Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Baroness Berridge Excerpts(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Lord Bishop of Chester
I will speak very briefly as we come to the end of this debate. As I was listening to it, I realised that there is a whole area to which we have not referred but which is entirely relevant; that is, religious institutions and places of religious instruction and education. Those are missing from the Bill. The application of the Bill to universities will have very uncertain benefits and be extremely impractical to apply in as much as universities are independent institutions. They do not always appear so to the heads of those institutions when they deal with Governments but they are independent institutions. That is a really important feature. Most of the authorities listed here are not independent in that way, although other educational establishments are included.
At some point, we need to stop beating about the bush and see that, alongside the guarantee of freedom of religious speech in our country, and the charitable status of those engaged in different religious practices and education, there is an obligation that should be stated in law. Why not? There is simply an area missing from the Bill as we have it. When the Minister replies, I wonder whether he would be willing at least to comment on the fact that, among all these authorities that are listed, places of religious instruction and education are simply not mentioned.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I rise as the last member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights—a long cast of players—to make representations in relation to this amendment. As noble Lords will be aware, the Joint Committee’s report recommended removing universities from the ambit of the Bill. However, I take on board the points made by the noble Baroness, Lady Sharp, about those in institutions for 15, 16 and 17 year-olds. I am grateful to the Minister for continuing to engage with the Joint Committee on Human Rights since we published our report. I have no doubt that what was presented to us was that there was a problem going on on campus, with certain groups holding extremist ideologies being given a platform and not being challenged on their views.
I wish to build briefly on the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Macdonald, in relation to the ambit of the criminal law here. Our response to some of these problems has obviously been to take terrorism offences and expand the ambit of the criminal law further and further down to preparatory-type offences, which we never would have envisaged 20 years ago. For instance, Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2006 concerns the encouragement of terrorism. Section 1(1) states:
“This section applies to a statement that is likely to be understood by some or all of the members of the public to whom it is published as a direct or indirect encouragement or other inducement to them to the commission, preparation or instigation of acts of terrorism or Convention offences”.
Offences such as that are designed to go further down the chain and to catch preparatory-type offences. That offence might just apply to printed published statements. I have not had the time to double-check that.
If one remembers that one adds on to all these preparatory offences the group of offences called “inchoate offences,” which are attempting to do that offence, conspiring to do that offence or inciting to do that offence. That takes the ambit of the criminal law a long way down in terms of the statements that we are talking about in this House. It has not been made clear to us what views this is aimed to prevent being expressed on our university campuses that are not within the realm of free speech, as offensive and as contrary to British values as some of us might think those views to be, but are outside the ambit of the extensive criminal law.
Finally, in relation to the point raised by the right reverend Prelate, I had assumed that religious institutions were somehow caught by the definitions of educational institutions. It is noteworthy that General Synod has an exemption under the Bill. In relation to the trust that has not been built up, perhaps because this is fast-track legislation and there has not been extensive consultation, somehow there is now concern among some in the church community that Clause 21 would require the vetting of speakers at carol services that take place on university campuses. I am not sure how one gets from Clause 21 to thinking that that might be a risk, but it indicates to me that more trust needs to be built through consultation if we are to have a clause of this nature.
Baroness O'Neill of Bengarve (CB)
I declare two interests, one as chair of the Equality and Human Rights Commission, which is thinking a lot these days about the right to freedom of expression and the challenges to it, and as a university teacher of some 40 years who has quite often not had her lectures drafted very much ahead of having to deliver them. That is a reality of academic life. I heard what other noble Lords have said about the ways these clauses could be counterproductive, but what is missing is positive thought about the ways in which universities have, not always with success but often, opened the minds of their students and countered radicalisation by the only long-term, effective method which is to discuss juvenile claims, hopes and aspirations that reveal hidden horrors within them. It is only speech that can defeat evil speech, and I hope that we will give far more thought to the positive measures that universities can take before we try in such an abstract way to construct forms of regulation that are likely to provoke what they seek to prevent.
Baroness Berridge
While the Minister is speaking of reflection, will he reflect further on the issue for charities? Under the previous Government there was a unit within the Charity Commission designed to look at the financial structures and compliance of various charities. It was discovered that a lot of extremism could be found when one looked, first, at the numbers: the finances revealed organisations that were charities to which we needed to pay close attention. We are not giving the Prevent duty to trustees of charities, who may arguably count as public. Yet the public fund an awful lot of charitable work through gift aid and so on. Surely the logic would be to extend the duty to the charitable sector. It is there to provide public benefit: that is the test that we have for charities. The unit seemed to be quite a good one. I think the Charity Commission had to decrease it, but has now increased it again, because looking at the numbers, at what trustees are up to, and at who they are connected to through the charitable structure, gives us some great information about what is actually going on.
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, Amendment 112E is in my name and I join the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, in her reasoning for it. Clause 24(8) states:
“The Secretary of State must publish the current version of any guidance issued under this section”.
However, Clause 25(1) states that,
“the Secretary of State may give directions to the authority for the purpose of enforcing the performance of that duty”.
The directions will be known to the Home Secretary and to the body in receipt of them but there is no requirement for the wider public to be made aware of the nature of these serious directions that could curtail freedom of speech. One could predict that they might be the subject of a freedom of information request but these directions should be known wider than that. I agree with the outline of Amendment 112E that Parliament, in the absence of a written constitution, is the guardian of such liberties. Producing a report to Parliament enables the matter to be scrutinised. As a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I believe that that committee could scrutinise the directions under this provision. This is a particular executive power that we exercise and it is appropriate that the provisions in Amendment 112E should be made.
Baroness Sharp of Guildford
I have added my name to Amendments 112C and 112E. It is important that the fine print of the duty is spelt out in the guidance. It is extremely important that this should be put in the public domain and scrutinised by Parliament. I very much endorse the provisions of Amendment 112C. Similarly, in relation to the Secretary of State giving directions, it is important that this is transparent and in the public domain. Including such a report would actually be after the event. The scrutiny is not before the action but after it. Nevertheless, it brings the matter to public notice. It is vital that this is scrutinised by Parliament. I very much like the notion that a copy must be sent to the chair of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. That is appropriate given the interest that that committee has shown in these provisions.
Baroness Berridge
“Part 15AFunding of terrorism: looting of cultural artefactsPanel and report
(1) Within three months of the passing of this Act, the Secretary of State shall appoint a panel to examine and report on the funding of terrorism through the looting and sale of cultural artefacts.
(2) The areas to be examined by the panel shall include, but shall not be limited to—
(a) the prevalence and scale of the funding of terrorism around the world through the looting and sale of cultural artefacts;(b) the extent to which looted cultural artefacts are sold in, or transit through, any part of the United Kingdom;(c) ways in which the practices in paragraph (b) can be reduced, including the possibility of placing a strict liability on United Kingdom auction houses in respect of the provenance of any cultural artefacts they sell; and(d) the treatment of any cultural artefacts seized by the United Kingdom authorities, including the involvement of British museums and galleries.(3) The report of the panel shall be laid before both Houses of Parliament.”
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, I rise to speak to Amendment 118B. First, I thank the charity Walk of Truth and its founder, Tasoula Hadjitofi, who drew this matter to my attention.
As I mentioned at Second Reading, it is clear that one of the streams of funding for IS in Iraq and Syria is the sale of looted religious and cultural heritage—anything from ancient coins to frescos literally hacked out of church walls. Due to the obvious difficulty of accessing IS-controlled territory, much of what we know is from reports by news outlets. Given the time, I will mention only one. In November 2014 an article in Newsweek quoted the executive director at Iraq Heritage, Aymen Jawad, as saying:
“By some estimates, these sales (of ancient artefacts) now represent ISIS’s second largest source of funding. One of its biggest paydays recently came from looting the ninth century B.C. grand palace of the Assyrian king Ashurnasirpal II at Kalhu, which is now called Nimrud … Tablets, manuscripts and cuneiforms are the most common artefacts being traded, and, unfortunately, this is being seen in Europe and America”.
Most of the reports indicate that these stolen treasures are finding their way into or through London. The news reports are confirmed by UNESCO, which has now alerted museums, Interpol, and the World Customs Organization to be vigilant,
“over objects that could come from the current looting of Iraqi heritage”.
The amendment requires the Home Secretary within three months of the Act to appoint a panel that would look carefully at this issue and specifically at the mens rea required for the offence under the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979. At the moment, the offence is committed, by auction houses and others, only where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that the goods were removed—in the case of Syria, for example—after 9 May 2011. I question whether that is sufficient, bearing in mind the current context.
The panel could investigate whether the UK should copy Germany’s law that will oblige dealers and collectors to present an export licence for where the object is coming from, in order to receive an import licence for any ancient artefact. The panel could also report on whether or how many stolen cultural and religious artefacts are coming through London. It could collate data on this matter, including how many cases the proceeds of crime unit of the Metropolitan Police is currently dealing with, which I presume has operational responsibility for this matter. Whether any artefacts have already been seized by the police and what happens to those artefacts would also be considered by the panel. If they have seized items, are the museums and galleries in London involved in helping to ensure that the artefacts are kept in conditions to preserve them, not only as criminal evidence but also to preserve their condition so they can one day be returned to Iraq or Syria? These items may require much more specialist handling than the colloquial “bagging up of evidence” to avoid contamination.
This panel would not be costly and would provide Parliament and the Government with much-needed data and recommendations to deal with the atrocious fact of stolen cultural heritage, which needs to be preserved for the time when Iraqis and Syrians can return to their homes and to the cultural heritage that should exist for them at that time. I beg to move.
Lord Renfrew of Kaimsthorn
My Lords, I certainly support the intention behind the amendment. My noble friend the Minister may well say in his reply that some of these issues are already covered by the Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act 2003. It is certainly the case that it is illegal to sell in this country cultural objects that were illegally exported from their country of origin after 2003. However, there are many new dimensions and my noble friend is right to draw attention to them. The scale on which terrorism is being funded through the sale of such artefacts gives cause for concern. I am not sure that many artefacts of this kind are being sold in this country now, but many will be in transit. As they may well be sold in the future they could still command a good price in the market.
I draw attention to one point. Proposed new subsection (2)(c) would require the examination of,
“the possibility of placing a strict liability on United Kingdom auction houses in respect of the provenance of any cultural artefacts they sell”.
This is not the occasion for a long debate on these matters. Some of them were raised in amendments during the passage of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, although they were not carried. They placed an onus on auction houses in particular to be more transparent about vendors because auction houses are not obliged to declare for whom they sell such objects and somebody selling privately on the open market is not obliged to declare from where the objects came. There is a real problem. Indeed, there have been cases recently where auction houses have offered for sale objects which, it turned out, did not have a respectable provenance and had emerged on the market by shady means. It is therefore time to place an onus on the auction houses to check the provenance of the artefacts and to be assured that they left their country of origin legally after 2003, which would comply with the Dealing in Cultural Objects (Offences) Act. However, there is at present no onus on auction houses to be clear about the source of their objects. That is a glaring loophole, and that is why I support the amendment.
Lord Ashton of Hyde
My Lords, I am grateful to my noble friend for tabling this interesting amendment and for giving due warning at Second Reading that it might be coming. It allows us the opportunity to give due consideration to the looting and sale of cultural artefacts. Of course I agree with all noble Lords who have spoken that this is a relevant issue in the context of the terrorist threat, given that such sales are often used as a source of finance for ISIL and others, as noble Lords have said. I hope that I may be able to give some reassurance.
I should stress that this is a global issue, on which all states need to respond together. That is why the United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 2195 in December 2014. This calls on all states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorism. In particular, the resolution highlights the fact that terrorists can benefit from a plethora of activities, including through the sale of artefacts. It also recognises that defeating terrorist fundraising requires a global effort.
My noble friend’s suggestion of a further examination of this issue is timely. The UN resolution already requires the Secretary-General to submit a report to the Security Council outlining efforts to address the threat of terrorists benefiting from a range of transnational organised crime, including the sale of artefacts. Notably, the report will contain recommendations to strengthen member states’ capability in relation to this issue. Rather than commission a separate report at this time, the UK will carefully consider the findings of the UN report and take appropriate action as necessary.
In addition to this, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime established an intergovernmental expert group on protection against trafficking in cultural property. In January 2014 that group finalised guidelines for crime prevention and criminal justice responses with respect to trafficking in cultural property and other related offences. Again, the United Kingdom has actively been involved in this work.
Amendment 118B proposes that a panel be appointed to explore looting and sale of antiquities for the purposes of financing terrorism and report on that subject. I hope that I have given my noble friends some reassurance on why such a requirement is unnecessary, given the UN work in this area and in light of our wider work on the issue.
As I have said, all states, including the UK, are required to stop terrorist financing, including through the sale of artefacts. The UN Security Council resolution makes it clear that there will be a report on efforts to counter the financing of terrorism-related crimes, including the sale of artefacts, which will include recommendations on how member states can strengthen their capabilities. I must stress that the UK takes the funding of terrorist organisations through any means, including through the sale of artefacts in the UK, very seriously. Instances of terrorist financing in the UK will be investigated by the police.
The UK already assesses how we can reduce all instances of terrorist financing and countering terrorist financing features in the Government’s counterterrorism strategy, Contest. The Government continually assess how best to disrupt the financing of the activities of terrorists, whether through the sale of antiquities or by other means.
Auction houses are required by law to report any suspicions of terrorist financing relating to high-value goods to the National Crime Agency. I can confirm to my noble friend Lord Renfrew that there is no suggestion that any UK companies or auction houses have been involved in terrorist financing through the sale of artefacts. Additionally, Part III of the Terrorism Act 2000 already makes it illegal to make funds available to terrorists or to enter into an arrangement that will result in funds being made available. Where there are suspicions of terrorist financing, it also creates various reporting obligations for the regulated sector, including auction houses, which are subject to criminal sanction in the event of non-compliance. Therefore, we do not see the need to impose an additional strict liability on auction houses, given that they are already obliged to raise terrorist financing suspicions with the authorities. I hope I have reassured your Lordships that the UK already has a very robust response to this important issue and plays an active role in what needs to be an international approach. I welcome the opportunity to put our work on this issue on the record and I am grateful to my noble friends for providing the chance to do so. In the light of the extensive work that already goes on in this area, I hope that my noble friend will feel able to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Berridge
I thank my noble friend the Minister and welcome what he said about the UK Government’s response to the UN report. This was an exploratory amendment around this issue but it served to distil matters. Although my noble friend stated that there is no evidence of current terrorist funding through auction houses in London, the evidence that I have received matches the comments of my noble friend Lord Renfrew. Items appear in the catalogues of auction houses in London, but when an auction house is phoned and asked whether it is certain of the origins of a particular artefact, that artefact disappears from the sale catalogue. So, clearly, through our suggestion of a panel, we have distilled the issue. As my noble friend stated, there is concern about the provenance of artefacts offered for sale here in London. I hope that my noble friend the Minister will meet us to discuss this specific issue as greater onus needs to be placed on auction houses in this context. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Specialist Printing Equipment and Materials (Offences) Bill
Baroness Berridge Excerpts(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Berridge
That the Bill be read a second time.
Relevant document: 15th Report from the Delegated Powers Committee
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, this small Bill is an important step in tackling identity crime. It had swift conduct through the other place by the honourable Member for Southend West, Mr David Amess. I will address briefly the context, the mischief that the Bill aims to address and a couple of final matters of clarification.
First, on the context, obtaining false identity documents enables criminals at all levels, from opportunistic criminals to those involved in immigration offences, serious organised crime and terrorism, to hide their tracks and evade detection. Although your Lordships will be aware of the use of false identities to commit fraud, in 2013 the National Fraud Authority showed that almost a third of UK adults have been the victim of such crime at some point, with an average economic loss of £1,200 per person. In fact, crimes using false identities now account for half of all frauds in the UK. False documents might be used to obtain a bank account, which gives the first layer of a legitimate identity that could then enable illegal immigrants to merge into society and even to claim social security benefits to which they are not entitled.
However, there is a public safety aspect to false documents. If someone knows that they will fail a CRB check to work with children, they might seek false documents and a false identity to obtain the requisite permission. People might even try to obtain a firearms licence with them if they have a previous conviction. On a visit this week to the specialist Metropolitan Police unit, Project Genesius, named after the patron saint of printing, I was shown numerous recent examples of illegal document factories which it has uncovered. Merely by downloading the hard disks from specialist printing equipment that it has seized, it has compiled a database of 94,000 false identities that are in circulation.
Project Genesius is a great example of the retailers of specialist printing equipment working together with the police to protect the public and the reputation of their industry. There are around only 1,000 retailers of this equipment. I was pleased to learn that when PC World proposed selling this equipment, it followed the police service’s request not to do so as, unlike other retailers, its systems would not have allowed the identity of the purchaser to be obtained. In fact, the consultation on this Bill showed that more than 80% of respondents favoured the introduction of this specific offence. I pay tribute to the dedication and enthusiasm of DCI Andrew Gould, Mr Gary McManus and their team at Project Genesius, which is such that other countries are now sending their officers to visit our specialist unit.
People who operate these document factories are of course prosecuted but the Crown Prosecution Service has not been able to prosecute those who have supplied this specialist equipment to criminals, even when there was evidence that the equipment was to be used for such purposes. The mischief that the Bill seeks to address is a small but important gap in the criminal law armoury: of knowingly supplying specialist printing equipment for the purposes of criminal conduct. Clause 2 defines “specialist” to cover the manufacture of relevant documents, which include passports and immigration documents, travel documents such as driving licences and blue badges, security passes, national insurance number cards, currency, credit cards, and birth, death and marriage certificates. It even includes those who make rubber stamps, as a false passport without a false UK immigration stamp can be useless.
Finally, there are a few matters of clarification. The geographical extent of the Bill will be for England and Wales. However, the Home Office is working with the devolved Administrations in Northern Ireland and Scotland, and the Crown dependencies, on these measures. It has committed to keeping them informed of the progress of the Bill. It is also important to note that false document factories are a cross-border problem, so the Bill will apply to the supply for the purpose of criminal activity occurring in any jurisdiction. If a supplier in England and Wales sells equipment to an identity fraudster knowing that they will use it to manufacture false documents, the supplier will be prosecuted whether the manufacture happens in England, Scotland, France or even Timbuktu.
Many of these specialist printing firms will also service the equipment that they have sold but the offence will take place at the time of the supply or sale of the specialist printer. If the company or an employee later becomes aware that a crime is being committed as a result of a printer supplied by their company, they will be in the same position as any other citizen, in having a moral responsibility but no legal duty to report it. However, if the company or an employee then made a subsequent sale to that person, their knowledge would be a relevant factor. I note that under Clause 3 corporations and partnerships, as well as individuals, can be prosecuted for this offence.
Finally, and in fear of sounding like I am on the National Lottery results programme, this seems to be the first appearance of the word “connivance” in an English statute. The word is not defined in the Bill and will therefore have its dictionary definition,
“willingness to allow or be secretly involved in an immoral or illegal act”.
Essentially, this is to cover implicit rather than explicit consent and will, I hope, cover those officers of companies or partnerships whose systems of reporting are so dilatory or are designed so as to avoid them knowing the information obtained by their salespeople or delivery drivers. I beg to move.
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Smith, and to the Minister for supporting the Bill. I shall deal with a couple of points that were raised.
First, on the scope, the Bill is aimed at identity documents; so while it would cover entry passes to premises and driving licences, faked examination results or qualifications would not be. Secondly, on mens rea, I made specific inquiries about why the wording is “knowingly supplying”. Making this a “recklessness” level offence had been considered but as there is a response to that, the mens rea remains “knowingly supplying”. Clause 3(1) states that the issue is whether the person who supplies the equipment “knows of the fact”. The lesser mens rea of “neglecting” or “consent and connivance” apply to the offices of a company. The Bill aims to ensure that officers cannot escape prosecution, leaving their front-desk staff, who have the knowledge, to be prosecuted alone. I hope that that clarifies the points raised.
I should cover one or two other minor matters. The craft shop sector was the only part of the industry where the police were concerned about a lack of awareness, because in order to fake a large number of documents, the forger needs hot foil which is obtainable in craft shops. Criminals go round buying up hot foil from many different shops, so the police are keen to raise awareness within the sector. I saw what these machines can do: they can print fake passports at a cost of just £300 each. I have checked and found out that, fortunately, none of the equipment seized so far has been used to try to forge parliamentary passes.
Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill
Baroness Berridge Excerpts(10 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights, I can say that the report we issued on Monday was one of the most positive during my tenure. The Government are to be applauded, as the proposals in the Bill are some of the most complex to get right in human rights terms. France has not just brought home the serious security threat that we face, which no one in your Lordships’ House denies; the French have also shown us the best of responses, namely the bold assertions of our freedoms.
It is one of the highest duties of the state to keep its citizens physically safe, but it is also for the state to enable citizens to enjoy and use their freedoms. Islamic State says that its state is actually very safe: there is no crime on the streets there, but there is no freedom. I am uncomfortable with the language that it is the first duty of the state to ensure security, as sometimes it seems like a trump card placed on the table to exclude further debate. I approach this Bill from the perspective that ensuring our security and our freedoms are two of the highest duties of the state. The principles in the Bill are admirable in performing those duties—with one caveat, which I will come to.
The power in Part 1 to seize passports is a lacuna that I was told of when I was visiting Heathrow Airport to see the Schedule 7 stop-and-search powers in operation. The officers specifically complained about not being able to stop a British citizen who was re-entering the country, question them about their travels and seize their travel documents. The report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights recommends tweaking this power, but is in principle supportive of its introduction. It is similar with the clauses relating to TPIMs. In fact, I have always been concerned about the ending of the power to relocate people, which was removed by this Parliament and arguably diminished the effectiveness of TPIMs.
Turning briefly to Part 6, I was surprised to learn from Walk of Truth, a small NGO run by Tasoula Hadjitofi and for which I hosted an event before Christmas, that IS partly funds itself through the sale of stolen religious art from Iraq and Syria. I hope that my noble friend will investigate whether Part 6 can be strengthened to ensure that there are fuller details of the origins of artefacts transported through our ports.
I join other noble Lords in saying that my tenure on the Joint Committee has been greatly assisted by the work of the independent reviewer, Mr David Anderson QC. As a parliamentarian, you are keenly aware that you lack the necessary security clearance to see the whole picture. Mr Anderson does, and his role is invaluable. I am grateful that Part 7 retains his role and I hope that the Government will take very seriously his need for additional resources in the current context.
Finally: my caveat. I think that all noble Lords are agreed about the mischief that Chapter 2 is aimed at. We need to be firm on our citizens but also need to know when they are returning from Iraq and Syria. I welcome the major changes that the Government have made to the proposed solution to this issue, which was at first said to be to exclude our citizens from the UK completely. I particularly welcome the recent concession that that power should be subject to some kind of judicial oversight. However, I still have concern about the power to temporarily exclude our citizens. Although Members of the other place now term that power “managed return”—I note that my noble friend the Minister said, “temporarily disrupt the return”—those terms are not entirely accurate. I welcome the candour of the Minister, James Brokenshire, in saying to the Joint Committee on Human Rights that it still includes a power to exclude our nationals from the UK.
Without getting bogged down in the semantics of Chapter 2, perhaps “conditional return” is a more accurate description. The noble Lord, Lord Harris, noted that those two-year terms can be renewed, so this could be a permanent exclusion. Also, there seem to be few limits in Clause 4 on the conditions that can be imposed on a permit to return. There is a very broad executive power in that regard.
Before I get bogged down in the legal-speak, I have a useful, although imperfect, analogy. Your really badly behaved teenager goes for a sleepover at a friend’s house and is so violently badly behaved that you refuse to accept him home except on certain conditions. Relations between the respective parents would undoubtedly be affected, and it is hardly conducive to wider neighbourhood relations. However evil the behaviour of our citizens abroad, are they not our citizens and our responsibility? Her Majesty’s Government were right to concede that we have to accept our citizens back if they are deported by other nations. Does that power not depend much on the co-operation of other nations if our citizens who refuse to comply with such broad conditions to return have to be detained, perhaps pending deportation to that country? Do we have to pay the costs of such detention to that other nation? What if they escape detention or house arrest and therefore commit an atrocity on foreign soil? Will we then have to compensate for the injuries and loss to that country and its citizens for failing our responsibility to allow our citizens to return?
I note the discussion of our passports. Of course, we do not have a legal right to a passport, and I do not think that this should be viewed primarily in terms of the citizen’s right to return to their own state. It is about the agreement that we have made in customary international law, as I understand it, between one nation and another. When you accept that nation’s citizens with their passports, that nation agrees to take them back at the end of their stay. It is clear that Her Majesty’s Government may be reaching agreements with other nations. Will Her Majesty’s Government be disclosing the terms of such agreements that we might reach about the treatment of our citizens? It is noteworthy to add that France, Germany, the United States and Denmark—all of whom face a similar risk to us—have not suggested that power. Perhaps that is because they have written constitutions. I have pondered on why our risk is different to theirs and why these nations have not resorted to a similar power, and have not been able to find a Government who have resorted to this measure.
It is very sad to note that only a few hours ago on the Times Twitter feed there was the report—and I will note with interest the response of Chancellor Merkel—that the anti-Islam demonstration in Dresden this evening made a demand for the German Government to ban the return of jihadi fighters. I am not that comfortable with those bedfellows in relation to this power, but with it we are in danger of undermining the fundamental aspect of collegiality in international law and international relations. The collegiality principle underpins the system that countries accept their own citizens back, without condition or permit to return, so that they can prosecute their case on their own soil. I hope that Her Majesty’s Government can answer the concern that has been raised by the independent reviewer and in the Joint Committee on Human Rights. What will we do if other nations start doing this to us, nations who may use—in our view—spurious national security reasons, such as those mounted by Burma about Rohingya Muslims, to introduce conditions for the return of their citizens to their countries? I fear some kind of long-term tit-for-tat like the Cold War, and pockets of citizens in different countries who cannot go home to their respective nations.
If we act unilaterally to introduce conditional returns, could not some nations go one tiny step further and say, “We do not want our citizens back, even if you deport them to us”? How can you rid yourself of Abu Qatada if Jordan will not take him back? I have seen the successful removal of someone from a plane here in the United Kingdom; our police and security services are indeed very impressive. I am not a soft touch. My world-view understands evil but it is not clear why we do not use the full force of TPIMs and the criminal justice system here in the UK, not at the Turkish Airlines check-in desk. Some of your Lordships have mentioned today the possible contravention of the Magna Carta, and we are rightly applauding ourselves on its anniversary this year. However, I am more concerned that the United Kingdom should still have the privilege of retaining a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council and could perhaps be seen as a poor role model in acting this way.
I am grateful to Her Majesty’s Government that they are still seeking engagement with the Joint Committee on Human Rights, due to the accelerated nature of the legislation. I hope to have my fears allayed but my final piece of preparation for today’s debate was to sit and read my passport this morning. Inside the front cover it says:
“Her Britannic Majesty’s Secretary of State Requests and requires in the Name of Her Majesty all those whom it may concern to allow the bearer to pass freely without let or hindrance, and to afford the bearer such assistance and protection as may be necessary”.
For centuries, I believe, that phraseology has been on our documents. We need to be very careful and take a long-term view of the potential risks that we run by acting in this way in relation to the validity of our passport when we travel overseas.
Immigration Bill
Baroness Berridge Excerpts(10 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, I express my gratitude to the Minister both for his amendment and for the clarifications that he has given on the guidance that will be given to tribunals. I am sure that the amendment helps to remove an element of doubt about the scope of the words “new matter”. It became clear as we discussed the matter following the debate on Report that some change was needed, and I am extremely grateful to the Minister for his willingness to listen to us and to deal with that point.
As for the guidance, I gave rather short notice of the point that the Minister has dealt with but he has dealt with it to my satisfaction. Again, I am very grateful to him for his willingness to meet us to discuss these rather tricky matters.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, first, my apologies for missing the first two sentences of the debate on this amendment. I left 1 Millbank over the road as soon as debate on the Bill started but I am not as nimble as I thought and I make my apologies to the House.
I, too, am grateful to the Minister for his reflection on this matter since Report and for the amendment that the Government have laid. I join the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in thanking him for the meeting that was arranged at short notice prior to the Recess. I, too, am grateful that the amendment narrows the definition of what the tribunal should consider to be a new matter and that what is or is not a new matter will be for the tribunal to determine according to the legislation. The narrowing of the definition is most welcome as, once the matter is determined to be a new matter, the tribunal cannot hear it without the consent of the Home Secretary.
I am also grateful for the specific guidance outlining the circumstances in which the Home Secretary will consent to such a new matter being in front of a tribunal. I am grateful for my noble friend’s explanation of what will happen if very junior counsel are in front of a tribunal when a new matter is raised and unfortunately they cannot get instructions or the file containing the necessary information.
Everything in the Government’s amendment is welcome as far as it goes but I do not think that it will come as any surprise to the Minister that I remain disappointed that the Government have not laid an amendment giving the tribunal an exceptional discretion to hear a new matter if the demands of justice require it. Justice is of course the overriding purpose of our courts and tribunals, and ordinarily the Secretary of State should be the primary decision-maker on a new matter but not if justice demands otherwise.
On Report, the constitution arguments were ably outlined by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Hope, Lord Woolf and Lord Brown. This is the first time that a party to any proceedings will have this kind of control over jurisdiction and I shall be interested to know—as I am sure all noble Lords will be—how it works out in practice. I would be grateful if the Minister could indicate whether, if this new power results in judicial review cases, there will be a way of keeping a record of the judicial review decisions in relation to the guidance and to consent being refused. Will those figures be available some time after the Bill is passed for the purposes of post-legislative scrutiny?
Lord Avebury (LD)
My Lords, the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association has pointed out that this is a meaningless amendment because a tribunal would not be able to consider a matter that was not within its jurisdiction in any case. It is disappointing that the Government have not noticeably reflected, as my noble and learned friend assured me they would, on the alternative suggestions made by my noble friend Lady Berridge, on this clause, and supported by several noble and learned Lords, to give effect to the recommendations of the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its eighth report. Your Lordships were almost unanimous in condemning a proposal to allow one of the parties to an appeal to instruct the tribunal on what matters it can or cannot consider.
My noble and learned friend the Minister did not challenge the assertion that the tribunal had not allowed abuse of its own process in the past or had treated the Secretary of State unfairly, or that the existing process was inefficient. There was no suggestion on Report that the Government had raised any concern in the past over this alleged problem, but if we concede that there might have been cases in which a new matter—which is only to be defined in guidance, as we heard—was raised, that still does not mean that your Lordships should agree to grant this sweeping power to allow the respondent to veto the consideration of the new matter, even when the reason for its last minute appearance was the difficulty in getting hold of the presenting officer, as in one of the cogent examples given by my noble friend in introducing her amendments. In such cases the presenting officer who may have been unable to get instructions from senior counsel overnight can ask for an adjournment. My noble and learned friend did not say that he knew of any instance when such a request had been refused.
My noble friend said that she thought satellite judicial review went against what the Government were seeking to achieve, but that would still be the only way of challenging a decision by the Secretary of State to prohibit the use of a proposed new matter, after the amendment that is now before us. I asked my noble and learned friend whether the Government had made any estimate of the number of judicial review cases likely to be heard as a result of this provision and what would be the estimated reduction in the savings expected from it. I received no answer. I certainly agree with the suggestion made by my noble friend just now that a record should be kept of such cases.
The main reason why the Government insist that the Secretary of State should have this power seems to be, as we have heard, that she is the primary decision-maker of right on these applications rather than the late arrival of new matters, some of which is due to the inaccessibility of the Home Office. Nobody argues with that in principle, although my noble friend Lady Berridge pointed out that the Secretary of State had, in effect, voluntarily abdicated that role by allowing officials to make such a large number of wrongful decisions at first instance.
Even if that problem is solved, there remains a serious objection to what the Government propose. The fundamental principle of the rule of law is the right to a fair trial. In his wonderful book, The Rule of Law, the late noble and learned Lord Bingham emphasised that the right applies to,
“adjudicative procedures of a hybrid kind … proceedings in which one or more parties may suffer serious consequences if an adverse decision is made”.
He goes on to mention a recent case in the Supreme Court in Canada, where the Chief Justice, delivering the unanimous judgment of the court, said that,
“a fair hearing requires that the affected person be informed of the case against him … and be permitted to respond to that case. This right is well established in immigration law”.
Thus, if the applicant is denied the right to present what may be a crucial piece of evidence, he is denied the right to a fair trial. That right trumps the Secretary of State’s right to be the primary decider. This amendment, leaving Clause 15 effectively untouched, does not cover the mischief dealt with so effectively by my noble friend Lady Berridge.
Immigration Bill
Baroness Berridge Excerpts(10 years, 9 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a trustee of the think tank British Future and as a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. In the time that has been allowed to the Joint Committee to scrutinise this legislation and whatever mechanism your Lordships’ House chooses, whether it is post-legislative scrutiny or the Joint Committee option, there are three brief matters on which I would still like to hear the comments of my noble friend the Minister. I thank him for outlining the important duties, privileges and obligations that naturalised British citizens have. As an 18 year-old on a gap year, I took what was perhaps an unwise journey to northern areas of Ghana, which were known at that time for their instability, but I had most wisely packed my British passport. When civil disturbance arose, I literally clung to my British passport, knowing that of course the embassy would help to rescue me if I needed it. At that young age, I realised what a privilege it indeed was to have British citizenship and a passport.
I will outline those three brief matters. First, much mention has been made of the potential to undermine the position of the United Kingdom in relation to human rights laws on the international stage. It is important to give two current examples. In November 2012, 31 Bahraini citizens were deprived of their citizenship for “undermining state security”. When given the opportunity to sit in front of some Bahraini politicians, I outlined the position in relation to those cases, which arose in the context of civil protest. I was met with the retort, “Well, you do this too”. “Yes”, I said, “but we don’t do it to leave someone stateless”. The second example would be that there has been much mention in your Lordships’ House of the plight of the Rohingya Muslims in Burma, who do not enjoy citizenship. I therefore struggle to see how representations could be so forcefully made about them being entitled to citizenship if the Burmese Government are able to use similar language to that being outlined in the legislation.
Secondly, although it may well be that this clause does not place us in breach of our treaty obligations in international law, as I understand it neither would reintroducing the death penalty, yet moving to re-enact that is not a trajectory that many of your Lordships would wish to see. One of the circumstances that were not commented on in Committee in your Lordships’ House is this situation. If it seems that we can deprive people of their nationality while they are, for instance, in Syria and do not then have to readmit them to the UK, what would happen in the unfortunate situation of having people within our borders who have managed to get some kind of visa to be in this country and are perhaps unsavoury if their country of origin deprives them of their citizenship, so that we are left with a little oasis of stateless citizens in the UK? I am slightly too young to remember properly the tit-for-tat diplomatic spats of the Cold War, but is it really too much to imagine that there could be a tit-for-tat deprivation of the citizenship of people in different jurisdictions around the world?
Thirdly, I would like to outline the impact on the next generation, which has perhaps not been fully explored in relation to this new power. There are, of course, implications for the nationality and citizenship of the children of those who have been deprived of their citizenship. I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister for clarifying that the power will not apply, as I understand it, to people who acquire their citizenship by way of registration, who are often the children of someone who is naturalised—such people who are under 18 acquire their citizenship by registration. I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister could outline the views of the Government about the effect on the next generation of children, who potentially have parents who are stripped of their nationality. This would make contact with that parent perhaps not impossible but significantly more difficult. Perhaps we might be at risk of sending a message to those children and perhaps having the same unfortunate effect as did certain of the powers that we used in Northern Ireland when we had a similar security situation.
Baroness Smith of Basildon (Lab)
My Lords, this has been a powerful debate. I am speaking to the amendment that I have been pleased to sign, along with the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Macdonald, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown. There is a sharp contrast with the time which was allowed to debate this issue in the other place.
I am grateful to the Minister for his comments at the beginning of the debate. I do not want to repeat the points which have been made, particularly those made more eloquently than I could do by those with legal expertise. I want to emphasise a number of points, particularly around the issue of scrutiny, which was referred to by the noble Lord, Lord Lester. This new government clause was introduced—with other amendments—in the other place just 24 hours prior to Report, all to be considered in a five-hour debate. It therefore did not receive the scrutiny that such a substantial and far-reaching clause needs and deserves. In the other place the Home Secretary admitted that,
“Members have not had as long to consider it as they would perhaps have wished”.
The Home Secretary claimed to have been “incredibly generous” in repeatedly giving way to respond to MPs’ concerns and questions, although I do not think that that was a particularly wise turn of phrase. As was made clear by my colleague in the other place, David Hanson, we were seeking to ensure that the consequences of such a significant clause had been properly thought through. The response from the Home Secretary was that the Government,
“recognise that there are consequences, and they have been considered”.—[Official Report, Commons, 30 Jan 2014; col. 1047-48.]
However, when we debated this in Committee, the responses from the Minister did not provide your Lordships’ House with the assurance that all the consequences had been considered. The noble Lord, Lord Sherbourne of Didsbury, partly quoted my comments in Committee, and I will reiterate the same point that everyone in your Lordships’ House wants to do everything possible to protect UK citizens from potential terrorist activity, both at home and abroad.
We also have to recognise that we have international obligations in this regard, as terrorism is a global threat. We all know that Clause 64 is a response to the Al-Jedda judgment by the Supreme Court, as was referred to by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood. It was clarified that the Secretary of State could not withdraw citizenship from an individual if it would leave them stateless. Clause 64 seeks to remove that barrier, and would allow the state to make an individual stateless if they are naturalised British citizens and the Government consider that they are involved with actions prejudicial to the interests of the UK. That would mean that either the former citizen remains locked in the UK, unable to leave, work or receive any support, but the Government still have obligations to that individual, or that they would be left stateless in another country and obviously not able to return.
When bringing forward such an exceptional power as this, the Government have a duty to consider the wider implications and the impact it will have. We understand that actions to tackle a threat to national or international security do at times curtail the freedom of an individual, but when such a measure is proposed it must be fully and properly considered. The process, the impact and the implications must all be fully thought through and understood.
The noble Lord, Lord Taylor, recognised the seriousness of this issue when we debated it in Committee. He said that it was right that we should have a thorough debate on the issue, after it was introduced at such a late stage and almost slipped in at the last minute in the Commons. However, the noble Lord has rejected the proposal in our amendment before the House today for scrutiny by a Joint Committee of both Houses, a dedicated committee to examine this in detail. He said that it should be debated during the passage of a Bill in your Lordships’ House.
For a debate to be effective, there must be answers to the questions raised. We are not a debating society. As the Minister has in effect acknowledged, our role in Parliament is to scrutinise and, if necessary, revise legislation. The noble Lord, Lord Lester, said in his comments that it was a complex issue. In Committee I and other noble Lords asked a number of questions in an attempt to understand how this clause would operate in practice and the impact on the individual, on public safety and on national and international security. To be effective in that scrutiny—the very scrutiny to which the noble Lord referred when introducing his amendment and rejecting our amendment—the Government must address the points we made, and answer the questions. On this very far-reaching clause, they have failed to do so.
In Committee we sought to understand the process and the full implications. What would the process be for making an order under the clause, and what would “seriously prejudicial” mean? What criteria would be considered by the Secretary of State, and what would be the process by which she would make her decision? I raised the specific case of Y1 with the Minister. In that case it appeared that the Home Secretary did not agree with the professional advice of the security services, following discussions with Cabinet members. I was not suggesting that that was necessarily wrong, but I wanted to understand if decisions could be made on political grounds. I did not receive much clarity on these points, but the Minister replied that this would affect only a small number of individuals. I have never considered that a few people being affected by a power makes it less important to consider the implications.
The Bureau of Investigative Journalism has identified 15 cases, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, also referred, in which the person was overseas at the time. It has also shown that the use of that power gradually increased under this Government, from roughly one case each year in 2010 to eight in 2013. However, when asked for more precise information—for example, on how many of the individuals whose citizenship was removed were in the UK and how many were outside the UK at the time the decision was made—the Minister refused to give us more detail on the grounds of national security. I am not sure that I fully understand why giving the numbers involved, rather than specific information, is a danger to national security.
The Government have clarified that this new power could be used against people whether or not they are in the country, and whether or not they can acquire another nationality. They have stated that they would expect those who can acquire another nationality to seek to do so, but have no answers on what happens if that fails. There remains a lack of clarity on what happens to people who have their citizenship removed while they are in the country. This is an important point, as this clause is designed to deal with those whose activities are of concern, and indeed those who may be a danger.
Mr James Brokenshire, the new Immigration Minister, said that in the event of a person remaining in the UK they could be granted limited leave, “possibly” with conditions, and the UK would have certain legal international obligations under the UN convention. He expanded on that in a letter to the Constitution Committee, in which he wrote:
“For those living in the UK, we may grant another form of immigration leave, depending on the person’s circumstances … Crucially this will not attract all the privileges associated with being a British citizen; they would not be entitled to hold a British passport, to vote or to have full access to public services”.
The Minister confirmed this in writing to us after the debate. He also added that, in certain circumstances when the person cannot return to their country of origin, “it may be necessary” to provide them with exceptional leave to remain of some kind or another. Does this mean therefore that people would be trapped here, and we would not be able to deport them but would still have obligations towards them? How does that help to ensure that national security is protected?
What happens if someone is in another state when the decision is taken? What happens if they cannot be contacted? The Minister said that they would have the full right of appeal, but they cannot have this if they cannot be contacted. How can someone be notified in such circumstances, or avail themselves of any review of the decision? What about children who may be left behind? What will be the obligations of the state these children are in when their parent is made stateless? What will be the obligations of the state in which the person is made stateless?
Immigration Bill
Baroness Berridge Excerpts(10 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Berridge
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I declare an interest as a trustee of the think tank British Future. I apologise that this my first speech in your Lordships’ House on the Bill although I am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and have been involved in considering this Bill from an early stage. I have been grateful for the comments of my noble and learned colleagues, and I accept that the amendment is not perfect. It was intended to raise this matter in Committee, but unfortunately your Lordships went rather quickly and a time limit was missed.
I thank the Minister for the lengthy and detailed correspondence that he has engaged in with the Joint Committee on Human Rights. As I hope noble Lords will realise, there are important points of principle in Amendment 10. There is no suspicion of the matters that were properly raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Smith. I think all parties share the concern about the difficulties that are faced in deporting foreign criminals, but that is not part of the principled and mature correspondence that has passed between the JCHR and the Government.
This amendment reflects the view of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and provides a more appropriate solution to a problem that it is accepted has arisen in the tribunal. The tribunal hears appeals from immigration decisions made by the Home Office. The Bill in my view breaches a constitutional principle that you cannot be both a party to a case and determine how it is heard. In colloquial terms, you cannot be both the football referee and the captain of one of the teams.
The problem that has arisen in the tribunal is that the law changed in 2002 and introduced the one-stop appeal notice, which meant, sensibly, that the tribunal should deal with all the immigration issues concerning the person before it in one hearing. This has largely prevented the proliferation of appeals from different claims made consecutively by the same person that was bogging down the immigration appeals system.
However, following the statutory instructions to hear everything together, the tribunal has developed the practice of hearing new matters that have arisen, perhaps even on the morning of the hearing, there and then. The new matter is determined by the tribunal without the Secretary of State first having made a decision on it.
I always find it hard to grasp issues in the abstract, and I thank the practitioners who make their living going daily in and out of the First-tier Tribunal for having helped me enormously in the past few days. A typical case might be where a person is appealing a Home Office decision to refuse an asylum case; for instance, because they fear persecution as a Baha’i believer from Iran. However, they come to the hearing with a new wife who is a British citizen, meaning that they now have a Human Rights Act claim in addition to the asylum claim. Sometimes the tribunal will adjourn the asylum appeal to give the Secretary of State an opportunity to make a decision on the new claim for family life, but it may say that as everyone is there, all the evidence is present in court and the appellant has a serious illness it should get on with it and decide the matter there and then.
It is this situation that the Government wish the Bill to change. Section 85(5) will meant that the tribunal must not consider the new matter—the claim to family life—unless the Secretary of State has given consent for it to do so, so a party to the proceedings has to consent to the judge hearing that new matter. The scope of the tribunal’s jurisdiction is dependent on the consent of the respondent to the appeal. If I am counsel in the case, I feel I must turn away from the judge towards my opponent and start making submissions, pleading for consent for the new matter to be raised. That would be a most unusual situation. That was conceded by the Government in a response to a question by the Joint Committee, in which they stated,
“as far as the Home Office is aware there are no other similar provisions in other statutory contexts”.
This would be new law.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I appreciate the noble Lord’s comments and help, which I know are made with a view to trying to resolve this matter. I assume the noble Lord means that his suggestion would be preferable to judicial review. The withholding of consent by the Secretary of State would, of course, be challengeable by judicial review but one is well aware of the attendant costs of that and a new application and appeal to the tribunal may well be cheaper and, possibly, quicker.
I must make it very clear that I am not giving any undertaking to bring this back at Third Reading, but I do undertake that it is fair and proper to reflect on the comments that have been made. On that basis, I invite my noble friend to withdraw the amendment.
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, I thank the mainly noble and learned Lords who have spoken, predominantly in support of the amendment. I am obviously disappointed by the Minister’s response to the concerns which have been properly outlined. He cites that it is a clear question of principle that the principal decision-maker is the Secretary of State, but the overriding interest in this matter is the principle of justice. As in the circumstances that I outlined, a matter may remain before the tribunal solely because a barrister makes every effort to avoid being at the hearing and cannot get hold of the Home Office to get a fresh decision made, and yet the tribunal is not allowed to take that conduct into account at all in determining whether the court can take the new matter—which may be impinged on by illness—into account. In these circumstances, one can only imagine the sense of injustice that will be felt, not only by the appellant but by their legal representatives who have gone to every effort to avoid that situation occurring.
I have listened carefully to my noble friend who says that there is no guarantee about bringing this back at Third Reading but that the Government will reflect on this matter. My knowledge of the Companion is not detailed enough for me to understand whether I am entitled to bring it back at Third Reading to determine the matter because I have never heard that phrase before in my three years in your Lordships’ House.
Earl Attlee (Con)
My Lords, it would entitle the noble Baroness to bring it back at Third Reading.
Baroness Berridge
I thank my noble friend for his clarification. I also ask the Minister to consider the resources that will have to be put behind presenting officers and barristers, who are often very junior. If consent has to be given on the day of the hearing you are going to have to get hold of the Home Office to get instructions on whether to give consent there and then, otherwise we can have yet another thing clogging up the system. I have tried to be generous to the junior barristers: there is nothing worse than getting the papers at 5 pm the night before and trying to do the best you can for your client.
Finally, I am incredibly disappointed because, as a Conservative, I believe in a small state. I never thought that I would have to defend the state trying to dip its toe into interfering with judicial proceedings. I thank noble Lords for their support but, with the clarification that we can, perhaps, bring this matter back at Third Reading, it is with great regret that I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Berridge Excerpts(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Lord Bishop of Ripon and Leeds
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for the way in which he introduced this debate and to the Minister for those comments and his response. My colleague the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle has added his name to this amendment, thereby expressing the concern of these Benches, in particular with regard to the work and worship at Westminster Abbey and St Margaret’s parish church. I am sorry that the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Newcastle is unable to be with us today. However, it is a particular delight to welcome the very reverend Dean of Westminster, as he exercises his constitutional right to sit on the steps of the Throne of this House.
The Abbey has suffered, as the noble Lord, Lord Deben, was saying, as a result of what is often quite unintentional disturbance of its worship, and its role as a place of prayer and the worship of God. It is important to affirm absolutely both the right of protest, with the human rights which are involved in being able to protest, and, at the same time, the right and duty of the Abbey to maintain its pattern of prayer to God, particularly in view of the way in which it stands for the spiritual nature and concerns of this nation, and of our monarch and the Royal Family. Our daily prayers here with your Lordships stress particularly the needs of this realm and of the monarch. Westminster Abbey is a unique testimony to prayer for those needs, and there is a need at this point to ensure that the Abbey is able to fulfil that particular task which it has in the life of both the church and the nation. I support the amendment and am grateful to the Minister for his generous words about it.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I, too, support the amendment. Just hearing the outline of the different authorities involved when there are issues with protests outside the front of Parliament leads me to the view that without this amendment, enforcement has not perhaps been as easy as it could be. I take into account that Westminster Cathedral does not have this issue, merely by virtue of the fact that the Abbey and St Margaret’s are positioned outside Parliament.
We have done much hard work to ensure that the work of the House of Commons is not disturbed; we should afford the same privileges to the Abbey and St Margaret’s, which are in this unique position. Perhaps most persuasively, it is not just that there is worship there and wedding services. I am aware of this because I often cut through the Abbey’s yard. The young people being educated there and the people living there are, I am sure, also disturbed by the protests. This is a reasonable accommodation of the right to protest and the freedom of worship, while allowing people in their residential and educational roles to be uninhibited. I will be supporting the amendment.
Lord Rosser
The Minister has reminded us that when a very similar amendment was considered in Committee he, as the Minister, said that the issue was how the existing by-laws were enforced rather than that the existing powers were inadequate. It was in that context that he proposed holding the meeting to which he referred, and which has now been held. It would be of some interest if the Minister were in a position to tell us, in the light of that meeting, why on the face of it Westminster City Council and the police were not able to enforce the powers that he said were already there and were adequate to deal with the situation that we are addressing.
Presumably, Westminster City Council must have had something to say on that, as did the police, since they were present at the meeting which the Minister held. He said in Committee that he needed to satisfy himself that the existing provisions were not being enforced by the council and the police, so it would be helpful to know what those two bodies had to say when they were asked why the existing provisions were not being enforced.
I appreciate that the Minister has said that there are different penalties. He referred to penalties of £5,000 against the £500, I think, under the powers for Westminster City Council, and to differences over no pre-notification for noise. That does not fully explain why the existing by-laws were apparently not being enforced. It would be helpful if the Minister could comment on that.
Since the Minister said that it is his intention to leave it to the House, I would make just one other point. The Minister said in Committee—I use his own words—that we need to be,
“very careful about taking any action that may impact disproportionately on people’s right to protest and their freedom of speech”.—[Official Report, 25/11/13; col. 1215.]
How is the Minister satisfied that we are being careful about not taking any such action, since I assume that that matter will have been discussed at the meeting which was held and to which he referred?
Syrian Refugees
Baroness Berridge Excerpts(11 years ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
The noble Lord rightly points to the need for a political solution because that is the long-term solution to all these difficulties. The catastrophic turn of events in Syria points to the need for finding a solution in which freedoms are established and people can enjoy freedom of expression and freedom of worship in ways that we would consider acceptable in this country. It can be achieved only through success at the conference, which I believe is on Wednesday. Let us wish the conference well.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for clarifying that 1,100 people have been granted refugee status, but I think it would be useful to have further clarification. How many of those people were already in this country when they applied for asylum, and how many have very dangerously made their way to our shores and claimed asylum? It seems that with the latter situation we are enabling some of the most able who can travel to come to our shores to get refugee status and not some of the most vulnerable, who have been processed by the United Nations and who are desperately in need of refugee status, to gain that status. Can the Minister reassure us that, post Geneva II, there will be a reconsideration of the Government’s policy, particularly in relation to our taking orphans from these camps who have no basis to go back to Syria, whatever the political settlement may look like?
Lord Taylor of Holbeach
I make no commitments on the latter point, and I cannot give a breakdown of the location of the asylum seekers—the 1,100 Syrian nationals—who have been successful in their applications. I know that 1,566 Syrians applied for asylum in the year ending September 2013, the latest data we have. The UK is the largest recipient of asylum seekers from Syria behind Germany and Sweden.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Berridge Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Faulks (Con)
My Lords, I would like to address the House on this clause. As the Minister will be aware, I am very much in favour of the architecture of this Bill and very sympathetic to its aims. However, as in life, not everything is perfect, and I fear that I cannot give my endorsement to this clause, which gives the court additional powers to order possession in relation to secure and assured tenancies in the event that the,
“tenant or a person residing in the dwelling-house has been convicted of an offence which took place during, and at the scene of, a riot in the United Kingdom”.
That distinguishes it from other parts of Part 5, which are concerned with matters that take place in the locality—or the vicinity, as the noble Lord, Lord Greaves, would have it.
I understand that the additional ground for possession has been included in the Bill to reflect the seriousness with which the Government view participation in riots, particularly those on a scale seen in this country during the summer before last. Those who committed offences during the riot on that occasion were dealt with speedily and firmly. Sentences of imprisonment were the norm, and some were lengthy. To some extent, one could say that they were deprived of the right to remain in a dwelling house by that very process. The courts have sufficient powers to deal firmly with offenders caught up in a riot and appeals against sentences were, for the most part, unsuccessful. The criminal justice system—some would say “for once”—in general responded very well to what occurred.
I am concerned that this measure is a step too far. While a court would still have to be satisfied that it was reasonable to grant possession, the fact that the relevant offence can be committed not only by the tenant but by someone residing in the dwelling house means that a tenant wholly innocent of involvement in a riot could potentially lose their home. I do not think that this is a necessary or appropriate provision, given all the other powers that exist elsewhere in the Bill. I am also concerned that what is essentially a procedure by way of civil remedy should carry with it a criminal offence of this sort connected with the civil recovery of possession. Although I share the Government’s concern that those involved with riots should be dealt with in a way that sends out a message to any potential rioters, I take the view, as did the Joint Committee on Human Rights, of which I am a member, that this clause is a step too far.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, I, too, am a member of the Joint Committee on Human Rights and wish to speak to Clause 91. I sympathise with the Government’s reasoning and motivation for this additional ground for possession being included in the Bill and appreciate the strong signals that are needed for people involved in rioting. I was in London in the summer of 2011 so I can directly share the concern of the Government and the general public about the serious nature of the offences of those who participate in riots, especially on that scale. However, as my noble friend Lord Faulks outlined, the criminal courts have sufficient powers to deal with those matters. If I recall correctly, some courts even sat through the night, and many offenders were clearly extremely shocked to be sentenced to a period of imprisonment. The criminal courts were not found wanting and sentences reflected the gravity with which the judiciary viewed this behaviour.
It is important to note the distinctive nature of the power in Clause 91. Unlike the powers in Clauses 86 to 90, this power is exercised in relation to behaviour that is not necessarily either of any impact on the landlord or in relation to the premises themselves or connected to the dwelling house. I also share the concern of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd. When speaking of the old ASBO regime, he stated that we are,
“using the civil law to do the work of the criminal law”.—[Official Report, 18/11/13; col. 750.]
Repossessing premises is a civil law matter, but this provision is akin to bringing criminal penalties for riot into our civil courts. As my noble friend Lord Faulks has outlined, the courts have to be satisfied that it is reasonable to grant possession. However, the fact that the offence can be committed not only by the tenant but by someone residing in the dwelling house means that a tenant wholly innocent of involvement in rioting could lose their home. That is unjust.
Such a tenant could argue that Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects their right to a family life and home. However, such arguments can often be lengthy and expensive. Many of these arguments will end up being funded by the taxpayer. Although I share the Government’s concern that rioting should have potentially serious consequences, I am left wondering why if rioting is a ground for repossessing premises, other serious offences, such as paedophilia, are not. I maintain the view recorded in the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. This clause will be an unhelpful precedent.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab)
My Lords, a few weeks ago I was quite taken aback when I received from a Conservative Peer a message of glowing tribute for the two speeches I had made in the Chamber that day. Since I had not been anywhere near the Chamber that day I was somewhat mystified, and that is why I want to make it clear that the speech before last was not made by me, but by someone with a similar name. The noble Baroness currently in the chair and I also have the same sort of problem from time to time, except that there is one big difference between her and me which is fairly obvious. I do not mean politics, I mean gender. So I want to make it clear that the speech before last was made by the noble Lord, Lord Faulks: F-A-U-L-K-S. I say that because if I just pronounced it, Hansard would not know what on earth to do.
I have a further point. Had I been making these points in another place with the noble Baroness, Lady Fookes, in the chair, she would have ruled me out of order long before now, but that does not happen here. My point is that that the numbering and lettering of these amendments is even more confusing than the confusion between our three names. I hope the clerks will look at some more logical way of numbering and lettering amendments. After all, 56 is not the only number that you can use for an amendment. There is 57 for example, and so on. These As, Bs, Cs, Ds and so on are most confusing. However, I am going on too long, taking up time now when I am looking forward to speaking in order, substantially and importantly, on attacks on shopkeepers and public service workers later in the Bill.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Baroness Berridge Excerpts(11 years, 2 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Wigley (PC)
My Lords, I shall speak to Amendment 20GA, which is tabled in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins, and is coupled with this group. It seeks to address concerns that the Bill does not adequately take account of the likely impact which these new provisions will have on people with a learning disability. The amendment says:
“Consideration should be given to people with a learning disability in the issuing of an injunction to ensure they are not discriminated against”.
It may not be the most elegant English, finishing with the word “against”, but I think the gist is generally understood. I should also declare my interest as vice-president of Mencap Wales.
As we heard in the debate on the previous bank of amendments, the Bill introduces civil injunctions to prevent nuisance and annoyance—IPNAs as they are called. These may be imposed if the court considers it “just and convenient” to prevent anti-social behaviour. The Joint Committee on Human Rights, in scrutinising the Bill, highlighted that this is a lower test than the test of necessity, as required by human rights law. Furthermore, it considered that the new IPNA definition of anti-social behaviour is broad and unclear.
This has set alarm bells ringing with Mencap and others who work with people with a learning disability, fearing that this will lead to IPNAs being used inappropriately. As many know, people with a learning disability are disproportionately likely to be victims of anti-social behaviour. Mencap's report Living in Fear found almost nine in 10 people with a learning disability had experienced bullying, harassment or some form of anti-social behaviour.
The root of this, of course, is attitudinal and is based on the value that we as a society place on disabled people. In some people's eyes they are different and sometimes regarded, sadly, as dangerous. This was brought into sharp focus by the recent murder of Bijan Ebrahimi. Bijan was a disabled man picked upon for being different on his estate in Bristol. He suffered from low-level harassment before being accused of being a paedophile. He was questioned by the police, who found him innocent, but unfortunately by this point rumours had begun circulating that he was a child abuser and two days later he was brutally murdered.
My concern is therefore that a lower threshold for IPNAs, together with a murky definition of anti-social behaviour, will result in these new injunctions being used out of misunderstanding, fear and ignorance of people with a learning disability, and of behaviour that might be associated with their impairment. It could also lead to a rise in vigilantism and will do nothing to improve people’s understanding of the needs of disabled people.
There is also a fear that victims may in turn be branded perpetrators. For example, a person with a learning disability might be continually verbally abused by a neighbour. What if that victim is at the end of his tether and snaps, so to speak, at the neighbour? Such behaviour might in turn result in an IPNA being placed on that individual. The Bill sets out examples of certain prohibitions and requirements in Parts 1 and 2, and the amendment would include consideration of learning disability at this juncture. Such a step, if backed by robust guidance, would undoubtedly go some way towards meeting these concerns. I hope that the Government might look at this area further, not least because I understand that no equality impact assessment of the Bill has been carried out to date. I look forward to hearing the Minister’s thoughts on these matters.
Baroness Berridge (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 20 was recommended by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in its fourth report—a committee on which both my noble friend Lord Faulks and I serve. Amendment 20 is a modest compromise and adds an element of reasonableness or objectivity, giving the test more rigour, and will aid the authorities and other agencies. It will enable them to better explain their refusal to act on behalf of some people who just have different views on what they should have to tolerate from their neighbours and other people in the neighbourhood. I agree with my noble friend Lord Faulks that at this earlier stage, the test should have a reasonableness requirement, as it is at this stage that the officials of the authorities outlined in Clause 4 have to consider that behaviour.
As has already been outlined, reasonableness and proportionality are a requirement that the judiciary has to take into account when granting an injunction. This means that there will be reasonableness applied in the test by the officials and, of course, by the court rather than having a more subjective test by the officials and only later on encountering the reasonableness threshold. I spoke at Second Reading about the inordinate lengths to which witnesses have to go to collect the necessary evidence to get an ASBI or an ASBO. Merely adding after “conduct” the words “that might reasonably be regarded as” does not increase the evidence that has to be gathered and I therefore support this amendment.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, I will add a brief word to what has just been said in support of Amendment 20. The words “any person” at the end of Clause 1(2) are rather important; I would have thought that they make it all the more important that the words which the noble Lord, Lord Faulks, has suggested are put in. Without that, one would have the very difficult task as a judge of having to assess the evidence of one individual and deciding whether that individual is to be believed. If that individual says that he or she has been annoyed or suffered a nuisance, it would be quite difficult to say that the test was not satisfied. The reasonableness test is the one which would soften this and make it more realistic, and I would have thought that it was compatible with the general aim of the measure.
Baroness Hamwee
My Lords, I say in response to my noble friend’s point about education and training, “Call me legalistic”. The noble Lord, Lord Harris of Haringey, is very bold in raising these important points. He used the phrase “bona fide” several times in his speech, as well as in the amendment. Followers of paganism would say that their religion was bona fide. As the noble Lord was speaking, it occurred to me that a call to prayer at a very early hour is very annoying to some people, but would one challenge that? He raises bold and brave questions.
Baroness Berridge
My Lords, I refer to the report of the Joint Committee on Human Rights. The examples raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Harris, all seem to relate to the manifestation of somebody’s religious beliefs. The report states that the holding of religious beliefs by any individual is an absolute right under both the European convention and in international law, under Article 18 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. It is only the manifestation of one’s religious or humanist beliefs that can be restricted by a country on certain grounds, as defined in European and international law. Would the Minister please outline why the Bill, as currently drafted, only allows prohibitions and requirements to,
“so far as is practicable … avoid any conflict with the respondent’s religious beliefs”?
It should, surely, be the manifestation of those religious beliefs that the Bill is aimed at.
Lord Ahmad of Wimbledon (Con)
My Lords, in standing up and responding I feel like the Jedi knight next to the Jedi master. May the Force be with us all.
Amendments 20F and 22CA raise an important point in respect of the duty on the court to ensure, so far as is practicable, that any prohibitions or requirements attached to an injunction do not conflict with the manifestation—as my noble friend so eloquently put it—of the respondent’s religious beliefs. In line with the Equality Act 2010, reference to religious beliefs should go further than so-called “traditional” religious beliefs. I believe that this can be covered in guidance but I would like to go away and consider further the points made by my noble friend. We can return to the wording of this section if required. I hope my noble friend will accept my assurance that we will further consider this point and those made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights.
I turn to the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Harris. I support the words of my noble friend Lady Hamwee: he raised bold and challenging concepts. As I said, in response to an earlier amendment, what may be perceived as perfectly acceptable to one person may not be acceptable to another. The courts are used to considering a person’s religious beliefs and do not need to be told that they can reject beliefs if they are spurious. In addition, to try to second-guess what would, in the words of the amendment, constitute activities “that would normally arise” is very difficult given that two people of the same religion may have different ways of practising their faith. I am a Muslim and there are 73 different denominations within Islam. During Ramadan, the time of your fast can differ depending on where you are. One obviously prefers to be at a place where the fast closes as the sun sets rather than when the sun is set totally. That is a practical illustration from a faith which is widely recognised.
The crucial point here is that, in considering an injunction, the court must avoid, so far as is practicable, any conflict with the manifestation of a respondent’s religious beliefs. If that is not practicable because, for example, avoiding the conflict would result in the respondent engaging in further anti-social behaviour purporting to be religious practice, the court would not be prevented from imposing prohibitions or requirements that it considered appropriate. This is something we can safely leave to the courts; they are more than capable of assessing the bona fide status of a respondent’s religious practice without express provision and, indeed, we have recently seen examples of that.
Amendments 20G and 22CB, tabled by my noble friend Lord Greaves, raise another important point. As we have made clear, the injunction should be available to help turn a troubled person’s life around, especially when they are young and impressionable. As such, it would not be helpful for requirements or prohibitions to unnecessarily stop them engaging in constructive training.
However, what is considered as training by some may not be worthy of special consideration by the court and some will try to use this term to delay the court’s process. Where training is worthy of consideration it is likely to be linked to an educational establishment or even a formalised work placement and, as such, is already provided for in the Bill. My noble friend also raised the issue of different wording in different parts of the Bill. We recognise that Clause 34(3) imports the word “training” whereas Clause 5(1) does not. I will certainly reflect on those two variations and return to them as required.
For the reasons I have given, I hope that my noble friend Lord Greaves will withdraw his amendment and that the noble Lord, Lord Harris—notwithstanding the important issues that he raised—will not press his.