Future Capability of the Armed Forces

Baroness Eaton Excerpts

Thursday 16th July 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Eaton (Con)]

My Lords, I join with others in thanking my noble friend Lord Harlech for initiating this debate. This House meets to consider a question that goes to the very heart of our future national security. Just weeks ago, the Chief of the Defence Staff publicly stated that the United Kingdom is running out of time to boost its Armed Forces, and that our adversaries are definitely “raising the stakes” and risk “crossing a line”.

Let us be clear: this is not a distant, hypothetical threat; it is a present reality. Russia’s war against Ukraine has entered its fifth year; our critical infrastructure is being tested daily in cyber space and beneath our sea, and there is an assumption that the sustained decades of relative peace in Europe no longer hold. Meanwhile, the conflict in Iran has shown how trade routes can be easily disrupted and the prosperity of our nation threatened by the closure of vital international waterways that we might be required to help unplug. We must resist the temptation to treat defence policy as a matter of budgets and spreadsheets alone. To do so would be to diminish what is really at stake: the ability of this country to keep its people safe, honour its alliances and deter those who would do us harm.

This is a moment for not only ambition but candour, because the hard truth is that our war-fighting readiness has been degraded for years. It did not happen in a single Parliament and it will not be restored by a single spending review or investment plan. It is a structural problem and it demands a structural answer. The defence investment plan, which was published only recently, was meant to deliver the strategic defence review’s vision of a stronger Army, a hybrid Navy and a next-generation Air Force, yet even the Government’s own assessment points to a funding gap of billions of pounds in the years ahead, as decisions will need to be made about discretionary spending.

Even after the DIP, our defence spending will reach only 2.7% of GDP by 2027-28. This is a welcome commitment but, given that we have an objective to reach 3% in the next Parliament and 3.5% in “core defence” by 2035 to align with our NATO commitments—with no sense of where the money will come from—we are entitled to be concerned that our Armed Forces will be short-changed. Intentions and actual capabilities are not the same.

Of particular concern must be that the British Army now stands at its smallest size since the start of the Napoleonic Wars over two centuries ago. The Royal Navy is at its smallest size since the mid-17th century. We all understand and appreciate that the nature of warfare has changed and that size does not necessarily matter, but the ability to project power clearly still does. For all the technological advances promised in the DIP, mass will still count for something, and there are fears that here we are falling behind. We rightly welcome new investment in drones and autonomous systems, in the Dreadnought programme and in AUKUS. These are opportunities to modernise, to deter and to protect those who serve. Let us be honest, however: the scale of the challenge ahead means that we are beyond easy answers. Rebuilding warfighting readiness cannot happen overnight and requires a laser focus that has eluded us—by choice or by neglect—for generations.

Today, therefore, as we take note of the future capability of our Armed Forces in the current international situation, let us also use this debate as a moment of real scrutiny and ensure that we support whatever measures are required so that the men and women of our military have the capability, the equipment and the support they need to keep this country safe.