Prevent: Learning Review

Baroness Doocey Excerpts

Thursday 13th February 2025 Lords Chamber

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am responding to this Statement on behalf of His Majesty’s loyal Opposition with deep sadness. Sir David Amess was not just a colleague and friend of mine in the other place; he was a true servant of the people. His warmth, kindness, keen sense of humour and unwavering commitment to his constituents set an example to all parliamentarians. His murder was an attack on democracy itself and it is incumbent on us all to do everything in our power to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again.

The Government are right to publish the Prevent Learning Review into this case. Transparency is crucial in restoring trust in our counterextremism strategies. It is only by learning from past failures that we can strengthen our national security. The findings of the review are concerning. It is clear that the vulnerabilities of the perpetrator were not adequately assessed, that record-keeping was inadequate and that a miscommunication led to an incomplete intervention. Most concerningly, the case was closed too soon, allowing a dangerous individual to slip through the cracks. These are not minor administrative errors but systematic failings that demand urgent attention.

I welcome the fact that all four recommendations of the review have been implemented, but we must go further. The introduction of a new independent Prevent commissioner is an important step, but this role must have real teeth to scrutinise the system and hold authorities to account. The Prevent programme must be laser-focused on countering Islamist extremism—the ideology that led to the murder of Sir David. The independent review of Prevent by William Shawcross made it clear that, too often, the programme has been distracted by vague and politically correct priorities, rather than focusing on the clear and present threat posed by radical Islamism. This must change.

The Government must also address the broader weaknesses in our counterterrorism approach. The British people expect that those who pose a clear danger to our country are properly monitored and, where necessary, detained. We must ask whether current powers are sufficient. Whole-life sentences for terrorists are welcome, but we should also consider greater use of terrorism prevention investigation measures and enhanced surveillance for those who leave Prevent but remain a risk.

Additionally, this review has highlighted the crucial issue of MPs’ security. Public service should not come with a threat of violence. The Government must continue working with the parliamentary security department to ensure that MPs can serve their constituents without fear.

More must be done to clamp down on online radicalisation, which played a role in this case. Social media companies must take greater responsibility for tackling extremist content.

Finally, let us never lose sight of what this debate is truly about. Sir David’s light remains. His service, optimism and belief in his community live on. It is in his memory that we must commit to doing everything possible to prevent another tragedy of this kind. I support the Government’s effort to strengthen Prevent, but I urge Ministers to ensure that this programme never again fails, as it did in this case. We must be ruthless in our commitment to national security and unwavering in our resolve to protect the values that Sir David embodied.

What specific measures will the new independent Prevent commissioner have at their disposal to ensure greater accountability and effectiveness in countering radicalisation?

Secondly, given the concerns raised in the Shawcross review, how will the Government ensure that Prevent remains focused on the most pressing threats, particularly from Islamist extremism, rather than being diluted by other priorities?

What steps are the Government taking to enhance the monitoring of individuals who leave the Prevent programme but may still pose a risk? Should stronger legal powers, such as TPIMs, be considered?

How will the Government work with social media companies to crack down on online radicalisation? What consequences will there be for platforms that fail to remove extremist content?

Lastly, what further reforms are being considered to improve MPs’ security? How will the Speaker’s Conference ensure that lessons from Sir David Amess’s murder are fully implemented?

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, the murder of Sir David Amess highlights the urgent need to strengthen our counterterrorism strategy if we are to prevent similar tragedies in future. The terrorist threat is continually evolving. More extremists now follow multiple ideologies, or none at all, with the internet and social media fuelling self-radicalisation. Conspiracy theories, personal grievances, misogyny and anti-Government sentiment further blur the picture, making credible threats harder and harder to predict. To stay effective, our approach must adapt to this increasingly fragmented and unpredictable landscape.

The review that was made public yesterday highlights that Sir David Amess’s killer had his Prevent file closed too soon in 2016—a failure the Home Office and counterterrorism police have known about since at least February 2022. Yet, as we heard last week, less than three years on, a similar pattern of failure has been identified in the review following the Southport stabbings. This suggests that, while much may have been done to improve the workings of Prevent in the last decade, some critical lessons have still not been learned. We therefore echo the sentiments of Sir David’s family in welcoming the fact that light has finally been shone on those failings, following yesterday’s retrospective publication of the 2022 report.

The Liberal Democrats have consistently raised concerns about whether the Prevent strategy is the most effective mechanism for addressing radicalisation. Unfortunately, recent events confirm that its shortcomings are not isolated incidents, and I therefore welcome the Government’s decision to task the new Prevent commissioner with reviewing the handling of Sir David’s case. Can the Minister confirm that the commissioner will have a broad and independent mandate to conduct a thorough assessment of Prevent? Will the Government commit to placing this role on a statutory footing to ensure accountability and effectiveness?

Any comprehensive review must also examine how Prevent collaborates with stakeholders, including police and crime commissioners and elected mayors. Community engagement is central to an effective counterterrorism strategy. Can the Minister outline how local communities will be consulted in the development of future counterextremism policies?

The current system is simply not equipped to manage emerging risks effectively. We live in a world where counterterrorism casework involving young people is increasing, and more referrals are now for individuals with a vulnerability rather than an apparent ideology. To tackle both emerging and traditional forms of radicalisation, we urgently need a system that is built for the reality of modern extremism.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, for their comments and contributions and I will try to answer the questions accordingly. I begin with the praise given to the late Sir David Amess by the noble Lord. Like him, I served in Parliament with Sir David—in my case, for 28 years. I shared with him a role on the Panel of Chairs, chairing debates in committee and in the House. I found him to be an honest, open colleague who stood up for his constituency with immense passion, and I am very pleased that Southend is now a city as a result of Sir David’s campaign. I also want to remember that primarily, Sir David was a father and a husband, and his family grieve much more than we will ever know. Our thoughts are with them today.

The noble Lord and the noble Baroness talked about the failures of the Prevent system in the case of the convicted killer of Sir David. There were a number of recommendations, and six findings were highlighted in the report. The Government wanted to publish those findings to ensure that they were open and transparent, and that the concerns raised would not be hidden behind a secret report. It is right that we did that this week, and it is also important that we look at the four recommendations in the report. To date, the Government have completed all four recommendations on key issues. I hope that that will give some comfort to those who have been the victims of previous attacks.

Having said that, we recognise that there are a number of considerations. The Shawcross report, which the noble Lord mentioned, made a number of recommendations; again, the Government have accepted those. They are in the process of implementing, I think, 31 of the 32 recommendations and will complete those in due course.

The noble Lord asked whether we need to look at other forms of monitoring. The terrorism prevention measures, which are in place to monitor people who are on the radar or who have had convictions, are extremely important and the Government keep them under regular review. The noble Lord also mentioned the Prevent commissioner, as did the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey. We have given the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, a temporary position for the moment, and have asked him to do three things, in effect: a sprint review of what happened in the specific case of Southport and the murders that took place there; a sprint review of what happened in relation to the murder of Sir David Amess, now that this document has been published; and a long-term review—which may well be taken forward with the full-time commissioner, who is shortly to be appointed—of the Prevent legislation as a whole. That review will look at legislation and the operation of Prevent; examine any specific lessons learned from those two horrific incidents—Southport and the murder of Sir David; and examine whether there are any recommendations to bring back to Ministers to continue to improve the position and help ensure that we stop future murders.

The noble Lord, Lord Davies, and the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, mentioned that there is considerable focus on potential Islamist and neo-Nazi terrorism, and that that is considerably fuelled by online activity. We are committed to looking at the implementation of the Online Safety Act, which will come into real effect on 17 March this year. But my right honourable friend the Home Secretary has also written to tech companies, asking them to be very wary of what I would term illegal criminal terrorist content and to remove it, pending the Government’s own review of whether there needs to be further action downstream through the Prevent review as a whole. Online radicalisation is extremely important and is the driver of many of these sole individuals who commit horrific crimes without any organisation behind them. They learn and they mirror, and the Government are extremely cognisant of that self-radicalisation online.

I turn to some of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, made. It is extremely important that we look at the whole question of internet regulation and at the six failings that were identified and the four recommendations that we have now implemented. I recognise the concerns that have been raised, but there is still a very positive story to tell about much of what is happening in Prevent. Since Prevent was put on a statutory footing by the previous Government in 2014, and onwards since 2015, some 5,000 individuals have been referred and have successfully gone through what I will term de-radicalisation programmes, having been identified as vulnerable individuals with a range of tendencies that are driving them to potential activity. That success has been positive, even though there are terrible failings, of which the murders of Sir David and the three young girls in Southport are critical examples.

In answer to the noble Baroness, Lady Doocey, the role of the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will be to look at Prevent legislation and policy; to oversee and ensure implementation of recommendations from previous reports and reviews, including the one on Sir David; to look at the coronial process; and to look at general Prevent learning reviews. It will be independent of government: no one who knows the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, will doubt that he will be independent of government. His job is to make recommendations, raise critical issues and, along with the general political process of the House of Commons and House of Lords, hold Ministers to account on the delivery of these recommendations.

I shall end where I started. Sir David Amess was a good man. He did not deserve the death that he had. He served his constituents well, and we need to be cognisant of the fact, particularly those of us who hold public office as elected Members of Parliament or Members of this House, that what happened to Sir David could have happened to any of us, at a surgery or at a public meeting. I am extremely cognisant of the fact that we need to address this.

Going back to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, the Speaker’s Conference is looking at security. Operation Bridger, the police-Home Office response for Members of Parliament in particular, is looking at security requirements generally. On a case-by-case basis, Members of this House can be examined and supported by Operation Bridger. That is extremely important, because the key thing is that the murder of Sir David Amess was an attack on democracy in this society. It was an attack on all of us, and on all the values that bring us to this House and to the House of Commons. So, I praise his work and I mourn his loss, but our lesson from this event must be to ensure that we improve the Prevent strategy to prevent radicalisation of further individuals downstream.