Securitisation Regulations 2018

Bambos Charalambous Excerpts

Wednesday 13th February 2019 Commons Chamber

[Bambos Charalambous (Enfield, Southgate) (Lab)]

It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman).

Not everyone appreciates the role that securitisation of loans and debts played in the financial crash of 2008, but it was a substantial role, with devastating consequences. To give some context, in the years prior to 2008, a calamitous decision was taken by executives in large US-based international banks to securitise sub-prime mortgages, which were mortgages given to people who had virtually no way of paying them back. Because of predatory lending, the number of these sub-prime mortgages continued to rise. They were then pooled together with other loans and debts and packaged as a financial product in the form of mortgage-backed securities that received triple A ratings from the credit rating companies.

[Mr Ranil Jayawardena (North East Hampshire) (Con)]

The hon. Gentleman is surely arguing that sub-prime lending was mismanaged rather than securitisation itself. Do I understand him correctly, or is he suggesting that securitisation was the problem?

[Bambos Charalambous]

It was both. It was the sub-prime lending and it was also the packaging of these products into securitisation with other, better products that were then triple A rated.

[Mr Jayawardena]

But is it not true that securitisation is really helpful in recycling capital, thereby providing investors with a stream of income that is useful to them and allowing responsible financial institutions to direct their capital at new people who want, for example, to borrow money to buy a home?

[Bambos Charalambous]

If done properly, there is benefit in securitisation, but it was not done properly in the United States, and therefore we need to take extra precautions now to ensure that it is done properly.

[Mr Jayawardena]

The hon. Gentleman is very kind to give way again. I want to unpick that a little further, because it is helpful. Can he confirm that securitisation is a good way of managing risk across a portfolio of loans, so that those with worse credit ratings can be properly and openly matched up with those with better credit ratings, to ensure that investors have a blend that they can draw an income on in the long run and allow institutions to use the capital they have secured from investors to offer new products to new people?

[Bambos Charalambous]

But if credit rating companies do not give the correct ratings, as happened in the United States, it all falls apart. I am happy to carry on the conversation with the hon. Gentleman in Strangers’ afterwards.

There was a big investment in mortgage-backed securities, with many financial institutions choosing to invest in them because of their promised high rate of return. When people started defaulting on sub-prime mortgages, the mortgage-backed securities lost their value, and the financial institutions that had invested heavily in them became exposed and suffered catastrophic losses. Since that time, steps have been taken to ensure that we never again experience the shockwaves of those failing giant financial institutions and the aftermath. We need a robust system of dealing with the risk of any such exposure due to securitisation, and that requires primary legislation.

As the hon. Member for Aberdeen North said, what we have before us are ill-conceived regulations that do not address the whole picture, and these changes are being made without the House having a chance to properly scrutinise them. Let us be clear: these regulations are not required due to the fear of a no-deal Brexit. They have conveniently been slipped in by the Government, under not the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 but other legislation.

The regulations give responsibility to the Financial Conduct Authority to supervise the compliance of people involved in securitisation practices and allow it to impose certain penalties and take other steps to monitor securitisation. Such changes should not be made via secondary legislation. The complexity of these measures needs proper scrutiny. The very fact that the regulations change provisions in criminal law by preventing the FCA from instituting criminal proceedings for money laundering and insider dealing is a serious matter that is worthy of proper debate and scrutiny, which cannot be done via this debate. The regulations are wrong-headed, as schedule 1 amends primary legislation and transfers significant powers to the Treasury, the Financial Conduct Authority, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Bank of England.

[Mr Jayawardena]

I am enjoying the hon. Gentleman’s contribution, even if we come from different starting points. Does he support the FCA having such a role but object to the principle of how this is being arrived at, or does he object to the FCA having this role? If not the FCA, who should it be?

[Bambos Charalambous]

Those are exactly the sort of points that should be made via a debate on primary, not secondary, legislation.

[Mr Jayawardena]

Will the hon. Gentleman give way?

[Bambos Charalambous]

I will not give way again, as I am almost at the end of my contribution.

These are important changes that Parliament needs to get right, due to the dire consequences of what went wrong in the past. These measures are opaque, unconstitutional and lacking in proper scrutiny. I invite the Government to withdraw the regulations and introduce primary legislation, to allow thorough and proper scrutiny to take place. Without such assurances, I will vote for the motion in the name of my right hon. Friend the Member for Islington North (Jeremy Corbyn) and against the Government.

[Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Eleanor Laing)]

I call Anneliese Dodds.