Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Baroness Barran Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th July 2021 Grand Committee

In terms of horizon scanning, we need resources far beyond our own. It is therefore vital that we work closely with others. As the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, said, these amendments would improve the Bill in terms of its central aims. I therefore commend the amendments to the Minister.

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Baroness Barran) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for tabling these amendments and for his very generous opening remarks. He reminds us that we must remain vigilant about current and emerging threats to our telecoms networks. Rightly, he also urged the Government to communicate how we will do that in a way that makes sense to the public. Today, we are focusing on this Bill and how it is designed to protect our networks now and into the future.

As we heard, Amendment 18 calls for a body to be set up for the purposes of monitoring current and emerging threats to our telecoms sector. The amendment lists a number of committees, departments, organisations and agencies that should be represented on this body.

The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, asked: if not here, where? I will try to answer that question in my remarks.

I assure noble Lords that we already have established procedures to monitor current and emerging threats to the telecoms sector. The National Cyber Security Centre undertakes regular risk assessments of such threats, and those assessments are used to inform government policy. For example, the code of practice the Bill will allow us to issue will be informed by the National Cyber Security Centre’s assessments.

In addition, the Government already have forums in which emerging threats and new technological developments are discussed with industry. The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked me to give examples of a particular domestic focus. This is one of them. For example, the National Cyber Security Centre’s network security information exchange is a trusted community of security professionals from across the telecoms sector who come together on a quarterly basis to discuss openly and share information on security issues and concerns. There are also established channels for the kind of cross-government and interagency working that the noble Lord’s amendment seeks to formalise. The Government do not see that it would be necessary to establish a new body corporate, which would simply risk duplicating the work of existing forums.

The noble Lord’s amendment would also make provision for Parliament to receive annual reports on current and emerging threats from this new body. The National Cyber Security Centre already publishes guidance as and when threats develop. Furthermore, as noble Lords are aware, the Intelligence and Security Committee is able to see and scrutinise the National Cyber Security Centre’s assessments of current and emerging threats. Given that there is already this provision for parliamentary oversight, I do not consider that laying a report before Parliament annually would be necessary.

Amendment 25 would require the Government to publish a long-term telecoms security and resilience strategy, covering various topics set out in the amendment, within six months of the Bill’s Royal Assent, and would require this strategy to be laid before Parliament. The Government share the noble Lord’s desire to ensure that this country is fully prepared to overcome future challenges to the security of our telecoms networks. However, the publication of such a strategy is, we feel, unnecessary because recent government reports and announcements, publicly available, already address these topics. The noble Lord will be aware that the Bill is the result of the recommendations put forward in the UK Telecoms Supply Chain Review Report, published in July 2019. That report, along with the Government’s announcements last year, has already set out our strategy for addressing telecoms security risks, particularly relating to supply chains.

In addition, we published our 5G Supply Chain Diversification Strategy last November. This includes our strategy for collaborating with allies on future network research and development, and influencing global telecoms standards. As I will touch on when we debate Amendments 24 and 28, this work is progressing well and the Government’s response to the recent diversification taskforce report, published earlier this month, sets out the steps we are taking to deliver on our goals.

More broadly, the Government’s approach to telecoms security and resilience is informed by cross-government priorities. These include the integrated review, published in March, which committed to launching a new comprehensive cyber strategy this year. The strategy will set out how we will build up the UK’s cyber resilience, deter our adversaries and influence tomorrow’s technologies so that they are safe, secure and open.

Alongside this, a national resilience strategy will ensure that our suite of systems, infrastructure and capabilities for managing the full range of resilience risks becomes more proactive, adaptable and responsive to future threats and challenges. Work is well under way to develop these cross-cutting strategies, and we will ensure that our approach to telecoms security and resilience continues to take them into account.

I think the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, know very well that there is a tension between having a greater degree of focus in a strategy and a wider scope. We believe that we have struck the right balance in this area.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about cyber deterrence. He may be aware that the Government will shortly bring forward legislation to counter state threats of the type he described. It will create new offences, tools and powers to detect, deter and disrupt hostile state activity by states targeted at the UK. He also referred, in the context of future-proofing, to the National Security Council. Among its responsibilities is examining forward-looking strategies.

The noble Baroness, Lady Northover, mentioned the role of the FCDO. Of course, she will know that the First Secretary of State provides leadership across departments to ensure that the Government’s response to cyberthreats and our ambition as a cyberpower are fulfilled.

My noble friend Lady Stroud talked about the Government being asleep at the wheel in relation to Huawei. I think that is a little harsh. The Government have always considered Huawei to pose a relatively high risk to the UK’s telecoms networks compared with other vendors. A risk mitigation strategy has been in place since Huawei began to supply equipment to UK public telecoms providers. Obviously, the Government have announced extensive advice to manage those security risks based on the work of the experts at the National Cyber Security Centre. Most recently, the Secretary of State announced advice that providers should remove all equipment made by Huawei from 5G networks by the end of 2027.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked about the presence of security experts on the recently announced diversification council. I can confirm that a senior official from the National Cyber Security Centre will attend to provide that expertise.

The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, asked what parliamentary scrutiny there was of Ofcom. The chief executive and other senior officials from Ofcom give regular evidence to parliamentary Select Committees, including an annual scrutiny session with the DCMS Select Committee, and it also lay its annual report and accounts before Parliament.

I hope I have managed to address most of the points raised and to reassure your Lordships that, while we recognise the very valid questions that have been asked, we believe that we have the balance right in terms of co-ordination and strategy. With that, I ask the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

I thank the Minister and other speakers for this debate, which is really important. The Minister was basically saying in her response, “Don’t worry, we’ve got this covered.” If the Government did indeed have it covered, I suggest that ripping out 40% of the 5G network at the cost of several billion pounds to the industry is a pretty poor cover. The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, that it took Back- Benchers to highlight this rather than the Government was particularly apposite.

The Minister portrayed the decision to remove Huawei almost as if it was a success of the process. Will she acknowledge that these billions of pounds are growth that we will not get, that they are investment in this country that has been wasted, and that it has put the country in danger in the process? Will she further acknowledge that there might be others who are able to help in the process of avoiding a repeat of what is a huge debacle?

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I tried to present the breadth and depth of approaches that the Government are taking to address this incredibly serious and complex problem. If I may borrow the word used by the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, we have tried to show some agility in responding to changing circumstances. The noble Lord will be aware that there were changes to the US foreign-produced direct product rules in May 2020 which changed the risk profile of our engagement with Huawei, and we acted on that, so I do not feel that I have to apologise at this point.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for her reply and for again seeking to answer the questions. We may well have to come back to some of this, but I take the point that the Government are seeking to address current and emerging threats; I just think that this needs to be more clearly stated in the Bill. The Minister gave examples of cross-government working. We all know that there are examples of cross-government working, but the Committee is saying—I think that there was agreement across the Committee—that sometimes there is a need for a mechanism to ensure that it happens. It may be that another body will do that more effectively in the face of the threats that we face now or may face in the future—it may be that we seek to replace rather than add a body. The Government may want to consider that.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

My Lords, I commend the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and my noble friend Lady Northover for this amendment, which I would have signed had she not done so already. We heard at Second Reading an excellent speech from the noble Lord, Lord West, explaining not only why this amendment is important but why certain figures who would normally speak in this debate are not doing so. He explained that the ISC is seeking to change its MoU. As such, he and others would not speak in this particular debate.

However, we have an analogous debate to refer to, which has already been mentioned. Those of us who are veterans of the National Security and Investment Bill have been through this already. I think the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, is the only other person in this Room who was involved in it. I certainly spent some of my life on that Bill.

We sent back to the Commons an amended version of that Bill. Your Lordships adopted an amendment not dissimilar from the one in front of the Committee today. That decision was made, as we heard from the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, because the BEIS Select Committee is not enabled to deal with the level of security information it needs to properly scrutinise the operation of BEIS for the National Security and Investment Act. There is exactly the same situation here. I gather, anecdotally, that the BEIS Committee is already hitting issues with getting the information it needs under that Act.

We also heard anecdotally on Tuesday of the debacle over the Newport Wafer Fab, where the BEIS Secretary of State has failed to use the power given to him by the National Security and Investment Act to do something around national security. The noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, is no longer in her place, but once again the ministry was forced by Back-Bench action to reconsider what it was doing. This should not be how things work. It is beginning to look like these are rhetorical points, rather than actually being usable. I hope the same fate does not befall this legislation and that it actually gets used rather than shelved. But in the same way as BEIS, DCMS will have a Select Committee that cannot access the information it needs to scrutinise the activities covered in this Bill.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, notwithstanding the stifling atmosphere of this Committee Room, managed to do a very close approximation of complete incredulity over why the Government should not listen to this fantastic advice. I can say that, having gone through the last Bill and seen how resistant the Government are to advice of this sort, this is neither an accident nor a sin of omission. This is a sin of commission. The Government are very clear that they do not want proper scrutiny of what they are doing, and if this Bill remains as it is, there will not be the scrutiny that is needed. Neutering of that scrutiny is not an accident but a deliberate act of the Government.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, for tabling this amendment, and the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for moving it. The role and remit of the Intelligence and Security Committee, as noble Lords have remarked, have been raised a number of times in the other place and at Second Reading of this Bill, so I welcome the opportunity to clarify how appropriate oversight of the Bill’s national security powers will be provided for in the Bill and through existing mechanisms.

Amendment 22 would require the Secretary of State to provide the Intelligence and Security Committee with copies of designation notices and designated vendor directions when such notices, or parts of them, are withheld under Section 105Z11(2) or (3) in the interests of national security. It would also require the Secretary of State to provide copies of notifications of contraventions, confirmation decisions, the reasons for giving urgent enforcement directions when withheld under Section 105Z22(5), and the reasons for confirming or modifying such directions when withheld under Section 105Z23(6).

I will try to correct the suggestion made by the noble Baroness, Lady Northover, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, that the Government are trying to avoid parliamentary scrutiny on this particular point. That simply is not borne out by the way that the Bill is drafted. We are very clear about where parliamentary scrutiny should take place. I recognise the desire of your Lordships for the Intelligence and Security Committee to play a greater role in the oversight of national security decision-making across government, including in relation to this Bill. As I mentioned earlier, through the oversight of the National Cyber Security Centre, the Intelligence and Security Committee can request information around NCSC advice on, and activities relating to, high-risk vendors.

However, this amendment would extend the role of the Intelligence and Security Committee in an unprecedented way. As noble Lords are aware, the activities of the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport are not within the ISC’s remit. That committee’s remit extends to the intelligence agencies and other activities of the Government in relation to intelligence or security matters, as they are set out in its memorandum of understanding.

The noble Lord, Lord Coaker, asked what he called the “central question” of how this will work in practice in terms of security access. My understanding is that according to the Osmotherly rules detailing how the Government may share information with Select Committees, members of the Digital, Culture, Media and Sport Committee are able to view and handle classified and other sensitive material, subject to agreement between the department and the chair of the committee on appropriate handling. Documents may also be shared with the chair of the DCMS Committee on Privy Council terms, subject to agreement between the committee chair and the department.

The advice of the intelligence agencies will not be the only factor that the Secretary of State will take into account when deciding what is proportionate to include in a designated vendor direction. As well as the advice of the National Cyber Security Centre, the Secretary of State will consider, among other things, the economic impact, the cost to industry and the impact on connectivity caused by the requirements in any designated vendor direction. The ISC does not have the remit to consider non-security issues such as the economic and connectivity implications of the requirements in designated vendor directions. The Digital, Culture Media and Sport Select Committee can consider those wider aspects and that is why it is the correct and appropriate body to see copies of designation notices and designated vendor directions that are not laid before Parliament. Any future changes to the ISC’s remit would be best managed through consideration of the Justice and Security Act 2013 and the associated memorandum of understanding.

For the reasons that I have set out, I am unable to accept the amendment and I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, will therefore withdraw it.

[Lord Coaker (Lab)]

I thank the Minister for her reply. The Government are going to have to reconsider this matter. The explanation of what can or cannot be looked at is very unclear. The purpose of the amendment is to make it clear through the legislation that the Intelligence and Security Committee would have an automatic right to look at some of the threats, rather than it being the judgment of someone, who has to consult someone else to make a decision. That is the whole point. It should not be a question of someone deciding after discussion whether the matter should go forward; there should be a requirement in the Bill that that be done.

The point that I keep making is that at security clearance level 3, hardly anyone in the country could look at this matter, but there may well be aspects of a threat to telecommunications from a state that are at that level. All that any of us is saying is that of course Parliament should not be openly told about it, but that does not mean that there should be no scrutiny by the committee set up with that express purpose, so that we have oversight and scrutiny of even the most highly classified information. It would be a great credit to our democracy if the even highest level of security threat were subject to a check, set up by Parliament.

I and the Committee are saying to the Minister that this matter needs to be reconsidered. Even the Government, in response to the debate in the other place, have said that they are going to look at the next annual report of the Intelligence and Security Committee to see whether its remit should be extended to include the DCMS Committee. The Government are therefore aware that there is a problem here and say that they will look at this issue. We are trying to horizon-scan here and are saying that this will be a problem if this proposal is not included in the Bill.

I honestly believe that the Government really are going to have to look at this. I am going to repeat that because it is so important. The Minister herself, even the Secretary of State, will not know of some of this. The noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, knows how many people know, but it is very few. Yet the Intelligence and Security Committee was set up to consider this issue and we are saying that there should be measures in the Bill to deal with it.

The reason why the noble Lord, Lord Fox, and I are incredulous is that this just does not logically hold together. This is not an opinion but a fact: if the Bill goes through unamended, we in Parliament will not be able to look at the security threats that people are making decisions about. It is accepted that not everybody should be told about such things—of course not—but I doubt whether Parliament thinks that this situation is acceptable. I ask the Minister to reconsider that.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

I thank the various noble Lords for their contributions. I will speak to Amendment 24, which bears my name, but I recommend that the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, reads the Chancellor’s Mansion House speech, in which he calls for a nuanced relationship with China. Failing that, she could read my speech on the first group of amendments, in which I challenged how nuanced a relationship can be with a country threatening both our security and that of its own people. At the heart of the Government’s challenge is to be all things to everyone in this argument. They are doomed to fail if they try to do that.

I turn to the amendment I am supposed to be speaking to. As we discussed at Second Reading, there are essentially three strands to the diversity strategy. The first leg is supporting incumbent suppliers. I was corrected by the Minister: this refers not to domestic suppliers but suppliers we already have, presumably— although it is not explicit—with the ones we do not want having been weeded out. The second is attracting new suppliers into the UK market, and the third is accelerating open interface solutions, which I assume helps the second of those strands in particular.

There is not a strand about growing a domestic industry; some of us—I am one of them—were confused about this. It mostly seems to be about taking advantage of other countries’ businesses that we can trust—or think we can at the moment; I refer the Committee to earlier comments by the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, about today’s allies not always being tomorrow’s allies—rather than massively growing our own national capability. Bearing in mind those three legs, it would be helpful to hear from the Minister how the improvement in the domestic share of this market is planned.

In her letter to many of us on the subject of diversification, the Minister made the point that Vodafone has already attracted six new suppliers, two of which were Samsung and NEC, into the market through the open RAN deployment. I think I asked her at Second Reading when open RAN would become a significant player in telecoms delivery in this country. If she gave an answer then I am afraid I mislaid it, so can she tell us when open RAN will become a significant player or whether it is something of a sideshow? I do not mean that in a bad way; it is a recognition of where it really is in the market at the moment.

The biggest challenge I have with this is that the Government have launched a lot of strategies. They usually come with a glossy document and a picture of a smiling Secretary of State. I can confirm that this strategy is no exception. We have a very nice picture of the Secretary of State, Oliver Dowden, on page 3, but it does not come with a timeline and a delivery plan. The Government would not issue a strategy if they did not have a delivery plan, so I am sure there must be one. I think it would help us all if we understood what the delivery plan is. Perhaps the Minister could share with the Committee the timeline for the delivery of this strategy, otherwise many of us might suspect that it is something that gets only launched, not delivered. I understand that money has been put into it but, again, that does not guarantee that outcomes will be forthcoming.

This amendment has been tabled to reveal how that timeline is going and how the outcomes are being delivered. That is what it is for. It would enable the Government’s spending of taxpayers’ money on delivering this strategy to be tracked by Parliament. That seems a perfectly reasonable function for Parliament to have.

The Minister might come back and say that DCMS is being asked to lay all sorts of things before Parliament. If that is the case, I think that all of us, including me, the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, who spoke very capably on this, the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, and others are quite capable of coming up with a composite annual report that covers not just the items in Amendment 24, but those in Amendment 25 on strategy, Amendment 23 on Ofcom’s performance, and Amendment 26 on skills. Taken together, I am sure we could put together a composite annual report in the next round of discussions that would save DCMS having to make several different annual reports. I suspect that that might be a way forward and look forward to the Minister embracing this idea, because of course DCMS wants to demonstrate how it is delivering its diversification strategy.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions to this short debate and consideration of the Government’s ambitious diversification strategy. The amendment tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, raises the important issue of diversification, which I know is of great interest to your Lordships, as it was to Members in the other place. Diversification is a key part of the Government’s broader approach to ensuring that our critical networks are healthy and resilient. That is why the Government set out their 5G diversification strategy last autumn, and we are fully committed to ensuring that this strategy comes to fruition.

Our long-term vision for the telecoms supply market is one where, first, network supply chains are disaggregated, providing network operators more choice and flexibility; secondly, open interfaces that promote interoperability are the default; thirdly, the global supply chain for components is distributed across regions, creating resilience and flexibility; fourthly, standards are set transparently and independently, promoting quality, innovation, security and interoperability; and finally, security and resilience is a priority and a key consideration in network design and operation. However, the Bill focuses on setting clear security standards for our public networks and services. As the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, pointed out, although diversification is designed to enhance security and resilience, not all diversification activity is relevant to the security and resilience of our networks. That is why we believe the amendment would not be appropriate.

The Government have already made progress since the publication of our strategy, including the creation of the Telecoms Diversification Taskforce, which set out its recommendations in the spring. Work is already under way to implement several of those recommendations. Research and development was highlighted by the task force as a key area of focus in order to promote open-interface technologies that will establish flexibility and interchangeability in the market. As raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, it will also allow a range of new smaller suppliers to compete in a more diverse marketplace.

That is why the Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport was delighted to announce the launch of the future radio access network competition on Friday 2 July. Through this, we will invest up to £30 million in open radio access network research and development projects across the UK to address barriers to high-performance open deployments. This competition is part of a wider programme of government initiatives, which includes the SmartRAN Open Network Inter- operability Centre—more friendlily known as SONIC Labs—a facility for testing interoperability and integration of open networking solutions, which opened on 24 June. A number of leading telecoms suppliers are already working together through this facility.

We welcome recent announcements from operators including Airspan, Mavenir, NEC and Vodafone to introduce open radio access networks into their infrastructure. This demonstrates that industry is working alongside us, here in the UK, to drive forward the change needed in the sector. We continue to work with mobile operators, suppliers and users on a number of other important enablers for diversification; for example, we are developing a road map for the long-term use and provision of legacy network services, including 2G and 3G. Alongside this, the Government have led efforts to engage with some of our closest international partners, including the Five Eyes, to build international consensus on this important issue.

We are also working to deliver on UK issues in standard- setting bodies, and working with industry, academia and international partners to ensure that standards are set in a way that aligns with our overall objectives. Ensuring that standards are truly open and interoperable will drive market growth and diversification. Through the UK’s G7 presidency, we took the first step in discussing the importance of secure and diverse supply chains among like-minded partners and the foundational role that telecommunications infrastructure, such as 5G, plays.

The noble Baroness, Lady Merron, asked how we were planning to spend the initial £250 million, which we announced to kick off work to deliver our key priorities. These priorities have been informed by the recommendations of the Telecoms Diversification Taskforce and include: establishing a state-of-the-art UK telecoms lab; exploring commercial incentives for new suppliers; launching test beds and trials for new technologies such as open RAN; investing in an R&D ecosystem; and seeking to lead a global coalition of like-minded partners on an international approach to diversification. In response to questions from the noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord Fox, about the growth of UK businesses, we have been clear that we are focused on investing in the UK and in UK businesses, but do not think that a UK-only solution is a wise or realistic option.

We are working closely with operators and suppliers to develop targeted measures that address the needs of industry to deliver our long-term vision for the market. We responded to the task force’s findings in July and outlined our next steps and the use of that initial investment. If the noble Earl, Lord Erroll, has not seen the government response, I am sure he would find it interesting. It also sets out our plans to create a diversification advisory council, which will meet quarterly. I hope that responds to his question.

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[Lord Fox (LD)]

Before I comment on that excellent speech from the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, I want to return to the answer that the Minister gave on the Newport Wafer Fab issue, which proves the point that we were making on the need for the ISC to be involved. Regarding the ISC issue, the Government furnished themselves with the National Security and Investment Act, which was supposed to deal with issues such as this. However, the Prime Minister has chosen to refer it back not to the people running that unit but to the National Security Adviser, which proves the point that someone with access to national security information is needed to make decisions of this nature, rather than an organisation that does not have access to the information. It absolutely proves the point that our amendment on the ISC is completely appropriate, just as it was appropriate for the BEIS analogue of what is happening here.

The noble Baroness, Lady Merron, made an excellent speech and I am not going to attempt to adorn it either with my normal flippancy or with detail. There is just one issue that I wish to raise regarding Simon Blagden. Are there any outstanding legal liabilities from his time at Fujitsu? In other words, has his activity been fully exonerated or is there potential legal recourse? Other than that, I echo the point that perception of these issues is as important as reality. If the Government continue to operate in a black-box way, everybody will assume that things are going on that they cannot see and that should not be happening. It is therefore in the Government’s interests to be transparent about how that person in particular was appointed and how the advisory council will operate.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Merron, for tabling the amendment and for giving me an opportunity to provide an update on the work of the Diversification Taskforce and the new diversification advisory council.

The Government recently announced the council, building on the work of the Diversification Taskforce, chaired by my noble friend Lord Livingston of Parkhead. I should like to take this opportunity to offer my thanks to him and the taskforce members for volunteering their valuable time and knowledge to their excellent review. Their recommendations and expertise will remain crucial to helping us bring greater resilience and competition to our future networks as the taskforce now transitions to the new diversification advisory council.

The Government recognise that diversification is a broad and complex issue relating to matters of security and resilience, technology and geopolitics. It is for this reason that we sought the advice of the experts appointed to the diversification task force. Many of the task force members will continue to provide advice as part of the new advisory council. In appointing the membership of the advisory council, the Government have followed all standard processes. The Government have ensured that the council comprises experts from both industry and academia across a wide range of subject matters, including security, of course.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lords, Lord Fox, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Alton, for tabling this amendment. The noble Lord, Lord Fox, has set out why they believe this definition of a public electronic communications network is needed. I also appreciated his reference to the importance of consumers, who, after all, are core in all our discussions.

It is important to hear from the Minister whether she believes that this definition is limiting for security purposes and what impact it would have. Perhaps she can advise on whether she feels that anything is missing which should be in there. Would this definition inhibit the future-proofing ability of the Bill? I look forward to hearing from the Minister.

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

This amendment seeks to clarify the definition of a public electronic communications network contained within Section 151 of the Communications Act 2003. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Fox, for moving it. It aims to do this by including specific examples of networks and systems covered by that definition.

In response to the noble Lord’s first question, three of the suggested examples in the amendment are already covered by the current definition of public electronic communications network, to the extent that they are electronic communications networks

“provided wholly or mainly for the purpose of making electronic communications services available to members of the public”.

These three examples are: landline communication systems; mobile data, audio and video networks; and satellite-delivered networks.

However, as the noble Lord explained, the amendment also refers to “digital surveillance networks”. I understand that the noble Lord is referring principally to CCTV and other similar technologies of the kind used by law enforcement and local authorities for specific surveillance purposes. These types of technologies have been raised by a number of noble Lords in previous debates, including the noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Fox. Such closed networks do not fall within the definition of a public electronic communications network as set out in Section 151 of the Communications Act. That definition refers to an electronic communications network that is provided

“wholly or mainly for the purpose of making electronic communications services available to members of the public”.

I emphasise “wholly or mainly”, because the noble Lord gave examples of where services might be provided which could reach a member of the public, but not “wholly or mainly”.

The powers in the Bill are intended to create a stronger regulatory and legislative framework to protect against the security threats to our public electronic communications networks and services, such as those provided by companies such as BT and Vodafone. Public networks are those most widely used by businesses and the public and it is right that the Bill should focus on the protection of those networks. Furthermore, any change to the definition of public electronic communications networks to include CCTV and other similar networks to which the noble Lord referred would affect other sections of the Communications Act beyond those relating to security. That is because the current definition of a public electronic communications network is used across Chapter 1 of Part 2 of the Act, and not only in Sections 105A to 105D, which this Bill replaces.

The consequences of such a change would be wide-ranging. For example, Section 127 creates a criminal offence of improper use of public electronic communications networks, as defined by Section 151. If the definition changed, the scope of those caught by that offence would also change. It would also affect other legislation that makes reference to the Act’s definition, such as the Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 or the Insolvency Act 1986. Any such change to the definition would therefore have substantial unintended impacts for providers of digital surveillance networks and for many other entities, including Ofcom, of course.

The noble Lord also asked how the security of digital surveillance networks could be assured. There is of course already legislation and extensive guidance in place to assure security and prevent the abuse of information gathered by CCTV and surveillance camera networks. As noble Lords will be aware, the Information Commissioner’s Office is the UK’s independent regulator for data protection and is responsible for providing advice and guidance on compliance with the UK’s data protection laws. All organisations in the UK that process personal information must comply with the requirements of the UK General Data Protection Regulation and the Data Protection Act 2018. The Information Commissioner’s Office has issued a specific data protection code that provides recommendations on the use of CCTV systems to help organisations comply with the Data Protection Act.

The Information Commissioner’s Office’s code and the Data Protection Act ensure that any personal data gathered via CCTV and similar networks is kept confidential and subject to the highest protections, including secure encryption of data. Where closed networks, such as CCTV and other similar surveillance technology, are used by public bodies or within critical national infrastructure, there are specific arrangements in place. Lead government departments, advisory partners —including the National Cyber Security Centre—and regulators work with infrastructure owners and operators to manage and mitigate the risk of security issues. There are, therefore, already adequate measures in place regarding safe deployment of CCTV and other similar surveillance technologies within the UK. Indeed, we are strengthening the actions we can take in this area.