Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 19th May 2020 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

9: Clause 1, page 2, line 14, at end insert—
“(f) the operator does not, after 31 December 2022, use vendors defined by the National Cyber Security Centre as high-risk vendors.”Member’s explanatory statement
The amendment would establish a deadline for operators by which existing high risk vendors are not to be used if they are to be able to apply for an order under Part 4A.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (Non-Afl)]

I shall beg noble Lords’ indulgence for a few minutes. I did not have an opportunity to speak at Second Reading, as I was advised not to come to Parliament, but I was assured that this would be an opportunity for me to do so.

I welcome the Bill and its aims to improve access to faster broadband and provide greater choice for tenants and leaseholders. My interest in the Bill, as people will see from my amendment, is very specific; it is to do with what we as a country see as critical infrastructure and how we protect our strategic interests to keep our critical infrastructure safe as technology becomes more complex.

I served on the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy from 2013 to 2016, when Huawei first came on to our radar, and two significant changes happened in that period. We saw the invasion of a sovereign state on the edge of Europe—the Russian annexation of Crimea—and the installation of President Xi Jinping as head of the Chinese Communist Party, bringing a more assertive, and perhaps what some would describe as more aggressive, tone into China’s international relations. Both have had a profound impact on geopolitics and potentially on security.

China’s companies have long been on our radar in the West for theft of intellectual property, from both business enterprises and research institutions. While I accept that there has always been a level of industrial espionage, with leakages from more advanced economies into those that are new challengers in particular sectors, the international community has attempted to deal openly with China on this. President Obama sought, and attained, an assurance from President Xi that the Chinese Government would clamp down on intellectual property theft, but there is little evidence that much has changed.

The difference is that China is now actively using its economic clout to advance its strategic and geopolitical interests, many of which run counter to our interests, and indeed our freedoms, here in the UK. Huawei is the world’s largest telecommunications company, and there is no reason that it should not be a trusted partner if it were like any other global telecoms firm. The point is that it is not. It has a long history of transgressions, not only in the West but more broadly. Moreover, it is subject to Chinese state security and other intelligence-related laws. These were updated in 2017 and now require Huawei, like other Chinese companies, to hand over data flowing through it to the Chinese state. It is effectively an arm of the state for the purposes of data capture and exploitation. If that was not the intention of the law, as Huawei tells us, the Chinese Government have done nothing to repudiate or amend the law in the period since. In other words, it is the intention of the Chinese Government to control worldwide data that Huawei collects, if they wish to.

There are examples of how this works. The African Union built a new headquarters in Addis Ababa in 2012. An accountant noticed that there was a huge energy consumption surge between midnight and the early hours of the morning in the period between 2012 and 2017. It transpired that data on Huawei’s servers was being transmitted back to Shenzhen covertly in those hours, hence the server activity.

There are many other examples of Huawei’s cyberactivities. The Equifax consumer credit hack recently resulted in millions of US consumers’ data being stolen. Additionally, 12.3 million Britons had their credit card details stolen. That hack was linked to Huawei and the People’s Liberation Army. I find it instructive that when BT involved Huawei in its 21st Century Network plan in 2005, information about Huawei’s involvement was withheld from Ministers and came to light some time later—in a 2013 report of the Intelligence and Security Committee, at the time chaired by Sir Malcolm Rifkind. If the Minister is not aware of its contents, I suggest she apprise herself of it, because it is fairly sobering.

I turn to my specific amendments. I know the UK Government’s position is that we want to roll out increased speed and capacity in our networks to benefit our businesses and consumers. I agree with that. However, the internet of things is here and requires improved capacity. I also agree with that. But Huawei’s involvement in this, even limited to 35% of the non-critical part of the infrastructure, is not something I feel comfortable with. It is incumbent on us to take our strategic national security vulnerabilities seriously, as we are planning not for the next five to seven years but for the next 20 to 30. There are several reasons for this. One is that we should not be so reliant on others for our sensitive and critical needs. One has only to look at the impact of the US-China trade war, and the impact on supply chains exacerbated now by Covid-19, to know that deglobalisation is starting. We in the UK are erecting barriers to our trade with the EU, yet think nothing of allowing companies that are more or less arms of other states into our systems, instead of developing our own capacities as France is attempting to do.

Another reason to be wary is that alternatives do exist. The US is proceeding with Ericsson, South Korea is using Samsung, but most importantly our Five Eyes allies have all rejected the Huawei option and are assessing alternatives. There is no burning imperative to take the decision now, and I fear it was rushed through. We will have to either repeal or regret this decision, unless we come up with safeguards that satisfy our concerns. The demonstration effect of letting Huawei into our system will lull other countries into the view that it is a safe alternative.

The Government tell us that the 35% of market share of Huawei infrastructure will be non-core and non-sensitive, but they do not acknowledge that the crucial difference between 4G and 5G is that, due to the internet of things, 5G networks are largely software-defined, so updates pushed to the network by the manufacturer can radically change how they operate. If a network is run by an untrusted vendor, that vendor can change what the network can do quite easily using software updates. The Australians have stressed this point over and over—namely, that you cannot safeguard against intent. If a provider is bound by its state’s law to do something, it is not its capability that is relevant but its intent. It is a combination of capability, where 5G is more vulnerable, and the intent of a provider that has to do a state’s bidding by law.

The Government also tell us that GCHQ has advised the National Security Council, and that they are acting on the advice of the NSC. However, it was pointed out in a Commons debate by Bob Seely MP on 10 March that the GCHQ Huawei oversight board has voiced deep concerns. According to him, the board found that it could

“only provide limited assurance that all risks to UK national security from Huawei’s involvement in the UK’s critical networks can be sufficiently mitigated … The Oversight Board advises that it will be difficult to appropriately risk-manage future products in the context of UK deployments, until the underlying defects in Huawei’s software engineering and … cyber security processes are remediated. At present, the Oversight Board has not yet seen anything to give it confidence in Huawei’s capacity to successfully complete the elements of its transformation programme”.—[Official Report, Commons, 10/3/20; col. 201.]

As recently as February 2020, the US Government have claimed in a report that backdoors intended for law enforcement officials in carriers’ equipment, such as antennae and routers installed since 2009, can be accessed by certain vendors.

Amendments 9 and 14 are based very much on Labour and Conservative Party amendments as of 10 March in the other place, and are designed to remove high-risk vendors from the United Kingdom by 2022. Amendment 14 would require vendors who use Part 4A code rights to explain to the satisfaction of the regulator, which will probably be Ofcom, in a publicised plan how they will remove high-risk vendors should they form part of the network. BT has now extended the period that it will take to remove a high-risk vendor from its network to the end of 2022. It needs that period to disentangle itself from those partners. The amendments will ensure that even if high-risk vendors are allowed into the network in the early stages, as the Government propose, there is a clear plan for disentanglement from the outset.

I will conclude by explaining to the Committee why I have tabled these amendments. We all acknowledge that Virtual Proceedings are inadequate for proper scrutiny of legislation. My experience is that, even in normal proceedings, Ministers are sometimes not quite as well informed as they might be. On 27 January 2020, in response to the Statement on Huawei, I asked the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes, for her assurances regarding Huawei’s participation in terms of its market share. She replied:

“I give her and the whole House the absolute assurance that high-risk vendors never have been and never will be involved in our most sensitive networks”.—[Official Report, 27/1/20; col. 1300.]


She clearly did not know from the Intelligence and Security Committee’s 2013 report that BT had involved Huawei from quite far back. Huawei is present on the ground in our networks. I am sure that she did not intend in any sense to mislead the House, but many of us who are concerned about these matters would be reassured by having these amendments in the Bill, although I accept that it is perhaps not the ideal vehicle for them—in fact, it is concerned with some things that I wholeheartedly support. If the Government accepted the amendment it would strengthen the Minister’s hand in giving a clear plan to the telecommunications sector regarding its obligations. It will reassure many in the country who have a clearer view of our security risks.

I should have said that I do not intend to press the amendment.

[Lord Adonis]

The noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, has made an extremely powerful speech. She has also been extremely ingenious in finding a way to bring this big geostrategic issue into the consideration of a Bill that has a very limited scope. However, given that it is to do with telecoms infrastructure and that one of the single biggest issues in upgrading our telecoms infrastructure is the degree to which we will be reliant on partnerships with Chinese companies, she is perfectly entitled to do so.

I assume that the clerks have ruled that the noble Baroness’s amendment is within the Bill’s scope, otherwise she would not be proposing it. Perhaps when she concludes at the end of this group, she can tell us that it has indeed been ruled within the scope of the Bill. If that is the case, I urge her to bring it back on Report, because, beyond the crisis, there is no more important issue facing Parliament than our relations with China. Indeed, the issue is related to the Covid crisis because the origins of the disease in Wuhan and the way the Chinese regime has dealt with it are central to the Covid-19 crisis. A critical issue that we are having to grapple with is how we get to the facts and the reforms to the international world health architecture that will be necessary which relate to the facts of the outbreak of this disease.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barran]

I shall answer that in two ways, if I may. Of course, I would be delighted to meet the noble Lord in conjunction with my noble friends Lord Ahmad and Lady Williams, and with the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, if she wishes to join. We can pick that up after the Committee. I assure the Committee that there is no loss of will or momentum on the Government’s side about the telecoms security Bill. Purely practical issues prevent me giving a firm date for its introduction.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine]

My Lords, I start by thanking the Minister for the manner in which she has dealt with this Bill. I will take up that offer of further conversations on it. In the meantime, I shall briefly address some of the issues raised by noble Lords.

I was grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, for his support. Yes, these amendments are very close to those tabled in the House of Commons. They are certainly in scope of the Bill, and he will be reassured to know that Chi Onwurah supported them in the House of Commons in February and March, and in fact moved one of them.

I think the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, mentioned the new US-Australia trade war when he meant, I think, the China-Australia trade war. I say that just for the Hansard record. I think that is what he meant. I will leave it at that.

I was enormously grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his speech. He has great knowledge of human rights around the world. He is right to say that we have collaborated over a very long period on the situation of the Chinese Uighurs. It saddens me that that seems to have dropped off the agenda completely in the light of the Covid story. From what I read on the internet, those people have higher rates of infection and they were infected in their internment camps and so on. It is something we must continue to watch.

I come specifically to the comments made by the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan of Cotes. I accept that the Bill is a less than ideal vehicle for the passage of these amendments, but I reiterate that they are not wrecking amendments of any sort. They are to strengthen the Government’s hand and to give predictability to providers about the necessary risks that face them as we go forward. She said that the manifesto target was part of the levelling-up agenda to improve connectivity, but I do not believe that United Kingdom citizens who have their personal details stolen or their financial details sold on the dark web and suffer losses would be grateful to the Government for having rolled out 5G perhaps 24 months sooner than if they had used an alternative provider. She and the Government may find themselves on the defensive when such things happen.

The noble Baroness also said that she believes that the decision is right in its assessment of risk, but future risk is always best approached tentatively, after careful evaluation. The most important thing is that the best way to evaluate risks is to have conversations with others who have been victims of the malpractice, particularly when the others are your trusted friends.

That brings me to the remark I find almost patronising on her part, when she warned us that those supporting the Bill in the House of Commons were perhaps part of an agenda to do a trade deal with the US—in other words, she was implying that those of us supporting the Bill here, particularly me, are being naive in our support for the discussions that took place in the Commons. I have pointed out that I do not think that one could accuse Mr Jeremy Corbyn, who added his signature to the Bill, of being desperately keen to do a trade deal with the US, or of being one of the usual suspects in terms of the European Union research group. I can reassure her that not only have I served on the National Security Council, but I first went to China 42 years ago, and I know it fairly well. So I am not walking into this with my eyes closed.

Let me also say, as I am looking at the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, on the screen and having been reminded of his Huawei connection, that perhaps I needed to have declared that I serve as a vice president of the APPG on China, along with the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, who is the vice chairman, if I recall correctly. So I have been engaged in Parliament in a very positive way with China as well.

It is almost trivialising to suggest that the motivation of lawmakers trying to improve legislation in the House of Lords is somehow guided by groupthink, or by a desire to fall into a certain line. All lawmakers across the House are motivated by the desire to do the best by the country, and there is nothing more important when trying to do the best by a country than caring for its national security.

I come to the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, and his questioning of the telecoms security Bill that the Minister has reassured the House will come to us shortly. In response to the question from the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, Mr Oliver Dowden gave repeated reassurances in the House, but only after some considerable pressure, that the Bill would be brought back before the summer.

I would actually be entirely content to deal with the context of the telecoms security Bill only when the House returns in full form, so that we can have the appropriate scrutiny of the Bill that we need in the proper manner. That Bill is of such critical importance to our national security that this virtual proceeding, and allowing Bills to go through on the basis of their being possibly uncontroversial, simply will not do. I say to the Minister that I would rather the Bill came back somewhat later than when the House is not ready to receive it in full, in the normal way.

Let me conclude by thanking the Minister for her very positive tone. I accept that she is eager to engage with those of us who have concerns and reservations, and I will go away and read her comments on these amendments more carefully, and will then consider my response and whether I will bring the amendments back on Report or not. On that basis, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 9 withdrawn.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Committee stage & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 2nd sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 2nd June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)]

My Lords, I fully support Amendment 21, proposed by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and I hope that when the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson of Whitley Bay, replies to this short debate, he can signal his support. If not, I hope he can reassure us that the measures in the proposed new clause will be undertaken in other ways. I will be most disappointed if all he says is that they are not necessary. I echo the comment made by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, in this respect.

As we know, the Bill is about enabling the UK to deliver on a major infrastructure project. As was said earlier, broadband has to be seen as an essential utility in the same way as gas, electricity, water and the postal service, to which my noble friend Lord Adonis referred. We must ensure that we have a world-beating service. We should remember what happened to the Pony Express.

One of the barriers to delivering gigabit capability is easy access to multi-dwelling buildings such as blocks of flats: a tenant wants the capacity but the owner does not respond to requests for access rights. So, I support the Government in delivering this and dealing with a real barrier to the target they have set—but is it enough? This new clause would enable us to decide and, if they are found wanting, to take action. It requires the Government to lay before Parliament a review of the Act’s impact within six months. Importantly, the review must make a recommendation to the Government on whether they should bring forward further legislation to achieve their stated aim, which we all support in the light of the findings of the review they conducted.

Finally, the new clause provides for further reviews every 12 months after the initial review. As the noble Lord, Lord Fox, said, it seeks to inject some adrenalin into the Bill. Broadband connectivity and faster broadband speeds are vital to our country and to our economy. This new clause would enable Parliament and the Government to confirm that work is on track and where it is not, for that to be highlighted and appropriate action to be taken.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in opposition to the amendment. I can see why the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Fox, tabled it, because targets are quite important to ensure that the Government do what they set out to do. However, the narrow timeframes given in the amendment are not practicable and will not tell us any more than we will know through other means.

I go straight to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Fox, about the Prime Minister commissioning the National Cyber Security Centre to review new US laws that will impact on Huawei’s ability to use US technology. We know that the Prime Minister is looking again at this matter through this review. I am delighted to hear that, as the Committee would expect me to be given what I said earlier on my own amendments. It is quite right: it is better to change your mind and to get better information later, rather than too late to be able to effect the changes you might need to put in place.

However, the amendment is redundant for another reason: six months’ time is way too narrow because it takes us to the end of this year, when we know that the bandwidth of Parliament and government will be intensely focused on Covid-19 and its impacts. Distracting additional pieces of legislation or reports would probably not garner the bandwidth they need for us to see whether the Government are achieving what they set out to achieve. Six months is way too short.

As for annual reviews, the correct place to know whether the Government are reaching their objectives is Ofcom’s annual reporting on this matter. Anyone who saw Ofcom’s last report of December 2019 got a very clear picture of where there has been success for fibre broadband, some limited success for ultrafast broadband and great open holes in rural coverage. We all know from what the regulator is telling us is that there are real issues about rural coverage that have their own particular hurdles, such as masts, local communities, planning permissions and all those things. All that information is readily available through the regulator. I cannot see why we would wish to put another layer of reporting on top of what the regulator is already doing.

I again emphasise that I am very much in favour of the Government’s objectives. I have my other concerns, which I might well come back to on Report, but for the moment the amendment is redundant in a very fast-moving situation.

[Lord Blunkett (Lab)]

Everything that I intended to say has already been eloquently put on to the agenda by those who have spoken in favour of the amendment, so I will be brief. I reinforce that what has happened over the past three months has, in many ways, drawn attention to the inadequacies of the system that we are operating, not just as individuals but in how companies have tried to survive in this very difficult environment. The more that we can ensure that we review progress the better it will be, in whatever form. I take the point entirely about reporting from Ofcom, but the emphasis has to be on requiring the Government to address the key issues. I do not intend to go back to the Second Reading issues about the industrial strategy, but the rebalancing of our economy and the regeneration and recovery programme will be highly dependent on connectivity, with acceptable speeds right across the country in ways that ensure that they are reliable. That point has not actually been reinforced.

A review is crucial if we are not to repeat what has sadly happened over the past 30 or, in many cases, 40 years in efforts to ensure that modern technology is used effectively and is available and accessible to everyone: promising a great deal and delivering far less. The great pity of the December election, which was mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Empey, is that we could have addressed the challenge of really ambitious investment but instead got caught up on pricing policy. Today, in this short debate and with this very narrowly focused Bill, it is time to say that we need to review anything that moves us on to being able to deliver what has been commonplace in other countries for a very long time, as was rightly said by my noble friend Lord Adonis.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th June 2020 Lords Chamber

Given all that we now know, the question for Parliament is whether it is willing to turn a blind eye and let Huawei march on regardless. In Committee, I drew a parallel with Siemens and its role in the Reich when, 80 years ago, it built its vast commercial interests on the backs of slave labour in Ravensbrück. Do not let us pretend to ourselves that this is any different; it is not. While a delay may suit the Government, it does not suit the Turkic Muslims in western China. For all these reasons, I commend the amendment to the House.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to have added my name to the amendment moved by the noble Lord, Lord Alton of Liverpool, whose expertise on human rights is paralleled by no one else in this House.

Deng Xiaoping, one of China’s most impressive leaders, had a lesson for his countrymen: “Hide your light and bide your time,” he told them. What he meant by that was that China’s power was extant but that it needed to be cautious as it became more important to the world for fear that the disruption that rising powers bring to the international system might paradoxically damage its interests. Under President Xi Jinping, this has been thrown aside as China stakes out its ambition as a global hegemon.

The current impasse between the United States and China is often referred to as the “Thucydides trap”, from his description of the Peloponnesian war. The idea is that, when two great powers are rivals for the top place, they will inevitably come into conflict. The choice then for middle-level powers, like the United Kingdom, is to decide on which side of the conflict they sit. I do not subscribe to this view of the inevitability of conflict, not least because the US is a democracy that operates with public accountability and checks and balances. The Chinese people not only have no such right of democratic consent, but for many of them the fact of their birth seals their fate—think of Xinjiang or, to a lesser degree, the Hong Kong of the future.

As we enter a harsher state of international relations, the display of Chinese power, some would say assertiveness, poses choices for the rest of us—those who are middle-ranking powers, be they Germany, France or even India—as we will have to confront it in the years ahead. The choices will be around values, economics and the rule of law.

If this Parliament has any meaning, it is as the expression of constitutional democracy. Its very purpose is to protect the citizens of this country from harm, be it their national security, however narrowly defined, or, more broadly, their privacy, their finances and their jobs. It is the job of the Government today to partner with Parliament in order to uphold those functions. We are not seeking to undermine the Government through this amendment; we are simply asking them to uphold their own responsibilities in the protection of the interests of the United Kingdom. That is the context in which the Modern Slavery Act and this amendment should be seen.

So let me speak of our values. I have not heard anyone outside China deny that, without trial, it has thrown more than 1 million people in Xinjiang province, the ethnic Uighur Muslims, into gulags. It has built internment camps, carried out a programme of forced and compulsory re-education and, as the Economist magazine put it this week,

“They have been selected … because of habits such as praying too often to Allah, showing too much enthusiasm for their Turkic culture or refusing to watch state television.”


Add to this the fact that men are not allowed to grow a beard, even during Ramadan, women are not allowed to wear headscarves—something I have witnessed myself in Beijing—and they are forced to eat pork, which is reminiscent of the treatment afforded to the Muslims of Spain during the Spanish Inquisition. This is the largest round-up of a minority anywhere since the Second World War who, since these people do not face charges in a court of law, do not know when they will be released. Today, we have also seen evidence that Uighur women are undergoing forced sterilisation.

According to several different reports from academics in the US, Australia and Germany, one of which has already been mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, the Chinese have official schemes to send tens of thousands of ethnic Uighurs from the camps to perform forced labour all across China. Factories are paid by the Government for each worker taken. They live in dormitories with watch-towers and undergo forced indoctrination—we called it brainwashing in the old days—and are unlikely to be paid. All of this is in violation of international human rights law.

The Australian Strategic Policy Institute has named 83 companies which have used this forced labour. When the firms are challenged on their supply chains, they ask us to work with them to change behaviour through legislation. They are so frightened of Chinese economic power that they need essentially to hide behind us, the western countries, to pressurise China. The Chinese companies whose products we use have no such qualms. While the US is moving towards stronger legislation as regards the use of Uighur forced labour by firms, we are not asking for that in this amendment; we are merely asking the House to vote to uphold legislation that it has passed previously, the Modern Slavery Act 2015.

Let me turn to the potential harm that high-risk vendors can pose to our citizens. As Eric Schmidt, the former CEO of Google, has explained with regard to the future of the internet and telecommunications, the most likely scenario that we in the West are facing is bifurcation of the internet into a Chinese-led internet and a non Chinese-led internet led by America. When describing the Chinese alternative, he has said:

“There’s a real danger that along with those products and services comes a different leadership regime from government, with censorship, controls, etc.”


That should serve as a warning about defending our rights.

At the heart of Chinese attitudes towards its tech dominance is a view of cybersecurity. At the second World Internet Conference held in 2015 in Wuzhen in China, President Xi Jinping defined cyber sovereignty as something that

“covers all aspects of state-to-state relations, which also includes cyberspace. We should respect the right of individual countries to independently choose their own path of cyber development, model of cyber regulation and Internet public policies, and participate in international cyberspace governance on an equal footing.”

Of course, we know that there is no international cyberspace governance that China subscribes to. It pushes us to incorporate its firms into our markets, but it does not give our firms market access. It is a vision of global corporate dominance that is based on unfair competition, data capture and flagrant breaches of commercial law. What is evident is that this idea of cyber sovereignty does not extend to other countries following their own path, as he advocated. No sooner did Australia announce that it did not want high-risk vendors such as Huawei and ZTE in its 5G network than it got the most vociferous bullying campaign directed against it.

Huawei—the high-risk vendor in question here—tells us that it is

“a private company wholly owned by its employees”

and therefore independent of the Chinese state. I think that the notion of independence is stretched in this description. Huawei is headquartered in China, regulated in China, while the lack of transparency in its financial and technological rise is not verifiable in terms of the transparency in corporate governance that we subscribe to here in the West. The founder, Mr Ren Zhengfei, and his daughter, Ms Meng Wanzhou, are members of the supervisory board, while almost all the members of that board have been at Huawei since the 1990s—something that corporate governance norms would frown at. We can safely deduce that the very fact that they have been there for some 25 to 30 years implies that they are party men and women.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 28th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)]

The noble Lord, Lord Vaizey of Didcot, has withdrawn, so I call the next speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB) [V]]

My Lords, last night at 8 pm, I lit my candle to commemorate Holocaust Memorial Day. Yesterday, Jewish leaders asked us to include later, less egregious events that have been committed against other groups—notably, and most recently, Chinese Uighurs. China is a superpower and we are a mid-sized state, but if the measure of a people is its moral standing, the United Kingdom has stood tall in the past and should continue to do so.

I note that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, is evaluating whether to press this amendment. I say to the House only that the amendment is modest. It seeks to prevent companies using UK telecommunications infrastructure to facilitate human rights abuses. The consumers of that infrastructure would not want infrastructure delivered to them on the back of human rights abuses. It would also give investors a steer, because they would know that the law is clearly set out, and they could make their choices accordingly. There is little that I would add, other than to say that the people of this country rightly hold their leaders to high standards, and this House should uphold those expectations.

[Baroness Morgan of Cotes (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I am pleased to speak at the Third Reading of this Bill. Like other noble Lords, I do not wish to detain the House for long, because it has taken some time to get to this stage.

I want to speak to Amendment 1, but it is worth reminding noble Lords that this Bill is, of course, intended to help the 10 million people in this country living in flats and apartments have the right to ask their landlord to help them get better broadband connectivity. This is a Bill to stop landlords failing to engage with telecoms operators. If we have learned nothing else in the past 10 months, although I am sure that we have learned plenty, broadband and better connectivity overall is now absolutely essential for people to be able to go about their daily lives in this country. As we have been hearing in the Covid-19 Select Committee of this House, the need for strong and reliable digital infrastructure will continue even after the pandemic has receded.

We have heard a very powerful speech by the noble Lord, Lord Alton. I remember him asking me the question this time last year. I will just say this to him: as he set out in his powerful speech, since the Bill was first debated last summer, events have indeed moved on. Although, as the Minister set out in her letter to all noble Lords, the amendment is not in scope, I am pleased to note that he and other noble Lords have recognised that the Minister has worked very hard to see if a way could be found to bring forward an amendment to the Bill that was in scope. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, will accept that the motivation behind his amendment and the passion and knowledge with which he speaks have been recognised and widely accepted, and are already influencing policy. He rightly pointed to the recent statement made by the Foreign Secretary as well as, of course, to the Telecommunications (Security) Bill which is being considered in the other place and will reach us.

I want also to pay tribute to the 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy which was published last month. When I was the Secretary of State with responsibility for digital, we made the decision last year about who would be able to work to roll out better connectivity. It was absolutely clear that we must not find ourselves in the situation again of being overly reliant on one supplier; we need to have more suppliers in the chain. I think that the new US Administration will help us through working together to achieve that.

The noble Lord, with his amendment, has compelled the Government to act. He has outlined the fact that there will be another opportunity, next week in the Trade Bill, for the House to consider the very important matters that he and other noble Lords have raised. For the reason that our fellow citizens need better connectivity, and that those who live in flats or apartments must be able to ask their landlords to engage in connectivity issues, this Bill is much needed now on the statute book.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I doubt very much whether the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, could ever possibly watch from the sidelines—but that is an aside.

After an unusually long gap between Report and Third Reading, we are sending the Bill back to the Commons in much better shape than when it arrived. It is still, however, a modest Bill with much to be modest about, to coin a phrase. We on these Benches have never thought that it was adequate in itself to deliver the ambition of one-gigabit-per-second broadband capability by 2025, and of course the goalposts themselves have now been moved by the Government. However, we now have the consultation on changes to the Electronic Communications Code, which is a step forward. I do hope that the Government will see the wisdom of retaining the review mechanism of the code in Clause 3, which the House inserted on Report, which can assess after that what other measures might be needed. We on these Benches will continue to press the Government on their electoral promises.

We also stressed during the passage of the Bill that we would like to see broadband treated as a utility, as with gas, water and electricity, with all the necessary and equivalent rights of entry. The last year could not have demonstrated more graphically the essential nature of good broadband to all our lives, alongside, if not ahead of, all those other utilities. We on these Benches advocate strongly for the universal service obligation to be raised to 25 or 30 megabits per second—that is, superfast levels—which should be treated as the minimum for these rural areas.

That said, I thank the Minister, the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, together with her Bill team, as ever, for their very good nature. I also thank her for her kind words, good nature and patience with us all throughout the Bill and for her willingness to listen, even if she did not always accept our arguments. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, for his collaboration and co-operation during the course of the Bill, which showed how we always achieve better results by cross-party working.

I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for raising some extremely important questions with reference to human rights abuses and modern slavery. His campaigning has clearly changed the Government’s approach and, despite what the Minister has said, it might become even more relevant in the context of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill, which, as we have heard, will come to this House shortly. Of course, the acid test will come next Tuesday on the Trade Bill ping-pong. This is of great significance in terms of the relationship between human rights and trade as a whole. Like him and many other noble Lords, I urge the Government to reconsider their position ahead of that vote.

Lastly, I thank Sarah Pughe in our whips’ office for her valuable help, and my noble friends Lord Fox and Lady Northover, who have contributed so knowledgeably throughout on different aspects of the Bill that they have given me a very easy run when leading on it.

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB) [V]]

My Lords, it is a privilege to make the concluding speech for the Cross Benches on this Bill today. I place on record our thanks to the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, and the Bill team, who have been so ready to engage with our concerns, albeit to limited avail in the end.

It was the late Robin Cook who, as Foreign Secretary, first set out a framework for the UK to have an ethical foreign policy in 1997. Given where the UK is now—debating sanctions only an hour ago against Russia in defence of human rights and democracy, standing up for the rights of people in Hong Kong and shortly to be in the process of discussing the National Security and Investment Bill—I think he would have been pleased with the progress made in the intervening period, not least with our efforts to prevent Chinese commercial enterprises, under the control of that country’s national security laws, from participating in egregious human rights violations and cashing in their profits in this country.

I first spoke to my amendment preventing firms that are a security threat operating our critical national infrastructure on 19 May 2020 in Committee on this Bill. In the intervening eight months and numerous debates, it was never my intention—and I think I speak for all other noble Lords who have led this charge; the noble Lords, Lord Alton, Lord Forsyth and Lord Adonis, joined by the Front-Bench speakers of the Liberal Democrats and the Labour Party—to prevent the necessary tools needed to roll out broadband to those who need it. Our concerns were well grounded and have, regrettably, come to pass as more information on the treatment of Chinese Uighurs comes to light.

It is also the co-operation between the House of Lords and the other place, so ably led by my noble friend Lord Alton, on these numerous amendments that has allowed us to help the Government to think through where the balance lies in relation to commerce and complicity in human rights abuses that has helped us reach this place today with our amendments. It is now for the other place to decide where that balance lies. I wish the Bill well.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Baroness Falkner of Margravine Excerpts

Consideration of Commons amendments & Lords Hansard
Thursday 4th March 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Falkner of Margravine (CB)]

My Lords, I join the Minister in congratulating our telecoms providers on rising to the challenge of providing relatively comprehensive connectivity to the nation in response to Covid.

However, I am reluctant to speak to Amendment 3 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara, other than to say that I do not support it, for the reason that it appears to place additional burdens and apportion impractical and potentially onerous rights. It would be injected into the Bill in its closing stages when we do not have the capacity as a House either to examine the issues or to reflect on the Electronic Telecommunications Code and the impact of the new rights being given to operators. My approach is that it is best not to introduce additional complexities to Bills during ping-pong.

However, I intervened on the Bill as far back as 19 May 2020 with my amendment to prevent vendors defined by the National Cyber Security Centre as high-risk. From the outset, I welcomed the aims of the Bill. My intentions were narrow and were to protect our critical infrastructure and, by definition, since that is built for the longer term—20, 30 or perhaps 40 years —to protect it from being compromised by firms that today might seem benign but in the long term may be able to jeopardise our security as technology becomes more complex.

My amendment was described as being anti-Huawei, although its wording was much broader. I owe a huge debt of gratitude to other noble Lords who joined me in that endeavour because I was constantly being told by the Government Benches that the amendment was inappropriate. However, the noble Lords, Lord Alton of Liverpool, Lord Forsyth of Drumlean, and Lord Adonis, stuck with me as we continued to argue that Huawei or, indeed, any other future telecoms provider that might jeopardise our national security should be removed from being able to operate with impunity in this country.

I truly regret that the Bill was delayed in our seeking those safeguards, but that is what we exist for here as a scrutinising Chamber. We give the Government an opportunity to think again and that is what has happened through those amendments. We currently have before us in the Telecommunications (Security) Bill the right place to discuss those matters as we go forward, and the Government have also seen the light of day on the use of Huawei.

I therefore thank the Minister for her openness throughout the year in having given us valuable time and discussing where we might go with our amendment. I thank all noble Lords who participated in the Bill for having put up with us and a slightly otiose amendment. Nevertheless, we got there in the end.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her comprehensive introduction. I agree with her emphasis on the importance of internet services and the need to eliminate digital exclusion. It is hard to think what the consequences would have been if we had suffered this pandemic just 10 years ago, when our broadband services were less extensive and much slower than now.

In the name of inclusivity, I welcome the first part of today’s business, Motion A. Throughout the course of the Bill, my noble friend Lord Fox, the noble Lords, Lord Stevenson of Balmacara and Lord Liddle, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, and others have been arguing for as inclusive a definition as possible of those who could be regarded as tenants, without straying into the territory of licensees or licences. It includes those with assured shorthold tenancies or assured tenancy agreements, as well as students living in short-term lets, where a tenant has, or tenants have, exclusive possession of the let property.

We have been concerned throughout to ensure that all tenancies such as renewable tenancies are included, even if they are not, strictly speaking, leases and that there should not be any grey areas that need to be interpreted by the courts. I am pleased that the Government have now produced an even more inclusive definition than the one that I argued for on Report. My sincere thanks go to the Minister and the Bill team for their care and consideration on what we have always regarded as an important issue.

However, I do not welcome Motion B. The original purpose of the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, which was strongly supported on these Benches—I remind the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner, that it was introduced not at ping-pong but on Report—was to ensure that the code is fit for the purpose of delivering the Government’s manifesto commitment of broadband capable of 1 gigabit per second to every home by 2025. The need for this has become even more important, particularly since the Covid-19 lockdown has demonstrated our increasing dependence on good broadband connectivity for remote working, education and many other aspects of life, as the Minister mentioned.

Sadly, it is clear that the Government are backtracking in their ambitions—the 2025 1 gigabit per second target has been watered down and the budget for rollout expenditure slashed by two-thirds. Even so, it is clear that the Electronic Communications Code needs regular review to ensure that the Government’s objective, however watered down, is met and that operators have all the rights under the code that they need.

My noble friend Lord Fox rightly commented on a universal service obligation of a miserable 10 megabits per second and I completely agree with him. However, looking to the future, I am glad that during the course of the Bill we have started a genuine debate around whether we can describe broadband as a utility and what the appropriate rights of entry are.

I am also grateful to the noble Baroness for answering what the noble Lord, Lord Stevenson, described as a blizzard of questions on telecoms supply chain diversification in her extremely informative letter last month. Some of the work being carried out on open RAN, mentioned by my noble friend Lord Fox, is ground- breaking for the interoperability and competitiveness of our 5G networks. It is good to see that international collaboration is regarded as essential and is ongoing.

However, at the end of the day I am left with a sense of bafflement. This has been a ridiculously modest Bill, given the challenges of the broadband and 5G rollout ahead. Of course, as the Minister has mentioned, we now have Access to Land: Consultation on Changes to the Electronic Communications Code, which was issued in January. Notwithstanding this Bill, it seems clear the Government think that further changes are needed to clarify the position on rights to upgrade and share. Why not an earlier consultation? Why were these issues not considered before this piece of legislation? Are these long-standing questions or are they thoughts that have arisen during the course of the Bill? Is there another Bill on the way? We know from the representations made that the operators are calling for other changes that are not included in the Bill or the consultation.

I have another quote from Matt Warman. In his introduction to the consultation he says:

“The government is committed to ensuring that the Code is fit for purpose in order to deliver our digital connectivity targets.”


That is excellent. A review of the kind envisaged in our amendment would have been perfect for that purpose. The Bill has taken an inordinate time to get through, but it is clear that more reforms are in the pipeline. The question remains: could we have been spending our time better and enacting a more comprehensive Bill with a wider range of revisions, instead of this piecemeal approach?