Anne McLaughlin
Main Page: Anne McLaughlin (Scottish National Party - Glasgow North East)Judicial Review and Courts Bill (Fourth sitting)
Anne McLaughlin ExcerptsThursday 4th November 2021
(3 years, 1 month ago)
Public Bill CommitteesRead Full debate Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 View all Judicial Review and Courts Act 2022 Debates Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: Public Bill Committee Amendments as at 4 November 2021 - (4 Nov 2021)
James Cartlidge
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who has considerable expertise in these matters and speaks on them very well. By the way, I am not suggesting that the Natural England case—it did not go to court, but there was a threatened judicial review from an organisation called Wild Justice, which I think Chris Packham is associated with—was vexatious. I make no comment on that. The point is that it would have achieved its aim, which was to have those particular licences declared unlawful, so the claimant would have been successful.
As I said at the time, had the remedies in the Bill been available, the legal advice could have assumed that at least one, or both, would have been used. If the prospective remedy, which we are debating in respect of these amendments, had been used, it would have made the many thousands of farmers, gamekeepers and others who were using those licences for shotguns far more certain that there would not be some kind of action, which from their point of view would be essentially retrospective, regarding the way they had used those licences that could undermine their rights, even though at the time—this is always the key thing about retrospectivity—they would have been using them both in the belief that they were lawful and in good faith. That is why this point is so important.
Anne McLaughlin (Glasgow North East) (SNP)
The Minister is talking about giving judges the right to use suspended or prospective-only quashing orders, but that is not what the Bill is about. The Bill is about the presumption that they will use those orders unless they can demonstrate good reason not to. Why not do what he is saying this means, and what other people seem to think this means, and just allow judges to use these orders?
James Cartlidge
We will debate the presumption in more detail, because there are a number of amendments to it in the later groups. With the greatest respect for the hon. Lady, I would simply say that that is an erroneous interpretation of the presumption. First, the Bill does bring in those new remedies, irrespective of the presumption, but the presumption is there. It does not force the judge to use them; yes, it highlights the fact that they are there and that we would expect them to be used were it appropriate, but what it ensures is that, whether they are used or not, the reasons and the thinking are written down. In a nutshell, this is about encouraging and expediting the accumulation of jurisprudence, which is incredibly important in a common-law system.
I understand the concern that such orders should not be used to prevent claimants from getting just outcomes. That very point was made on Second Reading by the Chair of the Justice Committee. However, I submit that the clause as drafted already protects against that. The list of factors for the court to consider in using the new remedies, which is set out in subsection (8), includes at paragraph (c) a requirement for the court to have regard to
“the interests or expectations of persons who would benefit from the quashing of the impugned act”.
In other words, it must consider the interests of the person or persons who has brought the judicial review.
In addition, the presumption at subsection (9) requires the court to use the new modifications for quashing orders only where it would offer “adequate redress”. Furthermore, subsection (2) allows the court to impose conditions on any remedy it gives, which is another way that the court can tailor any remedy to ensure it properly serves the interests of justice.
I therefore submit that the ability to limit or remove retrospective effect does have a clear purpose and that there are already sufficient safeguards in the provisions before the Committee to ensure the interests of the claimant are fairly balanced against the interests of good administration. The clause gives the courts the necessary flexibility to tailor its remedies appropriately.
Amendment 35 seeks to remove the subsection that states:
“Provision included in a quashing order under subsection (1) may be made subject to conditions”.
However, the whole point is that the ability to set conditions is very important, so that the court can strike the right balance in how it gives a remedy. For example, to avoid detriment to a claimant or those in the same situation, the court might specify that the defendant cannot take any new action to enforce the impugned decision, but is nevertheless afforded time to amend or correct it by virtue of a suspended quashing order. Removing the court’s ability to set such conditions would not be in the interests of justice or flexibility.
The final two amendments in the group, amendments 40 and 41, were originally connected to amendment 39, which the hon. Member for Hammersmith has withdrawn, and now relate to amendment 12. They are consequential amendments that remove elements of the clause that seek to provide further clarity in respect of the ability to limit or remove the retrospective effect of quashing orders. I agree with the hon. Gentleman that if we were to accept amendment 12, those amendments would logically follow. However, for the reasons I have explained, we do not accept the rationale of amendment 12 and, as such, we also oppose amendments 40 and 41. I urge him to withdraw his amendment.
Anne McLaughlin
Suspended quashing orders and prospective-only remedies will not apply in Scottish courts, but because they can and will affect UK-wide laws, the people of Scotland, who remain subject to UK-wide laws until they are independent—I have just disenfranchised myself from everybody on this side, apart from my hon. Friend the Member for Lanark and Hamilton East—are also impacted.
Our primary objection is that there is a statutory presumption written into the provisions. In other words, the default position for judges is expected to be that quashing orders are suspended and prospective-only. Government and Opposition Members, both today and in previous debates, have suggested that the presumption does not curtail a judge’s discretion to use the full suite of available remedies. They are wrong—[Interruption.]
The Chair
Order. Can I ask those who are playing with electronic devices to turn the sound down or off? Sorry, Anne—go on.
Anne McLaughlin
Thank you, Sir Mark.
On the power to issue a suspended quashing order with the option of prospective-only effect, the Bill says:
“the court must exercise the powers in that subsection accordingly unless it sees good reason not to do so.”
Our amendment 27 seeks to remove the word “must” and replace it with “may”. Given that Government Members are claiming that that is what they really mean, they ought not to have any problem supporting the amendment.
The word “must” clearly directs a judge’s reasoning and interferes with judicial independence and discretion, and the Government claim they do not want to do that. It is not just members of this Committee who have said so. The Secretary of State for Justice, the Lord Chancellor himself, said on Second Reading that the Bill
“gives judges greater flexibility in judicial review”.—[Official Report, 26 October 2021; Vol. 702, c. 195.]
As the Public Law Project pointed out, however, the inclusion of the statutory presumption contradicts that stated aim by tying the hands of judges so that they are required to use the new remedies in certain circumstances. If the powers are to be created, they ought to be the exception and not the norm, as the report of the independent review of administrative law suggests and as a number of Government Back Benchers, including the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) and the right hon. and learned Member for Kenilworth and Southam (Jeremy Wright) also suggested.
The PLP helpfully goes on to say why a statutory presumption is harmful, which is that it sets modified quashing orders as the starting point in all cases, which the judge then deviates from only if the court sees a good reason to do so. Even those who support that statutory presumption can list only a small number of cases in which such remedies might be appropriate. From what hon. Members have said this morning, however, they do not support the statutory presumption aspect, so they will have no difficulty in supporting amendment 27.
I do not know whether this is the appropriate time to say so, Sir Mark, but as the hon. Member for Hammersmith is pressing amendment 22 to a vote, I will be happy to withdraw my amendment and to support his instead.
James Cartlidge
It is a pleasure to follow the hon. Lady. I would not characterise the comments of my hon. Friends about judicial discretion as implying that they would therefore willingly see the presumption removed. I will not quite call it cheeky, but that is certainly a presumption of its own about our position on the matter and not entirely correct, as I hope we will discover should the amendment be pushed to a vote—it sounds as if it will be.
In her intervention on the speech by my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley North, and in her speech now, the hon. Member for Glasgow North East, although she clearly has a strong view on presumption, did not deny the point, which is significant in terms of the previous group of amendments, that under the Scotland Act 1998 the Scottish Government—and, under other legislation, the other devolved Administrations too—have a power to make prospective-only orders. That is important. I am not suggesting that the power is used frequently, but it exists, although admittedly without the presumption.
Anne McLaughlin
But the Minister’s last point was that it is without presumption, and only in certain circumstances. As I understand it, in certain circumstances in England and Wales those orders can be used anyway. Basically, we are trying to turn things on their head so that judges are told, “This is what you will do, unless you can convince us otherwise.” That is not comparable with the Scottish system at all.
James Cartlidge
I entirely accept that the hon. Lady disagrees on the point of presumption, which I will come to in a moment, but in terms of the first group of amendments, which were primarily about the important changes to quashing orders—that is, the prospective-only remedy—all of this underlines the fact that, as my hon. Friend the Member for Dudley North said, these things far from unprecedented in our constitution.
Before I turn to the specific amendments, one of the most interesting points made by the hon. Member for Hammersmith—which he made early on—was that people who bring a judicial review do not do so because they want a declaration; they want a quashing order. They want, as it were, the full bifta, rather than a relatively toothless outcome. On that point, an extremely important case to draw on is Hurley and Moore v. the Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy. That was an important decision regarding university tuition fees. Lord Justice Elias, one of the key judges, basically made a declaration against a quashing order—I quote the reasons why—saying that it
“would cause administrative chaos, and would inevitably have significant economic implications, if the regulations were now to be quashed.”
In my view therefore—this is important—the very presence of the new remedies, which as Conservative colleagues have said give more flexibility, makes it more likely and, dare I say, easier for a judge to issue a quashing order, rather than being restrained to the extent that the judge would otherwise simply issue a declaration. That is from the perspective of the best interests and the desire of the claimant to get their pound of flesh—their remedy—and to see their justice served. It is important to remember that point.
I turn now to the many amendments in the group. They deal primarily with the presumption, which the hon. Member for Glasgow North East was just talking about, in proposed new section 29A(9) of the Senior Courts Act 1981, and the factors that the courts must consider when deciding whether to use the new modifications—the quashing orders—at subsection (8).
There are two general points to stress. First, the Government’s intention in including both the presumption and the list of factors that the courts must consider is to assist in developing the jurisprudence around the new remedies. As the courts begin to consider cases where such remedies might be used, they will build up a body of case law about when the presumption is or is not rebutted and when the relevant factors apply. That will increase legal certainty, which is to everybody’s benefit. Secondly, I remind the Committee that we consulted both on the presumption and on which factors might be relevant in applying the new remedies. We reflected on the responses to that consultation. Respondents’ suggestions were helpful, particularly in allowing us to come up with the list of factors at subsection (8).
I turn now to amendments 22 and 27, tabled respectively by the hon. Members for Hammersmith and for Glasgow North East, which seek to remove the presumption at subsection (9). The amendments are based on a flawed assumption that the presumption is somehow intended to force the courts into using the new remedies where they are not appropriate. That is not the case. The Bill encourages the courts to use the remedies only where appropriate. It will be entirely up to judges to decide whether they offer adequate redress. If judges consider that they do not or that there is some other good reason not to use them, the court can rebut the presumption.
Anne McLaughlin
While the subsection says that
“the court must exercise the powers”
and amendment 27 asks for it to say that the court “may” exercise them, the Minister’s interpretation is that courts may exercise them. Does he understand why we want to amend the subsection? What he describes is what we are trying to amend it to.
James Cartlidge
That is a fair point. The words “must” and “may” often have significant meaning in Bills. The Bill’s wording does not seek to force a court’s hand but provides a clear message that Parliament expects to see the new powers used where appropriate. With respect, I think that clarity comes with the Bill’s wording.
However, the presumption also plays another important role in ensuring that the principles and practice around the new remedies are developed quickly. Jurisprudence can be a slow-moving beast, and the presumption will expedite the process and bring greater legal certainty. While removing the presumption from the Bill would not necessarily prevent the new modifications to quashing orders from operating effectively, we continue to believe that there is merit in providing this indication to the courts that they should properly consider the use of the new remedial options available to them, and to develop the case law as to their usage more quickly.
I turn now to amendments 24 and 34, the central purpose of which is to change the wording of the test that the court must apply when considering the presumption. The hon. Member for Hammersmith proposes “effective remedy” as an alternative to “adequate redress”, which he argues would be a more stringent test. I fear that we are getting pretty close to what we call semantic arguments. The Government’s intention is that the remedies are used only in circumstances where it is appropriate. We are not seeking to deny or restrict justice to claimants. I am not, therefore, persuaded that his wording would result in a higher test or make any material difference to the clause.
Amendment 24 also seeks to ensure that, in considering the “effective remedy”, the court considers the interests of not just the claimant but other affected persons. The way in which our “adequate redress” test is framed in no way prevents the court from considering the impact on persons other than the claimant. Indeed, when it is considered in conjunction with paragraph (c) of the list of factors at subsection (8), I contend that that is already captured by the clause.
Turning to amendment 23, which would remove the presumption contained at subsection (9) and replace it with a precondition—I think we are moving into smorgasbord territory—I submit that that would constitute a significantly more restrictive approach, which would limit the court’s flexibility to adapt the remedies to the situation before it. The amendment is redundant since the current presumption and list of factors provide an appropriate guide to the use of the new remedies. I do not see how it would make the situation clearer than the current drafting.
Let me turn now to a series of amendments that relate specifically to the list of factors at subsection (8), which is crucial to the operation of the new remedies. Amendments 13 and 21 seem to suggest that we need to tell the courts that the remedies that they use in judicial review cases should be used in the interest of justice and add a vague direction that
“good administration is administration which is lawful.”
The problem here, which confuses me, is that the implication of what the hon. Member for Hammersmith is suggesting appears to be that the courts would not otherwise act in the interests of justice or consider that lawful administration is a good thing. I do not think he necessarily trusts the courts to understand those rather fundamental concepts.
I argue that these amendments would add nothing of value to the Bill, as judges will retain the ability to use remedies in a way that they feel offers adequate redress for the claim brought. Our new remedies do not seek to change that. We are also struggling to find a clear justification for why a theoretical inquiry into the relationship between “goodness” and “lawfulness” needs to be made. Those concepts are very open to interpretation, and the amendment gives no indication as to their meaning in this context, while, in contrast, the current drafting makes the meaning clear and focused on practical issues.
Anne McLaughlin
As I said earlier, suspended quashing orders and prospective-only remedies do not apply in Scottish courts, and will not apply, but because these are UK-wide laws to which the people of Scotland are subject, they will be affected. Because Scottish courts can hear cases of UK-wide law, there will inevitably be an increase in the number choosing to be heard in the Scottish courts. After all, if someone knows that they are more likely to get some remedy for winning their case, why would they not choose the court system offering that? I am always happy to showcase all things Scottish, including our legal system, but who will pay for the increased capacity that the courts in Scotland will need if our system is to be clogged up with UK-wide hearings?
I have already explained why we are concerned about statutory presumption, and the hon. Member for Hammersmith has been very clear, so I will not take up time repeating him or myself. I do not imagine that any Bill Committee has a massive audience at home listening to us—although the hon. Member seemed to think differently earlier—but I think this is something that we should be encouraging people to tune into. After all, it is their lives we are talking about. While I do not think we can rival “Loose Women”, I do know that a number of people will be watching, and I think it is always worth explaining, in language that is as accessible as we can make it, what is going on.
So what do suspended quashing orders mean and why are we so opposed to them? On Second Reading, others and I raised the landmark judicial review that took place in 2017, which I think is worth talking about again. The Supreme Court found that Parliament could never have intended to limit people’s right to access justice by charging them fees to use the employment tribunal. It found in favour of the claimants and the quashing order had immediate effect. That meant that the fees were immediately abolished and the Government were required retrospectively to refund anyone who had paid in the past—and quite right. People had been charged up to £1,200 to access this form of justice. The Supreme Court ruled that they should not have been and they were rightly refunded.
However, if clause 1 had been in place, those extortionate fees could have stayed in place until a date determined by the court, so that everyone who required to ask for an employment tribunal between the date of the ruling and the date decided by the court—say, six months hence—would have to pay those unlawful fees of up to £1,200. The Government would then be given the time to rectify the unlawful policy, although this legislation allows the deadline to be varied if they do not rectify it on time; however, the rectification is the interesting bit.
What that means is that the Government would in effect be able to change the law so that the thing that had just been judged to be unlawful—in this case by the Supreme Court—was suddenly lawful. How can that possibly be? The effect in that case is that everyone who had paid the unlawful fee would be out of pocket, never to be refunded. Everyone who then paid in the intervening six months, or however long the Government were given to make the changes, would also be out pocket, never to be refunded. The Government would then change the law so that everyone in future is required to pay those fees of up to £1,200 or miss out on their access to justice, which is most likely the outcome for many people. We are talking about people losing their jobs, possibly wrongly, and being unlawfully dismissed, losing their entire income, and losing their right to access benefits—people who are sacked do not get support for the long term, because it is deemed to be their own fault.
Angela Crawley (Lanark and Hamilton East) (SNP)
My hon. Friend is making a compelling case. Thus far throughout our proceedings, on Tuesday and today, we have heard much discussion about “three bites of the cherry” and the notion that people are enjoying some advantageous aspect of the process. What we have not heard about is real cases where individuals have had the right to take cases to this stage and have them challenged, and where the Government have been held to account for their policy. The case that my hon. Friend has raised is a prime example, so does she agree taking away this mechanism will only further inhibit those who need that protection from the Government’s policies?
Anne McLaughlin
Yes, and that is what we are talking about—ordinary people who ordinarily do not have the access to justice that people with perhaps a little more money do. The tribunal system, which we will come on to later, is primarily about more vulnerable people, I would say. We have been talking about the people who had the landmark ruling, whom it affected. Even if they had managed finally to access benefits after losing their job unfairly and waiting to access justice, we all know that benefits are not enough to live on. They do not even cover things like the mortgage. Being wrongfully dismissed has a massive impact on someone’s life. Thank goodness for the Supreme Court judgment and thank goodness it happened in 2017 and not 2022, because if it happened in 2022, it would not make a blind bit of difference to anyone’s life, regardless of the outcome. Despite the effort and cost of going to court, a victim is left without an effective remedy, and the Government or public body, although acting unlawfully, faces no real consequences. We must not underestimate the chilling effect that this will have. For that daytime TV audience not used to legalese, what that means is that it will put people off attempting to access justice in the first place, because who would put themselves through all this for no tangible outcome?
The clause creates a perfect storm, with claimants having no incentive to challenge the Government or other public bodies, while said public bodies and Government proceed safe in the knowledge that they can do what they like. It is the risk of being held to account, the potential for challenge, that drives good decision and policy making. That point was made by a number of Opposition colleagues, at least, earlier today.
The measure also undermines judicial discretion. I know that we have already argued about this today, but it is imposing a statutory presumption in favour of suspended quashing orders. The Minister, in trying to reassure us that the statutory presumption does not mean, “This is what judges must do,” while ruling out removing the provision that says, “This is what judges must do,” did nothing to reassure us.
As Liberty points out in its evidence, IRAL considered prospective-only remedies and chose not to recommend them. It also chose not to recommend a statutory presumption for suspended quashing orders. What was the point of the independent review if the Government were simply going to ignore its conclusions? Therefore, we will vote against clause 1 standing part of the Bill.
James Cartlidge
It is an interesting thought that the way we are going to measure the success of our debates is whether we can compete with “Loose Women” on the viewing figures front. I think that that is highly unlikely, no matter how wonderful our language and discourse, but if there is someone who has watched all the way through—good luck to them—I think that it would be hard for them to refute the idea that we have had a pretty thorough debate on the key issues of clause 1, which is very important.
I will answer one point from the hon. Member for Glasgow North East, and this is really where the disagreement, to which the hon. Member for Hammersmith was referring, exists about the extent to which we put our faith in judicial discretion. Yes, there is the point about the presumption, but as I said, that is about jurisprudence, from our point of view. To go back to what the hon. Member for Glasgow North East said about, I think, the case to do with tribunal fees, she was arguing in effect, “They would not have been refunded if these remedies had existed, because they would have applied prospectively,” but that would be only if the judge chose to use that remedy. That point is absolutely fundamental. There would be absolutely no requirement for them to do so.
Anne McLaughlin
The Minister keeps saying that, and I keep saying this, so I will just keep saying it. The legislation says that judges must—they must—use those orders unless they can demonstrate otherwise. Why not just say that they “may” do this, and give them the opportunity to do it? Otherwise, they will have to dig deep and find lots of reasons that are acceptable to the Government for not using it.
James Cartlidge
I did address that point in some detail in my speech on the last batch of amendments but one, but I will repeat the point. We want there to be certainty that judges should be considering these remedies, but that does not mean they have to use them. Rather, they should state the reasons, whether they do or do not, so that we build up that log of jurisprudence, which, as I said, is very important in a common-law system.
There has been an in-depth debate on this clause, so I do not intend to go much further. I just want to make one more important point. As far as Government Members are concerned, these measures strengthen quashing orders by giving judges more flexibility and more tools in the judicial toolbox, and thereby strengthen judicial review. On the question of whether they should be used, of course that is a discretionary matter.
Perhaps the issue is this: we see the glass as half full. We do not feel that the new measures would be used detrimentally for our constituents. On the contrary, we think that they would be used in ways that support better public administration while still protecting the right of the claimant to obtain their justice, but ensuring that quashing orders do not have detrimental side effects when used. That is why I say that we are not forcing the judges’ hands.