wales and be able to make decisions on the establishment of a new service in Wales for the people of Wales, based on Wales-specific information? Amendment 844 would be the best course of action in order to recognise that this Bill has not been designed with Wales or for Wales and to align Wales with Scotland in making a decision on this matter.
I turn finally to the amendments in this group from the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey. In the hypothetical scenario that we passed her amendments alone, we would be leaving Wales in a grey area. Wales would be taken out of this Bill, but with no way for the Senedd to legislate on this matter. In this Committee, we must consider the full consequences and where those decisions will then lie. My Amendment 844 would avoid that scenario and ensure that the Senedd had a way of legislating on this matter if it chose to do so.
To conclude, and as I already highlighted at Second Reading, I support people’s right to choose how they die. However, in the case of services being made available in Wales, they must be shaped and designed by the people of Wales. That must be an ability for the Senedd and not for us here in Westminster.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Llanfaes; that was a tour de force. Goodness knows, we rarely agree, and I am hardly a Plaid supporter, but I am from Wales. I want to reflect on couple of tiny things that she said in why I wanted to speak.
Family and friends in Wales were completely confused about what the vote meant when it happened. They asked, “Have we just voted for assisted dying?” It was not clear, the way it came across. They were not sure what was being voted on. In a way, they were not alone, because when I talk to people, I also feel very uncomfortable that the Senedd was basically asked to vote on a blank cheque, as was said, because Members of the Senedd did not, do not and could not yet know what the Bill will look like. You can blame us here for that—we have not got very far—but the truth is that it seems presumptive for the Senedd to be asked to give consent in advance when we do not yet know whether amendments will get through this place and how they will change the Bill. By the way, that includes amendments by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, the Bill’s sponsor.
I will be very brief in my response to that because of the time. That has nothing to do with this issue; this is a completely separate issue. Deciding on assisted suicide is not the same as allowing abortion to term without any legal consequences, which is an extreme provision supported by only 1% of the British public—but I accept that Parliament made a different decision. Those two issues are not connected in any way, so that issue is not relevant to this debate. We raise these issues—real concerns about how this would operate in practice—but we are still waiting to hear specific answers from the sponsor of the Bill. If we had answers earlier, we might make faster progress.
My Lords, I cannot let the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, get away with that. What happened on Wednesday night was a separate issue. As it happens, I argued for a change in the law in relation to decriminalising abortion—but now I am on this side. This sort of easy “swatting away”, “culture war”-style argument is unhelpful. People, in good faith, are concerned about the lack of safeguards in this Bill.
I do not agree with the idea that no one wants to get to Report. I would much prefer to be voting on aspects of the Bill, because a wide range of the concerns that have been raised could be addressed through amendments tabled by the sponsor of the Bill so that we can get on with it. That is what I would want.
The only reason we are discussing Wales, as far as I am concerned, is what has happened since we discussed it on the first day in relation to the Senedd’s decision. It is a perfectly appropriate thing to raise. The idea that we are wasting time talking about Wales—said by people who apparently respect devolution—seems a bit rich. We want to get to Report, and we should keep the insults out in order to do so.
Lord Goodman of Wycombe (Con)
My Lords, my Amendment 765, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Rooker, would delete Clause 42(4). I will briefly read the subsection, as it is not very long:
“Regulations under subsection (3) may make any provision that … could be made by an Act of Parliament, and … would not be within the legislative competence of the Senedd if it were contained in an Act of the Senedd”.
I will not repeat the case put by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, who quoted the report of the Delegated Powers Committee, on which I sit, which argued that the clause is highly inappropriate. Rather than do that, I will put to the sponsor of the Bill a simple question, and I would be grateful if he addressed it when he winds up. I quote from the report of the committee:
“Delegated powers that can be used to do anything that an Act of Parliament can do are very rare, with the wording currently appearing in just two Acts: the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 and the European Union (Future Relationship) Act 2020”.
I was not on the committee when that report was produced, but my understanding is that the argument at the time was that the exigencies of Brexit required business to be done by regulation, rather than by an Act of Parliament. My question for the sponsor of the Bill is: what is the exigency in this case that requires the provision, which he believes needs to be made, to be made by regulation, which necessarily has to be dealt with on a “take it or leave it” basis, rather than by an Act of Parliament that Peers and Members of the other place can amend? I would be grateful if he could answer that question when he replies to the debate. If he cannot, I look forward to returning to this on Report, if we ever get there.
My Lords, I am pleased that the noble Lord who moved the amendment is in remission from his cancer. On other Bills we wish he was in remission from his political views, but on this one we celebrate with him.
I used to run a cancer charity, and the truth is that on this issue not everyone is using statistics. Doctors are often using their eyes; when we are talking about the last weeks it is their eyes, rather than going to any statistical table, that will tell them. There is an assumption that all this is going to be based statistically on the six-month period, but it is not like that. My own guess is that most people who are dying will probably start thinking about this only at three months. Tonight I am going to be dining with a recent widower. His wife—a very well-known author but it does not matter who she was—had cancer. She fought it, but fighting it is not enough. It was only really in the last weeks that she realised that what she wanted was help in those weeks. It was at that point that she tried to get to Switzerland, but by then it was too late.
My judgment is that much of this, for many of the patients who will be asking for this, will be very much towards the end. I will be surprised if at that point the doctor is going to their statistical tables, because at that stage the patient’s age and underlying health and other factors will contribute as much to assessing whether it is going to be days, weeks or maybe a month as the particular type of cancer that they have. This attempt to make that process overscientific is probably not right, and we should have faith, which some people in this House do not seem to have, in doctors.
My Lords, it is hard to follow the noble Lords, Lord Moylan and Lord Carlile, whose contributions were made with such panache, wit and insight. What really intimidated me was the noble Lord, Lord Moylan, saying, “This amendment is all about understanding the mathematics”. I thought, “Oh God, I’ve put my name to it. There’s been a terrible error”. I bring absolutely no mathematical understanding to the question.
I put my name to the amendment on the requirement that medical practitioners should discuss underlying data on survival—in terms of the median prognosis of six months and how it is calculated and so on—because I am interested in ensuring that there is maximum transparency for patients under the Bill, so that any choice that they make is well informed. The Bill rightly requires that an applicant for assisted dying is informed, so it seems obvious that being informed should include an understanding of the context of the data and the reliability of a prognosis, which would help them to inform themselves.
My Lords, we have already had extensive discussion about the multidisciplinary team involvement. In 50 years of nursing—not all in clinical—I have never heard a doctor come out with, “You’ve definitely got six months to live”. There are much more subtle conversations.
I accept that people with MAID sometimes want to discuss it and say, “If I come off the support that you’re giving me, how long would I live?” Some of the answers can be very straightforward and we still enable patients to stop treatment when they want to.
I am also delighted that the noble Lord is alive and that he clearly understands statistical formulae.
I just want to ask the noble Baroness for one clarification. I agree that most doctors are not brutal and do not say, “You’ve got six months and that’s it”. I asked whether the Bill, which requires you to have a six-month prognosis to access the service, will encourage doctors to feel that they have to be more definitive to allow people to access this service.
I do not think so. I have greater faith in the medical profession and the multidisciplinary team.