Public Order Bill

Baroness Barker Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 1st November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I speak on this Bill solely on the issue of Clause 9 and, in the course of my speech, I will rebut many of the arguments made by the noble Lords, Lord McAvoy and Lord Farmer, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan—this will come as no surprise to her because we have, over the years, exchanged completely opposing views on the subject of abortion.

This is not actually about the subject of abortion; it is about the right of women to access a service to which they are legally entitled and the extent to which other people can frustrate them in doing that. Let us be very clear. Clause 9 is very simple. It would introduce a buffer zone 150 metres around abortion clinics where activities such as harassment, intimidation, the use of loudspeakers, the display of graphic images and handing out leaflets of false medical education when for use for the purpose of influencing a decision to access or provide abortion care are banned. That is it—none of the wild extrapolations that other speakers have made.

I disagree entirely with the Minister’s interpretation. He says that this contravenes the human rights of protesters. No, Articles 9, 10 and 11 are qualified rights: they can be limited to protect the rights of others. Let us be clear, the clause does not ban protest. You can hold the views which the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan and the noble Lords, Lord McAvoy and Lord Farmer, do, and you can pursue them in any manner you like—just not within 150 metres of where people are trying to access a service. You can carry on with your campaigns, as you always do, your disinformation and all of that. You are entitled to do that, just not there. Similar laws are already in place in Canada, Australia and Spain, and they have been upheld as being lawful in superior courts around the world.

The second argument is that the police or councils already have the powers to do this. Well, no they do not. Not even in places where the council and the local policing authorities have sought to implement the law as it stands in England have they been able to do that. What we have ended up with is a patchwork of protection for some people but not for others, with lots of challenges, including local authorities being resistant in times of economic hardship in their budgets to find themselves up in court. All we have got is a point where women have undergone and experienced harm in order for protections to be brought in, and I think that is wrong.

The third false claim is that we are seeking to punish people for something as benignly innocent as silent prayer. Well, no—this clause talks quite clearly about seeking to influence or inform people, of persistently occupying places, and of people trying to prevent people accessing legal services. So let us see what has actually been happening outside the clinics under those headings. We have had people handing out leaflets saying, “The abortion was harder to get over than the rape”. We have had people leaving baby clothes in hedges outside clinics, filming women, holding posters saying, “Babies are murdered in here”. In one instance, a monk went into a clinic with a camera under his cassock, accompanied by a lady. He was screaming at the clinic staff, using words that I—and most certainly the bishop—would never use, using a loudspeaker to proclaim that a girl who ran past with her hoodie down over her face because she was so frightened was a “baby killer”—leaving her mother to take her to another facility 60 miles away.

That is all the stuff that goes on day in and day out, and the experience that has led the staff to draft this in the way it has been drafted; it is a world away from benign prayer, it really is. I have no problem at all with people who have deeply religious conviction who wish to pursue what they believe to be right and do so in ways that I may disagree with—but I draw a line at them doing it at that point in time, with one specific intention: to frustrate women from accessing a legal service.

We have had absolute years of this, and it has been getting worse. People have been watching all that American stuff, and all those right-wing American foundations that are always going on about culture wars and being silenced. We know that they are funding activity like this across Europe. The time has come to say “Stop”, and for us to agree with the House of Commons that we need to take a very specific measure to protect women in a very specific space and circumstance. Let us do that. Let us leave those who disagree to pursue their views elsewhere—but let us give those women the protection they deserve.

Public Order Bill

Baroness Barker Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 22nd November 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

If I may continue, I have a simple example on private dwellings. A woman leaving her home on her driveway, which is adjacent to a public right of way within the 150-metre buffer zone, with her pregnant friend who is contemplating an abortion but is not quite sure about it, would commit a criminal offence by talking to her about her options.

We believe in freedom of speech. This clause is so completely disproportionate that your Lordships cannot accept it. After all, there has been no prior consultation about this complete restriction on the right to freedom of expression. The 2018 Home Office review—I am sorry; I know noble Lords have said we should not talk about this, but I think that it is important—said:

“There have also been reports of verbal and physical abuse by pro-choice activists against pro-life activists.”


Do noble Lords who support Clause 9 have a view on that and how the clause would address it? The failure to address this is one of the many failings in this debate.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

If the noble Baroness were to listen carefully to what the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, said and to read the amendments that have been tabled, the clause is about any interference—no matter the motivation of it—within that 150-metre zone. It would apply exactly to the point she has just made.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support Clause 9. During this debate, I found myself challenged by our preference for not regarding this as a surrogate for talking about whether people are for or against abortion. At times I have noticed that there seems to be a link between those who oppose this clause and those who oppose abortion. This will not always been the case, but noble Lords who have spoken have often mentioned it. My heart finds it hard to contemplate abortion, but my head says that it is probably reasonably pragmatic in our society, and we have to accept it.

The reason for this clause seems to be the inconsistent application of police discretion around the country. The resources of each institution affected by the protests mean that they cannot always approach a civil injunction or remedy. As the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, mentioned, it ends up being a lottery as to whether or not women in different parts of the country are protected. This is not good for anyone.

I support Clause 9 and I will reject the review, not because reflection is inherently a bad thing, as the noble Lord, Lord Cormack, said, but because I take this to be a wrecking amendment rather than something which is intended to develop the proposal. If I am wrong, that is my error, but that is how I felt the argument was being developed.

The basic proposal is about stopping interfering with women as they go to an abortion clinic. I do not understand the argument about needing to offer them advice at the point at which they approach a clinic. If the point is to offer advice on whether there are alternatives or whether they should even be contemplating abortion, this must be the least efficient process that anybody has ever devised. There has to be a better method than standing in the street, potentially shouting—we have seen examples of this—to engage with a woman at the point at which she is very vulnerable, just before she is potentially going to receive treatment, to try to persuade her not to do it. There has to be a better way. If this is the only way in which any protester can think to engage, they are in error. It is not a reasonable approach. It causes the majority of people to think that carrying out this type of protest in this way should be stopped.

People have described it as a conversation. I do not accept that. It is not a conversation—it sounds like a one-way monologue; it usually sounds like intimidation and, certainly, like bullying. For me, it is something that should certainly not be tolerated in a just society. I cannot support that.

There have been examples offered of where the police have intervened when people were merely praying; I think the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, mentioned this. I would be surprised if a police officer did that but, if there are examples, we ought to examine them. Let us get to the bottom of it. That would have required a member of the public to complain and then for the officer to attend. I do not think they would just have turned up of their own volition to intervene in an event around an abortion clinic that someone had not complained about in the first place. I would like to understand more about that, but I do not think this clause is designed to stop people praying. It might be designed to stop people congregating together in such a way that it intimidates people at what may be their most vulnerable time.

The argument about this being an absolute prohibition of protest in just one very small part of the country is a fair argument. I think all of us would say that, if that is going to happen, it should be in a very small part —and perhaps no part—of the country. It is an absolute argument. I could have accepted that, but my reasons for not doing so in this case, and why I believe Clause 9 is a reasonable approach, is that the harassment that is being suffered is gender-specific. Only one half of society will generally be affected by this type of influence or advice: the women of our society. It is also time-specific; it is a point at which women need this advice and at a time when they are in most peril, either personally, by conscience, or physically, and that seems to me to be a time when we should give them most support. Finally, it is at a place about which they have no discretion; they have no discretion about where they will seek support. They have to go to a hospital or a clinic. These places are identified and the women become vulnerable because they are identified as they approach them.

I would generally support an absolute prohibition of stopping protest—but in these places, at these times, for the women of our society, I support this clause. It deserves our support in protecting the women who need it.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

My Lords, I made an extensive speech at Second Reading so I shall confine myself to just a few points of reflection on the debate today. First, the rest of the Bill is about protest; this is about the harassment of people seeking a legal health service to which they are entitled, as the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester reminded us. There are those of us who believe that women have the right to access those services freely and safely. Our amendments try to ensure that this whole clause addresses just that and, indeed, narrows it down. There are those who do not believe that such a service should exist or that people should be able to access it. They have very much exaggerated what this clause is about and its potential implementation. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, said in her introduction that all the evidence is that this activity does not stop access. I have no knowledge of any such evidence, and she did not give us any, but I have to ask: if it is not effective, why do people continue to do it, day after day?

A number of noble Lords rested their cases on the 2018 review. The amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and myself have been informed by the providers of services and the thousands of women who attend those services and report to us that the current system of local PSPOs is not working, and they are continuing to suffer harassment as a result. So we need to be quite clear about the motivation behind the amendments but also their effect.

The noble Baroness, Lady Eaton, was one of the many people who gave a passionate defence of free speech. She said you cannot pick and choose. I say to her that, uniquely among all healthcare services, abortion services are targeted specifically. That is why we have to seek remedies, which we would not otherwise wish to do. The reason we are doing this is that, over the last two years, influenced by America, and influenced and funded by the same organisations that overturned Roe v Wade, there has been a change and an escalation.

I listened carefully to a number of noble Lords who made emotive comments suggesting that we wish to “criminalise prayer”. In the case of a single person in silent prayer, no, we do not; in the case of a church where every member turns up, week in week out, to stand directly in the path of women trying to access a service with the avowed intent of frustrating their access, yes we do.

One amendment that nobody has talked about at all is our Amendment 87, which talks about the definition of interference. I urge noble Lords to go back and look at that. I include the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, because, when he objects to the phrase about “persistently and repeatedly” occupying something, that again comes from the experience of clinic staff and users. People come day by day to undertake their activities in the doorway of a clinic.

[Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)]

I am not objecting to the idea behind that clause; all I am saying is that the wording seems to me a bit defective because the word “occupies” does not have a target. I am sure that it could be better expressed; if it were better expressed, I would be content.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

I very much welcome the noble and learned Lord’s help in trying to find a suitable wording for what we are seeking to do. I want to inform your Lordships’ House of what is happening: there are individual acts that, one by one, may not be intimidating but, put together in a pattern with a deliberate aim, they are.

I say to the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, that I am glad he was there with my colleague David Steel in 1967, but we are in a very different place now. Back in 1967, clinics were not having to deal with harassment as they are now.

[Lord Macdonald of River Glaven (CB)]

Does the noble Baroness agree with me that there is clear evidence of a concerted effort by well-funded, extremist United States—sometimes religious—groups to replicate in this country the situation that exists outside abortion clinics in the United States, in which women are routinely abused and threatened for trying to access medical care?

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

I do not think there is any doubt about that; the evidence is—

[Lord Farmer (Con)]

On the point about evidence, we are hearing people’s opinions about what the evidence is. Surely this requires a review so that we can involve the police, churches, abortion users—everybody—to get real evidence that is satisfactory to this House. At the moment, it is the kind of evidence where we are saying, “We know about and maybe you don’t.” I have not seen any 100% documentary evidence that these things are going on. I am going on the word of the noble Baroness and others.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

The noble Lord, Lord Farmer, raised a question about the intimidation of women in clinics. He knows that clinics are regulated by the Department of Health and Social Care and the CQC and that it is expressly against the terms of their licence to do that; if they were found to be doing that, they would not be able to carry on.

I want to deal with the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord McCrea, about penalties. The penalties provided in Clause 9 are equivalent to those for other cases of harassment in other statutes. Amendment 94 would introduce a penalty at the same level as for skateboarding in the wrong place. I happen to think that the abuse of women is a lot more serious than a skateboarding offence.

[Lord McCrea of Magherafelt and Cookstown (DUP)]

Accepting that there should be a penalty for harassment, can I ask the noble Baroness whether she really believe that compassionately asking a person “Are you sure?” deserves a six-month, or 12-month or two-year sentence?

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

I suggest that the noble Lord goes back and reads the clause and the terms of interference. I do not think that what he describes comes under that, which is why the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and I are trying to make sure that this law is as explicit and clear as possible. We do not want to do what the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, does and create loopholes whereby those who are currently harassing people can move around the country and continue to do so in different ways.

The fact is that we need this law because the current patchwork system does not work. It does not protect staff or women at all. It is a proportionate measure which, I accept, can be refined further through the amendments put forward by myself and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, and those that may be put forward in a similar spirit.

[Baroness Fox of Buckley (Non-Afl)]

I have an inquiry about PSPOs which has been raised. When PSPOs were originally advocated by pro-choice people, I was unsure about their use. My colleagues in BPAS, for example, were keen on PSPOs as a good, targeted way of stopping problems outside specific clinics, and they assured me that it was at specific clinics where problems were occurring. Is the argument of Clause 9 that things have got so out of hand that the original arguments in defence of PSPOs are redundant? The noble Baroness would not be against one who was not against PSPOs as a remedy in the past.

[Baroness Barker (LD)]

The answer is that the situation has moved on, so what was an answer before the existence of PSPOs is no longer relevant.

I have said enough. I think we all know where we are on this and the positions we came from. I would like to work with those Members who want to, and with the Minister, to make sure that we get to where the vast majority of us, and of the public, want to be: women being able access a service legally and safely, and 150 metres down the road you can be as extreme in your opposition as you like.

[Lord Paddick (LD)]

We on these Benches accept that many people have strong views both on abortion and on this clause, on both sides of the argument, as reflected in our debate. I want to say two things at the outset. First, my understanding is that organisations that provide abortion services, such as the British Pregnancy Advisory Service, talk through the options available in the case of an unwanted pregnancy, including continuing with the pregnancy and arranging adoption or fostering, becoming a parent and ending the pregnancy with an abortion. The second is that it must be one of the most difficult, life-changing decisions anyone has to make.

To be subjected to one-sided opinions by well-meaning, passionate but in some cases fixated individuals at such a vulnerable moment cannot be right, whether outside or inside an abortion clinic. As the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, said, this is about targeting an individual seeking medical services. Many noble Lords have talked about free speech. There is a difference between offering advice and support, and forcing advice and support on those who do not want it. By all means, campaign, demonstrate and provide advice, help and support on the internet, for example, but not when someone is on their way to an abortion clinic.

What is said inside an abortion clinic is regulated and controlled; what is said outside by campaigners against abortion is not. There is a series of amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Fox of Buckley, supported the noble Baroness, Lady Hoey. Amendment 80 brings us back to the debate we had last week about “reasonable excuse”. I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, for that debate and for his contribution today.

This brings us back to the potential argument that the more important the issue, the greater the excuse to break the law. Last week, we debated whether anything could be more important than saving the planet from catastrophic climate change and therefore, there could be a “reasonable excuse” to do anything, however unlawful, if saving the planet was the intention. I am sure there are some who feel that nothing is more important, as they see it, than “saving the life of an unborn child”, so any means justify the ends. Such an amendment would render buffer zones ineffective.

Amendments 81 and 86 lead potentially to the whack-a-mole scenario—or, as my noble friend Lady Hamwee more eloquently put it, the displacement of protests from one clinic to another—whereby those wanting to get those wanting an abortion to change their minds at the last minute would travel around the country until every local authority had a buffer zone around every clinic. Either there is a right to abortion without last-minute interference, or there is not. I am not clear from the wording of Amendment 86 whether it would amount to a maximum of a two-year buffer zone, or simply the expensive and bureaucratic process of having to renew the buffer zone every year.

Amendment 82 introduces the concept of “intentionally or recklessly” interfering, which no doubt would result in endless arguments about whether the offering of advice, or whatever form the interaction takes, amounted to interference or not. Amendment 89, also supported by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of St Albans, would allow “silent witness” by those who persistently, continuously or repeatedly picket abortion clinics. That sounds to me like quite intimidating behaviour, even if it is silent prayer. We cannot support these amendments. Either the Committee supports this clause or it does not; creating uncertainty about whether the interaction is reasonable, which clinics have a buffer zone or what amounts to interference is unhelpful.

On Amendment 94, I can understand why the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, has drawn a parallel with Part 3 of the Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Act 2022 and public space protection orders, but the latter refers to things like banning the drinking of alcohol in a local park—otherwise innocuous activities that are causing a particular problem in a specific area. This measure is about interfering with a person’s right to choose to access abortion services. They are very similar in terms of protecting public space, but very different in terms of the kind of activity they are trying to prevent.

We support Amendments 80A, 82A, and 82B in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Sugg and Lady Watkins of Tavistock, and my noble friend Lady Barker, which would bring the phrase “buffer zones” into line with similar legislation in other jurisdictions. We support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede, and my noble friend Lady Barker.

On Amendment 84, if we are going to have buffer zones, they need to be around every place where abortion services are provided. Amendments 87 and 91 helpfully clarify that the proposed offences apply only in relation to abortion services. Amendments 95, 96 and 97 also usefully exempt anyone invited to go along to the clinic with the person seeking abortion services, and anything said or done when all parties are in someone’s home or a place of worship.

We also support the clarification provided by Amendment 93A in the name of my noble friend Lady Hamwee, supported by my noble friend Lady Barker and the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg: that an “abortion clinic” should include places where advice and counselling related to abortions is provided.